Author: Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA

  • Serial Bankruptcy Filings and Colorado Foreclosure: In Rem Relief and the Spouse Who Files

    Serial Bankruptcy Filings and Colorado Foreclosure: In Rem Relief and the Spouse Who Files

    Carmen schedules surgeries at a hospital in Aurora and has shared the deed to an Arapahoe County house with her husband since 2014. They separated in 2024. In 2025 and again in 2026 he filed Chapter 13 alone, each time shortly before a public trustee sale, and both cases were dismissed after he stopped making plan payments. The loan is about $41,000 behind, a third sale is set for January 2027, and the servicer’s lawyer now talks about “in rem relief.”

    Carmen has never filed bankruptcy. She has steady pay and wants to catch the loan up herself. Whether his filings have used up her chance depends mostly on one recorded court order and on how early she moves.

    Does in rem relief from stay in Colorado follow the house or the person who filed?

    Most repeat filer rules follow the person: they count prior cases “of the debtor,” and Carmen filed none. The exception is an order under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4), which is aimed at the real property. A court may enter one when it finds the bankruptcy belonged to a scheme against creditors that involved an unauthorized transfer or “multiple bankruptcy filings affecting such real property.” Once recorded under state law, the order binds any later case affecting that property filed within two years after entry. Companion § 362(b)(20) says no stay arises against enforcing the lien during those two years.

    The 2010 technical corrections act (Pub. L. 111-327, § 2(a)(12)(C)) changed “hinder, and” to “hinder, or,” so the lender does not have to prove fraud. Nothing in the text requires that the same person filed the earlier cases.

    How does the repeat bankruptcy filing ladder work, from 30 days to two years?

    Under § 362(c)(3), if one case of the debtor was pending in the prior year and dismissed, the stay in the new case ends as to that debtor on day 30 unless a hearing to extend it is completed before then. Often the case is presumed filed in bad faith, rebuttable only by clear and convincing evidence. Denver’s L.B.R. 4001-4 requires the motion with the petition or promptly after, on at least 14 days’ notice, and warns that a late motion may be summarily denied (D. Colo. Local Bankruptcy Rules). Under § 362(c)(4), two or more such cases mean no stay at all unless the debtor asks within 30 days and the court imposes one. And § 109(g) bars refiling for 180 days after certain dismissals, with § 362(b)(21) withholding the stay against real property liens in that situation.

    The Tenth Circuit’s bankruptcy appellate panel adds a twist. In Holcomb v. Hardeman (In re Holcomb), 380 B.R. 813 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2008), the panel held the day 30 termination reaches only the debtor and the debtor’s property, not property of the estate. The Fifth Circuit agrees (Rose v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 945 F.3d 226 (5th Cir. 2019)); the First Circuit does not (Smith v. State of Maine Bureau of Revenue Services, 910 F.3d 576 (1st Cir. 2018)). I have not found a Tenth Circuit court of appeals decision resolving it, so lenders here usually file a stay relief or (d)(4) motion rather than wait for day 30.

    How does a Colorado public trustee sale timeline interact with a bankruptcy filing?

    For a nonagricultural home, the first sale date falls 110 to 125 calendar days after the notice of election and demand is recorded (C.R.S. § 38-38-108(1)(a)). An owner curing outside bankruptcy must file a notice of intent to cure at least 15 calendar days before the sale (C.R.S. § 38-38-104(1)). If publication is finished when a petition is filed, the sale rolls week to week, and continuances generally cannot pass 12 months from the original date (C.R.S. § 38-38-109). House Bill 26-1098 (effective July 1, 2026) did not move those deadlines.

    The redemption statute, C.R.S. § 38-38-302, gives redemption rights to junior lienors, not the owner. And the Chapter 13 right to cure a home loan default lasts only until the residence is sold at a foreclosure sale (11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(1)). Why consumer collection law will not stop that sale is covered in Colorado foreclosure after Obduskey.

    Foreclosure Sale Date Set? Contact Us Now

    Can a spouse who filed in good faith lose the stay because of the other spouse’s cases?

    Yes. In In re Villegas, No. 25 B 10323 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 2025), the husband filed four Chapter 13 cases on the house beginning in 2022. The wife then filed her own, citing their separation and three postpetition payments, and lost: the court found her filing part of the scheme and her evidence nowhere near rebutting the bank’s case.

    In Alakozai v. Citizens Equity First Credit Union (In re Alakozai), 499 B.R. 698 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2013), an order entered in the husband’s case and recorded with the county bound the property when the wife later filed her own case, and her challenge to the original findings failed as a collateral attack. That panel requires proof of a scheme, an aim of delay, hindrance or fraud, and a transfer or multiple filings (In re First Yorkshire Holdings, Inc., 470 B.R. 864 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012)).

    I found no Tenth Circuit court of appeals decision and no published Denver bankruptcy opinion construing § 362(d)(4). My read is that Colorado judges would use the same elements and judge good faith on the totality of the circumstances, as the Tenth Circuit does for Chapter 13 bad faith (Gier v. Farmers State Bank of Lucas (In re Gier), 986 F.2d 1326 (10th Cir. 1993)).

    What does a joint owner have to prove to get relief from an in rem order?

    Here I read the cases differently than a lender would. Courts look for quick dismissals, petitions timed to sale dates, no change between cases, long gaps in payments and spouses trading filings. Lenders use that list as a checklist. A good faith joint owner should use it as a map of her proof, because the statute lets a later debtor seek relief “based upon changed circumstances or for good cause shown.”

    For Carmen, the separation counts only if she documents it: a separate address, separate accounts, the divorce filing. Her pay stubs show income his cases never had. Her budget must carry the regular payment plus the cure, paid on time every month.

    Timing matters too: a petition filed weeks ahead with the plan ready looks like repayment, and one filed the night before looks like round three. While her case is pending, § 1301 also stays collection of the consumer debt from her husband as codebtor.

    What would Carmen’s calendar look like before a January 2027 sale in Aurora?

    Illustrative only. His first case was filed March 3, 2025 and dismissed July 15, 2025; his second was filed February 9, 2026 and dismissed June 22, 2026. The sale is set for Wednesday, January 20, 2027.

    If he filed again on December 14, 2026, the lookback year would start December 14, 2025. Only his second case falls in it, so § 362(c)(3) applies, and the stay would end as to him on January 13, 2027 unless extended, a week before the sale, though under Holcomb the house, as estate property, would stay protected until the lender won relief. Had he refiled between June 22 and July 15, 2026, both cases would have counted under (c)(4) and no stay would have arisen.

    Carmen instead files her own Chapter 13 on Wednesday, December 2, 2026, 49 days before the sale. If no (d)(4) order exists, she has the full stay, and the lender may seek in rem relief in her case. If the lender won one in his second case in May 2026 and recorded it with the Arapahoe County clerk and recorder (C.R.S. § 38-35-109(1) allows recording certified court orders), the house has no stay until May 2028 unless she wins relief before January 20. Either way her plan must cure $41,000, about $683 a month over 60 months before the trustee’s fee, plus the regular payment.

    Rule What triggers it Who it binds How to get out
    § 362(c)(3) One of the debtor’s cases pending in the prior year and dismissed The refiling debtor (under Holcomb, not estate property) Extension hearing completed within 30 days; rebut any presumption by clear and convincing evidence
    § 362(c)(4) Two or more such cases The refiling debtor Request within 30 days that the court impose a stay
    § 109(g) Dismissal for willful failure to obey orders, or voluntary dismissal after a stay relief motion The prior debtor, for 180 days Wait out the 180 days
    § 362(d)(4) with § 362(b)(20) Recorded order finding a scheme involving a transfer or multiple filings The property, in any case filed within two years after entry Later debtor’s motion showing changed circumstances or good cause

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Can my spouse’s bankruptcy filings take away my automatic stay in Colorado?

    The 30 day and no stay rules count only your own prior cases. A recorded in rem order from your spouse’s case binds the property itself for two years, whoever files.

    How do I find out whether an in rem order was recorded on my house?

    Search the county clerk and recorder’s records for the property. Then check each prior case docket for a § 362(d)(4) order.

    Is there a deadline to ask for relief from an in rem order?

    The statute sets none, but the order binds cases filed within two years after entry. Practically, relief must come before the sale, because the cure right ends when the house is sold.

    Can I buy my Colorado house back after a public trustee sale?

    Not as the owner. Colorado’s redemption statute gives that right to qualifying junior lienors.

    Will my husband’s dismissed cases count against my good faith?

    They can, if the court finds the filings were coordinated. A documented separation, your own income and a funded plan are what set your case apart.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm represents Colorado homeowners in Chapter 13 cases to cure mortgage arrears, including in rem relief disputes, and advises on whether Chapter 7 or another bankruptcy option fits better. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    If a family member’s filings are hanging over a sale date on your home, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Liberty Global Is Now Tenth Circuit Law: Economic Substance Risk for Colorado Tax Strategies

    Liberty Global Is Now Tenth Circuit Law: Economic Substance Risk for Colorado Tax Strategies

    Stella owns a civil engineering firm in Golden. It is an S corporation netting about $1.4 million a year, and that profit lands on her personal return. In October 2026 her wealth adviser introduced a promoter with a year end “structure”: a $95,000 fee, documents signed before December 31, and a $1.2 million deduction for 2026, with a law firm opinion letter included. Her CPA is uneasy and cannot say why in one sentence.

    Here it is. If the IRS decides the structure lacks economic substance, the deduction disappears and a 20 or 40 percent penalty applies with no reasonable cause defense, opinion letter or not. For a Colorado owner, the rules come from a Tenth Circuit decision that went against the taxpayer this year.

    Listen to this post

    North Star Tax and Legal Briefing: Liberty Global Is Now Tenth Circuit Law: Economic Substance Risk for Colorado Tax Strategies

    A five minute briefing on the economic substance doctrine after the Tenth Circuit's Liberty Global decision: why a packaged year end deduction can cost a Colorado owner the deduction plus a 20 or 40 percent penalty, and what to ask a promoter before signing.

    Download the MP3 · Episode page on Podbean

    Show / hide the episode transcript

    A Colorado business owner gets a pitch in October. Call her Stella. She is fictional, but her problem is not. Stella owns a civil engineering firm in Golden, an S corporation netting about one point four million dollars a year. A promoter offers her a year end structure: a ninety five thousand dollar fee, documents signed before December thirty first, and a one point two million dollar deduction, with a law firm opinion letter included. Her CPA is uneasy and cannot say why in one sentence. Here is the sentence. If the I R S decides the structure has no economic substance, the deduction disappears, and a penalty of twenty or forty percent applies that no opinion letter can excuse.

    The economic substance doctrine lets the I R S disregard a transaction that has no real effect apart from saving tax. Since two thousand ten, the test has been written into the tax code, and it has two parts. First, the transaction has to change your economic position in a meaningful way, setting the federal income tax savings aside. Second, you need a substantial purpose for doing it other than tax. The I R S requires both. Passing one is not enough.

    Here is the distinction to hold on to. An ordinary deduction that gets disallowed is usually an argument about facts and records. An economic substance disallowance is different in kind. The I R S is saying the arrangement changed nothing except the tax bill, and harsher penalty rules follow.

    For Colorado, the rules now come from the Tenth Circuit, the federal appeals court that covers the state. In April of this year, in the Liberty Global case, a divided panel ruled against the taxpayer. A four step plan had been built so that a two point four billion dollar internal gain could be offset by a dividend deduction, supporting a refund claim of close to one hundred ten million dollars. The majority held that the doctrine applies when a taxpayer uses tax code provisions mechanically to get a benefit Congress did not intend. The full court declined to rehear the case in August, and Liberty Global has until December fifteenth to ask the Supreme Court to take it. For now, the decision binds the federal courts in Colorado.

    And this is not only a problem for multinationals. Years earlier, the same court threw out a loss of roughly sixty million dollars that an individual had claimed through his S corporation.

    Now the other side. One judge dissented, worried about a business that uses a provision exactly as written. And the explanation prepared for Congress says the law was not meant to disturb basic choices, like financing with debt or with equity. An S election or a retirement plan contribution sits far closer to that list than a purchased deduction, though nothing is immune.

    Back to Stella. Suppose she claims the one point two million dollars and the I R S disallows it. Using simplified math, that adds four hundred forty four thousand dollars of federal tax, plus fifty two thousand eight hundred dollars to Colorado, because the state return starts from federal taxable income. Then the penalty. Eighty eight thousand eight hundred dollars at twenty percent, or one hundred seventy seven thousand six hundred dollars at forty percent if the facts were not adequately disclosed on the return. Add the promoter’s fee, and the undisclosed version costs about seven hundred sixty nine thousand four hundred dollars before interest.

    And the usual defense is gone. With most accuracy penalties, relying on professional advice can show reasonable cause. For this penalty, the law removes that defense. The opinion letter may help her argue for the deduction itself. It does not protect her from the penalty. And Tax Court probably offers no better rule. For a Colorado resident, it follows the Tenth Circuit.

    So what do you do this week? First, make the promoter answer one question: if the tax benefit were zero, what changes in my company’s economic position? Second, ask what profit is expected before tax, and whether it is substantial next to the tax savings. Third, ask how many other people bought the same structure, and whether the fee is refundable if the deduction fails. A fee like that carries its own disclosure requirement. And if a strategy is already going on a return, know that adequate disclosure on a timely return drops the penalty from forty percent to twenty. It does not save the deduction.

    That’s what we do at North Star Law Firm. The initial consultation is free, and the full written analysis with citations is at c o dash legal dot net.

    What did the Tenth Circuit decide in Liberty Global, and is it final?

    The economic substance doctrine lets the IRS disregard a transaction with no real effect apart from tax savings. Since 2010, 26 U.S.C. § 7701(o) says a transaction to which the doctrine is “relevant” passes only if it changes the taxpayer’s economic position in a meaningful way, apart from federal income tax effects, and the taxpayer had a substantial nontax purpose. The IRS requires both (Notice 2010-62).

    Commentary from late 2025 called the Colorado case a pending appeal. In Liberty Global, Inc. v. United States, 174 F.4th 1208 (10th Cir. 2026), decided April 21, 2026, a divided panel affirmed the District of Colorado. A four step plan had created foreign earnings so that a $2.4 billion internal gain could be offset by a § 245A dividend deduction, supporting a refund claim of close to $110 million. Judge Murphy’s majority called the dispute over a separate threshold relevance test “a red herring” on these facts and held the doctrine relevant when a taxpayer uses Code provisions mechanically “to obtain a benefit not intended by Congress.” Judge Eid dissented.

    The court denied rehearing en banc on August 17, 2026, with Judges Hartz, Tymkovich and Eid voting to rehear. On November 5, 2026 Justice Gorsuch extended the time to petition for certiorari from November 15 to December 15, 2026 (Application No. 26A628). No petition was docketed as of November 13, so the panel opinion binds the federal courts in Colorado.

    Does the economic substance doctrine reach a Colorado business owner, or only multinationals?

    It reaches owners like Stella. Sala v. United States, 613 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2010) came up from the federal court in Denver, where an individual had won on a roughly $60 million loss from a currency options program run through his S corporation. The Tenth Circuit reversed for lack of objective economic substance. The statute excludes an individual’s personal transactions, but only those outside a trade or business or investment activity (§ 7701(o)(5)(B)), and a series of steps counts as one transaction (§ 7701(o)(5)(D)).

    In my experience, what reaches a closely held business is the packaged product: one design sold to many buyers, each getting a deduction sized to their income. The microcaptive insurance case discussed below is one. Syndicated conservation easements are another; the IRS’s 2026 Dirty Dozen (IR-2026-30) flags inflated easement appraisals, and § 170(h)(7) now denies the deduction entirely when a partnership’s or S corporation’s easement contribution exceeds 2.5 times the owners’ relevant basis, with limited exceptions. Colorado has its own easement credit under C.R.S. § 39-22-522, with certificates from the Division of Conservation; the state credit and the federal doctrine are separate questions.

    The Joint Committee on Taxation’s 2010 explanation (JCX-18-10, at 152 to 53) says the law was not meant to disturb basic choices like debt versus equity financing, a subchapter C reorganization, or a related party deal priced at arm’s length under § 482. An S election or a retirement plan contribution sits far closer to that list than a purchased deduction, though nothing is immune.

    Why can’t an opinion letter stop the 40 percent economic substance penalty?

    Section 6662(b)(6) imposes a 20 percent penalty on an underpayment from a transaction lacking economic substance, and § 6662(i) makes it 40 percent if the relevant facts were not adequately disclosed on the return. Under Notice 2010-62 that means Form 8275 or 8275-R, plus the Form 8886 statement under Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4 for a reportable transaction. An amended return filed after the IRS first contacts you does not count.

    Reasonable cause, often shown by relying on professional advice, is the usual defense to accuracy penalties. Section 6664(c)(2) removes it for this penalty, and § 6676(c) does the same for refund claims. An opinion letter may help on the merits but not on this penalty.

    What remains is procedure: § 6751(b) requires written supervisory approval of the initial penalty determination, as the IRS manual repeats for these penalties (IRM Exhibit 4.46.4-4). The old executive signoff was reportedly dropped in 2022.

    Would a Colorado taxpayer get a better rule in Tax Court under Patel?

    Probably not. In Patel v. Commissioner, 165 T.C. 171 (2025), a reviewed opinion filed November 12, 2025, the Tax Court held that § 7701(o) requires a relevance determination drawn from the earlier case law, as § 7701(o)(5)(C) directs. It then found the doctrine relevant to the Patels’ microcaptive insurance arrangements, found both prongs failed, and sustained the 20 percent penalty for 2014 through 2016 and the 40 percent rate for 2014 and 2015. The Patels have appealed to the Fifth Circuit.

    Under Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), the Tax Court follows a court of appeals decision squarely in point when the appeal lies to that court. Golsen is itself a Tenth Circuit case, affirmed at 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971), where life insurance loan interest was disallowed for lack of economic substance. An individual’s appeal goes to the circuit of legal residence when the petition is filed (§ 7482(b)(1)), absent a written stipulation. Stella gets the Tenth Circuit’s standard. Forum still matters for other reasons; see my post on Tax Court versus a refund suit.

    The conflict is narrower than it sounds. The majority never cites Patel or expressly rejects a threshold step; relevance is met when a taxpayer pursues a benefit Congress did not intend. Patel requires a separate step but still applied the doctrine to a marketed product. For a purchased deduction, I would expect both tests to find relevance. The gap matters more for a business using a provision exactly as written, which is Judge Eid’s concern.

    What would a disallowed year end strategy cost a Golden engineering firm owner?

    Illustrative only, with simplified math. Stella claims the $1.2 million deduction on her 2026 return and files on April 15, 2027. The IRS generally has until April 15, 2030 to assess (§ 6501(a)). The six year rule in § 6501(e) targets omitted income, not an overstated deduction, but an undisclosed listed transaction stays open until one year after the information is furnished (§ 6501(c)(10)).

    Treating the whole amount as taxed at the 37 percent top rate for 2026, which slightly overstates it, (IR-2025-103), disallowance adds $444,000 of federal tax. Colorado’s 4.40 percent tax for 2026 starts from federal taxable income (C.R.S. § 39-22-104), adding $52,800. The penalty is $88,800 at 20 percent or $177,600 at 40 percent, plus interest from April 15, 2027 under § 6601(a). With the $95,000 fee, the undisclosed version costs about $769,400 before interest. A notice of deficiency gives her 90 days to petition the Tax Court (§ 6213(a)), which tries Colorado cases in Denver; see choosing a Colorado place of trial.

    What should a Colorado owner ask before signing up for a packaged tax strategy?

    Make the promoter answer the statute. If the tax benefit were zero, what changes in my firm’s economic position? What profit is expected before tax, and is it substantial next to the tax savings? Section 7701(o)(2) counts profit potential only on that comparison and treats fees as expenses. Colorado savings do not help: § 7701(o)(3) treats related state tax effects like federal ones.

    Then ask how many others bought it and whether it needs a Form 8886. A fee refundable if the deduction fails, or tied to the tax saved, makes it a reportable transaction with contractual protection under Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(4). The Supreme Court framed the core question in 1935 in Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465: what was done “apart from the tax motive.”

    Issue Ordinary disallowed deduction Economic substance disallowance
    Penalty rate 20 percent, if negligent or a substantial understatement 20 percent of any underpayment; 40 percent if undisclosed
    Reasonable cause Available under § 6664(c)(1) Barred by § 6664(c)(2)
    Opinion letter Can support reasonable cause No penalty protection
    Disclosure Can reduce the understatement penalty under § 6662(d)(2)(B) Avoids only the 40 percent rate
    Forum for a Coloradan Appeals, then Tax Court in Denver Same, or a refund suit in the District of Colorado (Tenth Circuit law) or the Court of Federal Claims (Federal Circuit law)

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Is Liberty Global final?

    The Tenth Circuit’s decision stands, and rehearing en banc was denied on August 17, 2026. Liberty Global has until December 15, 2026 to petition the Supreme Court.

    Does Patel help a Colorado taxpayer in Tax Court?

    Only where it does not conflict with the Tenth Circuit. Under Golsen, the Tax Court follows the circuit that hears the appeal, for a Colorado resident the Tenth Circuit.

    Can reasonable cause excuse the economic substance penalty?

    No. Section 6664(c)(2) removes that exception, so the defenses are that the transaction had substance, that the doctrine is not relevant, or that the IRS skipped a required step such as written supervisory approval.

    Does disclosing the strategy on my return help?

    Adequate disclosure on a timely return drops the penalty from 40 to 20 percent. It does not save the deduction.

    How long does the IRS have to challenge a 2026 deduction?

    Generally three years after the return is filed. An undisclosed listed transaction stays open until one year after the required information reaches the IRS.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm reviews proposed tax strategies for Colorado business owners before they sign, defends IRS audits of strategies already claimed, challenges penalties, and handles Tax Court litigation at the Denver trial session. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    If a promoter is offering you a year end deduction, or the IRS is already asking about one, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Fighting the IRS in a Colorado Bankruptcy Court: Section 505 After Bush v. United States

    Fighting the IRS in a Colorado Bankruptcy Court: Section 505 After Bush v. United States

    Curtis runs an excavation business in Trinidad as a sole proprietor. The IRS audited his 2021 and 2022 returns, disallowed about $190,000 of equipment and subcontractor expenses for thin records, and in September 2026 mailed a deficiency notice proposing roughly $71,000 of tax plus a 20 percent accuracy penalty. His Tax Court deadline falls in December, and with his equipment lender also unpaid, he is weighing a Chapter 13 in Denver.

    Can a bankruptcy judge decide what he owes, and would that beat the Tax Court? Often yes, but the answer turns less on the jurisdiction fight the Supreme Court declined last December than on his chapter and his estate.

    Can a Colorado bankruptcy court decide how much I owe the IRS under Section 505?

    Yes. 11 U.S.C. § 505(a)(1) lets the court determine the amount or legality of a tax, penalty or addition to tax, whether or not assessed or paid. The fight usually arrives as an objection to the IRS proof of claim, a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B).

    The main limit is § 505(a)(2)(A): the court cannot redo a tax contested and adjudicated before the case began. In City Vending of Muskogee, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 898 F.2d 122 (10th Cir. 1990), the Tenth Circuit applied that bar to state assessments that became final before filing, including one whose merits no tribunal reached because the company let its appeal rights lapse. The same opinion said § 505 stays open where the debtor never challenged the tax or a challenge was pending at filing. The refund waiting period in § 505(a)(2)(B) (120 days after a proper request), the property tax limit in (a)(2)(C) and the § 505(b) procedure for taxes arising during the case do not touch Curtis.

    The burden does not move either. A proof of claim is prima facie evidence under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(f), and under Raleigh v. Illinois Department of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15 (2000) Curtis still has to prove his deductions.

    Does filing Chapter 13 stop my Tax Court deadline?

    It freezes it. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(8) stays a Tax Court case about an individual debtor’s tax for periods ending before the order for relief. A petition filed during the stay is invalid; the Tax Court dismissed one in Halpern v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 895 (1991), under the older statute, and read the current version as reaching cases about the debtor’s own tax in Carter v. Commissioner, 163 T.C. 141 (2024). In exchange, 26 U.S.C. § 6213(f)(1) suspends the 90 day period while the bankruptcy bars a petition and for 60 days after.

    The IRS is not frozen. Under § 362(b)(9) it may still audit, issue a notice of deficiency and assess, and its proof of claim is timely within 180 days after the order for relief under § 502(b)(9)(A) and Rule 3002(c)(1).

    So Curtis must choose before December. If he petitions the Tax Court first, a later Chapter 13 stays that case, and the bankruptcy judge can lift the stay or decide the claim. If he files Chapter 13 first, the fight is in Denver. He cannot let the Tax Court decide and then try again in bankruptcy; § 505(a)(2)(A) bars that. Our post on missing the Tax Court 90 day deadline in Colorado covers the deadline itself.

    IRS Claim in Your Bankruptcy? Contact Us Now

    What did the Supreme Court do with Bush v. United States?

    It turned the case away. The docket for No. 25-108 shows the petition filed July 25, 2025, the government’s opposition on October 29, the reply on November 10, and certiorari denied on December 8, 2025. A denial decides nothing on the merits.

    An Indiana farm couple had conceded about $100,000 of tax in Tax Court and were set for trial on a 75 percent fraud penalty. They filed Chapter 13 that day, converted to Chapter 7, and asked the bankruptcy court to set the penalty. In Bush v. United States, 939 F.3d 839 (7th Cir. 2019), amended at 100 F.4th 807 (7th Cir. 2024), the court held that § 505 assigns a task but grants no jurisdiction, which must come from 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). On remand the couple’s own schedules showed the penalty could not change any creditor’s recovery, so there was no “related to” jurisdiction, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed by per curiam order on April 29, 2025 (No. 24-2996).

    The government’s brief itself pointed out that a tax penalty is more likely to affect creditors in Chapter 11, and that even in the Bushes’ Chapter 7 the court could have decided the tax itself, since the IRS priority claim was partly paid.

    Where does the Tenth Circuit stand on Section 505 and related to jurisdiction?

    The Tenth Circuit has not squarely decided whether § 505 grants jurisdiction on its own. City Vending speaks of jurisdiction under § 505, but the Solicitor General’s brief called that usage loose and denied a circuit split.

    Federal courts in Colorado do have a related to test. In Gardner v. United States (In re Gardner), 913 F.2d 1515 (10th Cir. 1990), a dispute between the IRS and a debtor’s former wife over property a divorce decree had taken out of the estate could not conceivably affect the estate, so it was dismissed. My read is that a Denver bankruptcy judge would use Gardner the way the Seventh Circuit used its test, asking when the objection is filed whether the tax amount could change creditor recoveries or plan payments.

    Even with jurisdiction, the judge may abstain under § 1334(c)(1), and § 1334(d) keeps that choice from the court of appeals. In In re McIntyre, BAP No. CO-22-004 (10th Cir. BAP Dec. 30, 2022) (unpublished), an appeal from Denver, the panel confirmed that abstention can reach claim objections. And Rowland v. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Adv. No. 09-1142 S (Bankr. D.N.M. Apr. 1, 2010) abstained in a closed no asset Chapter 7 because neither policy City Vending named was served.

    Why does the chapter I file decide whether a Section 505 fight is worth it?

    The amount has to matter. In Chapter 13, § 1322(a)(2) requires full payment of priority claims, so every dollar cut from a priority tax comes off the plan payment. In a no asset Chapter 7, abstention is likely.

    An illustration with assumed dates: the notice is dated Monday, September 21, 2026. The 90th day is Sunday, December 20, and § 6213(a) does not count a weekend last day, so a petition is timely Monday, December 21. If Curtis files Chapter 13 on Thursday, December 3, then 73 days have run and 17 are frozen. If the stay lifted March 1, 2027, the freeze would run 60 more days, and on my count the deadline would land around May 17, 2027. I would not cut it that close. The IRS claim would be due Tuesday, June 1, 2027.

    Both years’ tax should be priority: neither deficiency was assessed before filing and both are still assessable, which fits § 507(a)(8)(A)(iii). Over a 60 month plan, the five year maximum under § 1322(d), $71,000 is about $1,183 a month before trustee fees. Every $12,000 the court cuts is $200 a month. The roughly $14,200 penalty is different. Section 507(a)(8)(G) gives priority only to penalties compensating actual loss, so it should share with general unsecured debts, and § 1328(a)(2) does not except it from a completed plan’s discharge. So the fight worth having is over the tax, the reverse of Bush. Timing rules for older taxes are on our discharging tax debt page.

    Should I choose Tax Court or bankruptcy court for my IRS dispute?

    Most Colorado taxpayers have four doors; our post on choosing after a notice of deficiency goes deeper.

    Forum and who decides Pay first? Deadline to get in Main limit
    Tax Court deficiency case, tried in Denver (Tax Court judge) No 90 days after the notice of deficiency Barred while the bankruptcy stay applies
    Bankruptcy court in Denver under § 505 (bankruptcy judge) No No fixed statutory day; object promptly once the IRS files its claim, due 180 days after filing Tax must matter to the estate or plan; judge may abstain
    Refund suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado (district judge or jury) Yes, in full Refund claim first; suit after 6 months, within 2 years of disallowance Full payment rule
    Collection due process hearing, then Tax Court (IRS Appeals, then Tax Court judge) No Request within 30 days of the levy notice; Tax Court within 30 days of the determination Amount open only if no notice of deficiency or other chance to dispute

    The refund rules come from 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a), § 6532(a)(1) and Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960); the hearing rules from § 6330.

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Can I file a Tax Court petition after I file bankruptcy?

    Not while the stay covers those tax years. The 90 day period is suspended during the stay and for 60 days after, so the right is paused, not lost.

    Did the Supreme Court decide Bush v. United States?

    No. It denied certiorari on December 8, 2025, which sets no national rule. Colorado courts follow Tenth Circuit authority.

    Will the IRS stop auditing me if I file Chapter 13?

    No. The IRS may keep auditing, issue a notice of deficiency and assess. The stay holds back collection.

    Can a Denver bankruptcy judge decide my tax in a no asset Chapter 7?

    Sometimes. If the result cannot change what creditors receive, the court may find no jurisdiction or abstain in favor of the Tax Court.

    Does the accuracy penalty have to be paid in full in a Chapter 13 plan?

    Generally not. A penalty that does not compensate actual loss is not a priority claim, and a completed plan’s discharge generally reaches it.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm helps Colorado taxpayers decide whether an IRS deficiency belongs in the Tax Court or a Chapter 13 case in Denver, sequences the filings so neither door closes by accident, and rebuilds the records behind disallowed deductions in audit defense and claim objections. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    If a notice of deficiency and a bankruptcy are both on your table, the order of filings may matter more than anything else you decide this month, so contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Colorado IRS Penalties: Stacked Math, Which Relief to Request First, and Bankruptcy

    Colorado IRS Penalties: Stacked Math, Which Relief to Request First, and Bankruptcy

    Joanna, a relief veterinarian in Fort Collins who works for herself, lost months to a parent’s illness while her accountant stopped returning calls. She filed her 2022 and 2023 Forms 1040 together in March 2025, filed 2024 on time, and went on a payment plan for $38,000 of 2022 tax and $24,000 of 2023 tax. She made no estimated payments for either year. Her November 2026 notices show penalties and interest approaching three quarters of the tax.

    She needs the math behind those numbers and an order of operations. Bankruptcy belongs in that answer too, and in Colorado it turns on two Tenth Circuit decisions that pull in opposite directions.

    How do the failure to file and failure to pay penalties stack on a late Colorado return?

    The failure to file penalty under 26 U.S.C. § 6651(a)(1) is 5 percent of the unpaid tax for each month late, counting a partial month as a full one, capped at 25 percent. The failure to pay penalty under § 6651(a)(2) is 0.5 percent a month, also capped at 25 percent. For months when both apply, § 6651(c)(1) reduces the filing penalty by the payment penalty, so the filing penalty stops at 22.5 percent after five months while the payment penalty can run for 50.

    Interest on the filing penalty runs from the return’s due date, but interest on the payment penalty starts only at notice and demand (§ 6601(e)(2)). The rate is the federal short term rate plus 3 points, compounded daily (§ 6621(a)(2), § 6622(a)). The IRS rate table shows 8 percent from October 2023 through 2024 and 7 percent otherwise, except 6 percent in the second quarter of 2026.

    Illustration, computed from the statute: Joanna’s 2022 return was due April 18, 2023 and her 2023 return April 15, 2024. Filed in mid March 2025, both hit the 22.5 percent ceiling, $8,550 for 2022 and $5,400 for 2023. By early November 2026 the 2022 payment penalty has run 43 months ($8,170) and the 2023 penalty 31 months ($3,720). Total: $25,840 of penalties on $62,000 of tax, plus roughly $19,600 of interest on the tax and filing penalties. I ignored her small plan payments and left out the separate estimated tax penalty under § 6654.

    Her plan does not slow the meter: § 6651(h) halves the payment penalty during an installment agreement only for someone who filed on time, and § 6651(d) doubles it to 1 percent after a notice of intent to levy.

    Should she ask for first time penalty abatement or reasonable cause relief, and for which year?

    First time abatement is an administrative waiver in IRM 20.1.1.3.3.2.1. It removes filing, payment and deposit penalties for one tax period if the three prior years show the same return filed and no unreversed penalties other than estimated tax penalties, and the IRS applies it before reasonable cause.

    Only 2022 can qualify, assuming 2019 through 2021 were clean, because the 2023 lookback includes penalized 2022. Abating 2022 removes $16,720 plus related interest, though the payment penalty keeps accruing on unpaid tax until the balance is paid.

    That leaves reasonable cause for 2023. Treas. Reg. § 301.6651-1(c) asks whether she used ordinary business care and prudence and still could not comply. The silent accountant will not carry it: United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241 (1985) holds that relying on an agent to file on time is not reasonable cause, and the Tenth Circuit applied the standard strictly in In re Craddock, 149 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 1998). A documented illness is stronger, but the IRS will ask why filing waited until March 2025.

    The IRS eligibility page does not hold a penalty abated for reasonable cause against a later year. My read: if 2022 were relieved that way, 2023 might qualify for the waiver under the IRM, which asks only that prior returns were filed. The web page says “timely filed,” so do not count on it.

    For later years, IR-2026-83 (July 8, 2026) announced an Automatic Exemption from Penalty for eligible original returns beginning with tax year 2025; it replaces first time abatement for eligible returns originally due on or after January 1, 2027.

    IRS Penalty Notice in Hand? Contact Us Now

    Where does an IRS penalty appeal go if relief is denied?

    The IRS penalty appeal page gives a taxpayer generally 30 days from the rejection letter to ask for Appeals, with the letter controlling the exact date. Know the cost first. Under § 6330(c)(2)(B), a collection due process hearing can address the liability only if there was no notice of deficiency or other opportunity to dispute it. Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(e)(3), Q&A-E2, counts an offered Appeals conference as that opportunity, and the Tenth Circuit upheld it in Keller Tank Services II, Inc. v. Commissioner, 854 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 2017), used or not. After a penalty appeal, assume that Tax Court route is closed.

    Nor are these penalties part of a Tax Court deficiency case. Section 6665(b) keeps § 6651 and § 6654 additions out of deficiency procedures except the part tied to a deficiency. See my post on the Tax Court versus a refund suit.

    The other route is pay and sue. A refund claim on Form 843 is due within three years of filing the return or two years of payment, whichever is later (§ 6511(a)). Suit may start six months after the claim, or sooner if the IRS rules, and no later than two years after a disallowance notice (§ 6532(a)(1)), in the District of Colorado under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) and 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a). Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960) requires full payment first, which is hard on a payment plan.

    Are IRS penalties discharged in bankruptcy in Colorado?

    Often, even when the tax survives. Under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7), a tax penalty survives Chapter 7 only if it relates to a nondischargeable tax under subparagraph (A) and is not saved by subparagraph (B), which covers a transaction or event more than three years before the petition. Roberts v. United States (In re Roberts), 906 F.2d 1440 (10th Cir. 1990) read the two as alternatives and discharged penalties for the 1982 and 1983 tax years while the tax survived.

    Mallo v. IRS (In re Mallo), 774 F.3d 1313 (10th Cir. 2014), which came out of Colorado, held that a late Form 1040 is not a “return” for discharge purposes unless prepared under § 6020(a). The Supreme Court denied review of the circuit split in Salvador v. United States, No. 24-108 (Nov. 4, 2024). Interest on a surviving tax survives too (In re Burns, 887 F.2d 1541 (11th Cir. 1989)).

    For Joanna, the tax would likely survive a Colorado Chapter 7, but the penalties differ. Roberts treated the tax year as the event; using the later and safer anchor of the due date, the three years ran for 2022 on April 18, 2026 and run for 2023 on April 15, 2027. I found no Tenth Circuit decision dating a payment penalty that grows monthly, so recent months may be argued to fall inside the window.

    Chapter 13 differs. The discharge in § 1328(a)(2) excepts late return taxes under § 523(a)(1)(B) but not § 523(a)(7), so on my reading the penalties, as general unsecured claims, are discharged at completion. They get no priority under § 507(a)(8)(G), which covers only penalties compensating actual loss, and § 726(a)(4) pays them only after general unsecured creditors in Chapter 7.

    Does an IRS abatement change what Colorado says she owes?

    No. Colorado assesses its own additions under C.R.S. § 39-22-621, which caps the late filing and late payment penalties at 12 percent, charges only the larger when both apply, and lets the executive director waive penalties for good cause. A federal abatement can support that request, but Colorado decides it separately.

    Relief route Penalties it reaches What you must show Where a denial goes
    First time abatement, by request (a separate automatic exemption covers eligible 2025 and later returns) Failure to file, pay or deposit; one tax period Same return filed for three prior years, no unreversed penalties Appeals, usually within 30 days of the letter
    Reasonable cause Filing, payment, deposit and accuracy penalties, not § 6654 Ordinary business care and prudence Appeals, then a refund claim and suit
    Statutory waiver or IRS error Penalties caused by written IRS advice; some estimated tax penalties Advice answering your written request (§ 6404(f)); disaster, retirement or disability (§ 6654(e)(3)) Refund claim on Form 843
    Refund claim and suit Any penalty paid Full payment, timely claim, six months’ wait District of Colorado, then the Tenth Circuit
    Bankruptcy discharge after three years Noncompensatory tax penalties Penalty event more than three years before the petition Bankruptcy court; the late return tax itself may survive

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Will the IRS remove my penalties automatically now?

    Only for eligible returns starting with tax year 2025. Older years still need a request.

    Is my accountant missing the deadline reasonable cause?

    Usually not. Boyle holds that relying on an agent to file is not reasonable cause, and the Tenth Circuit applied the reasonable cause standard strictly in Craddock.

    Can the Tax Court hear a failure to pay penalty dispute?

    Not in a deficiency case for tax you reported. A collection due process appeal reaches it only if you had no earlier chance to dispute it.

    Is a trust fund recovery penalty the same as a late deposit penalty?

    No. The deposit penalty is § 6656. The § 6672 penalty is a personal liability equal to the unpaid withheld taxes, owed by responsible people who acted willfully; see my post on board members and trust fund penalties.

    Does the supervisory approval rule help with late filing penalties?

    No. Section 6751(b)(2)(A) exempts § 6651 and § 6654. For audit penalties, an unpublished Tenth Circuit order, Minemyer v. Commissioner, No. 21-9006 (Jan. 19, 2023), accepted approval given by the notice of deficiency.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm prepares penalty abatement requests for Colorado taxpayers, handles IRS Appeals and collection due process hearings, and evaluates which tax debts and penalties a bankruptcy can discharge. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    If your notices show penalties growing faster than your plan payments, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Subchapter V at $7.5 Million in Colorado: Owners the Old Limit Locked Out

    Subchapter V at $7.5 Million in Colorado: Owners the Old Limit Locked Out

    Russell owns a precision machining company in Longmont, a Colorado corporation with 31 employees and about $5.2 million of debt: a $2.9 million bank term loan and line secured by equipment and receivables, a $1.6 million SBA COVID EIDL, about $450,000 owed to vendors, and $250,000 Russell lent the company himself. He personally guaranteed the bank loan and the EIDL. In August 2026 a lawyer told him Subchapter V was closed because the company owed more than $3,424,000, and a regular Chapter 11 was priced beyond what the shop could pay.

    That answer was right in August. For a case filed on or after November 10, 2026, it is not.

    What did the Bankruptcy Threshold Adjustment Act change about the Subchapter V debt limit in Colorado?

    H.R. 7730 was signed on Tuesday, November 10, 2026. I read the enrolled bill. Section 2(a) rewrites 11 U.S.C. § 1182(1) so a Subchapter V debtor may owe up to $7,500,000. Section 2(b) replaces § 109(e) with one Chapter 13 limit, less than $2,750,000 of noncontingent, liquidated debt, secured and unsecured together. Section 3 applies both only to cases commenced on or after enactment.

    Subchapter V began February 19, 2020, at $2,725,625. The CARES Act raised it to $7,500,000 on March 27, 2020; later laws extended and revived that figure until it expired June 21, 2024. The limit then fell back to the small business debtor amount in § 101(51D), indexed to $3,424,000 on April 1, 2025.

    The Act leaves the § 101(51D) small business debtor figure at $3,424,000. So a $5 million company that skips the Subchapter V election is not a small business debtor, and § 1102(a)(3) will not keep a creditors’ committee out of its case. Because § 104(a), also untouched, still lists § 109(e) and § 1182(1) for triennial adjustment, I read both new figures as due to adjust on April 1, 2028.

    Does a Colorado company with $3.4 to $7.5 million of debt qualify for Subchapter V now?

    Most will pass the debt test. Amended § 1182(1)(A) counts noncontingent, liquidated debt as of the petition date, excludes debts owed to affiliates or insiders, and requires that at least half arose from business activities. Single asset real estate companies and SEC reporting companies are excluded, and affiliates filing together share one $7,500,000 cap under § 1182(1)(B).

    Worked example (illustrative only). Russell’s company counts $2,900,000 to the bank, $1,600,000 to the SBA and $450,000 to vendors, or $4,950,000, all business debt. His $250,000 loan drops out because § 101(31)(B) makes an officer or person in control an insider. Suppose the company files Monday, December 7, 2026, which under § 301(b) is the order for relief. Section 1188(a) requires a status conference within 60 days, by Friday, February 5, 2027, with the company’s report due 14 days before the date set. The plan is due in 90 days under § 1189(b); day 90 is Sunday, March 7, so Rule 9006(a)(1)(C) moves it to Monday, March 8, 2027.

    Under § 1181(b) there is no committee or disclosure statement unless ordered, and under § 1189(a) only the company may file a plan. A Subchapter V trustee is appointed under § 1183(a); for a Denver case, by the U.S. Trustee for Region 19. No quarterly U.S. Trustee fee is owed, since 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(6)(A) excludes Subchapter V. And § 1191(b) and (c)(2) allow confirmation over objection if the plan, among other requirements, commits projected disposable income for three to five years, so Russell can keep his shares without paying vendors in full.

    Debts Between $3.4 and $7.5 Million? Contact Us Now

    Can a Colorado company already in a regular Chapter 11 switch to Subchapter V?

    Probably not. Section 3 reaches only new cases, so a company that filed an ordinary Chapter 11 in September stays under the old limit. Rule 1020(a) puts the election in the petition, and Rule 1009(a)(1) lets a debtor amend the petition before the case closes. But a case filed before November 10 stays under the old § 1182(1), which borrows the § 101(51D) test: debt measured as of the petition date or order for relief, with a $3,424,000 ceiling.

    Dismissal and refiling carry risks. For individuals, § 109(g) bars a new case for 180 days after certain dismissals, and § 362(c)(3) ends the stay 30 days into a new case filed within a year of a dismissed one. A corporation escapes those, but a refiled case can still be dismissed for cause, including bad faith, under § 1112(b); see my post on bad faith Subchapter V filings in Colorado. I found no ruling since November 10 on pending cases.

    Can you use Subchapter V in Colorado after your business has closed?

    Take an owner whose company closed in 2025, leaving a $2 million EIDL guaranty and other business debt above $3,424,000. Subchapter V was out, and so was Chapter 13, with its April 1, 2025 limits of $526,700 unsecured and $1,580,125 secured. What remains is whether an individual with a closed business is “engaged in commercial or business activities” on the petition date.

    The leading Colorado case is In re Ikalowych, 629 B.R. 261 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2021). Judge Thomas McNamara’s debtor managed and partly owned a hail repair company that stopped operating and surrendered its assets to the bank before filing. He still owned a small management company, did about 12 hours a month of unpaid wind down work, and had started a salaried sales job. About 86 percent of his $7.4 million of debt came from guaranties. Under a totality of the circumstances test the court found him engaged in business, “just barely,” and overruled the U.S. Trustee’s objection. The job counted as activity but not toward the 50 percent test, since none of his debt arose from it.

    At $7.4 million, Ikalowych was shut out of Subchapter V from June 2024 until November 9, 2026. Today he would clear the debt test.

    Two Utah rulings show the range. In In re Offer Space, LLC, 629 B.R. 299 (Bankr. D. Utah 2021), a shut down company qualified because it was still collecting receivables, maintaining bank accounts and winding down for creditors. In In re Bohman, 663 B.R. 831 (Bankr. D. Utah 2024), a retired guarantor whose LLC had been idle since 2015 lost, and his election was stricken. I found no Tenth Circuit or Tenth Circuit BAP decision on point. A Denver judge would likely start from Ikalowych and ask what the owner was doing on filing day.

    In any plan, § 506(a) treats the SBA as secured only up to its collateral’s value, with the rest unsecured. If a demand has arrived, see my post on SBA demand letters and Treasury offset and our SBA loan page.

    Should a Colorado guarantor choose Chapter 13 or Subchapter V under the new $2.75 million limit?

    Under § 524(e), the company’s discharge does not release Russell’s guaranties. If both lenders call them, his exposure is about $4.5 million: too much for Chapter 13, but inside the Subchapter V limit. Before November 10 his own case meant regular Chapter 11 or Chapter 7. Now, since he still runs the company, an individual Subchapter V case is possible.

    Below $2,750,000 there is a real choice. Chapter 13 requires regular income, and spouses may file together under the combined limit. The plan runs three years, or five if household income exceeds the Colorado median (§ 1325(b)(4)), and the standing trustee takes a fee of up to 10 percent of payments under 28 U.S.C. § 586(e). The codebtor stay in § 1301 covers consumer debts only, so it will not protect a spouse who also guaranteed the EIDL.

    An individual Subchapter V plan also runs three to five years. If confirmed without creditor consent, § 1192 delays discharge until those payments are made and excepts debts of the kinds listed in § 523(a). How that exception treats corporate debtors is covered in my 2 Monkey Trading post. In my experience Chapter 13 suits the wage earner whose business is gone; Subchapter V suits the owner still operating.

    What changed on November 10, 2026, at a glance?

    Situation Before Nov. 10, 2026 Cases filed on or after Nov. 10, 2026
    Subchapter V debt ceiling $3,424,000 (since April 1, 2025) $7,500,000
    Chapter 13 ceiling Less than $526,700 unsecured and $1,580,125 secured Less than $2,750,000 combined
    Operating company with about $5 million of debt Regular Chapter 11 only Subchapter V if the other tests are met
    Individual with a closed business and $4 million of guaranty and EIDL debt Regular Chapter 11 or Chapter 7 Subchapter V if engaged in business on filing day; still over the Chapter 13 limit
    Case already pending in regular Chapter 11 Old limits apply Old limits still apply

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Is the $7.5 million Subchapter V limit temporary again?

    The enrolled bill has no sunset clause, unlike the 2020 and 2022 increases. Under section 104(a), it may rise with inflation on April 1, 2028.

    Does money I lent my own company count toward the Subchapter V limit?

    Not if you are an insider. Debts owed to insiders are excluded, and a corporation’s officers, directors and persons in control are insiders.

    Will my company’s Subchapter V plan release my personal guaranty?

    No. Under section 524(e), the company’s discharge does not affect a guarantor’s liability. He needs his own case or a deal with the lender.

    Has the Tenth Circuit decided whether a closed business qualifies for Subchapter V?

    Not as of November 13, 2026. The leading Colorado ruling is In re Ikalowych, a 2021 bankruptcy court decision applying a totality of the circumstances test.

    Does a Subchapter V debtor pay quarterly U.S. Trustee fees?

    No. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(6)(A), the quarterly fee applies in Chapter 11 cases other than those under Subchapter V.

    Can my spouse and I file Chapter 13 together under the new limit?

    Yes. A couple may file jointly if their combined noncontingent, liquidated debts are less than $2,750,000 and the filing spouse has regular income.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm helps Colorado owners weigh Subchapter V against regular Chapter 11 and handles SBA EIDL and guaranty debt in a plan or a Chapter 13 case. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    If you were told this year your debts were too large for Subchapter V, that may have changed. To have your numbers checked again, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Out of State Bankruptcy Subpoena in Colorado: Documents, Video Testimony and Rule 45

    Out of State Bankruptcy Subpoena in Colorado: Documents, Video Testimony and Rule 45

    Nadia owns a structural steel fabrication shop in Montrose, organized as a small Colorado corporation. In 2025 the shop sold about $240,000 of beams and plate to a Nevada general contractor, which filed Chapter 11 in Las Vegas in February 2026. The Chapter 11 trustee has sued the contractor’s former owners for fraudulent transfers. Nadia is not a party, but a process server handed her a subpoena from the Nevada bankruptcy court demanding her invoices and payment records and commanding her to testify at the January 2027 trial “by videoconference from a location of her choosing.” The same trustee’s preference demand letter arrived that week.

    Can a court 430 miles away, as the crow flies, make her do all of that? Some of it, yes. The video testimony, probably not before December 2027.

    Can an out of state bankruptcy subpoena force a Colorado witness to testify by video?

    Bankruptcy Rule 9016 makes civil Rule 45 apply in bankruptcy. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(2) the subpoena issues from the court where the case is pending, and Rule 45(b)(2) allows service anywhere in the United States. Service in Montrose was valid; reach is another matter. Rule 45(c)(1) caps a trial summons at a 100 mile radius around the witness’s home, job, or regular place of business in person, or, in limited cases, her own state. Las Vegas fails both.

    The trustee will say Nadia never leaves home. The Ninth Circuit rejected that argument in In re Kirkland, 75 F.4th 1030 (9th Cir. 2023), where a Chapter 7 trustee in a Los Angeles adversary proceeding had subpoenaed two witnesses to testify by video from their homes in the Virgin Islands. The panel ordered them quashed because a trial “occurs in a specific place: where the court is located.” Nevada is in the Ninth Circuit under 28 U.S.C. § 41, so the Las Vegas court is bound.

    Does the 100 mile limit apply to remote testimony in Colorado and the Tenth Circuit?

    The Tenth Circuit has not decided the Kirkland question, and I found no Colorado bankruptcy court ruling on it. The district courts here lean the Ninth Circuit’s way. In In re EpiPen Marketing, Sales Practices & Antitrust Litigation, No. 17-md-2785 (D. Kan. July 7, 2021), the court refused to use Rule 43(a) to reach defense witnesses outside its subpoena power and predicted the Tenth Circuit would agree. In Perez v. Sunbeam Products, Inc., No. 21-cv-01915 (D. Colo. Nov. 19, 2024), Chief Judge Brimmer denied video testimony from witnesses beyond reach, finding “no authority for allowing video testimony merely because a witness’s presence cannot be procured by subpoena.”

    Some courts elsewhere measure from the witness’s chair; EpiPen collects them. Even where the subpoena is valid, remote trial testimony needs the judge’s permission under Rule 43(a), applied in bankruptcy by Rule 9017, for “good cause in compelling circumstances.” The Tenth Circuit called that standard “permissive and not mandatory” in Eller v. Trans Union, LLC, 739 F.3d 467 (10th Cir. 2013).

    What are the deadlines to object to a bankruptcy subpoena, and where is a motion to quash filed?

    The documents command is different. Rule 45(c)(2)(A) keeps the production site inside a 100 mile radius of Nadia’s business, which means Montrose or electronic delivery, the way most production happens now. A subpoena naming Las Vegas as the production site exceeds the rule.

    Under Rule 45(d)(2)(B), written objections are due “before the earlier of the time specified for compliance or 14 days after the subpoena is served.” A timely objection puts the burden on the trustee to move to compel, and any order compelling production must protect a nonparty from “significant expense.” Under Rule 45(d)(3)(A), “the court for the district where compliance is required” must quash or modify a subpoena that exceeds the geographic limits or imposes undue burden. For documents, that is Colorado, and D.C.COLO.LCivR 84.1(a) refers bankruptcy matters to the bankruptcy judges in Denver. The testimony command is messier: under Kirkland, compliance for a remote trial appearance happens at the Las Vegas courthouse, which makes Nevada a proper forum. Under Rule 45(f), a Colorado court may transfer the motion to Nevada if the witness consents or circumstances are exceptional.

    The Fifth Amendment will not shield business records; Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988), holds that a custodian “may not resist a subpoena for corporate records on Fifth Amendment grounds.” A nonparty’s own legal fees are usually hers to bear, unless the court sanctions the issuing side under Rule 45(d)(1), which can include “reasonable attorney’s fees.”

    Served With a Bankruptcy Subpoena? Contact Us Now

    What would the proposed Rule 45 amendment change, and when could it take effect?

    A fix for Kirkland was published for comment in August 2025 (comments closed February 16, 2026), approved by the rules committees in April and June 2026 and then by the Judicial Conference, and sent to the Supreme Court on October 20, 2026. A new Rule 45(c)(2) would make the place a remote witness attends “the location where the person is commanded to appear in person.” Measured that way, Nadia’s video appearance would occur in Montrose.

    Under 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a), the Court must send a rule to Congress no later than May 1, and it takes effect no earlier than December 1 of that year. The transmittal package projects December 1, 2027. As of November 6, 2026, I found no Supreme Court order and no bill in Congress on the subject. The committee note adds that the change “does not alter the standards for deciding whether to permit in-court remote trial testimony,” so Rule 43(a) and Eller still control. For a January 2027 trial, the current rule governs.

    Why would the trustee who sent a preference demand also subpoena a Colorado supplier?

    Because one set of records answers both questions. Payments Nadia received within 90 days before the petition are exposed under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A), and her best defense is often the ordinary course exception in § 547(c)(2). That defense rests on invoice dates, credit terms, the contractor’s historical payment speed, and whether collection calls preceded the money. Those are the records the subpoena demands.

    I treat the subpoena and the demand letter as one matter. Our post on preference demand letters and the ordinary course and new value defenses covers the defense itself. A trustee could also seek a Rule 2004 examination, but Rule 2004(c) compels attendance through Rule 9016, so the same mileage limits apply. Ignoring out of state bankruptcy papers is riskier still; see our post on default judgments against Colorado vendors.

    How would the dates and costs work for a Montrose steel shop?

    An illustrative calendar: service on Thursday, November 12, 2026; production due December 5; trial January 20, 2027 in Las Vegas, about 540 driving miles away. Fourteen days after service is November 26, Thanksgiving. Bankruptcy Rule 9006(a) carries a deadline that lands on a legal holiday to the next day, but I would serve objections by Wednesday, November 25.

    Assume gathering 2025 invoices, bank records and emails takes 12 staff hours at $45 plus five hours of lawyer review at $350: about $2,290 before any motion. Nadia can object to the video command and move to quash. Or she can offer a deposition in Montrose, which Rule 45(c)(1)(A) allows and which Rule 32(a)(4)(B), applied through Bankruptcy Rule 7032, lets the trustee play at trial because she lives beyond 100 miles from the courthouse, in exchange for a narrower request and reimbursed costs.

    The calendar also explains the urgency. If the petition was filed February 10, 2026, 11 U.S.C. § 546(a)(1)(A) gives the trustee until February 10, 2028 to sue on a preference. January testimony previews her defense with a year to spare.

    Command from an out of state bankruptcy court Enforceable today under Rule 45(c)? After the amendment (Dec. 1, 2027 at the earliest) Where to challenge it; who pays
    Produce invoices and payment records Yes, if produced within 100 miles of the business or electronically No change (provision renumbered) Colorado bankruptcy court; witness bears routine costs, with protection from significant expense
    Sit for a deposition in Colorado Yes, within 100 miles of Montrose No change, but 14 days’ notice required Colorado bankruptcy court; issuing party tenders fees and mileage
    Travel to Las Vegas for trial No No change Nevada or Colorado; sanctions possible against the issuer
    Give trial testimony by video from Colorado No in the Ninth Circuit; undecided in the Tenth Reachable, but only with Rule 43(a) approval Nevada under Kirkland, or Colorado; fee shifting only as a sanction

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Can a Nevada bankruptcy court make me testify by Zoom from Colorado?

    Not under the current rule as the Ninth Circuit read it in In re Kirkland, which binds Nevada courts. The proposed amendment cannot take effect before December 1, 2027. You can still agree to testify remotely if you prefer.

    How long do I have to object to a subpoena for documents?

    Written objections are due before the earlier of the compliance date or 14 days after service. Serve them early rather than relying on holiday rollover rules.

    Do I have to travel to another state for a bankruptcy deposition?

    No. A subpoena cannot make you attend beyond a 100 mile radius of your home, job, or regular place of business. The party wanting your testimony has to come to you or take it by video.

    Will the trustee pay for my time gathering documents?

    Not automatically. After a timely objection, an order compelling production must protect a nonparty from significant expense. Many trustees will narrow the request to avoid a motion.

    Is a Tax Court subpoena limited to 100 miles?

    No. Under 26 U.S.C. § 7456(a) and Tax Court Rule 147(c), the Tax Court can compel witnesses from any place in the United States, and it has held remote sessions on Zoomgov since 2020. See our post on the Tax Court place of trial for Colorado taxpayers.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm helps Colorado business owners respond to subpoenas and demand letters from bankruptcy cases filed in other states, and defends the preference claims that often follow. It also handles Chapter 11 matters and Tax Court litigation. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    If a bankruptcy subpoena has arrived, the 14 day objection window comes first, so contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Who Can Put a Colorado LLC Into Bankruptcy? Consent Clauses, Lender Vetoes and Receivers

    Who Can Put a Colorado LLC Into Bankruptcy? Consent Clauses, Lender Vetoes and Receivers

    Vincent owns 49 percent of a commercial HVAC contractor in Lakewood, organized as a Colorado LLC, and he runs the jobs. The other 51 percent belongs to a man who used to be married to Vincent’s sister and now lives in Arizona. The company owes about $1.4 million, an SBA 7(a) loan included, and a judgment creditor has asked the Jefferson County District Court to appoint a receiver. Vincent believes a Subchapter V case in Denver is the only way to keep 22 people working, and his partner has stopped returning calls.

    Then he rereads the operating agreement. Filing requires “unanimous consent of the members,” and the bank’s affiliate sits inside the company as a “special member” with a veto. The first question is not whether Subchapter V would work. It is whether anyone can sign the petition.

    Who can file bankruptcy for a Colorado LLC when the members disagree?

    State law answers that. In Price v. Gurney, 324 U.S. 100 (1945), the Supreme Court said authority to file for a company “finds its source in local law,” and a court that finds the filers lacked it “has no alternative but to dismiss the petition.” Having a right to obtain authority later is not enough.

    For a Colorado LLC, C.R.S. § 7-80-401 lets a majority of members (or managers) make routine decisions, but subsection (2) requires each member’s consent for an act “not in the ordinary course of the business.” C.R.S. § 7-80-108(1)(a) lets the operating agreement set the members’ own rules, and Vincent’s agreement removes any doubt. Neither man can file over the other’s objection.

    The Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel applied this to a Colorado LLC in In re DB Capital Holdings, LLC, BAP No. CO-10-046 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. Dec. 6, 2010). An Aspen condominium developer’s lender already had a Colorado state court receiver, and an amendment the manager blamed on the lender barred bankruptcy filings. The manager filed Chapter 11 anyway, and the panel affirmed dismissal. The ban was a deal among members, with no proof of coercion, and a unanimous consent rule for acts outside ordinary business independently barred the filing. It is unpublished, but it is the closest Colorado authority I have found.

    Can a lender’s special member or golden share block a Colorado LLC from filing?

    Who holds the veto matters. In In re Lake Michigan Beach Pottawattamie Resort LLC, 547 B.R. 899 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2016), a forbearance deal made the lender a special member that could block a filing while weighing only its own interests, and the court held the provision void. In In re Intervention Energy Holdings, LLC, 553 B.R. 258 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016), a lender’s single $1 unit carried a filing veto the court called “tantamount to an absolute waiver.” In re Lexington Hospitality Group, LLC, No. 17-51568 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Sept. 15, 2017) agreed, calling a lender’s “independent manager” “merely a pretense.”

    Real owners get more room. In re Franchise Services of North America, Inc., 891 F.3d 198 (5th Cir. 2018) enforced a preferred shareholder’s consent right although its parent was also owed a fee, protecting “a bona fide shareholder” who votes against a petition.

    No Tenth Circuit or Colorado bankruptcy court decision has tested a lender affiliate’s veto. Section 7-80-108(1.5) lets an agreement restrict fiduciary duties unless that is “manifestly unreasonable,” and § 7-80-108(2)(d) bars eliminating good faith and fair dealing. My read: a Denver judge would likely treat a special member answering only to the bank as Lake Michigan did, but enforce a real owner’s unanimity right. An SBA 7(a) loan covenant is not a vote inside the LLC; after a filing, the lender’s tools are stay relief or a motion to dismiss for bad faith Subchapter V filings.

    Fighting Over Who Controls the Filing? Contact Us Now

    Does a Jefferson County receiver take away the members’ power to file?

    That turns on the order’s words. Colorado courts appoint receivers under C.R.C.P. 66, including after judgment. A creditor with an unsatisfied judgment against an insolvent LLC can also seek judicial dissolution under C.R.S. § 7-80-810, where C.R.S. § 7-80-812 allows a custodian who may act “through or in place of its managers or members.”

    An order to take the trucks and receivables and “manage the business” is aimed at property. I found no Colorado or Tenth Circuit decision holding that an order silent on bankruptcy strips members of the power to file; I expect a Colorado judge would reason as the Third Circuit did.

    Filing triggers the 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) stay. A state court receiver is a “custodian” under 11 U.S.C. § 101(11), and 11 U.S.C. § 543 requires it to stop administering the property except to preserve it, then turn it over, unless the court excuses that under § 543(d).

    What did Whittaker decide, and when does it reach a Colorado company?

    In In re Whittaker, Clark & Daniels, Inc., 176 F.4th 241 (3d Cir. 2026), a revised opinion issued April 27, 2026 on panel rehearing, the Third Circuit again upheld a New Jersey board’s filing over a South Carolina receiver’s objection. New Jersey law governed the board’s authority under the internal affairs doctrine. The receivership order “nowhere” addressed corporate affairs, and to displace the board the receiver needed recognition and an ancillary appointment in New Jersey. Filing without authority is “cause” to dismiss under 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b), not a jurisdictional defect.

    It binds only the Third Circuit, and for a Colorado LLC under a Jefferson County receiver the recognition problem never arises. It matters when a Delaware or Wyoming LLC operates here, or when another state’s court appoints a receiver over a Colorado LLC. As of November 6, 2026, two certiorari petitions are pending: No. 26-159, from the receiver, Peter Protopapas, fully briefed since September 4, and No. 26-263, from the talc claimants’ committee, with the response due November 6.

    What can a 49 percent member do if the majority member will not consent?

    Filing anyway is the weakest move. The partner moves to dismiss under § 1112(b) and likely wins, and the signed petition is a certification under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011 that it is warranted by law. Vincent can negotiate, perhaps offering a price for his partner’s interest, or ask a Colorado court for dissolution under § 7-80-810 because it is “not reasonably practicable” to run the business under the agreement.

    Creditors have a door members lack. Under 11 U.S.C. § 303(b), three creditors holding undisputed, noncontingent claims of at least $21,050 above their liens (the figure since April 1, 2025) can file an involuntary Chapter 7 or 11 case, or one creditor if there are fewer than 12, not counting insiders and employees. Owning equity does not make Vincent a creditor. Losing petitioners can owe fees or damages under § 303(i). In DB Capital, creditors filed one three days after the dismissal.

    How would this play out for a Lakewood HVAC contractor?

    This is illustrative. The company’s $1.4 million is under the $3,424,000 debt limit applied by 11 U.S.C. § 1182(1) and § 101(51D), in effect since April 1, 2025. H.R. 7730, the Bankruptcy Threshold Adjustment Act of 2026, passed the House September 16 and the Senate September 28, 2026; as of November 6 the record shows no presentment or signature.

    Say the receiver hearing is set for January 12, 2027. In version one, the partner and the special member sign a written consent, and the LLC files Subchapter V in Denver on December 7, 2026. The stay halts the receiver motion.

    In version two, the partner refuses, and on January 12 the court appoints a receiver to “manage the business,” saying nothing about bankruptcy. Vincent still cannot file; his obstacle is the consent clause, not the receiver.

    In version three, Vincent files alone in December. His partner moves to dismiss, and by late January the case is likely gone, the retainer spent and the receiver hearing back on calendar. If the company stops in February owing two weeks of wages, each of the 22 employees has a priority claim under 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4) up to $17,150 (the cap since April 1, 2025) for wages earned within 180 days before the petition or the shutdown, whichever comes first.

    Situation Can it block a filing? Key authority First step, and the risk of skipping it
    Unanimous consent clause among real members Likely yes § 7-80-401(2); DB Capital; Price Get written consent; filing without it invites dismissal
    Lender affiliate special member veto Doubtful, untested in Colorado Lake Michigan; Intervention Energy Learn how the veto was imposed; losing means dismissal
    Colorado receivership order silent on bankruptcy Probably not by itself C.R.C.P. 66; § 543; Whittaker by analogy Read the order; one displacing the members changes the answer
    Out of state receiver over a Colorado LLC Not without Colorado recognition Whittaker; internal affairs doctrine Check for a Colorado recognition filing

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Can the majority member of a Colorado LLC file bankruptcy without the minority member?

    Under the default rule in C.R.S. § 7-80-401(2), no. A filing is outside the ordinary course and needs every member’s consent unless the operating agreement says otherwise.

    Is a bankruptcy filed without authority automatically void?

    No. Someone must raise it, usually by a section 1112(b) motion. If the filers lacked authority under state law, Price v. Gurney requires dismissal.

    Does a receiver appointment stop my Colorado LLC from filing bankruptcy?

    Not by itself; it depends on whether the order reaches governance or only property. After a filing, section 543 generally requires the receiver to turn property over.

    Can my SBA lender prohibit my company from filing bankruptcy?

    Several courts have refused to enforce lender vetoes built into a borrower’s governance, and a loan covenant is not a member vote. The Tenth Circuit has not ruled.

    Can creditors put a deadlocked Colorado LLC into bankruptcy?

    Yes. Under section 303(b), three qualifying creditors with at least $21,050 in undisputed claims, or one if there are fewer than 12, can file an involuntary Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 case.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm represents Colorado business owners and members in Subchapter V cases, Chapter 11 reorganizations and SBA loan and business debt problems. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    If members or a receiver are fighting over your company’s filing, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Changing an Irrevocable Trust in Colorado: Decanting, Settlement Agreements and Tax

    Changing an Irrevocable Trust in Colorado: Decanting, Settlement Agreements and Tax

    Beatriz lives in Steamboat Springs and is the successor trustee of an irrevocable trust her father signed in Illinois in 2009. It holds about $3.1 million, mostly a rental duplex in town and a brokerage account. Her mother gets the income for life; then the principal splits between Beatriz and her brother, each taking outright at 30. Her brother is 27 and has a gambling problem, and the trust has no spendthrift clause.

    She wants to hold his share in a discretionary trust for his lifetime, rewrite trustee succession, and run the trust from Colorado. Colorado law offers ways to do that without a judge. My job, as a tax lawyer, is the federal bill that can come with each one.

    Can you modify an irrevocable trust in Colorado without going to court?

    Often, yes. A trustee with broad discretion over principal can decant under the Colorado Uniform Trust Decanting Act, C.R.S. §§ 15-16-901 to -930. The people whose interests are affected can sign a nonjudicial settlement agreement under C.R.S. § 15-5-111. A trust director can act if the document names one.

    That last route is narrow. Under C.R.S. § 15-16-806, a director holds the powers the trust terms grant and little more; Colorado has no freestanding statutory trust protector power. If nothing works out of court, a judge can modify with all beneficiaries’ consent (§ 15-5-411), for circumstances the settlor did not anticipate (§ 15-5-412), or to meet the settlor’s tax objectives, even retroactively (§ 15-5-416).

    How does Colorado trust decanting work, and does it fit this trust?

    Under C.R.S. § 15-16-911, a trustee whose power to distribute principal is not limited to an ascertainable standard may pour the trust into a second trust with new terms. It cannot add beneficiaries or “reduce or eliminate a vested interest.” A trustee held to a standard such as health and support must give each beneficiary “substantially similar” interests (§ 15-16-912).

    Here is the catch. If the 2009 trust gives the trustee no discretion over principal, there is no decanting power at all, and a fixed right to principal at termination is a vested interest unless someone could distribute that property elsewhere. Decanting works for Beatriz only if the instrument lets the trustee invade principal for her mother, and only if her brother’s descendants already appear in it as contingent takers.

    Notice under § 15-16-907 must go out at least 63 days before the trustee acts, not the 60 days often quoted, unless everyone waives in writing. Court approval is optional under § 15-16-909, which also lets a court appoint a special fiduciary when the trustee is a beneficiary too. The tax limits in § 15-16-919(2) protect marital and charitable deductions, the annual exclusion, S corporation eligibility, and a zero inclusion ratio under 26 U.S.C. § 2642(c). None of them stops a beneficiary from making a gift.

    Is a beneficiary’s consent to a Colorado nonjudicial settlement agreement a taxable gift?

    It can be. When the brother signs away an outright share for a discretionary interest, he gives something up for nothing. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c)(1) taxes gratuitous transfers “regardless of the means or device employed,” and § 25.2512-8 reaches transfers for less than full value.

    In Chief Counsel Advice 202352018 (released Dec. 29, 2023), beneficiaries consented to a court modification adding a tax reimbursement clause, and Chief Counsel said it “will constitute a taxable gift” by them. The memo adds that the answer is the same when “a beneficiary fails to exercise their right to object” under a notice statute. Colorado’s decanting act gives notice and a path to court, so I do not call decanting automatically gift free. A trustee acting on discretion the beneficiaries cannot veto stands on better ground, but nothing published settles it, and Rev. Proc. 2026-3, section 4.01(55), says the IRS will not ordinarily rule on the question.

    There is a second trap. Because the brother’s new trust benefits his family, 26 U.S.C. § 2702 can value the interest he keeps at zero unless the gift is drafted to be incomplete.

    How large could the brother’s gift be in a Steamboat Springs example?

    Illustrative only. Assume Beatriz’s mother is 70 and the brother’s remainder is half of $3.1 million, or $1,550,000. At the November 2026 § 7520 rate of 6.20 percent (Rev. Rul. 2026-21), the IRS Table S remainder factor for age 70 is 0.44035, so his remainder is worth about $682,543. If he gives up roughly half, Route A (a settlement agreement he signs) produces a gift near $341,271. If § 2702 zeroes out what he keeps, the IRS could argue for $682,543.

    Either way he files Form 709. A future interest gets no annual exclusion ($19,000 for 2026 under Rev. Proc. 2025-32), so § 6019 requires a return, due April 15, 2027 for a 2026 signing (§ 6075(b)). Tax is unlikely against the $15,000,000 basic exclusion for 2026, but he uses some of it. For 2027, IR-2026-133 (Nov. 5, 2026) and Rev. Proc. 2026-35 set $20,000 and $15,480,000; our Colorado 2026 year end estate and gift guide covers the exclusion in more detail.

    Route B, a decanting after notice, gives the brother nothing to sign. If the trustee’s discretion supports it and her file shows a fiduciary reason, the gift case against him is weaker, subject to the notice point above.

    Can changing a trust trigger income tax, GST tax, or estate tax for a beneficiary?

    Under Cottage Savings Ass’n v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554 (1991), swapping property for something “materially different” is a realization event under 26 U.S.C. § 1001. Beneficiaries trading interests can fall inside that rule; a new trustee or a new place of administration does not. With her father dead, no grantor is left to be taxed under 26 U.S.C. §§ 671 and following, so the second trust stays a nongrantor trust unless someone receives owner powers.

    The trust was never GST exempt, so its inclusion ratio under § 2642 is presumably one, meaning no allocated exemption shelters it. A lifetime trust passing to the brother’s children creates a taxable termination at his death unless the property is in his estate, which makes him the transferor under § 2652(a)(1). A testamentary general power does that through § 2041 and earns a new basis, which Rev. Rul. 2023-2 ties to estate inclusion. If he ever serves as trustee, distributions to himself should stay within Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1(c)(2)‘s health, education, support and maintenance standard. The grandfathered trust safe harbor in Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1(b)(4)(i)(D), applied in PLR 202518009 (2025), does not reach this trust.

    Route A also raises an estate tax question. If consenting makes the brother a partial settlor of a trust that can pay him, § 2036 and § 2038 come into play. And under C.R.S. § 15-5-505(1)(b), a settlor’s creditors can reach the most that could be distributed to him. For a gambler, the portion he funded may be the portion his creditors take.

    What happens when you move a trust to Colorado for administration?

    Under C.R.S. § 15-5-108(5), qualified beneficiaries get at least 60 days’ notice, and a timely objection suspends the move. Governing law does not change on its own; under § 15-5-107, the law the trust designates generally controls, so Illinois law may still govern this 2009 instrument.

    Under C.R.S. § 39-22-103(10), a trust “administered in this state” is a resident trust, and the Colorado Department of Revenue requires Form 105. The duplex rents are Colorado source income either way, so the trust already files as a nonresident. If it keeps $50,000 of capital gains in principal in 2026, Colorado tax at 4.40 percent is $2,200 (illustrative). Amendment 87, a graduated rate measure on the November 3, 2026 ballot, would replace the flat rate beginning in 2027 if it is certified as approved; as of November 6, 2026 the count was close and no result had been certified. Leaving Illinois needs an Illinois opinion.

    Route Who acts, Colorado statute Typical gift tax exposure Income or GST issue
    Settlement agreement All materially affected parties; § 15-5-111 High for a beneficiary whose share shrinks Possible exchange; signer may become partial transferor
    Decanting Trustee after 63 days’ notice; § 15-16-911 Lower; “failure to object” theory remains Later taxable termination absent estate inclusion
    Trust director Director, if the instrument grants it; § 15-16-806 Turns on who holds the power Same GST planning as decanting
    Court order Judge; §§ 15-5-411, -412, -416 Consent under § 15-5-411 carries the agreement risk The order does not bind the IRS

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Can a Colorado trustee change an irrevocable trust without the beneficiaries’ signatures?

    Sometimes. A trustee with discretion over principal can decant after at least 63 days’ notice. Without that discretion, an agreement or a court order is usually needed.

    Does moving a trust to Colorado make it a Colorado taxpayer?

    Yes. A trust administered in Colorado is a resident trust and files Form 105. Colorado real estate produces Colorado source income wherever the trust is run.

    Will the IRS issue a private ruling approving a decanting?

    Not ordinarily, if beneficial interests change. Rev. Proc. 2026-3 lists the gift question as an area where rulings will not ordinarily issue.

    Do I report my consent to a trust change on a gift tax return?

    If your interest shrinks and someone else’s grows, the IRS may treat your consent as a gift. Because it is a future interest, the annual exclusion usually does not apply, so Form 709 is generally required even when no tax is due.

    Does Colorado tax gifts or estates when a trust is changed?

    No. Colorado has no gift, estate or inheritance tax, so the transfer tax exposure is federal. Colorado’s role is fiduciary income tax and the trust law that decides validity.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm advises Colorado trustees and beneficiaries on the federal tax side of trust changes, including gift returns, GST exposure and Colorado fiduciary filings, through its trust and estate tax planning and real estate tax strategy work, and represents clients in IRS examinations when a gift return is questioned. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    The tax analysis belongs in the file before anyone signs an agreement or mails a decanting notice. If you are a trustee or beneficiary thinking about rewriting an irrevocable trust, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • NIL and Revenue Share Taxes for Colorado College Athletes and Their Parents

    NIL and Revenue Share Taxes for Colorado College Athletes and Their Parents

    Jada is 19 and a sophomore on a volleyball roster in Boulder. Her Texas parents claim her as a dependent. In 2026 she signed with a Boulder outdoor brand and a Denver car dealer for $38,000, her school paid her $14,000 of revenue share, the brand shipped her about $3,000 of gear, and a collective covered the lease on a used SUV. Nobody withheld a dollar, and her father is worried about April.

    Most of it carries income tax plus self-employment tax, Colorado gets a slice, and her parents’ return is now in play. A first year earner often gets one pass on federal estimated tax penalties; Colorado’s pass is narrower.

    Is NIL money taxable in Colorado, and is it self-employment income?

    Usually yes. A brand paying for posts, shoots and appearances is buying services, reported on Schedule C. Self-employment tax under 26 U.S.C. § 1401 is 12.4 percent for Social Security plus 2.9 percent for Medicare, applied to 92.35 percent of net earnings under § 1402(a)(12). The Social Security piece stops at the 2026 wage base of $184,500 (SSA notice), and half the tax is deductible under § 164(f).

    Gear and the car count. When services are paid in property, Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(1) puts the fair market value in income, and the IRS’s NIL page agrees. A collective that pays an athlete’s lease is paying her.

    For payments after December 31, 2025, the 1099-NEC trigger in § 6041(a) rose from $600 to $2,000 (Pub. L. 119-21, § 70433), so a $1,500 appearance may come with no form. It is still income.

    Are House settlement revenue share payments taxable, and why did the school send two 1099s?

    The settlement in In re College Athlete NIL Litigation, No. 4:20-cv-03919-CW (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2025) lets Division I schools pay athletes from a capped pool; the order is silent on tax. Colorado moved first: HB25-1041, signed March 28, 2025, amended C.R.S. § 23-16-301 so Colorado schools may pay athletes for their name, image and likeness.

    The payments are taxable; the label varies. CU’s athletics department told families it treats athletes as independent contractors, withholds nothing, and may issue both a 1099-NEC and a 1099-MISC because the payment is partly a license fee (CU guidance). The split matters: the IRS page says a payment purely for use of a likeness, with no personal services, is a Schedule E royalty outside self-employment tax. As of November 6, 2026 I found no ruling, notice or regulation on revenue share, and the web page is not precedent.

    In AM 2023-004, Chief Counsel found that many collectives serve athletes’ private interests, which threatens their charity status. It does not make Jada’s lease a gift.

    Does a Texas athlete at a Colorado school owe Colorado income tax?

    On part of it. Under C.R.S. § 39-22-103(8)(a), a resident is someone domiciled here, or someone who keeps a permanent place of abode here and spends more than six months of the year here. Jada plans to return to Texas, so her domicile stays there, but watch the second test if she rents in Boulder year round; the Department of Revenue’s nonresident guidance does not address students.

    As a nonresident she owes tax only on Colorado source income. C.R.S. § 39-22-109 reaches a business carried on here, and the Department treats personal service income as Colorado source when the person did the work here. Form 104PN computes tax as if she were a resident, at the 4.40 percent rate in § 39-22-104(1.7)(c), then multiplies by Colorado AGI over federal AGI. Intangible income is Colorado source for a nonresident only if tied to a Colorado business, so the royalty slice deserves a second look.

    California requires a nonresident with California income to file once worldwide gross income tops $22,941 for a single filer under 65 in 2025 (FTB instructions). Texas has no income tax. A Colorado domiciled athlete playing in Oregon owes Colorado on everything, with a capped credit for Oregon’s tax under C.R.S. § 39-22-108.

    Nonresident aliens owe no self-employment tax under § 1402(b), but U.S. source royalties face 30 percent tax and withholding under § 871(a) and § 1441 absent a treaty, and student visas restrict paid work. See our post on the substantial presence test in Colorado.

    What does a Boulder athlete’s 2026 NIL tax bill look like, and when are estimated payments due?

    Jada’s year, illustrative and rounded: assume the school reports all $14,000 on a 1099-NEC, the lease runs $550 a month ($6,600), and the brand deal includes $4,000 for two California appearances and $1,500 for one in Texas. Gross receipts are $61,600. After a 15 percent agent fee ($5,700), training ($1,800), travel ($1,600) and phone and content costs ($1,200), net profit is $51,300.

    Self-employment tax is about $7,248, and the $3,624 deduction leaves AGI at $47,676. The 2026 dependent cap in Rev. Proc. 2025-32 (the greater of $1,350 or earned income plus $450) does not bite, so her standard deduction is the full $16,100. The § 199A deduction is capped at 20 percent of taxable income, here $6,315. Endorsement income is a specified service business under Treas. Reg. § 1.199A-5(b)(2)(xiv), which matters only above the 2026 threshold of $201,750. Taxable income is about $25,261, income tax $2,783, and the federal total about $10,032.

    For Colorado, $1,111 of full year tax times a 94 percent apportionment ($48,225 of her net is Colorado work) gives roughly $1,045. California’s share sits on about $2,300 of net.

    Federal installments under § 6654(c) fall on April 15, June 15, September 15 and January 15. If Jada, a U.S. citizen, owed nothing for 2025, § 6654(e)(2) erases any 2026 penalty, so paying $10,032 on April 15, 2027 works once. In 2027 the required payment becomes the lesser of 90 percent of 2027 tax or 100 percent of 2026 tax: about $2,508 a quarter, the first due the same April 15 as her 2026 balance.

    C.R.S. § 39-22-605 uses the same dates and a $1,000 floor, but its zero prior year exception requires Colorado residence throughout the prior year, and its prior year safe harbor requires a Colorado return for that year. A Texan filing here for the first time gets neither. With $1,045 of tax, she should have paid 70 percent during 2026; the charge is figured as interest on the shortfall. Under § 6654(h) and § 39-22-605(9), filing and paying in full by January 31, 2027 cures the January installment.

    Can parents still claim an NIL athlete as a dependent?

    Maybe not. A qualifying child under § 152(c)(1)(D) must not provide more than half of her own support, and § 152(f)(5) leaves scholarships out of the count. Spending decides it. If Jada pays $12,000 of rent and food, the $6,600 lease counts as support she provided, and her parents spend $9,000, they lose her as a dependent.

    The kiddie tax in § 1(g) reaches only unearned income, such as a royalty slice, and skips a student 18 to 23 whose earned income exceeds half of her support, as Jada’s does. The American Opportunity Credit under § 25A phases out between $160,000 and $180,000 of joint income and needs expenses the scholarship did not cover. Under § 117, scholarship money for tuition, fees and required books is excluded, and Rev. Rul. 77-263 lets athletic scholarships qualify; room and board is taxable.

    Should a college athlete form an LLC or S corp for NIL income?

    Usually not. An S corporation saves payroll tax only on profit above a reasonable salary. At a $32,000 salary, payroll tax would be about $4,896 against roughly $7,248 now. Payroll service, a Form 1120-S and the Secretary of State’s $50 LLC filing and $25 periodic report (fee schedule) eat much of that, and her school’s W-9 runs to her personally. A single member LLC alone changes nothing for tax. See our post on LLC vs S corp vs C corp tax math in Colorado.

    As of November 6, 2026, no federal NIL bill is law; the SCORE Act (H.R. 4312) has not passed the House, and the Senate’s Protect College Sports Act is pending.

    Payment Federal character and form Self-employment tax Colorado, nonresident athlete
    Brand NIL deal Schedule C; 1099-NEC at $2,000 or more for 2026 Yes Taxed on work done in Colorado; apportioned on Form 104PN
    School revenue share Schedule C for services, Schedule E for a pure royalty; 1099-NEC, 1099-MISC or both Yes on services; no on a true royalty Service part taxed; royalty sourcing is an open question
    Collective paid car lease Fair market value is compensation; often no form Yes Taxed if the services were performed in Colorado
    Free gear Fair market value is compensation Yes Taxed if tied to Colorado work

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Do I owe tax on NIL money if I never got a 1099?

    Yes. The 1099 is an information return, not the source of the tax. For 2026 payments a 1099-NEC is required only at $2,000 or more.

    Are House settlement revenue share payments subject to self-employment tax?

    The part paid for services generally is. The IRS says a payment purely for use of your likeness is a royalty outside self-employment tax. Check which forms your school issued.

    I am an out of state athlete living in Colorado. Do I file a Colorado return?

    If you earned Colorado source income, you likely file Form 104 with Form 104PN. Keeping a Colorado home and spending over six months here can make you a resident.

    When is my first estimated tax payment due if I start getting NIL money?

    Federal and Colorado installments are due April 15, June 15, September 15 and January 15. Owing no federal tax the year before can excuse a first year federal penalty. Colorado’s exception requires prior Colorado residence.

    Can my parents still claim me if I earn NIL income?

    Only if you did not provide over half of your own support. Scholarships are left out of that count; rent and food paid from NIL money are not.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm helps athletes and families with federal tax planning, Colorado state tax questions, entity choices and returns that were never filed. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    If your athlete’s deals came in this fall and January 15 is close, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • DOJ v. McNutt and Colorado Home Distilling: What Changes for Hobbyists and Distillers

    DOJ v. McNutt and Colorado Home Distilling: What Changes for Hobbyists and Distillers

    Marcus has pressed apples and fermented hard cider in his Salida garage for years. He read that a federal appeals court struck down the home distilling ban, and now he wants to run a few gallons through a small pot still and age it as apple brandy. A friend who owns a licensed craft distillery in town asks the other half: if the ban falls, does her federal permit or quarterly excise tax change?

    For Marcus, nothing he read makes a garage still lawful in Colorado. For his friend, nothing turns on the case. The reasons matter, because Department of Justice v. McNutt, now at the Supreme Court, turns on a question about the taxing power that reaches well past whiskey.

    Is home distilling legal in Colorado after the Fifth Circuit’s McNutt ruling?

    No. Under 26 U.S.C. § 5178(a)(1)(B), no distilled spirits plant may be located “in any dwelling house, in any shed, yard, or inclosure connected with any dwelling house.” The Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB) regulation at 27 C.F.R. § 19.51 is blunter: “A person may not produce distilled spirits at home for personal use.”

    The ruling protects people, not a region. The government’s cert petition describes the injunction entered in Hobby Distillers Ass’n v. Alcohol & Tobacco Tax & Trade Bureau, 740 F. Supp. 3d 509 (N.D. Tex. 2024), as running “against McNutt, the association, and the association’s members.” Colorado sits in the Tenth Circuit, which has not ruled on the ban. Unless Marcus is a plaintiff or a Hobby Distillers Association member, the ban still binds him, and membership would not fix his state law problem.

    What did the Fifth and Sixth Circuits hold, and what is the Supreme Court deciding in DOJ v. McNutt?

    In McNutt v. U.S. Department of Justice, 173 F.4th 204 (5th Cir. 2026), decided April 10, 2026, the panel held that the ban collects nothing, so it falls outside the taxing power, and is not “necessary and proper” either. It leaned on NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 574 (2012), which limits the taxing power to “requiring an individual to pay money into the Federal Treasury, no more.” It refused to read United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126 (2010) as a rational basis test, and warned that the government’s logic had no stopping point.

    Eleven days later, Ream v. U.S. Department of the Treasury, 174 F.4th 480 (6th Cir. 2026) agreed the taxing power alone could not carry the ban but upheld it as necessary and proper. Judge Kethledge pointed to the “stupendous frauds” Congress documented in 1867 and to how much harder a house is to inspect, concluding that “empirically, alcohol is sui generis, or very close to it.”

    The docket in No. 26-204 shows certiorari granted October 19, 2026, on whether the location ban “is necessary and proper for carrying into execution Congress’s enumerated power to lay and collect taxes.” As of November 6, 2026, no argument date is listed. Ream’s petition, No. 26-93, remains pending. Ohio and 14 other states filed an amicus brief there; Colorado did not join.

    What federal penalties does a Colorado home distiller face under 26 U.S.C. 5601?

    Several; McNutt challenged one. Section 5601(a) makes each of these a felony carrying up to $10,000 and five years per offense: possessing an unregistered still (paragraph (1)), distilling in a dwelling or connected shed or yard (paragraph (6)), making a wash fit for distillation off a qualified plant (paragraph (7)), and producing spirits without being “a distiller authorized by law” (paragraph (8)). Sections 5602 (fraud) and 5604 (closures and marks) add more.

    Forfeiture is the harsher piece. Under § 5615, an unregistered still is forfeited with nearby personal property, and someone distilling without bond can lose his interest “in the lot or tract of land on which the distillery is situated.” The tax attaches “as soon as this substance is in existence” under § 5001(b), and § 5006(c)(2) makes it “due and payable immediately upon production” for spirits made outside a qualified plant. Marcus would owe $13.50 per proof gallon on brandy he never sold.

    What would a Supreme Court win for McNutt change for a Colorado hobbyist?

    Less than headlines suggest. A win removes the location ban and paragraph (6). Registration under § 5171, still registration under § 5179, the permit requirement and the tax all stay. The Fifth Circuit said a home distiller would then stand “on the same level as current licensees,” paperwork included.

    For beer and wine, Pub. L. 95-458 (1978) shaped today’s household exemptions in § 5042(a)(2) and § 5053(e): 200 gallons a calendar year with two or more adults, 100 with one. Congress never wrote a spirits counterpart, and no court can.

    Colorado law runs separately. A manufacturer’s license under C.R.S. § 44-3-402 goes to persons “distilling, rectifying, or brewing within this state,” and the home exception in C.R.S. § 44-3-106(2) reaches only malt and vinous liquors made in conformity with federal law. I found no Colorado exception for home spirits; Colorado licensed counsel should confirm for any specific plan.

    So Marcus can keep making cider, which federal law treats as wine (§ 5041(g)), within the household limit. A lawful still means a fuel alcohol plant under § 5181, with the product used only as fuel. Beverage brandy would still need federal qualification and a Colorado license after a McNutt win in 2027.

    What does a licensed Colorado craft distillery owe in federal excise tax and Colorado distillery tax?

    TTB’s list of permittees showed 178 Colorado distilled spirits plant permits as of November 2, 2026, tenth among the states, each registered on TTB F 5110.41 (27 C.F.R. § 19.73). Section 5001(c) cuts the $13.50 rate to $2.70 on the first 100,000 proof gallons a plant distills or processes and removes each calendar year, and $13.34 on the next 22,130,000. Those rates became permanent in December 2020 (Pub. L. 116-260, div. EE), and related companies share one allotment under § 5001(c)(2).

    Illustrative example: Marcus’s friend removes 4,000 proof gallons of her own spirits in 2027. At $2.70 she owes $10,800; at the full rate it would be $54,000. Because she expects no more than $50,000 for 2027 and owed no more than that in 2026, § 5061(d)(4) and 27 C.F.R. § 19.235(c) let her file TTB F 5000.24 quarterly, and § 5551(d) excuses a bond. Under § 19.236(b), her first quarter return and payment are due April 14, 2027. At the full rate she would cross $50,000 and lose both benefits.

    Colorado’s excise is 60.26 cents per liter under C.R.S. § 44-3-503, per the Legislative Council’s March 2026 issue brief. At 80 proof, 4,000 proof gallons is 5,000 gallons (about 18,927 liters), roughly $11,405 if all of it sells in Colorado. For income tax, the excise is a cost of goods, and § 263A capitalization applies unless she meets the § 448(c) gross receipts test. Late TTB returns draw § 6651 additions, with the usual reasonable cause defense. On entity choice, see our 2026 LLC, S corporation and C corporation comparison.

    Why should Colorado taxpayers who never distill care about the taxing power question?

    Much of the Code is not tax but machinery for collecting it. The government’s petition says the ban works by “channeling taxable conduct into locations where tax evasion is more difficult.” The respondents’ brief calls that “a federal police power in all but name.” Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937) held that a tax does not stop being a tax because it regulates. McNutt asks how far a rule that collects nothing may go in collection’s name.

    My read: if the Court adopts the Fifth Circuit’s view, expect challenges to other criminal rules justified as collection aids; Ohio’s brief says a Texas federal court has already carried McNutt into firearm rules. If it follows the Sixth Circuit, the fallout stays narrow. Recordkeeping tied to a taxed item looks safe either way; the Fifth Circuit itself distinguished rules aimed at “the very articles” taxed. For another federal excise regime, see dyed diesel relief for Colorado truckers and farmers.

    Activity in Colorado Federal permit and tax Colorado license After a hypothetical McNutt win
    Home beer, wine or cider for personal use No permit; tax exempt up to 100 or 200 gallons a year None within the § 44-3-106(2) exception No change
    Home fuel alcohol § 5181 fuel plant permit; product used only as fuel Confirm with Colorado counsel Little practical change
    Home beverage distilling Barred by § 5178(a)(1)(B); tax due on production Manufacturer’s license required; no home exception found Location ban gone; registration, permit, tax and state license remain
    Licensed craft distillery Registration and permit; $2.70 or $13.50 per proof gallon Manufacturer’s license; 60.26 cents per liter No change

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Can I legally distill spirits at home in Colorado right now?

    No. The federal location ban still applies to anyone outside the McNutt injunction, which covers the plaintiffs and Hobby Distillers Association members. Colorado’s home production exception covers beer and wine, not spirits.

    Does the Fifth Circuit decision apply in Colorado?

    Not as precedent. The Tenth Circuit has not ruled, and the Sixth Circuit went the other way. The Supreme Court will decide, probably before its 2027 summer recess.

    If McNutt wins, can I sell spirits I make at home?

    No. Selling still requires federal registration and a permit, the excise tax, and a Colorado manufacturer’s license. The case concerns only where a still may sit.

    Do I owe federal excise tax on spirits I make just for myself?

    Yes. The tax attaches when the spirits exist and is due immediately when made outside a qualified plant. Spirits have no personal use exemption.

    Does a small Colorado distillery need a bond?

    Not if it expects no more than $50,000 in federal excise tax for the year and owed no more than $50,000 the year before. Those taxpayers file quarterly and, under section 5551(d), are treated as bonded.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm advises Colorado distillers and other producers on federal excise and income tax questions, entity selection, and penalty abatement when a return or payment slips. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    To have your distillery’s excise filing, bond status and reduced rate allotment reviewed before the 2027 returns, contact North Star Law Firm.