Default Interest and Lender Fees in a Colorado Commercial Real Estate Bankruptcy: Section 506(b) After Desert Willow

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An owner of a Denver warehouse or a Colorado Springs retail strip facing a public trustee sale eventually sees the lender’s payoff figure, and it usually runs well past principal and ordinary interest because the note has flipped to a default rate and the lender’s late charges and legal bills ride along. If the owner files Chapter 11 before the sale, a Colorado bankruptcy court decides how much of that default interest the lender actually gets, and under which law.

A July 2026 New York ruling split those charges at the petition date. Here is what that split means for a Colorado owner under Section 506(b), with the numbers on a $4 million loan.

What did the Desert Willow decision hold about Section 506(b)?

In In re 1300 Desert Willow Rd., LLC, No. 25-11375 (PB) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2026) (bench decision), Judge Philip Bentley ruled on a single-asset debtor’s objection to its lender’s roughly $26 million claim. Oddly for a New York case, the collateral was an industrial plant in New Mexico, inside the Tenth Circuit.

The court held that the word “reasonable” in Section 506(b) reaches only charges accruing after the petition. Earlier charges stand or fall under the law governing the loan, New York law there. The debtor still got relief, just from state law: prepetition late fees were struck as a penalty because they duplicated default interest. Postpetition late fees fell under Section 506(b), while default-rate interest after filing was allowed if the sale shows the lender oversecured.

Why does the petition date split a Colorado lender’s claim in two?

A claim is fixed “as of the date of the filing of the petition” and disallowed only if unenforceable “under any agreement or applicable law.” 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1). As the Supreme Court put it, “[c]reditors’ entitlements in bankruptcy arise in the first instance from the underlying substantive law creating the debtor’s obligation.” Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 549 U.S. 443 (2007).

Postpetition amounts come in through 11 U.S.C. § 506(b), which gives a lender whose collateral exceeds its claim “interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided for under the agreement or State statute under which such claim arose.” United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989), read the interest clause as standing alone, while fees need both a contractual (or, since 2005, statutory) basis and reasonableness. An undersecured lender gets none of it, which is why the equity cushion drives everything below.

Where do the Tenth Circuit and the District of Colorado stand?

The firm has found no published Tenth Circuit decision choosing a side. The closest language is in In re Gledhill, 164 F.3d 1338 (10th Cir. 1999), which said oversecured creditors “are entitled to interest, penalties, attorney fees, and costs that accrue before the debtor’s bankruptcy petition is filed,” while later charges “are permitted only if authorized under 11 U.S.C. § 506(b).” That was framing, not a holding (the case was about a judgment lien), but it reads a lot like Judge Bentley’s line.

The Tenth Circuit’s Bankruptcy Appellate Panel requires an allowed secured claim, oversecured status, a fee right in the agreement or a state statute, and a reasonable amount. In re Sun ‘N Fun Waterpark, LLC, 408 B.R. 361 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2009). And in Denver, Judge Matsch applied an 18 percent default rate instead of the 10 percent note rate from acceleration forward and upheld 4 percent late charges, but sent the fee award back for a proper reasonableness review. In re Neusteter Realty Co., 79 B.R. 30 (D. Colo. 1987).

The other camp exists too. The en banc Eleventh Circuit applied reasonableness to fees whether they vested before or after filing, treating the excess as unsecured. In re Welzel, 275 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2001). The Fifth Circuit agreed in In re 804 Congress, L.L.C., 756 F.3d 368 (5th Cir. 2014).

How does the Colorado public trustee timeline push owners into Chapter 11?

For non-agricultural property, the first sale date falls 110 to 125 calendar days after the notice of election and demand is recorded. C.R.S. § 38-38-108(1). A notice of intent to cure is due 15 calendar days before the sale. C.R.S. § 38-38-104. Talks often run to the wire, so the petition lands days before the sale.

A building producing substantially all of the owner’s income is often single asset real estate under 11 U.S.C. § 101(51B). A company whose main business is owning that property isn’t a small business debtor, so Subchapter V is out (and its debt cap has been $3,424,000 since April 1, 2025). Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3), the debtor then has 90 days from the order for relief to file a plan with a reasonable possibility of confirmation or start monthly payments at the “nondefault contract rate of interest” on the value of the lender’s interest. Those payments preserve the stay. They don’t stop default interest from accruing.

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What does the math look like on a $4 million Colorado loan?

Say a Denver LLC owns one industrial building appraised at $5.5 million, with a $4 million interest-only note at 6 percent ($20,000 a month) that jumps to 11 percent on default and charges 5 percent on late installments. The owner misses the February 2026 payment, the lender accelerates, and the owner files September 15.

Over those seven and a half months, interest at 11 percent comes to $275,000, and $125,000 of it is the default spread. With eight $1,000 late charges and $40,000 of foreclosure fees, the claim is about $4,323,000 on the petition date. Under Desert Willow, that $125,000, the $8,000 and the $40,000 are tested under the note and Colorado law. Under Welzel, the fees and late charges would also face a reasonableness review.

If the case runs a year, the 11 percent rate adds $440,000 (another $200,000 of spread), the lender bills $60,000 in fees, and the 6 percent Section 362(d)(3) payments cover about $259,000. All of that is a Section 506(b) question, and with a cushion still above $900,000 the lender stays oversecured. The spread alone totals about $325,000.

Colorado lets parties agree to rates up to 45 percent a year, C.R.S. § 5-12-103, and the 8 percent rate in C.R.S. § 5-12-102 applies only absent an agreed rate. A penalty challenge to prepetition charges would likely run through the liquidated damages test in Klinger v. Adams County School District No. 50, 130 P.3d 1027 (Colo. 2006). Whether a duplicative late charge fails that test is a state-law question for Colorado-licensed counsel.

Can cure and reinstatement under Section 1124(2) stop the default rate?

A plan can leave the loan unimpaired by curing the default, reinstating the original maturity, and compensating the lender for reliance damages. 11 U.S.C. § 1124(2). That undoes acceleration, so after confirmation the note runs at 6 percent again, saving about $16,667 a month for the rest of the term.

The default interest already accrued is harder. Under 11 U.S.C. § 1123(d), the cure amount “shall be determined in accordance with the underlying agreement and applicable nonbankruptcy law,” and the Ninth Circuit read that to require default interest the note calls for. In re New Investments, Inc., 840 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2016). A Colorado debtor would parse the note and point to the state cure statute, which leaves out principal due only by acceleration and caps interest during a sale continuance at the regular rate. Whether that carries into a bankruptcy cure is an argument, not settled law.

Which law governs each charge in a Colorado case?

Charge Governing law (Desert Willow view) Burden Remedies
Prepetition default interest Note and Colorado law, § 502(b)(1) Filed claim is prima facie valid (Rule 3001(f)); objector must rebut State-law enforceability or penalty challenge
Prepetition late charges and fees Note and Colorado law; Welzel courts add § 506(b) reasonableness Same shifting burden Duplication and penalty arguments
Postpetition default interest § 506(b), only if oversecured Desert Willow presumes the contract default rate; debtor must rebut Valuation fight; cure and reinstatement
Postpetition fees and late charges § 506(b) reasonableness Lender must meet the four Sun ‘N Fun elements Reasonableness and duplication objections

Frequently Asked Questions

Does Desert Willow bind a Colorado bankruptcy court?

No. A D. Colo. judge can treat it only as persuasive, though its reasoning tracks language the Tenth Circuit used in Gledhill.

Can a lender collect default interest after a Colorado Chapter 11 filing?

Only if it’s oversecured. Section 506(b) lets an oversecured lender add postpetition interest, and courts often start from the contract rate, including a default rate. An undersecured lender gets no postpetition interest.

Can a single-asset real estate company use Subchapter V?

Generally no. The small business debtor definition excludes a company whose primary activity is owning single asset real estate, so most Colorado building owners file under regular Chapter 11.

What does the 90-day SARE deadline require?

File a plan with a reasonable possibility of confirmation, or start monthly interest payments at the nondefault contract rate. If the SARE finding comes late, the deadline can run 30 days from that finding. Missing it invites stay relief.

Does curing the loan in a plan wipe out default interest already charged?

Not automatically, because Section 1123(d) ties the cure amount to the loan documents and applicable nonbankruptcy law. Reinstatement does stop the default rate going forward.

Who decides whether a late charge on a Colorado loan is a penalty?

The bankruptcy court, when it rules on a claim objection. Under the Desert Willow view, it would apply Colorado contract law to prepetition charges.

How North Star Law Firm Can Help

North Star Law Firm represents business owners in Chapter 11 and Subchapter V cases, including objections to a lender’s default interest and fees, and handles the real estate tax side of a restructuring. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

Once a notice of election and demand is recorded, the clock is running. To go over the loan documents before the sale date, contact North Star Law Firm.