Category: Bankruptcy

  • Serial Bankruptcy Filings and Colorado Foreclosure: In Rem Relief and the Spouse Who Files

    Serial Bankruptcy Filings and Colorado Foreclosure: In Rem Relief and the Spouse Who Files

    Carmen schedules surgeries at a hospital in Aurora and has shared the deed to an Arapahoe County house with her husband since 2014. They separated in 2024. In 2025 and again in 2026 he filed Chapter 13 alone, each time shortly before a public trustee sale, and both cases were dismissed after he stopped making plan payments. The loan is about $41,000 behind, a third sale is set for January 2027, and the servicer’s lawyer now talks about “in rem relief.”

    Carmen has never filed bankruptcy. She has steady pay and wants to catch the loan up herself. Whether his filings have used up her chance depends mostly on one recorded court order and on how early she moves.

    Does in rem relief from stay in Colorado follow the house or the person who filed?

    Most repeat filer rules follow the person: they count prior cases “of the debtor,” and Carmen filed none. The exception is an order under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4), which is aimed at the real property. A court may enter one when it finds the bankruptcy belonged to a scheme against creditors that involved an unauthorized transfer or “multiple bankruptcy filings affecting such real property.” Once recorded under state law, the order binds any later case affecting that property filed within two years after entry. Companion § 362(b)(20) says no stay arises against enforcing the lien during those two years.

    The 2010 technical corrections act (Pub. L. 111-327, § 2(a)(12)(C)) changed “hinder, and” to “hinder, or,” so the lender does not have to prove fraud. Nothing in the text requires that the same person filed the earlier cases.

    How does the repeat bankruptcy filing ladder work, from 30 days to two years?

    Under § 362(c)(3), if one case of the debtor was pending in the prior year and dismissed, the stay in the new case ends as to that debtor on day 30 unless a hearing to extend it is completed before then. Often the case is presumed filed in bad faith, rebuttable only by clear and convincing evidence. Denver’s L.B.R. 4001-4 requires the motion with the petition or promptly after, on at least 14 days’ notice, and warns that a late motion may be summarily denied (D. Colo. Local Bankruptcy Rules). Under § 362(c)(4), two or more such cases mean no stay at all unless the debtor asks within 30 days and the court imposes one. And § 109(g) bars refiling for 180 days after certain dismissals, with § 362(b)(21) withholding the stay against real property liens in that situation.

    The Tenth Circuit’s bankruptcy appellate panel adds a twist. In Holcomb v. Hardeman (In re Holcomb), 380 B.R. 813 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2008), the panel held the day 30 termination reaches only the debtor and the debtor’s property, not property of the estate. The Fifth Circuit agrees (Rose v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 945 F.3d 226 (5th Cir. 2019)); the First Circuit does not (Smith v. State of Maine Bureau of Revenue Services, 910 F.3d 576 (1st Cir. 2018)). I have not found a Tenth Circuit court of appeals decision resolving it, so lenders here usually file a stay relief or (d)(4) motion rather than wait for day 30.

    How does a Colorado public trustee sale timeline interact with a bankruptcy filing?

    For a nonagricultural home, the first sale date falls 110 to 125 calendar days after the notice of election and demand is recorded (C.R.S. § 38-38-108(1)(a)). An owner curing outside bankruptcy must file a notice of intent to cure at least 15 calendar days before the sale (C.R.S. § 38-38-104(1)). If publication is finished when a petition is filed, the sale rolls week to week, and continuances generally cannot pass 12 months from the original date (C.R.S. § 38-38-109). House Bill 26-1098 (effective July 1, 2026) did not move those deadlines.

    The redemption statute, C.R.S. § 38-38-302, gives redemption rights to junior lienors, not the owner. And the Chapter 13 right to cure a home loan default lasts only until the residence is sold at a foreclosure sale (11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(1)). Why consumer collection law will not stop that sale is covered in Colorado foreclosure after Obduskey.

    Foreclosure Sale Date Set? Contact Us Now

    Can a spouse who filed in good faith lose the stay because of the other spouse’s cases?

    Yes. In In re Villegas, No. 25 B 10323 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 2025), the husband filed four Chapter 13 cases on the house beginning in 2022. The wife then filed her own, citing their separation and three postpetition payments, and lost: the court found her filing part of the scheme and her evidence nowhere near rebutting the bank’s case.

    In Alakozai v. Citizens Equity First Credit Union (In re Alakozai), 499 B.R. 698 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2013), an order entered in the husband’s case and recorded with the county bound the property when the wife later filed her own case, and her challenge to the original findings failed as a collateral attack. That panel requires proof of a scheme, an aim of delay, hindrance or fraud, and a transfer or multiple filings (In re First Yorkshire Holdings, Inc., 470 B.R. 864 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012)).

    I found no Tenth Circuit court of appeals decision and no published Denver bankruptcy opinion construing § 362(d)(4). My read is that Colorado judges would use the same elements and judge good faith on the totality of the circumstances, as the Tenth Circuit does for Chapter 13 bad faith (Gier v. Farmers State Bank of Lucas (In re Gier), 986 F.2d 1326 (10th Cir. 1993)).

    What does a joint owner have to prove to get relief from an in rem order?

    Here I read the cases differently than a lender would. Courts look for quick dismissals, petitions timed to sale dates, no change between cases, long gaps in payments and spouses trading filings. Lenders use that list as a checklist. A good faith joint owner should use it as a map of her proof, because the statute lets a later debtor seek relief “based upon changed circumstances or for good cause shown.”

    For Carmen, the separation counts only if she documents it: a separate address, separate accounts, the divorce filing. Her pay stubs show income his cases never had. Her budget must carry the regular payment plus the cure, paid on time every month.

    Timing matters too: a petition filed weeks ahead with the plan ready looks like repayment, and one filed the night before looks like round three. While her case is pending, § 1301 also stays collection of the consumer debt from her husband as codebtor.

    What would Carmen’s calendar look like before a January 2027 sale in Aurora?

    Illustrative only. His first case was filed March 3, 2025 and dismissed July 15, 2025; his second was filed February 9, 2026 and dismissed June 22, 2026. The sale is set for Wednesday, January 20, 2027.

    If he filed again on December 14, 2026, the lookback year would start December 14, 2025. Only his second case falls in it, so § 362(c)(3) applies, and the stay would end as to him on January 13, 2027 unless extended, a week before the sale, though under Holcomb the house, as estate property, would stay protected until the lender won relief. Had he refiled between June 22 and July 15, 2026, both cases would have counted under (c)(4) and no stay would have arisen.

    Carmen instead files her own Chapter 13 on Wednesday, December 2, 2026, 49 days before the sale. If no (d)(4) order exists, she has the full stay, and the lender may seek in rem relief in her case. If the lender won one in his second case in May 2026 and recorded it with the Arapahoe County clerk and recorder (C.R.S. § 38-35-109(1) allows recording certified court orders), the house has no stay until May 2028 unless she wins relief before January 20. Either way her plan must cure $41,000, about $683 a month over 60 months before the trustee’s fee, plus the regular payment.

    Rule What triggers it Who it binds How to get out
    § 362(c)(3) One of the debtor’s cases pending in the prior year and dismissed The refiling debtor (under Holcomb, not estate property) Extension hearing completed within 30 days; rebut any presumption by clear and convincing evidence
    § 362(c)(4) Two or more such cases The refiling debtor Request within 30 days that the court impose a stay
    § 109(g) Dismissal for willful failure to obey orders, or voluntary dismissal after a stay relief motion The prior debtor, for 180 days Wait out the 180 days
    § 362(d)(4) with § 362(b)(20) Recorded order finding a scheme involving a transfer or multiple filings The property, in any case filed within two years after entry Later debtor’s motion showing changed circumstances or good cause

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Can my spouse’s bankruptcy filings take away my automatic stay in Colorado?

    The 30 day and no stay rules count only your own prior cases. A recorded in rem order from your spouse’s case binds the property itself for two years, whoever files.

    How do I find out whether an in rem order was recorded on my house?

    Search the county clerk and recorder’s records for the property. Then check each prior case docket for a § 362(d)(4) order.

    Is there a deadline to ask for relief from an in rem order?

    The statute sets none, but the order binds cases filed within two years after entry. Practically, relief must come before the sale, because the cure right ends when the house is sold.

    Can I buy my Colorado house back after a public trustee sale?

    Not as the owner. Colorado’s redemption statute gives that right to qualifying junior lienors.

    Will my husband’s dismissed cases count against my good faith?

    They can, if the court finds the filings were coordinated. A documented separation, your own income and a funded plan are what set your case apart.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm represents Colorado homeowners in Chapter 13 cases to cure mortgage arrears, including in rem relief disputes, and advises on whether Chapter 7 or another bankruptcy option fits better. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    If a family member’s filings are hanging over a sale date on your home, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Fighting the IRS in a Colorado Bankruptcy Court: Section 505 After Bush v. United States

    Fighting the IRS in a Colorado Bankruptcy Court: Section 505 After Bush v. United States

    Curtis runs an excavation business in Trinidad as a sole proprietor. The IRS audited his 2021 and 2022 returns, disallowed about $190,000 of equipment and subcontractor expenses for thin records, and in September 2026 mailed a deficiency notice proposing roughly $71,000 of tax plus a 20 percent accuracy penalty. His Tax Court deadline falls in December, and with his equipment lender also unpaid, he is weighing a Chapter 13 in Denver.

    Can a bankruptcy judge decide what he owes, and would that beat the Tax Court? Often yes, but the answer turns less on the jurisdiction fight the Supreme Court declined last December than on his chapter and his estate.

    Can a Colorado bankruptcy court decide how much I owe the IRS under Section 505?

    Yes. 11 U.S.C. § 505(a)(1) lets the court determine the amount or legality of a tax, penalty or addition to tax, whether or not assessed or paid. The fight usually arrives as an objection to the IRS proof of claim, a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B).

    The main limit is § 505(a)(2)(A): the court cannot redo a tax contested and adjudicated before the case began. In City Vending of Muskogee, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 898 F.2d 122 (10th Cir. 1990), the Tenth Circuit applied that bar to state assessments that became final before filing, including one whose merits no tribunal reached because the company let its appeal rights lapse. The same opinion said § 505 stays open where the debtor never challenged the tax or a challenge was pending at filing. The refund waiting period in § 505(a)(2)(B) (120 days after a proper request), the property tax limit in (a)(2)(C) and the § 505(b) procedure for taxes arising during the case do not touch Curtis.

    The burden does not move either. A proof of claim is prima facie evidence under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(f), and under Raleigh v. Illinois Department of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15 (2000) Curtis still has to prove his deductions.

    Does filing Chapter 13 stop my Tax Court deadline?

    It freezes it. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(8) stays a Tax Court case about an individual debtor’s tax for periods ending before the order for relief. A petition filed during the stay is invalid; the Tax Court dismissed one in Halpern v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 895 (1991), under the older statute, and read the current version as reaching cases about the debtor’s own tax in Carter v. Commissioner, 163 T.C. 141 (2024). In exchange, 26 U.S.C. § 6213(f)(1) suspends the 90 day period while the bankruptcy bars a petition and for 60 days after.

    The IRS is not frozen. Under § 362(b)(9) it may still audit, issue a notice of deficiency and assess, and its proof of claim is timely within 180 days after the order for relief under § 502(b)(9)(A) and Rule 3002(c)(1).

    So Curtis must choose before December. If he petitions the Tax Court first, a later Chapter 13 stays that case, and the bankruptcy judge can lift the stay or decide the claim. If he files Chapter 13 first, the fight is in Denver. He cannot let the Tax Court decide and then try again in bankruptcy; § 505(a)(2)(A) bars that. Our post on missing the Tax Court 90 day deadline in Colorado covers the deadline itself.

    IRS Claim in Your Bankruptcy? Contact Us Now

    What did the Supreme Court do with Bush v. United States?

    It turned the case away. The docket for No. 25-108 shows the petition filed July 25, 2025, the government’s opposition on October 29, the reply on November 10, and certiorari denied on December 8, 2025. A denial decides nothing on the merits.

    An Indiana farm couple had conceded about $100,000 of tax in Tax Court and were set for trial on a 75 percent fraud penalty. They filed Chapter 13 that day, converted to Chapter 7, and asked the bankruptcy court to set the penalty. In Bush v. United States, 939 F.3d 839 (7th Cir. 2019), amended at 100 F.4th 807 (7th Cir. 2024), the court held that § 505 assigns a task but grants no jurisdiction, which must come from 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). On remand the couple’s own schedules showed the penalty could not change any creditor’s recovery, so there was no “related to” jurisdiction, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed by per curiam order on April 29, 2025 (No. 24-2996).

    The government’s brief itself pointed out that a tax penalty is more likely to affect creditors in Chapter 11, and that even in the Bushes’ Chapter 7 the court could have decided the tax itself, since the IRS priority claim was partly paid.

    Where does the Tenth Circuit stand on Section 505 and related to jurisdiction?

    The Tenth Circuit has not squarely decided whether § 505 grants jurisdiction on its own. City Vending speaks of jurisdiction under § 505, but the Solicitor General’s brief called that usage loose and denied a circuit split.

    Federal courts in Colorado do have a related to test. In Gardner v. United States (In re Gardner), 913 F.2d 1515 (10th Cir. 1990), a dispute between the IRS and a debtor’s former wife over property a divorce decree had taken out of the estate could not conceivably affect the estate, so it was dismissed. My read is that a Denver bankruptcy judge would use Gardner the way the Seventh Circuit used its test, asking when the objection is filed whether the tax amount could change creditor recoveries or plan payments.

    Even with jurisdiction, the judge may abstain under § 1334(c)(1), and § 1334(d) keeps that choice from the court of appeals. In In re McIntyre, BAP No. CO-22-004 (10th Cir. BAP Dec. 30, 2022) (unpublished), an appeal from Denver, the panel confirmed that abstention can reach claim objections. And Rowland v. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Adv. No. 09-1142 S (Bankr. D.N.M. Apr. 1, 2010) abstained in a closed no asset Chapter 7 because neither policy City Vending named was served.

    Why does the chapter I file decide whether a Section 505 fight is worth it?

    The amount has to matter. In Chapter 13, § 1322(a)(2) requires full payment of priority claims, so every dollar cut from a priority tax comes off the plan payment. In a no asset Chapter 7, abstention is likely.

    An illustration with assumed dates: the notice is dated Monday, September 21, 2026. The 90th day is Sunday, December 20, and § 6213(a) does not count a weekend last day, so a petition is timely Monday, December 21. If Curtis files Chapter 13 on Thursday, December 3, then 73 days have run and 17 are frozen. If the stay lifted March 1, 2027, the freeze would run 60 more days, and on my count the deadline would land around May 17, 2027. I would not cut it that close. The IRS claim would be due Tuesday, June 1, 2027.

    Both years’ tax should be priority: neither deficiency was assessed before filing and both are still assessable, which fits § 507(a)(8)(A)(iii). Over a 60 month plan, the five year maximum under § 1322(d), $71,000 is about $1,183 a month before trustee fees. Every $12,000 the court cuts is $200 a month. The roughly $14,200 penalty is different. Section 507(a)(8)(G) gives priority only to penalties compensating actual loss, so it should share with general unsecured debts, and § 1328(a)(2) does not except it from a completed plan’s discharge. So the fight worth having is over the tax, the reverse of Bush. Timing rules for older taxes are on our discharging tax debt page.

    Should I choose Tax Court or bankruptcy court for my IRS dispute?

    Most Colorado taxpayers have four doors; our post on choosing after a notice of deficiency goes deeper.

    Forum and who decides Pay first? Deadline to get in Main limit
    Tax Court deficiency case, tried in Denver (Tax Court judge) No 90 days after the notice of deficiency Barred while the bankruptcy stay applies
    Bankruptcy court in Denver under § 505 (bankruptcy judge) No No fixed statutory day; object promptly once the IRS files its claim, due 180 days after filing Tax must matter to the estate or plan; judge may abstain
    Refund suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado (district judge or jury) Yes, in full Refund claim first; suit after 6 months, within 2 years of disallowance Full payment rule
    Collection due process hearing, then Tax Court (IRS Appeals, then Tax Court judge) No Request within 30 days of the levy notice; Tax Court within 30 days of the determination Amount open only if no notice of deficiency or other chance to dispute

    The refund rules come from 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a), § 6532(a)(1) and Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960); the hearing rules from § 6330.

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Can I file a Tax Court petition after I file bankruptcy?

    Not while the stay covers those tax years. The 90 day period is suspended during the stay and for 60 days after, so the right is paused, not lost.

    Did the Supreme Court decide Bush v. United States?

    No. It denied certiorari on December 8, 2025, which sets no national rule. Colorado courts follow Tenth Circuit authority.

    Will the IRS stop auditing me if I file Chapter 13?

    No. The IRS may keep auditing, issue a notice of deficiency and assess. The stay holds back collection.

    Can a Denver bankruptcy judge decide my tax in a no asset Chapter 7?

    Sometimes. If the result cannot change what creditors receive, the court may find no jurisdiction or abstain in favor of the Tax Court.

    Does the accuracy penalty have to be paid in full in a Chapter 13 plan?

    Generally not. A penalty that does not compensate actual loss is not a priority claim, and a completed plan’s discharge generally reaches it.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm helps Colorado taxpayers decide whether an IRS deficiency belongs in the Tax Court or a Chapter 13 case in Denver, sequences the filings so neither door closes by accident, and rebuilds the records behind disallowed deductions in audit defense and claim objections. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    If a notice of deficiency and a bankruptcy are both on your table, the order of filings may matter more than anything else you decide this month, so contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Subchapter V at $7.5 Million in Colorado: Owners the Old Limit Locked Out

    Subchapter V at $7.5 Million in Colorado: Owners the Old Limit Locked Out

    Russell owns a precision machining company in Longmont, a Colorado corporation with 31 employees and about $5.2 million of debt: a $2.9 million bank term loan and line secured by equipment and receivables, a $1.6 million SBA COVID EIDL, about $450,000 owed to vendors, and $250,000 Russell lent the company himself. He personally guaranteed the bank loan and the EIDL. In August 2026 a lawyer told him Subchapter V was closed because the company owed more than $3,424,000, and a regular Chapter 11 was priced beyond what the shop could pay.

    That answer was right in August. For a case filed on or after November 10, 2026, it is not.

    What did the Bankruptcy Threshold Adjustment Act change about the Subchapter V debt limit in Colorado?

    H.R. 7730 was signed on Tuesday, November 10, 2026. I read the enrolled bill. Section 2(a) rewrites 11 U.S.C. § 1182(1) so a Subchapter V debtor may owe up to $7,500,000. Section 2(b) replaces § 109(e) with one Chapter 13 limit, less than $2,750,000 of noncontingent, liquidated debt, secured and unsecured together. Section 3 applies both only to cases commenced on or after enactment.

    Subchapter V began February 19, 2020, at $2,725,625. The CARES Act raised it to $7,500,000 on March 27, 2020; later laws extended and revived that figure until it expired June 21, 2024. The limit then fell back to the small business debtor amount in § 101(51D), indexed to $3,424,000 on April 1, 2025.

    The Act leaves the § 101(51D) small business debtor figure at $3,424,000. So a $5 million company that skips the Subchapter V election is not a small business debtor, and § 1102(a)(3) will not keep a creditors’ committee out of its case. Because § 104(a), also untouched, still lists § 109(e) and § 1182(1) for triennial adjustment, I read both new figures as due to adjust on April 1, 2028.

    Does a Colorado company with $3.4 to $7.5 million of debt qualify for Subchapter V now?

    Most will pass the debt test. Amended § 1182(1)(A) counts noncontingent, liquidated debt as of the petition date, excludes debts owed to affiliates or insiders, and requires that at least half arose from business activities. Single asset real estate companies and SEC reporting companies are excluded, and affiliates filing together share one $7,500,000 cap under § 1182(1)(B).

    Worked example (illustrative only). Russell’s company counts $2,900,000 to the bank, $1,600,000 to the SBA and $450,000 to vendors, or $4,950,000, all business debt. His $250,000 loan drops out because § 101(31)(B) makes an officer or person in control an insider. Suppose the company files Monday, December 7, 2026, which under § 301(b) is the order for relief. Section 1188(a) requires a status conference within 60 days, by Friday, February 5, 2027, with the company’s report due 14 days before the date set. The plan is due in 90 days under § 1189(b); day 90 is Sunday, March 7, so Rule 9006(a)(1)(C) moves it to Monday, March 8, 2027.

    Under § 1181(b) there is no committee or disclosure statement unless ordered, and under § 1189(a) only the company may file a plan. A Subchapter V trustee is appointed under § 1183(a); for a Denver case, by the U.S. Trustee for Region 19. No quarterly U.S. Trustee fee is owed, since 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(6)(A) excludes Subchapter V. And § 1191(b) and (c)(2) allow confirmation over objection if the plan, among other requirements, commits projected disposable income for three to five years, so Russell can keep his shares without paying vendors in full.

    Debts Between $3.4 and $7.5 Million? Contact Us Now

    Can a Colorado company already in a regular Chapter 11 switch to Subchapter V?

    Probably not. Section 3 reaches only new cases, so a company that filed an ordinary Chapter 11 in September stays under the old limit. Rule 1020(a) puts the election in the petition, and Rule 1009(a)(1) lets a debtor amend the petition before the case closes. But a case filed before November 10 stays under the old § 1182(1), which borrows the § 101(51D) test: debt measured as of the petition date or order for relief, with a $3,424,000 ceiling.

    Dismissal and refiling carry risks. For individuals, § 109(g) bars a new case for 180 days after certain dismissals, and § 362(c)(3) ends the stay 30 days into a new case filed within a year of a dismissed one. A corporation escapes those, but a refiled case can still be dismissed for cause, including bad faith, under § 1112(b); see my post on bad faith Subchapter V filings in Colorado. I found no ruling since November 10 on pending cases.

    Can you use Subchapter V in Colorado after your business has closed?

    Take an owner whose company closed in 2025, leaving a $2 million EIDL guaranty and other business debt above $3,424,000. Subchapter V was out, and so was Chapter 13, with its April 1, 2025 limits of $526,700 unsecured and $1,580,125 secured. What remains is whether an individual with a closed business is “engaged in commercial or business activities” on the petition date.

    The leading Colorado case is In re Ikalowych, 629 B.R. 261 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2021). Judge Thomas McNamara’s debtor managed and partly owned a hail repair company that stopped operating and surrendered its assets to the bank before filing. He still owned a small management company, did about 12 hours a month of unpaid wind down work, and had started a salaried sales job. About 86 percent of his $7.4 million of debt came from guaranties. Under a totality of the circumstances test the court found him engaged in business, “just barely,” and overruled the U.S. Trustee’s objection. The job counted as activity but not toward the 50 percent test, since none of his debt arose from it.

    At $7.4 million, Ikalowych was shut out of Subchapter V from June 2024 until November 9, 2026. Today he would clear the debt test.

    Two Utah rulings show the range. In In re Offer Space, LLC, 629 B.R. 299 (Bankr. D. Utah 2021), a shut down company qualified because it was still collecting receivables, maintaining bank accounts and winding down for creditors. In In re Bohman, 663 B.R. 831 (Bankr. D. Utah 2024), a retired guarantor whose LLC had been idle since 2015 lost, and his election was stricken. I found no Tenth Circuit or Tenth Circuit BAP decision on point. A Denver judge would likely start from Ikalowych and ask what the owner was doing on filing day.

    In any plan, § 506(a) treats the SBA as secured only up to its collateral’s value, with the rest unsecured. If a demand has arrived, see my post on SBA demand letters and Treasury offset and our SBA loan page.

    Should a Colorado guarantor choose Chapter 13 or Subchapter V under the new $2.75 million limit?

    Under § 524(e), the company’s discharge does not release Russell’s guaranties. If both lenders call them, his exposure is about $4.5 million: too much for Chapter 13, but inside the Subchapter V limit. Before November 10 his own case meant regular Chapter 11 or Chapter 7. Now, since he still runs the company, an individual Subchapter V case is possible.

    Below $2,750,000 there is a real choice. Chapter 13 requires regular income, and spouses may file together under the combined limit. The plan runs three years, or five if household income exceeds the Colorado median (§ 1325(b)(4)), and the standing trustee takes a fee of up to 10 percent of payments under 28 U.S.C. § 586(e). The codebtor stay in § 1301 covers consumer debts only, so it will not protect a spouse who also guaranteed the EIDL.

    An individual Subchapter V plan also runs three to five years. If confirmed without creditor consent, § 1192 delays discharge until those payments are made and excepts debts of the kinds listed in § 523(a). How that exception treats corporate debtors is covered in my 2 Monkey Trading post. In my experience Chapter 13 suits the wage earner whose business is gone; Subchapter V suits the owner still operating.

    What changed on November 10, 2026, at a glance?

    Situation Before Nov. 10, 2026 Cases filed on or after Nov. 10, 2026
    Subchapter V debt ceiling $3,424,000 (since April 1, 2025) $7,500,000
    Chapter 13 ceiling Less than $526,700 unsecured and $1,580,125 secured Less than $2,750,000 combined
    Operating company with about $5 million of debt Regular Chapter 11 only Subchapter V if the other tests are met
    Individual with a closed business and $4 million of guaranty and EIDL debt Regular Chapter 11 or Chapter 7 Subchapter V if engaged in business on filing day; still over the Chapter 13 limit
    Case already pending in regular Chapter 11 Old limits apply Old limits still apply

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Is the $7.5 million Subchapter V limit temporary again?

    The enrolled bill has no sunset clause, unlike the 2020 and 2022 increases. Under section 104(a), it may rise with inflation on April 1, 2028.

    Does money I lent my own company count toward the Subchapter V limit?

    Not if you are an insider. Debts owed to insiders are excluded, and a corporation’s officers, directors and persons in control are insiders.

    Will my company’s Subchapter V plan release my personal guaranty?

    No. Under section 524(e), the company’s discharge does not affect a guarantor’s liability. He needs his own case or a deal with the lender.

    Has the Tenth Circuit decided whether a closed business qualifies for Subchapter V?

    Not as of November 13, 2026. The leading Colorado ruling is In re Ikalowych, a 2021 bankruptcy court decision applying a totality of the circumstances test.

    Does a Subchapter V debtor pay quarterly U.S. Trustee fees?

    No. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(6)(A), the quarterly fee applies in Chapter 11 cases other than those under Subchapter V.

    Can my spouse and I file Chapter 13 together under the new limit?

    Yes. A couple may file jointly if their combined noncontingent, liquidated debts are less than $2,750,000 and the filing spouse has regular income.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm helps Colorado owners weigh Subchapter V against regular Chapter 11 and handles SBA EIDL and guaranty debt in a plan or a Chapter 13 case. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    If you were told this year your debts were too large for Subchapter V, that may have changed. To have your numbers checked again, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Out of State Bankruptcy Subpoena in Colorado: Documents, Video Testimony and Rule 45

    Out of State Bankruptcy Subpoena in Colorado: Documents, Video Testimony and Rule 45

    Nadia owns a structural steel fabrication shop in Montrose, organized as a small Colorado corporation. In 2025 the shop sold about $240,000 of beams and plate to a Nevada general contractor, which filed Chapter 11 in Las Vegas in February 2026. The Chapter 11 trustee has sued the contractor’s former owners for fraudulent transfers. Nadia is not a party, but a process server handed her a subpoena from the Nevada bankruptcy court demanding her invoices and payment records and commanding her to testify at the January 2027 trial “by videoconference from a location of her choosing.” The same trustee’s preference demand letter arrived that week.

    Can a court 430 miles away, as the crow flies, make her do all of that? Some of it, yes. The video testimony, probably not before December 2027.

    Can an out of state bankruptcy subpoena force a Colorado witness to testify by video?

    Bankruptcy Rule 9016 makes civil Rule 45 apply in bankruptcy. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(2) the subpoena issues from the court where the case is pending, and Rule 45(b)(2) allows service anywhere in the United States. Service in Montrose was valid; reach is another matter. Rule 45(c)(1) caps a trial summons at a 100 mile radius around the witness’s home, job, or regular place of business in person, or, in limited cases, her own state. Las Vegas fails both.

    The trustee will say Nadia never leaves home. The Ninth Circuit rejected that argument in In re Kirkland, 75 F.4th 1030 (9th Cir. 2023), where a Chapter 7 trustee in a Los Angeles adversary proceeding had subpoenaed two witnesses to testify by video from their homes in the Virgin Islands. The panel ordered them quashed because a trial “occurs in a specific place: where the court is located.” Nevada is in the Ninth Circuit under 28 U.S.C. § 41, so the Las Vegas court is bound.

    Does the 100 mile limit apply to remote testimony in Colorado and the Tenth Circuit?

    The Tenth Circuit has not decided the Kirkland question, and I found no Colorado bankruptcy court ruling on it. The district courts here lean the Ninth Circuit’s way. In In re EpiPen Marketing, Sales Practices & Antitrust Litigation, No. 17-md-2785 (D. Kan. July 7, 2021), the court refused to use Rule 43(a) to reach defense witnesses outside its subpoena power and predicted the Tenth Circuit would agree. In Perez v. Sunbeam Products, Inc., No. 21-cv-01915 (D. Colo. Nov. 19, 2024), Chief Judge Brimmer denied video testimony from witnesses beyond reach, finding “no authority for allowing video testimony merely because a witness’s presence cannot be procured by subpoena.”

    Some courts elsewhere measure from the witness’s chair; EpiPen collects them. Even where the subpoena is valid, remote trial testimony needs the judge’s permission under Rule 43(a), applied in bankruptcy by Rule 9017, for “good cause in compelling circumstances.” The Tenth Circuit called that standard “permissive and not mandatory” in Eller v. Trans Union, LLC, 739 F.3d 467 (10th Cir. 2013).

    What are the deadlines to object to a bankruptcy subpoena, and where is a motion to quash filed?

    The documents command is different. Rule 45(c)(2)(A) keeps the production site inside a 100 mile radius of Nadia’s business, which means Montrose or electronic delivery, the way most production happens now. A subpoena naming Las Vegas as the production site exceeds the rule.

    Under Rule 45(d)(2)(B), written objections are due “before the earlier of the time specified for compliance or 14 days after the subpoena is served.” A timely objection puts the burden on the trustee to move to compel, and any order compelling production must protect a nonparty from “significant expense.” Under Rule 45(d)(3)(A), “the court for the district where compliance is required” must quash or modify a subpoena that exceeds the geographic limits or imposes undue burden. For documents, that is Colorado, and D.C.COLO.LCivR 84.1(a) refers bankruptcy matters to the bankruptcy judges in Denver. The testimony command is messier: under Kirkland, compliance for a remote trial appearance happens at the Las Vegas courthouse, which makes Nevada a proper forum. Under Rule 45(f), a Colorado court may transfer the motion to Nevada if the witness consents or circumstances are exceptional.

    The Fifth Amendment will not shield business records; Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988), holds that a custodian “may not resist a subpoena for corporate records on Fifth Amendment grounds.” A nonparty’s own legal fees are usually hers to bear, unless the court sanctions the issuing side under Rule 45(d)(1), which can include “reasonable attorney’s fees.”

    Served With a Bankruptcy Subpoena? Contact Us Now

    What would the proposed Rule 45 amendment change, and when could it take effect?

    A fix for Kirkland was published for comment in August 2025 (comments closed February 16, 2026), approved by the rules committees in April and June 2026 and then by the Judicial Conference, and sent to the Supreme Court on October 20, 2026. A new Rule 45(c)(2) would make the place a remote witness attends “the location where the person is commanded to appear in person.” Measured that way, Nadia’s video appearance would occur in Montrose.

    Under 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a), the Court must send a rule to Congress no later than May 1, and it takes effect no earlier than December 1 of that year. The transmittal package projects December 1, 2027. As of November 6, 2026, I found no Supreme Court order and no bill in Congress on the subject. The committee note adds that the change “does not alter the standards for deciding whether to permit in-court remote trial testimony,” so Rule 43(a) and Eller still control. For a January 2027 trial, the current rule governs.

    Why would the trustee who sent a preference demand also subpoena a Colorado supplier?

    Because one set of records answers both questions. Payments Nadia received within 90 days before the petition are exposed under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A), and her best defense is often the ordinary course exception in § 547(c)(2). That defense rests on invoice dates, credit terms, the contractor’s historical payment speed, and whether collection calls preceded the money. Those are the records the subpoena demands.

    I treat the subpoena and the demand letter as one matter. Our post on preference demand letters and the ordinary course and new value defenses covers the defense itself. A trustee could also seek a Rule 2004 examination, but Rule 2004(c) compels attendance through Rule 9016, so the same mileage limits apply. Ignoring out of state bankruptcy papers is riskier still; see our post on default judgments against Colorado vendors.

    How would the dates and costs work for a Montrose steel shop?

    An illustrative calendar: service on Thursday, November 12, 2026; production due December 5; trial January 20, 2027 in Las Vegas, about 540 driving miles away. Fourteen days after service is November 26, Thanksgiving. Bankruptcy Rule 9006(a) carries a deadline that lands on a legal holiday to the next day, but I would serve objections by Wednesday, November 25.

    Assume gathering 2025 invoices, bank records and emails takes 12 staff hours at $45 plus five hours of lawyer review at $350: about $2,290 before any motion. Nadia can object to the video command and move to quash. Or she can offer a deposition in Montrose, which Rule 45(c)(1)(A) allows and which Rule 32(a)(4)(B), applied through Bankruptcy Rule 7032, lets the trustee play at trial because she lives beyond 100 miles from the courthouse, in exchange for a narrower request and reimbursed costs.

    The calendar also explains the urgency. If the petition was filed February 10, 2026, 11 U.S.C. § 546(a)(1)(A) gives the trustee until February 10, 2028 to sue on a preference. January testimony previews her defense with a year to spare.

    Command from an out of state bankruptcy court Enforceable today under Rule 45(c)? After the amendment (Dec. 1, 2027 at the earliest) Where to challenge it; who pays
    Produce invoices and payment records Yes, if produced within 100 miles of the business or electronically No change (provision renumbered) Colorado bankruptcy court; witness bears routine costs, with protection from significant expense
    Sit for a deposition in Colorado Yes, within 100 miles of Montrose No change, but 14 days’ notice required Colorado bankruptcy court; issuing party tenders fees and mileage
    Travel to Las Vegas for trial No No change Nevada or Colorado; sanctions possible against the issuer
    Give trial testimony by video from Colorado No in the Ninth Circuit; undecided in the Tenth Reachable, but only with Rule 43(a) approval Nevada under Kirkland, or Colorado; fee shifting only as a sanction

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Can a Nevada bankruptcy court make me testify by Zoom from Colorado?

    Not under the current rule as the Ninth Circuit read it in In re Kirkland, which binds Nevada courts. The proposed amendment cannot take effect before December 1, 2027. You can still agree to testify remotely if you prefer.

    How long do I have to object to a subpoena for documents?

    Written objections are due before the earlier of the compliance date or 14 days after service. Serve them early rather than relying on holiday rollover rules.

    Do I have to travel to another state for a bankruptcy deposition?

    No. A subpoena cannot make you attend beyond a 100 mile radius of your home, job, or regular place of business. The party wanting your testimony has to come to you or take it by video.

    Will the trustee pay for my time gathering documents?

    Not automatically. After a timely objection, an order compelling production must protect a nonparty from significant expense. Many trustees will narrow the request to avoid a motion.

    Is a Tax Court subpoena limited to 100 miles?

    No. Under 26 U.S.C. § 7456(a) and Tax Court Rule 147(c), the Tax Court can compel witnesses from any place in the United States, and it has held remote sessions on Zoomgov since 2020. See our post on the Tax Court place of trial for Colorado taxpayers.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm helps Colorado business owners respond to subpoenas and demand letters from bankruptcy cases filed in other states, and defends the preference claims that often follow. It also handles Chapter 11 matters and Tax Court litigation. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    If a bankruptcy subpoena has arrived, the 14 day objection window comes first, so contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Who Can Put a Colorado LLC Into Bankruptcy? Consent Clauses, Lender Vetoes and Receivers

    Who Can Put a Colorado LLC Into Bankruptcy? Consent Clauses, Lender Vetoes and Receivers

    Vincent owns 49 percent of a commercial HVAC contractor in Lakewood, organized as a Colorado LLC, and he runs the jobs. The other 51 percent belongs to a man who used to be married to Vincent’s sister and now lives in Arizona. The company owes about $1.4 million, an SBA 7(a) loan included, and a judgment creditor has asked the Jefferson County District Court to appoint a receiver. Vincent believes a Subchapter V case in Denver is the only way to keep 22 people working, and his partner has stopped returning calls.

    Then he rereads the operating agreement. Filing requires “unanimous consent of the members,” and the bank’s affiliate sits inside the company as a “special member” with a veto. The first question is not whether Subchapter V would work. It is whether anyone can sign the petition.

    Who can file bankruptcy for a Colorado LLC when the members disagree?

    State law answers that. In Price v. Gurney, 324 U.S. 100 (1945), the Supreme Court said authority to file for a company “finds its source in local law,” and a court that finds the filers lacked it “has no alternative but to dismiss the petition.” Having a right to obtain authority later is not enough.

    For a Colorado LLC, C.R.S. § 7-80-401 lets a majority of members (or managers) make routine decisions, but subsection (2) requires each member’s consent for an act “not in the ordinary course of the business.” C.R.S. § 7-80-108(1)(a) lets the operating agreement set the members’ own rules, and Vincent’s agreement removes any doubt. Neither man can file over the other’s objection.

    The Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel applied this to a Colorado LLC in In re DB Capital Holdings, LLC, BAP No. CO-10-046 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. Dec. 6, 2010). An Aspen condominium developer’s lender already had a Colorado state court receiver, and an amendment the manager blamed on the lender barred bankruptcy filings. The manager filed Chapter 11 anyway, and the panel affirmed dismissal. The ban was a deal among members, with no proof of coercion, and a unanimous consent rule for acts outside ordinary business independently barred the filing. It is unpublished, but it is the closest Colorado authority I have found.

    Can a lender’s special member or golden share block a Colorado LLC from filing?

    Who holds the veto matters. In In re Lake Michigan Beach Pottawattamie Resort LLC, 547 B.R. 899 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2016), a forbearance deal made the lender a special member that could block a filing while weighing only its own interests, and the court held the provision void. In In re Intervention Energy Holdings, LLC, 553 B.R. 258 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016), a lender’s single $1 unit carried a filing veto the court called “tantamount to an absolute waiver.” In re Lexington Hospitality Group, LLC, No. 17-51568 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Sept. 15, 2017) agreed, calling a lender’s “independent manager” “merely a pretense.”

    Real owners get more room. In re Franchise Services of North America, Inc., 891 F.3d 198 (5th Cir. 2018) enforced a preferred shareholder’s consent right although its parent was also owed a fee, protecting “a bona fide shareholder” who votes against a petition.

    No Tenth Circuit or Colorado bankruptcy court decision has tested a lender affiliate’s veto. Section 7-80-108(1.5) lets an agreement restrict fiduciary duties unless that is “manifestly unreasonable,” and § 7-80-108(2)(d) bars eliminating good faith and fair dealing. My read: a Denver judge would likely treat a special member answering only to the bank as Lake Michigan did, but enforce a real owner’s unanimity right. An SBA 7(a) loan covenant is not a vote inside the LLC; after a filing, the lender’s tools are stay relief or a motion to dismiss for bad faith Subchapter V filings.

    Fighting Over Who Controls the Filing? Contact Us Now

    Does a Jefferson County receiver take away the members’ power to file?

    That turns on the order’s words. Colorado courts appoint receivers under C.R.C.P. 66, including after judgment. A creditor with an unsatisfied judgment against an insolvent LLC can also seek judicial dissolution under C.R.S. § 7-80-810, where C.R.S. § 7-80-812 allows a custodian who may act “through or in place of its managers or members.”

    An order to take the trucks and receivables and “manage the business” is aimed at property. I found no Colorado or Tenth Circuit decision holding that an order silent on bankruptcy strips members of the power to file; I expect a Colorado judge would reason as the Third Circuit did.

    Filing triggers the 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) stay. A state court receiver is a “custodian” under 11 U.S.C. § 101(11), and 11 U.S.C. § 543 requires it to stop administering the property except to preserve it, then turn it over, unless the court excuses that under § 543(d).

    What did Whittaker decide, and when does it reach a Colorado company?

    In In re Whittaker, Clark & Daniels, Inc., 176 F.4th 241 (3d Cir. 2026), a revised opinion issued April 27, 2026 on panel rehearing, the Third Circuit again upheld a New Jersey board’s filing over a South Carolina receiver’s objection. New Jersey law governed the board’s authority under the internal affairs doctrine. The receivership order “nowhere” addressed corporate affairs, and to displace the board the receiver needed recognition and an ancillary appointment in New Jersey. Filing without authority is “cause” to dismiss under 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b), not a jurisdictional defect.

    It binds only the Third Circuit, and for a Colorado LLC under a Jefferson County receiver the recognition problem never arises. It matters when a Delaware or Wyoming LLC operates here, or when another state’s court appoints a receiver over a Colorado LLC. As of November 6, 2026, two certiorari petitions are pending: No. 26-159, from the receiver, Peter Protopapas, fully briefed since September 4, and No. 26-263, from the talc claimants’ committee, with the response due November 6.

    What can a 49 percent member do if the majority member will not consent?

    Filing anyway is the weakest move. The partner moves to dismiss under § 1112(b) and likely wins, and the signed petition is a certification under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011 that it is warranted by law. Vincent can negotiate, perhaps offering a price for his partner’s interest, or ask a Colorado court for dissolution under § 7-80-810 because it is “not reasonably practicable” to run the business under the agreement.

    Creditors have a door members lack. Under 11 U.S.C. § 303(b), three creditors holding undisputed, noncontingent claims of at least $21,050 above their liens (the figure since April 1, 2025) can file an involuntary Chapter 7 or 11 case, or one creditor if there are fewer than 12, not counting insiders and employees. Owning equity does not make Vincent a creditor. Losing petitioners can owe fees or damages under § 303(i). In DB Capital, creditors filed one three days after the dismissal.

    How would this play out for a Lakewood HVAC contractor?

    This is illustrative. The company’s $1.4 million is under the $3,424,000 debt limit applied by 11 U.S.C. § 1182(1) and § 101(51D), in effect since April 1, 2025. H.R. 7730, the Bankruptcy Threshold Adjustment Act of 2026, passed the House September 16 and the Senate September 28, 2026; as of November 6 the record shows no presentment or signature.

    Say the receiver hearing is set for January 12, 2027. In version one, the partner and the special member sign a written consent, and the LLC files Subchapter V in Denver on December 7, 2026. The stay halts the receiver motion.

    In version two, the partner refuses, and on January 12 the court appoints a receiver to “manage the business,” saying nothing about bankruptcy. Vincent still cannot file; his obstacle is the consent clause, not the receiver.

    In version three, Vincent files alone in December. His partner moves to dismiss, and by late January the case is likely gone, the retainer spent and the receiver hearing back on calendar. If the company stops in February owing two weeks of wages, each of the 22 employees has a priority claim under 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4) up to $17,150 (the cap since April 1, 2025) for wages earned within 180 days before the petition or the shutdown, whichever comes first.

    Situation Can it block a filing? Key authority First step, and the risk of skipping it
    Unanimous consent clause among real members Likely yes § 7-80-401(2); DB Capital; Price Get written consent; filing without it invites dismissal
    Lender affiliate special member veto Doubtful, untested in Colorado Lake Michigan; Intervention Energy Learn how the veto was imposed; losing means dismissal
    Colorado receivership order silent on bankruptcy Probably not by itself C.R.C.P. 66; § 543; Whittaker by analogy Read the order; one displacing the members changes the answer
    Out of state receiver over a Colorado LLC Not without Colorado recognition Whittaker; internal affairs doctrine Check for a Colorado recognition filing

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Can the majority member of a Colorado LLC file bankruptcy without the minority member?

    Under the default rule in C.R.S. § 7-80-401(2), no. A filing is outside the ordinary course and needs every member’s consent unless the operating agreement says otherwise.

    Is a bankruptcy filed without authority automatically void?

    No. Someone must raise it, usually by a section 1112(b) motion. If the filers lacked authority under state law, Price v. Gurney requires dismissal.

    Does a receiver appointment stop my Colorado LLC from filing bankruptcy?

    Not by itself; it depends on whether the order reaches governance or only property. After a filing, section 543 generally requires the receiver to turn property over.

    Can my SBA lender prohibit my company from filing bankruptcy?

    Several courts have refused to enforce lender vetoes built into a borrower’s governance, and a loan covenant is not a member vote. The Tenth Circuit has not ruled.

    Can creditors put a deadlocked Colorado LLC into bankruptcy?

    Yes. Under section 303(b), three qualifying creditors with at least $21,050 in undisputed claims, or one if there are fewer than 12, can file an involuntary Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 case.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm represents Colorado business owners and members in Subchapter V cases, Chapter 11 reorganizations and SBA loan and business debt problems. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    If members or a receiver are fighting over your company’s filing, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Colorado Chapter 11 Landlords: Using Rents as Cash Collateral and the Equity Cushion

    Colorado Chapter 11 Landlords: Using Rents as Cash Collateral and the Equity Cushion

    Lorena owns two older apartment buildings in Pueblo through an LLC she owns alone: 46 units, one deed of trust to a regional bank, and an assignment of rents in the loan papers. The balloon came due in 2026, the bank would not extend, and the LLC filed Chapter 11 in Denver to buy time for a refinance. Rents run about $52,000 a month, and the gas bill, the manager’s payroll and the insurance premium are due before the bank calls back.

    The bank’s first letter says every dollar of rent is its cash collateral. That is partly right, but a court can still let the LLC spend rents, and the answer turns mostly on what the LLC can prove in the first two weeks.

    Can a Colorado landlord use rents in a Chapter 11 when the lender has an assignment of rents?

    Only with consent from the bank or a court order. 11 U.S.C. § 363(a) puts encumbered “rents” inside the definition of cash collateral, § 363(c)(2) bars using them without consent or an order entered “after notice and a hearing,” and § 363(c)(4) requires the debtor to “segregate and account for” them meanwhile. Spending them anyway can be cause to convert or dismiss under § 1112(b)(4)(D).

    Rents collected after the filing stay subject to the bank’s lien because of § 552(b)(2), added in 1994, which reaches them “to the extent provided in such security agreement” and “notwithstanding section 546(b).” Before that, Colorado courts asked whether the lender had perfected its rents interest under state law. Colorado is a lien theory state (C.R.S. § 38-35-117), and in Consolidated Capital Income Trust v. Colter, Inc., 47 B.R. 1008 (D. Colo. 1985), Judge Matsch called a mortgagee’s interest in apartment rents “an inchoate or passive lien.” In re RV Centennial Partnership, 202 B.R. 774 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1996) treated a receiver’s appointment, now governed by C.R.S. § 38-38-601, as the step that perfected it.

    Now the loan documents carry most of the weight, read under Colorado law. As far as I can find, Colorado has not enacted the Uniform Assignment of Rents Act, and the Tenth Circuit has not construed § 552(b)(2). The court may trim the lien “based on the equities of the case,” but a debtor should not plan around that.

    What does a cash collateral motion in the Denver bankruptcy court have to show?

    Interim use is requested under L.B.R. 2081-1, for expedited motions in the first 21 days after the order for relief. The motion needs affidavits from someone with personal knowledge and must reach the U.S. Trustee within four hours after filing. Chambers tries to set a hearing within three days, and only an interim order issues.

    L.B.R. 4001-2 requires a “line item budget for both the interim and final order periods.” Under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4001(b)(2), the final hearing starts “no earlier than 14 days after” service, and until then the court allows only what is “necessary to avoid immediate and irreparable harm.” Section 363(p)(1) puts the burden of proving adequate protection on the debtor.

    Lender Cutting Off Your Rents? Contact Us Now

    Why did the Broadway Realty debtors lose, and should a Colorado landlord worry?

    In In re Broadway Realty I Co., LLC, No. 25-11050 (DSJ) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2025), 82 related New York apartment owners, each with its own Flagstar loan, asked to keep spending rents. Judge Jones denied the motion without prejudice. Some cushions were under 18 percent on the debtors’ own appraisals, the budget was consolidated though a property level version existed, and nobody could break down the professional fees.

    Read it as a list of missing exhibits. The judge refused to wait for proof of harm, calling adequate protection “an explicitly prospective enterprise.” The cases ended in a liquidating plan confirmed in January 2026. A Colorado case with one lender and two buildings can close those gaps by building the numbers property by property.

    How big an equity cushion does a Colorado bankruptcy judge need to see?

    There is no Tenth Circuit percentage. In re O’Connor, 808 F.2d 1393 (10th Cir. 1987) treats adequate protection as a question of fact, decided “flexibly on the proverbial ‘case-by-case’ basis,” and reinstated an order letting debtors spend cash collateral backed by replacement liens. In In re Gallegos Research Group, Corp., 193 B.R. 577 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1995), Judge Krieger wrote that sufficiency “must be determined by the facts in each case,” and a small cushion or a long case can fall short.

    The closest apartment case is In re Bluejay Properties, LLC, BAP No. KS-12-105 (10th Cir. BAP Mar. 12, 2014) (unpublished). A Kansas complex worth about $17 million secured a claim of slightly less than $14 million, and the panel held that “adequate protection” does not require “identical protection,” letting the debtor pay legal fees from rents. It persuades but does not bind. The familiar 15 and 20 percent figures come from cases the Broadway Realty opinion surveyed, not from any Colorado rule.

    The CHFA Colorado Statewide Apartment Survey for the second quarter of 2026 puts Pueblo metro vacancy at 2.6 percent and average rent at $1,190, against 5.5 percent statewide, after vacancy rose across Colorado from late 2022 through 2025. That helps a Pueblo debtor.

    What should the budget show, and can rents pay the lawyers?

    As a forensic accountant, I want a rent roll for each building, a trailing twelve month operating statement, an escrow tied to actual bills, and a line for the U.S. Trustee’s quarterly fee under 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(6), which through 2030 is the greater of 0.4 percent of disbursements or $250 for quarters under $1 million. Professional fees go on a separate line, paid from other money unless the bank agrees.

    Section 506(c) rarely rescues that line. It reaches reasonable, necessary costs of preserving the property only “to the extent of any benefit” to the lender, and lawyers hired to fight the lender do not benefit it. Property taxes qualify. Default interest and fees also shrink the cushion; see default interest and lender fees under section 506(b).

    How would this play out for Lorena’s Pueblo apartment buildings?

    This example is illustrative. Say the LLC filed Tuesday, November 3, 2026, the buildings appraise together at $4.9 million, and the bank is owed $4.1 million. The cushion is $800,000, about 16.3 percent of value, and $90,000 of asserted default interest and fees would cut it to about 14.5 percent. Alone, that proves little. Had the appraisal come in below the debt, United Savings Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U.S. 365 (1988) would give the bank protection against decline only, nothing for delay.

    Rents of $52,000, less $31,000 of operating costs including payroll and a $6,500 escrow, leave $14,500. At an assumed 4 percent nondefault contract rate, interest on $4.1 million is about $13,667 a month. A realistic offer under § 361 is that monthly interest, replacement liens on postpetition rents, and weekly reports. About $833 a month remains, before a quarterly trustee fee near $614.

    The 46 units clear the “fewer than 4 residential units” carve out in § 101(51B), so the question is whether two buildings are “a single property or project.” If so, § 362(d)(3) requires a plan with “a reasonable possibility of being confirmed” or monthly interest at the “nondefault contract rate” within 90 days after the order for relief (February 1, 2027 here), or 30 days after a later SARE finding. Otherwise the stay lifts and the bank forecloses through the public trustee, as discussed in Colorado foreclosure after Obduskey.

    Subchapter V is probably closed. The definition in § 101(51D) excludes “a person whose primary activity is the business of owning single asset real estate,” and the $3,424,000 debt limit in effect since April 1, 2025 (Federal Register notice of Feb. 4, 2025) is below the LLC’s debt. As of November 6, 2026, H.R. 7730, which would raise the limit to $7.5 million, had passed both chambers with no signature recorded, and it keeps the single asset exclusion.

    Here is how the usual packages compare.

    Protection offered What the debtor must prove Typical interim result (general observation) Risk to debtor and usual lender response
    Equity cushion only Current appraisal and stable value Approved if wide; often denied when thin Lender’s appraiser attacks the cap rate
    Cushion plus monthly interest Cushion and net rent to pay contract interest Often approved when net rent covers it Little cash left; lender disputes the rate
    Replacement liens and reporting Rents and occupancy will hold Weeks at a time, tied to the budget A shortfall reopens the fight
    Consent with agreed budget Terms that clear L.B.R. 4001-2 Usually entered quickly Lender seeks a § 506(c) waiver

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Are apartment rents cash collateral in a Colorado Chapter 11?

    Yes, if the deed of trust or a separate assignment gives the lender a security interest in rents. Section 552(b)(2) carries that interest into rents collected after filing.

    Does my lender need a receiver before I file to claim the rents?

    Generally not, after the 1994 amendment. Older Colorado cases turned on receivers and notice, but the security agreement now carries most of the weight, read under Colorado law.

    How fast can the Denver bankruptcy court approve use of rents?

    Chambers tries to hear an expedited motion within three days under L.B.R. 2081-1. That yields only an interim order; a final hearing waits at least 14 days after service.

    Is a 20 percent equity cushion required in Colorado?

    No Colorado or Tenth Circuit rule sets a number. Judges weigh the cushion with value trends, cash flow and the other protection offered.

    Does the 90 day single asset deadline apply to my building?

    Only if the property is single asset real estate, which excludes residential property with fewer than four units. Then the debtor needs a confirmable plan or monthly interest payments by day 90.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm represents Colorado property owners in Chapter 11 reorganizations, including cash collateral fights, and advises on Subchapter V eligibility and the tax side of a refinance or sale. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    A rents motion is won on proof. If your lender is trying to cut off the rents your buildings run on, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Bankruptcy Mediation in Colorado: L.B.R. 9019-2, the Subchapter V Trustee and Rule 9019

    Bankruptcy Mediation in Colorado: L.B.R. 9019-2, the Subchapter V Trustee and Rule 9019

    Margo owns a restaurant group in Steamboat Springs: a flagship dining room downtown and a smaller café nearby. After two thin winters her company filed Subchapter V in Denver owing about $2.6 million, including a $500,000 SBA EIDL. The flagship’s landlord filed a $410,000 claim for back rent and rejection damages and says it will vote against any plan.

    Margo asks whether a mediator can get the landlord to a number before confirmation, who pays for one, and what the Subchapter V trustee should be doing meanwhile. In Colorado the answers start with a short local rule.

    How does bankruptcy mediation work in Colorado under L.B.R. 9019-2?

    Under L.B.R. 9019-2, part of the Local Bankruptcy Rules as amended effective December 1, 2021, the court “may refer a matter to mediation sua sponte, upon written stipulation, or upon motion by a party or the United States Trustee.” Participation is voluntary “[u]nless otherwise ordered,” so a judge can require it. Afterward the mediator reports only the dates, who attended, and whether the matter resolved.

    What the rule leaves out matters more. It has no mediator roster, nothing on fees and no confidentiality clause, and the court’s general orders, checked October 30, 2026, add no mediation or loss-mitigation program. So the parties pick a private mediator and submit a stipulated motion with a referral order that fills those gaps.

    Fed. R. Evid. 408 only limits using settlement talk as evidence of a claim’s amount. Colorado’s Dispute Resolution Act protects mediation communications (C.R.S. § 13-22-307), but Fed. R. Evid. 501 applies federal common law to privilege on federal questions like claim allowance, and the district court’s ADR clause, D.C.COLO.LCivR 16.6(e), covers only communications to a magistrate judge. Put confidentiality in the referral order and a signed mediation agreement.

    What is the Subchapter V trustee supposed to do to help settle my case?

    Under 11 U.S.C. § 1183(b)(7), the trustee shall “facilitate the development of a consensual plan of reorganization,” and the U.S. Trustee Program’s Subchapter V trustee handbook tells trustees to start plan talks “[a]s soon as possible.” The trustee is the first call. The status conference comes within 60 days after the order for relief, and at least 14 days before it the debtor reports its efforts “to attain a consensual plan of reorganization” (§ 1188(a), (c)). That report is where Margo should say the landlord dispute needs a neutral.

    The trustee is not free, though; fees are allowed under § 330(a) and paid by the estate. Nor is the trustee a confidential neutral. Section 1183(b)(3) has the trustee heard on valuation and confirmation, and § 1183(b)(2) lets the court order an investigation. A mediator who reports only “settled” or “not settled” can hear what Margo would never tell the trustee.

    How much can a landlord claim after a rejected restaurant lease, and can mediation settle it?

    Rejection counts as a breach just before the petition (§ 365(g)(1)), and § 502(b)(6) caps the landlord at rent for “the greater of one year, or 15 percent, not to exceed three years, of the remaining term,” plus rent unpaid at filing.

    Illustrative example (hypothetical numbers). The flagship lease has 76 months left at $9,800 a month. Fifteen percent of 76 months is 11.4 months, under a year, so one year controls: $117,600. Add four months of unpaid prepetition rent, $39,200, and the cap is $156,800, not $410,000.

    A bank holds $700,000 with a first lien on assets worth $760,000, so the SBA’s EIDL is $60,000 secured and $440,000 unsecured under § 506(a). With $990,000 of trade debt and the capped landlord, the unsecured class totals $1,586,800. A plan paying it $210,000 over three years returns about 13.2 cents.

    The vote is the landlord’s leverage. A class accepts with two-thirds in amount and more than half in number of those voting (§ 1126(c)), and many trade creditors never vote. If creditors holding $260,000 vote yes, the SBA abstains, and the landlord votes no on its filed claim (deemed allowed until Margo objects, § 502(a)), the class rejects; even at $156,800, yes reaches only 62 percent. That forces a cramdown under § 1191(b), where the trustee usually disburses payments (§ 1194(b)) and the discharge waits for completed payments under § 1192. See the post on whether a Colorado Subchapter V company can still owe a fraud debt.

    Now mediate it. The landlord takes an allowed claim of $130,000, Margo assumes the café lease the same landlord owns and cures $18,000 of arrears over six months (§ 365(b)(1)(A)), and the landlord votes yes. The class accepts, and if the SBA’s secured class accepts or is unimpaired, the plan goes under § 1191(a): discharge at confirmation, and the trustee’s service ends at substantial consummation (§ 1183(c)(1)). Negotiate both leases together: § 365(d)(4) allows 120 days after the order for relief to assume the café lease, one 90-day extension, and more only with the landlord’s written consent.

    Who pays for a bankruptcy mediator in a Denver Subchapter V case?

    L.B.R. 9019-2 is silent, so the referral order or mediation agreement sets the fee; an even split is common. The estate’s half needs court authority: employment under § 327(a) with fees allowed under § 330, or express authority in a noticed referral order, with the fee paid as an administrative expense under § 503(b). I want the rate, a cap and the split in the order before the session is booked.

    A contested confirmation costs more: a claim objection, feasibility and valuation evidence, and trustee time throughout. And mind the trap: referral “does not operate to stay, postpone, or extend any deadlines,” and the 90-day plan deadline in § 1189(b) stretches only for circumstances for which the debtor “should not justly be held accountable.”

    How is a mediated settlement approved under Rule 9019 in Colorado?

    A handshake binds no one until the court approves it. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019(a), restyled effective December 1, 2024, allows approval “[o]n the trustee’s motion and after notice and a hearing,” and a Subchapter V debtor in possession holds the trustee’s powers (§ 1184). Rule 2002(a)(3) requires 21 days’ notice to creditors. Colorado has no L.B.R. 9019-1; the notice follows L.B.R. 9013-1 and must state a specific objection date.

    In Reiss v. Hagmann, 881 F.2d 890 (10th Cir. 1989), the Tenth Circuit reversed approval of a settlement the sole creditor opposed, holding that approval “must be an informed one based upon an objective evaluation of developed facts.” In re Kopexa Realty Venture Co., 213 B.R. 1020 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1997) lists the factors: “the probable success of the underlying litigation on the merits, the possible difficulty in collection of a judgment, the complexity and expense of the litigation, and the interests of creditors in deference to their reasonable views,” and vacated an approval resting on the trustee’s business judgment without findings. Both trace to Protective Committee v. Anderson (TMT Trailer Ferry), 390 U.S. 414 (1968), which demands facts, not allegations.

    So Margo’s motion needs a declaration with the § 502(b)(6) math. A deal written into the plan is instead tested at confirmation on 28 days’ notice under Rule 2002(b)(2). If it releases Margo’s guaranty, see Colorado plan releases after Purdue.

    Which disputes in a Colorado Chapter 11 small business case are worth mediating?

    Mediation pays where the dollars are uncertain and both sides spend to fight: valuation, disputes among LLC members, and preference suits, which the federal ADR statute covers as “adversary proceedings in bankruptcy” (28 U.S.C. § 651(b)). The SBA is harder. An agency may compromise a claim of up to $100,000, excluding interest, or a higher amount the Attorney General sets (31 U.S.C. § 3711(a)(2)), so on a larger EIDL balance the person at the table usually cannot say yes that day. Skip mediation for a pure legal question a judge can decide on briefs, a creditor with no economic stake, or a debtor that cannot fund any deal.

    Dispute Natural facilitator How the deal is approved, and when Cost sensitivity
    Landlord rejection claim Trustee, then a mediator Rule 9019 motion, 21 days’ notice; before ballots High: the cap limits the dollars
    Creditor fraud objection Mediator in the adversary Stipulated dismissal or judgment; before the vote Moderate: matters mainly in cramdown
    Preference adversary Mediator Rule 9019 motion; often after confirmation High: defense costs rival the transfer
    Lender adequate protection Judge at the § 1188 conference, or trustee Rule 4001(d) stipulation, 14-day objection period; first 60 days Moderate: payments drive feasibility
    Unsecured class vote Trustee (§ 1183(b)(7)) Ballots under § 1126(c); confirmation under § 1191(a) or (b) Low cash, high stakes: sets discharge timing

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Can the Colorado bankruptcy court make me go to mediation?

    Yes. Under L.B.R. 9019-2(a) the court can refer a matter on its own, on a stipulation, or on a motion by a party or the U.S. Trustee, and participation is voluntary only until the court orders otherwise.

    Does mediation pause my Subchapter V deadlines?

    No. A referral extends nothing unless the court orders it, so the 90-day plan deadline and the 120-day deadline to assume or reject a commercial lease keep running.

    Is talking to the Subchapter V trustee the same as mediating?

    No. The trustee must help build a consensual plan but is also heard at confirmation and can be ordered to investigate, so those conversations are not confidential.

    Is there mediation if my bankruptcy case is appealed?

    At the Tenth Circuit, the Circuit Mediation Office may hold confidential conferences in any pending matter under 10th Cir. R. 33.1. The BAP’s local rules, effective January 1, 2026, have no mediation procedure.

    Can a business with $2.6 million of debt use Subchapter V in Colorado?

    Yes, under the $3,424,000 limit in effect since April 1, 2025. H.R. 7730 would raise it to $7,500,000; as of October 30, 2026 it had passed both chambers, with no signature recorded.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm represents Colorado business owners in Subchapter V reorganizations and Chapter 11 cases, including landlord claim disputes, plan negotiations and SBA loan and business debt problems. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    If one creditor’s vote stands between your company and a consensual plan, raise mediation before the status conference report is due, and contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Your Colorado Customer Paid You, Then Filed Bankruptcy: Preference Clawbacks and Defenses

    Your Colorado Customer Paid You, Then Filed Bankruptcy: Preference Clawbacks and Defenses

    Hollis owns an electrical-supply distributor in Longmont. A Fort Lupton contractor that owed him about $71,000 sent three wires over seven weeks totaling $38,000, then filed Chapter 7 in Denver. Eleven months later the trustee’s lawyer sent a preference demand letter: return the $38,000, or pay $28,000 within 30 days.

    Nobody accuses Hollis of wrongdoing. Bankruptcy still reaches payments made just before a filing, but the creditor has defenses, and the Tenth Circuit has said a good deal about them.

    Can a Colorado bankruptcy trustee take back a payment your customer made before filing?

    Yes. Under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b), a trustee can avoid a payment to a creditor on an antecedent debt, made while the debtor was insolvent and within 90 days before the petition, that let the creditor collect more than a Chapter 7 liquidation would pay. For an insider, such as an officer of a corporate debtor under § 101(31), the reach-back is one year. Section 550(a)(1) then lets the trustee recover the money.

    The trustee carries those elements under § 547(g), helped by the § 547(f) presumption of insolvency during the 90 days; the creditor carries the § 547(c) defenses. Since February 19, 2020, § 547(b) has also required “reasonable due diligence in the circumstances of the case” that takes into account a party’s “known or reasonably knowable affirmative defenses.” In Rebein v. NutriQuest, LLC (In re Sandy Road Farms, LLC), Adv. No. 25-7001 (Bankr. D. Kan. Oct. 22, 2025), a Kansas bankruptcy court treated that diligence as a condition precedent that a general allegation satisfies. I found no Colorado ruling.

    Why can a trustee reach payments Colorado law would leave alone?

    The old rule is that a struggling debtor picks whom to pay. In Clarke v. White, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 178 (1838), often cited as Clark v. White, the Supreme Court upheld a failed Washington, D.C. merchant’s separate settlements with creditors: “The debtor may prefer one creditor, pay him fully, and exhaust his whole property.” Commentators link that race-to-the-courthouse rule with the Contracts Clause, though the opinion never mentions the Clause. Congress’s bankruptcy power overrides it.

    Colorado law largely keeps it. Under the Colorado Voidable Transactions Act, renamed by S.B. 25-133 (Colo. Sess. Laws 2025, ch. 57), satisfying an antecedent debt is value under C.R.S. § 38-8-104(1), and the § 38-8-105(2) badges of intent rarely fit a supplier paid normally. The state preference rule, C.R.S. § 38-8-106(2), reaches only insiders with reasonable cause to believe the debtor was insolvent, and S.B. 25-133 stretched its deadline in § 38-8-110(1)(c) from one year to “not later than four years after the transfer was made” for claims filed on or after August 6, 2025. A trustee can generally use that claim through § 544(b)(1). Section 547, by contrast, reaches Hollis with no fraud at all.

    Trustee Demanding You Return a Payment? Contact Us Now

    How does the Tenth Circuit apply the ordinary course of business defense?

    Section 547(c)(2) protects payment of an ordinary-course debt if the payment was “(A) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee; or (B) made according to ordinary business terms.” Since 2005, either prong suffices. For (A), Payne v. Clarendon National Insurance Co. (In re Sunset Sales, Inc.), 220 B.R. 1005 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1998), aff’d, 195 F.3d 568 (10th Cir. 1999), weighs how long the parties dealt, changes in the amount or form of payment, unusual collection activity, and the circumstances. Late payments are typically not ordinary unless lateness was the normal pattern between the parties.

    Prong (B) looks at the industry when debtors are healthy. In Clark v. Balcor Real Estate Finance, Inc. (In re Meridith Hoffman Partners), 12 F.3d 1549 (10th Cir. 1993), a lender’s post-default rent escrow failed because lenders used it “only in extraordinary circumstances, when debtors are in trouble.” Jubber v. SMC Electrical Products, Inc. (In re C.W. Mining Co.), 798 F.3d 983 (10th Cir. 2015) held that even a first-time deal can qualify, and that payment “shortly before or at the due date” generally does, as a $200,000 wire sent two days early did.

    In Weinman v. Dragul (In re Cornerstar Wine & Liquor, LLC), No. 19-12135 EEB (Bankr. D. Colo. Mar. 10, 2023), Judge Brown protected three identical $500 repayments but not a $25,000 one, noting a two-year baseline is common “But that is not an absolute requirement.” No opinion sets a formula, so I build two years of invoice-to-payment days, with the average and the range, and compare each payment in the 90 days. Inside the range is defensible under (A). Outside it, or after a credit hold, you need (B) and trade evidence.

    Do new value, a contemporaneous exchange or the small-preference floor protect a payment?

    Under § 547(c)(4), a creditor that ships unsecured goods after being paid keeps the payment to that extent, unless the debtor paid for those goods with an otherwise unavoidable transfer. Only shipments after a wire offset it. Circuits split on whether new value must stay unpaid; finding no Tenth Circuit ruling, I count only shipments still open at filing. The contemporaneous exchange defense in § 547(c)(1) covers an intended exchange that was “in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange.” In Lowrey v. U.P.G., Inc. (In re Robinson Bros. Drilling, Inc.), 877 F.2d 32 (10th Cir. 1989), a $40,000 payment bought lien releases worth $7,884.97, and only that amount was protected; new value must be proved “with specificity,” and a promise of future business is not new value.

    Section 547(c)(9) bars avoidance in a case filed by a debtor whose debts are not primarily consumer debts when the transfer’s aggregate value is under $8,575, the figure for cases filed on or after April 1, 2025 (90 Fed. Reg. 8941).

    How would the numbers work for a Longmont supplier?

    An illustration with hypothetical facts. The contractor filed on November 6, 2025, so the 90-day window opened August 8. For two years it had paid Hollis 38 to 55 days after invoice. On September 18 (day 49) it wired $11,000 on invoices 48 days old. On October 6 (day 31) it wired $15,000 on invoices 62 days old, after collection calls. On October 28 (day 9) it wired $12,000 on invoices 71 days old, a week after Hollis imposed a credit hold. Between the second and third wires he shipped $9,000 on October 10 and $6,500 on October 20, still unpaid at filing.

    The September wire fits the history under § 547(c)(2)(A). The October 6 wire misses the range, but $15,500 of later shipments covers all $15,000 under § 547(c)(4). The October 28 wire followed a hold and no shipments came after it, so unless trade evidence shows 70-day pay is normal for Front Range electrical suppliers, $12,000 is exposed. Every wire exceeds $8,575. That $12,000 is well under the $28,000 offer, and whatever Hollis repays becomes an unsecured claim under § 502(h) on top of the $48,500 still owed. None of this predicts a result.

    What should a Colorado creditor do after receiving a preference demand letter?

    Do not pay on the letter, and do not ignore it. Under § 546(a), the trustee must sue within two years after the order for relief (longer if the first trustee is appointed late in that period) and before the case closes. A voluntary filing is the order for relief (§ 301(b)), so Hollis’s two years run from November 6, 2025. Section 502(d) lets the trustee block your own claim until an avoidable transfer is returned.

    Pull two years of invoices and payment dates, delivery records and emails about holds. Answer in writing, and ask what diligence the trustee did on your defenses. If the case is in another state, 28 U.S.C. § 1409(b) requires a trustee recovering a non-consumer debt under $31,425 from a non-insider (cases filed on or after April 1, 2025) to sue where the defendant resides. If a complaint arrives, see our posts on default judgments in out-of-state bankruptcy adversaries and defending a fraudulent transfer complaint.

    Defense Creditor must show Evidence to pull Tenth Circuit or D. Colo. treatment
    Contemporaneous exchange, § 547(c)(1) Intended, actual near-simultaneous exchange COD terms, lien releases, dates Robinson Bros. Drilling: protected only to the lien value proved
    Ordinary course, § 547(c)(2) Payment ordinary between the parties (A) or on industry terms (B) Two years of days-to-pay, collection notes, trade data Late and workout payments failed (Sunset Sales, Meridith Hoffman); routine ones held (C.W. Mining, Cornerstar)
    New value, § 547(c)(4) Unsecured goods or services given after the payment Shipments and open invoices dated after each wire No Tenth Circuit ruling found on “remains unpaid”
    Small-preference floor, § 547(c)(9) Business debtor; transfer under $8,575 (cases filed on or after April 1, 2025) Payment amounts, debtor’s schedules Applies by its terms

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Do I have to return a payment because the trustee’s lawyer demands it?

    No. A demand letter is not a judgment. The trustee must sue within the section 546(a) period and prove each element, and you can raise your defenses.

    How far back can a bankruptcy trustee claw back payments in Colorado?

    Ninety days for most creditors and one year for insiders under section 547(b)(4). For claims filed on or after August 6, 2025, Colorado’s insider-preference claim runs four years.

    Does it matter that my customer paid late?

    Often it decides the case. The Tenth Circuit BAP treats late payments as not ordinary unless lateness was your normal pattern with the debtor.

    What is the small preference threshold for a business bankruptcy in 2026?

    It is $8,575 for cases filed on or after April 1, 2025, when the debtor’s debts are not primarily consumer debts. A transfer below that aggregate value cannot be avoided as a preference.

    If my customer filed bankruptcy in another state, where can the trustee sue me?

    Under 28 U.S.C. section 1409(b), a trustee recovering a non-consumer debt under $31,425 from a non-insider must sue in your home district, the District of Colorado. Larger claims can go where the bankruptcy is pending under section 1409(a).

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm represents Colorado vendors, landlords, lenders and contractors in preference and clawback defense in Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 cases. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    Payment records are easiest to gather early. If a trustee wants a pre-bankruptcy payment back, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Consigned Goods in a Colorado Shop or Gallery Bankruptcy: UCC 9-319, PMSI Notice, Art Law

    Consigned Goods in a Colorado Shop or Gallery Bankruptcy: UCC 9-319, PMSI Notice, Art Law

    Delia builds walnut tables and steel consoles in Salida. About $48,000 of her work, valued at what she expects to net after commissions, sits in two stores: $29,500 at a Denver design showroom and $18,500 at a Breckenridge gallery. In October the showroom’s owner filed Chapter 7 in Denver, and its bank says a blanket lien on “all inventory” covers her pieces. The gallery is open but paying late.

    She wants to drive over and load her furniture. She can’t without court permission, and whether she gets it back turns mostly on what she filed with the Colorado Secretary of State.

    Who owns consigned goods when a Colorado consignment shop or showroom files bankruptcy?

    As between Delia and the showroom, she does. Against its creditors, maybe not. Article 9 covers “a consignment” (C.R.S. § 4-9-109(a)(4)), defined in § 4-9-102(a)(20) as a delivery for sale to a merchant that deals in goods of that kind under its own name, is not an auctioneer, and is not generally known by its creditors to be substantially engaged in selling the goods of others.

    When a deal fits, § 4-9-103(d) turns the consignor’s ownership into a purchase-money security interest in inventory, and § 4-9-319(a) treats the consignee, while it holds the goods, as having her rights and title as far as its creditors are concerned.

    In bankruptcy, the trustee holds the rights of a hypothetical judicial lien creditor as of the petition date under 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1). Colorado’s “lien creditor” definition includes the trustee (§ 4-9-102(a)(52)), and § 4-9-317(a)(2) puts an unperfected interest behind one. The Ninth Circuit applied that chain to an unperfected fuel consignor, including receivables collected before filing, in IPC (USA), Inc. v. Ellis (In re Pettit Oil Co.), No. 17-60081 (9th Cir. Mar. 11, 2019). Perfection means a UCC-1 filed with the Secretary of State (§ 4-9-310(a); § 4-9-501(a)(2)).

    Is a consignment shop “generally known” to sell other people’s goods, and who has to prove it?

    This exclusion lets many Colorado consignors skip Article 9. If the shop’s creditors generally know it is substantially engaged in selling others’ goods, the deal is not an Article 9 consignment, and the UCC’s Permanent Editorial Board says in PEB Commentary No. 20 (Jan. 24, 2019) that non-UCC law then typically keeps the goods away from the consignee’s creditors.

    Proving it is hard. In In re Valley Media, Inc., 279 B.R. 105 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002), the court called it “ultimately the burden of the consignor” and required proof that a majority of the debtor’s creditors, counted by number rather than dollars, knew; industry-wide knowledge was not enough. In In re Morgansen’s Ltd., 302 B.R. 784 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2003), consignors to a Southampton shop stocked about 70 percent by consignment offered no proof about its creditors and lost; the district court agreed on that point in Goss v. Morgansen’s Ltd., No. 04-CV-0268 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005), remanding a separate issue. In the Sports Authority case, In re TSAWD Holdings, Inc., 601 B.R. 599 (Bankr. D. Del. 2019), 20 percent of inventory was the floor and 14 percent fell short.

    I found no Tenth Circuit, Tenth Circuit BAP or Colorado bankruptcy decision on this exclusion under revised Article 9. A Denver judge would likely start from Valley Media‘s burden and head count, asking about creditors generally, as the PEB urges. That helps a dedicated resale or Western-wear consignment store, not a showroom mixing its own stock with consigned lines. Two other exits: a ski jacket a hiker consigns was usually consumer goods before delivery, and a delivery under $1,000 falls outside the definition.

    What happens to consigned goods after the consignee files Chapter 7 in Colorado?

    The estate takes “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property” (11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)), and § 4-9-319 gives the debtor enough to pull consigned goods in until a court rules. Section 362(a)(3) stays “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate,” and § 542(a) requires whoever holds such property to turn it over to the trustee. See also why Colorado Chapter 7 cases stay open.

    The fight usually comes with a sale motion under § 363(b), often free and clear under § 363(f)(4) because the consignor’s interest is “in bona fide dispute.” She can seek adequate protection under § 363(e), but § 363(p)(2) puts the burden of proving her interest on her. To force the question, she can file an adversary proceeding to determine the “validity, priority, or extent” of her interest under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(b), or move for stay relief under § 362(d). On that motion, § 362(e)(1) ends the stay as to her 30 days after the request unless the court continues it after a hearing. Waiting for the trustee rarely helps.

    Your Consigned Inventory Is Stuck in a Bankruptcy? Contact Us Now

    Does Colorado’s art consignment law protect artists when a gallery goes bankrupt?

    Partly. Under C.R.S. § 6-15-102, a work of fine art an artist delivers to an art dealer for sale on commission is trust property, the dealer is her agent, sale proceeds are trust funds, and none of it is “subject to or subordinate to any claims, liens, or security interests of the consignee’s creditors.” Section 6-15-101 includes “a craft work in materials, including but not limited to clay, textile, fiber, wood, metal, plastic, or glass,” and an “art dealer” is anyone selling fine art other than an exclusive auctioneer. Waivers are void (§ 6-15-104(2)), and a violating dealer owes $50 plus actual damages and fees (§ 6-15-103).

    Only the creator is protected, nothing is filed, and bankruptcy is never mentioned. The override runs “Notwithstanding the provisions of the ‘Uniform Commercial Code – Sales,’” meaning Article 2 (see § 4-2-326(4)), and the statute dates from 1982, long before revised Article 9 moved consignments into § 4-9-319. New York’s version overrides “any provision of the uniform commercial code or any other law,” and Arizona’s applies “Notwithstanding title 47,” its whole UCC.

    An artist would argue that § 541(d) brings in only bare legal title, not an equitable interest held for her; a trustee would answer with § 4-9-319 and § 544(a). I found no Colorado decision on that conflict, so artists should still file a UCC-1.

    How would this play out for a Salida furniture maker caught in a showroom bankruptcy?

    Illustrative example (hypothetical facts). The showroom filed a voluntary Chapter 7 on October 13, 2026. Delia delivered her pieces there in four loads, each over $1,000, and never filed a UCC-1. The bank filed on “all inventory” in 2023 and claims $300,000.

    She has no perfected purchase-money argument. If Article 9 applies, the bank reaches her pieces through § 4-9-319(a), the trustee outranks her, and her $29,500 becomes an unsecured claim that may pay little. Section 503(b)(9) covers goods “sold to the debtor” within 20 days before filing, and she sold the showroom nothing (see our post on 503(b)(9) and reclamation). Under Rule 3002(c) her proof of claim is due within 70 days after the order for relief, here December 22, 2026. If she proves most of the showroom’s creditors knew it mainly sold outside makers’ lines, the pieces stay hers; the art statute might cover the consoles if the showroom is an “art dealer.”

    In Breckenridge, she files a UCC-1 on November 4, 2026 using “consignor” and “consignee” as § 4-9-505(a) allows, finds a 2024 lender filing on the gallery’s inventory, and sends that lender a signed notice. Because that lender filed first, § 4-9-324(b) and (c) give her priority on future deliveries only if the notice arrives within five years before the gallery takes possession and she is perfected by then. A notice sent to a lender’s former agent failed in TSAWD. The $18,500 already hanging stays behind the 2024 lender under § 4-9-322(a)(1), and if the gallery files within 90 days, by about February 2, 2027, its trustee may attack the late perfection as a preference under § 547(b) and (e), the problem the one late filer faced in Valley Media.

    Consignor’s position Against the inventory lender Against a Chapter 7 trustee Likely recovery
    Filed UCC-1 and sent signed notice before delivery (Article 9 applies) Primes an earlier-filed lender (§ 4-9-324(b)) Perfected interest survives § 544(a) Goods or their sale proceeds
    Filed UCC-1, no notice (Article 9 applies) Loses to a lender that filed first Wins if perfected before delivery or outside the preference window What is left after the senior lender
    Nothing filed, shop generally known to sell others’ goods (outside Article 9) Lien generally does not reach the goods Goods typically outside the estate; consignor bears the burden Goods back, if she proves the head count
    Nothing filed, shop not generally known (Article 9 applies) Lender reaches goods via § 4-9-319(a) Trustee prevails under § 544(a)(1) Unsecured claim, often paid little

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Can I pick up my consigned items from a Colorado store that filed bankruptcy?

    Not on your own. Section 362(a)(3) stays acts to obtain possession of estate property. You need the trustee’s agreement or a court order.

    Do I need a UCC-1 to protect consigned goods in Colorado?

    For an Article 9 consignment, yes, with the Colorado Secretary of State. To beat a lender that filed first on the store’s inventory, it must also receive your signed notice before delivery.

    Does Colorado’s art consignment statute keep my artwork out of a gallery’s bankruptcy?

    It makes the work trust property beyond the dealer’s creditors. But it overrides only the UCC’s sales article, and no Colorado court has reconciled it with section 4-9-319.

    Is a consignor’s claim a 503(b)(9) priority claim?

    Usually not. Section 503(b)(9) covers goods sold to the debtor, and a consignor never sells to the store.

    When is the proof of claim deadline in a Colorado Chapter 7?

    In a voluntary case, 70 days after the order for relief under Rule 3002(c). If a judgment later avoids your interest in the goods, Rule 3002(c)(3) allows a claim within 30 days after it becomes final.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm represents Colorado consignors and vendors in bankruptcy disputes, including sale objections in Chapter 7 cases and preference defense. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    If your goods sit in a Colorado store or gallery that just filed, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Lapsed UCC-1 in a Colorado Bankruptcy: Does the Lender Become Unsecured After In re Short?

    Lapsed UCC-1 in a Colorado Bankruptcy: Does the Lender Become Unsecured After In re Short?

    Priya runs an outdoor-gear rental and repair LLC in Durango. In February 2021 an equipment lender filed a UCC-1 with the Colorado Secretary of State covering all of the company’s equipment and inventory. After a bad season the LLC filed Chapter 7 in Denver in November 2025. The filing hit its five-year mark in February 2026 with no continuation statement, and the trustee is selling about $180,000 of rafts, bikes and shop tools. The lender says $140,000 of that is its money.

    Another creditor’s lawyer told Priya the lapse “wipes out” the lien. My answer is less exciting. In Colorado, a lapse that happens after the petition rarely turns a secured lender into an unsecured one. The estate’s better arguments usually sit elsewhere in the file.

    Does a lapsed UCC financing statement make a lender unsecured in a Colorado bankruptcy?

    Under C.R.S. § 4-9-515(a), a filed financing statement is effective for five years. Subsection (c) says that on lapse the interest “becomes unperfected, unless the security interest is perfected otherwise,” and is “deemed never to have been perfected as against a purchaser of the collateral for value.” Colorado’s version is the uniform text, apart from a cross-reference to a transition rule for pre-1996 filings. Nothing in it pauses the clock for a bankruptcy.

    That is deliberate. Former C.R.S. § 4-9-403(2) kept a filing alive “until termination of the insolvency proceedings,” and revised Article 9 dropped the rule. But losing perfection is not losing the lien. An unperfected interest still binds the debtor and only loses priority contests. The real question is whether anyone in the case holds the kind of claim that wins one.

    What did In re Short decide, and does it bind a Colorado bankruptcy judge?

    In Thomson v. Short (In re Short), Bankr. No. 19-29471, Adv. No. 22-02004 (Bankr. D. Utah May 9, 2025), a father’s UCC-1 against his son’s personal property lapsed in October 2020, about ten months into the son’s Chapter 7. Judge Kevin R. Anderson held that the interest was perfected on the petition date, “and that status controls.” He allowed $24,417.60 as secured; most of the $182,300 claim failed for unrelated reasons.

    Some summaries say Utah’s UCC contains a bankruptcy carve-out. The opinion does not rest on one. Utah Code § 70A-9a-515 is uniform text, like Colorado’s, and the court relied on Official Comment 4 to section 9-515: if the debtor files before lapse, the lapse rules “would be of no effect to the extent that federal bankruptcy law dictates a contrary result.” Because Colorado enacted the same section, the reasoning carries over.

    Utah shares the Tenth Circuit with Colorado, so Denver bankruptcy judges will see Short cited, but it binds no one here. As of October 30, 2026 I found no appeal and no District of Colorado decision citing it.

    Secured Creditor’s UCC Lapsed in Your Case? Contact Us Now

    Why can’t a Colorado Chapter 7 trustee use the section 544(a) strong-arm power against a post-petition lapse?

    11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) gives the trustee a judicial lien creditor’s rights “as of the commencement of the case.” C.R.S. § 4-9-102(a)(52)(C) agrees that a trustee is a lien creditor “from the date of the filing of the petition,” and under § 4-9-317(a)(2) a lien creditor wins only if it arrives before perfection. Priya’s lender was perfected on the petition date. The trustee arrived second.

    The “deemed never perfected” sentence protects only a purchaser for value, and C.R.S. § 4-1-201(b)(29) limits a purchase to a voluntary transaction. A judicial lien is not one. The official comment confirms the retroactive language “does not apply with respect to lien creditors.”

    A lapse before the petition comes out the other way: the lender was unperfected when the trustee became a lien creditor, and the trustee wins. A buyer at the trustee’s sale is a purchaser for value, but in my reading that changes little, because a sale under § 363(f) normally moves the lien to the proceeds.

    Has the Tenth Circuit decided what happens when a UCC-1 lapses during a bankruptcy?

    No. The nearest case is Clark v. Valley Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n (In re Reliance Equities, Inc.), 966 F.2d 1338 (10th Cir. 1992), where a lender’s brief automatic perfection under the Colorado UCC expired after the Chapter 7 petition. The court would not freeze its status at filing, citing the risk of secret liens. A UCC-1 anyone could find on the petition date raises no such risk, which is how Short distinguished it.

    In re Chaseley’s Foods, Inc., 726 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1983) kept an SBA lien superior to the trustee after a lapse four months post-petition, under an Indiana statute that, like Colorado’s today, was silent about bankruptcy. In re Bond Enterprises, Inc., 54 B.R. 366 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1985) did the same. In re Hilyard Drilling Co., 840 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1988) is a pre-petition lapse case; the filing ran out nine months before the petition. The contrary voice, In re 800 Bourbon Street, LLC, 541 B.R. 616 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2015), rejected the freeze for a Louisiana mortgage but still paid that creditor.

    I expect a Colorado bankruptcy judge to follow the majority. The lender also had a cheap fix. Since 1994, § 362(b)(3) has exempted from the stay acts “to maintain or continue the perfection of” an interest, working with § 546(b)(1)(B), and John Deere Co. v. Alamosa National Bank, 786 P.2d 505 (Colo. App. 1989) had already upheld a mid-case continuation.

    How does a Colorado trustee challenge the lender’s lien, and who has standing?

    A lender claiming secured status must attach evidence of perfection under Bankruptcy Rule 3001(d). The trustee objects under Rule 3007, served at least 30 days before the hearing and stated with the particularity D. Colo. L.B.R. 3007-1 requires. A fight over “the validity, priority, or extent of a lien” is listed in Rule 7001(b) (restyled December 1, 2024), so it needs an adversary proceeding. If the lien falls, § 506(a) makes the claim unsecured and § 506(d) voids the lien.

    Priya’s LLC will not bring that case. In Chapter 7 the avoidance powers belong to the trustee, one reason a Colorado Chapter 7 case can stay open longer than owners expect. An individual debtor can sometimes use § 522(f) or (h), but both depend on exemptions an LLC lacks. A Chapter 11 debtor in possession holds trustee powers under § 1107(a), and a Subchapter V debtor under § 1184. When ordering a Secretary of State search, ask for lapsed records; otherwise the report omits them (C.R.S. § 4-9-523(c)), and the office need keep them only one year after lapse (§ 4-9-522(a)).

    How would the numbers work for a Durango gear-rental LLC?

    Illustrative dates: UCC-1 filed February 10, 2021; petition November 14, 2025; lapse after February 10, 2026; trustee’s sale in March 2026 for $180,000. The continuation window under C.R.S. § 4-9-515(d) ran from August 10, 2025 to February 10, 2026, so the lender had three post-petition months to file a UCC-3 without asking the court. It did not. Under Short‘s reasoning it was still perfected on November 14, 2025, takes its $140,000, and leaves $40,000 for the estate.

    The estate’s real chances are at the front of the file. Attachment under C.R.S. § 4-9-203(b) needs value, rights in the collateral and a signed security agreement describing it, and § 4-9-108(c) rejects “all the debtor’s assets” as a description. A UCC-1 using a name other than the one on the LLC’s articles fails § 4-9-503(a)(1) unless a correct-name search using standard search logic still finds it (§ 4-9-506(c)). And a UCC-1 filed on an older loan within 90 days of the petition, or one year for an insider, counts as a transfer on the filing date under § 547(e)(2)(B), open to attack under § 547(b)(4). Priya’s 2021 filing is safe there.

    If Priya personally guaranteed the loan, a lender paid from the sale chases her for less, so an estate win can leave her guaranty larger.

    Scenario Lender against the trustee Estate’s best argument Likely Colorado result
    Perfected and continued before the petition Perfected Attachment, description or name defects Lender secured unless a defect appears
    Perfected at petition, lapsed during case, no continuation Perfected as of commencement Statute has no tolling clause; 800 Bourbon Lender likely stays secured
    Continuation filed during case Perfected Little; § 362(b)(3) permits it Lender secured
    Lapsed before the petition Unperfected § 544(a)(1); § 4-9-317(a)(2) Trustee wins
    UCC-1 filed within 90 days (one year for insider) on older debt Perfected by a late transfer Preference, § 547(b) and (e) Trustee often wins
    Wrong debtor name on the UCC-1 Unperfected if seriously misleading § 4-9-506(b) Turns on the correct-name search

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Does a UCC-1 that lapses during my Colorado bankruptcy make the lender unsecured?

    Usually not. Most courts that have ruled, including the Utah bankruptcy court in In re Short, measure perfection on the petition date. The Tenth Circuit has not decided the question.

    Can a lender file a UCC continuation statement after my company files bankruptcy?

    Yes. Section 362(b)(3) lets it file without stay relief, but only inside the six-month window before the five-year date. Once the filing has lapsed, a continuation is too late.

    Can my LLC object to the lender’s secured claim in Chapter 7?

    Generally the Chapter 7 trustee controls lien challenges for the estate. A Chapter 11 or Subchapter V debtor in possession holds a trustee’s powers and can bring the challenge itself.

    What if the lender’s UCC-1 lapsed before we filed?

    Then the lender was unperfected on the petition date. The trustee, as a lien creditor under section 544(a)(1), takes priority, and the lender is likely left with an unsecured claim.

    Does the Colorado Secretary of State search show lapsed filings?

    Only if the search request asks for them. The office must keep a lapsed record for at least a year, so order the search early.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm represents Colorado business owners and creditors in Chapter 7 cases, Chapter 11 reorganizations and preference and lien disputes. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    The security agreement and the Secretary of State search usually decide these fights before anyone argues about the freeze rule. If a lapsed UCC-1 has turned up in your bankruptcy case, contact North Star Law Firm.