Category: Bankruptcy

  • Chapter 12 Bankruptcy in Colorado: Selling Farmland and the Section 1232 Capital Gains Fix

    Chapter 12 Bankruptcy in Colorado: Selling Farmland and the Section 1232 Capital Gains Fix

    Picture a potato grower outside Center farming ground his family bought in the late 1990s. With the operating line tapped out, his exit is selling two quarter-sections. NASS counted 10.80 million hundredweight of Colorado potatoes in storage on February 1, 2025, and russet varieties covered 89.3 percent of reported San Luis Valley potato acres in 2023. Here, Chapter 12 bankruptcy in Colorado often beats Chapter 11, largely because of the tax bill.

    Most bankruptcy chapters make the farmer pay the capital gains tax on that sale in full. A 2017 statute makes Chapter 12 the exception.

    Who qualifies as a Colorado family farmer for Chapter 12?

    Under 11 U.S.C. § 101(18), an individual or married couple qualifies if debts are under the cap, at least half of the noncontingent, liquidated debts come from farming, and more than half of gross income came from farming in the prior tax year or in each of the second and third years before filing. The Family Farmer Relief Act of 2019, Pub. L. 116-51, set the cap at $10,000,000, and 90 Fed. Reg. 8941 (Feb. 4, 2025) raised it to $12,562,250 from April 1, 2025. Family fishermen (§ 101(19A)) face a $2,568,000 cap. In re Mongeau, 633 B.R. 387 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2021), decided inside the Tenth Circuit, held a couple who wound down before filing still eligible.

    Per the U.S. Trustee Program’s trustee list, Colorado has no standing Chapter 12 trustee; one is assigned case by case through the Denver office. Colorado opts out of the federal exemptions (C.R.S. § 13-54-107), so a farm residence falls under the C.R.S. § 38-41-201 homestead exemption ($250,000, or $350,000 for an elderly or disabled owner, spouse, or dependent), and C.R.S. § 13-54-102(1)(g) shields up to $100,000 of livestock, crops, and machinery per couple when agriculture is the principal occupation.

    Why can a Chapter 12 farmer sell land over an undersecured lender’s objection?

    In Chapter 11 and its Subchapter V, a sale under 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) strips liens only if a § 363(f) condition is met. The usual route, § 363(f)(3), asks whether the price exceeds “the aggregate value of all liens.” Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Knupfer (In re PW, LLC), 391 B.R. 25 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008), measured that against the liens’ face amount. On that reading, a lender owed $2.5 million on land bringing $2.4 million can block it.

    Section 1206 permits, “in addition to” § 363(f), a sale of “farmland, farm equipment, or property used to carry out a commercial fishing operation” free and clear, with the lien attaching to proceeds. The farmer exercises that power as debtor in possession under § 1203, and because it remains a § 363(b) sale, the lender keeps its § 363(k) credit bid unless limited for cause.

    What can a Chapter 12 plan sale under section 1222(b)(8) add?

    Section 1222(b)(8) lets the plan “provide for the sale of all or any part of the property of the estate.” Chapter 11 relies on § 1123(b)(4) and the cramdown sale in § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii), which Subchapter V imports through § 1191(c)(1) even though § 1181(a) disables § 1129(b). In re Ditech Holding Corp., 606 B.R. 544 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019), called § 363(f) relief “narrower than that afforded to a debtor under a confirmed plan.”

    The plan is the negotiating table: a lender eager for a sale may let the family keep the home quarter or sell after harvest. Secured claims are protected by § 1225(a)(5). The plan is due in 90 days under § 1221, and § 1224 wants confirmation heard within 45 days after that.

    How does section 1232 change capital gains tax on selling farmland in bankruptcy?

    In Hall v. United States, 566 U.S. 506 (2012), a 5 to 4 Court held that about $29,000 of tax on a farm sold mid-case was not “incurred by the estate” under § 503(b), because a Chapter 12 estate is not a separate taxpayer under 26 U.S.C. § 1399. The plan could neither pay nor discharge it.

    Section 1005 of Division B of Pub. L. 115-72 (Oct. 26, 2017) added 11 U.S.C. § 1232. It covers “any unsecured claim of a governmental unit” arising before the petition, or after it and before discharge, “as a result of the sale, transfer, exchange, or other disposition of any property used in the debtor’s farming operation.” That claim is treated as prepetition and unsecured, loses priority under § 507, must be provided for in the plan, and is discharged under § 1228. It is not limited to capital gains, so equipment recapture appears covered, though ground leased to a neighbor may not count.

    Section 1232(b) runs the liquidation test as if the claim were ordinary prepetition debt, and § 1232(c) lifts the § 523(a)(1)(A) and (B) discharge exceptions. Under § 1232(d), a farmer filing a postpetition return serves it and the claim calculation on the taxing authority, which has 180 days to file a claim; after that the debtor may file one the government cannot amend.

    How is the 1232 claim computed, and does it reach Colorado income tax?

    The statute is silent on the math, and IRM 5.9.9.10.3 sends caseworkers to Area Counsel. The leading case is Colorado’s. In In re Ficken, 430 B.R. 663 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2010), after eastern Colorado ranchers sold cattle under their plan, the panel endorsed the marginal method: prepare the real return, then a pro forma return without the qualifying sales, and protect the difference. Knudsen v. IRS, 581 F.3d 696 (8th Cir. 2009), agreed. Both construed the old § 1222(a)(2)(A), and Hall overtook Ficken on postpetition sales, so using the method under § 1232 is a strong argument, not settled law.

    Section 101(27) defines “governmental unit” to include a State and its departments, so the Colorado Department of Revenue’s claim on the same gain should be treated the same way. Colorado’s C.R.S. § 39-22-518 capital gain subtraction survives for Schedule F filers selling assessor-classified agricultural land acquired from May 9, 1994 through June 3, 2009 and held five years, capped at $100,000 yearly. But a qualified taxpayer cannot have overdue state tax liabilities, which include uncollectible ones “resulting from bankruptcy.”

    What does the math look like for a San Luis Valley potato operation?

    Hypothetical. A married couple farming as sole proprietors near Center owe $3.2 million, $2.5 million of it to their operating lender. They bought 320 acres in 1998 for $400,000 and have a $2.4 million buyer, a gain of about $2,000,000. Federal tax at 20 percent is roughly $400,000 (simplified; active farm gain escapes the 3.8 percent tax under 26 U.S.C. § 1411(c)(1)(A)(iii)). After the $100,000 subtraction, Colorado’s 4.4 percent rate in C.R.S. § 39-22-104(1.7)(c) yields $83,600.

    Under § 1206 the sale closes anyway. Say $200,000 of the lender’s claim ends up unsecured, next to $400,000 owed to vendors. Section 1232 adds the $400,000 federal claim and, on the text, the $83,600 state claim, for a pool of about $1,083,600. If the plan pays that pool $180,000 from disposable income, each creditor gets about 16.6 cents: roughly $66,400 to the IRS and $13,900 to the state. The balance is discharged.

    The couple also fits under the $3,424,000 Subchapter V limit in § 101(51D), but an individual’s Chapter 11 estate is a separate taxpayer under 26 U.S.C. § 1398, so tax on a postpetition sale is a § 507(a)(2) administrative expense, payable in full on the effective date under § 1129(a)(9)(A) or across a nonconsensual plan under § 1191(e). A sale the year before filing creates a § 507(a)(8) priority claim, also paid in full. About $483,600 gets paid either way, if PW did not block the sale.

    Selling Farm Assets Under Pressure? Contact Us Now

    Feature § 363 sale (Ch. 11 / Sub V) § 1206 sale (Ch. 12) Plan sale (Ch. 11 / Sub V) Plan sale (Ch. 12)
    Free and clear over objecting lienholder Only under § 363(f); PW limits (f)(3) Yes; lien moves to proceeds Yes, § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) Yes, § 1222(b)(8) with § 1225(a)(5)
    Credit bid Yes, § 363(k) Yes, § 363(k) Yes, § 363(k) No express provision
    Tax on gain Paid in full as priority § 1232: pro rata, dischargeable Paid in full as priority § 1232: pro rata, dischargeable
    Timing Motion; can close early Motion; can close early At confirmation Plan in 90 days
    Bargaining room Sale terms only Sale terms only Claim treatment and proceeds Retained acres, timing, carve-outs

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Can a Colorado farmer file Chapter 12 after selling off most of the equipment?

    Sometimes. In In re Mongeau, a Kansas bankruptcy court found a couple who had sold most of their farm assets still eligible.

    What is the Chapter 12 debt limit for a family farmer?

    For cases filed since April 1, 2025, aggregate debts cannot exceed $12,562,250 under 11 U.S.C. § 101(18).

    Does section 1232 cover a farmland sale made after filing?

    Yes. It reaches tax claims arising after the petition and before discharge, the gap Hall v. United States exposed.

    What happens to the section 1232 claim if the case is dismissed?

    The claim is discharged only under section 1228, so a dismissal leaves the full tax owed.

    Can the operating lender block a Chapter 12 sale of farmland?

    Not by withholding consent, because section 1206 permits a free-and-clear sale with the lien moving to the proceeds, though the lender may still credit bid.

    Is the Colorado Department of Revenue’s claim covered by section 1232?

    The text reaches any governmental unit, which includes a State, but no controlling Tenth Circuit ruling was located, so the plan should name the state claim.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm handles Colorado bankruptcy filings for farm and ranch families and the tax side of a land sale, including how farm-sale taxes and older IRS balances are discharged in bankruptcy, when Subchapter V fits better, and the Colorado Department of Revenue side. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    Decisions made before a listing is signed fix most of the tax result. To review a Chapter 12 filing or a planned sale, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • SBA Demand Letter in Colorado: Suspension, Treasury Offset, and Bankruptcy After the 2026 EIDL and PPP Fraud Sweep

    SBA Demand Letter in Colorado: Suspension, Treasury Offset, and Bankruptcy After the 2026 EIDL and PPP Fraud Sweep

    The SBA’s September 14, 2026 announcement lists 10,138 suspended Colorado borrowers tied to $558,956,242 in PPP and COVID EIDL approvals. Most will first hear about it from a 30-day letter. If you are holding an SBA demand letter in Colorado, the deadline is real, but the letter is the government’s opening position, not a ruling against you.

    What does an EIDL fraud suspension actually do to a Colorado borrower?

    Per that release, a suspended borrower loses access to future SBA small business and disaster loans and to other SBA programs, including 8(a) contracting. That is an eligibility bar, not a judgment, and it creates no debt. The demand letter comes separately. The SBA Inspector General’s Operation No Doze notice says the letters assert a debt to the United States and explain how to pay or respond; the first 8,000 or so go to Kansas and Missouri. The same operation includes a criminal surge that the Justice Department says reached more than 160 defendants, and a suspension alone does not put you there.

    What happens when the 30 days on a Colorado SBA demand letter run out?

    Collection. Under 31 C.F.R. 285.12, an agency relying on Treasury for offset generally must send a delinquent debt to Treasury’s Cross-Servicing program within 120 days, and 31 U.S.C. 3717(e) passes collection costs to the debtor along with a penalty charge of up to 6 percent a year. The SBA puts interest and fees at up to 28 percent; Treasury’s public cross-servicing pages post no current rate.

    31 U.S.C. 3720A and 26 U.S.C. 6402(d) let Treasury apply your federal income tax refund to the SBA debt without a lawsuit. Section 3716 reaches federal salaries (up to 15 percent of disposable pay under 31 C.F.R. 285.7) and Social Security, which 31 C.F.R. 285.4 limits to the lesser of 15 percent or the amount above $750 a month. Offset has no time limit. It can also be reported to credit bureaus under 31 U.S.C. 3711(e) and posted to HUD’s CAIVRS database, which FHA mortgage lenders check.

    How does the administrative False Claims Act differ from a DOJ case in Colorado?

    The Administrative False Claims Act is the renamed Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act, 31 U.S.C. 3801-3812. Reckless disregard is enough; no intent to defraud is required. Under section 3802 and 13 C.F.R. part 142, the SBA can assess up to twice the false amount plus up to $14,308 per claim. Section 3803 requires Justice Department sign-off, limits the process to claims of $1 million or less (indexed), and holds the hearing in the district where you live or do business, which for a Colorado owner means here, before an SBA administrative law judge. Miss the SBA’s 30-day answer deadline and the default is the maximum.

    A suit under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729 would come from the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Colorado, with treble damages plus $14,308 to $28,619 per claim under 28 C.F.R. 85.5. PPP and EIDL fraud now carry a 10-year limitations period (15 U.S.C. 636(a)(36)(W)). Criminal exposure under 18 U.S.C. 1014, 1040, and 1343 runs as high as 30 years.

    What should a Colorado owner do during the 30 days?

    First, do not call the OIG hotline to explain. Section 3803(a)(1) makes the Inspector General the investigator and preserves that office’s duty to report crimes to the Attorney General, so a casual explanation can become evidence. Then rebuild the file: applications, loan agreement, any personal guaranty, and bank statements tracing the proceeds. EIDL revenue proof means 2019 returns and, for a Colorado retailer or restaurant, state sales tax returns (Form DR 0100), an independent record of gross sales. PPP proof means Forms 941 and payroll registers.

    Next, find out why the loan was flagged. Enforcement targets duplicate applications, phantom businesses, padded headcounts, and personal spending, but data matching also misfires, for example on a mismatched EIN. Section 3716(a) lets you inspect the SBA’s records and request review, and section 3720A(b) allows at least 60 days to dispute before refund offset. An owner who spent the money properly but kept a thin file is nowhere near one who bought a boat. The written response should prove which you are, measured against 13 C.F.R. 123.303.

    Got an SBA Demand Letter? Contact Us Now

    How would the 30 days play out for a Colorado Springs restaurant?

    Hypothetical: an Old Colorado City restaurant LLC got a $150,000 EIDL in 2020 and a $42,000 PPP loan forgiven in 2021. Its letter is dated Tuesday, October 13, 2026 and arrives October 16. Counting 30 days from the letter date (its own wording controls), the deadline is Thursday, November 12.

    By October 19 the owner has counsel, and on October 20 counsel requests the SBA’s records. By October 30 the bank trail accounts for all but $9,500 of the EIDL, which the owner took as draws in place of salary. The PPP file holds the real problem: $48,000 paid to two 1099 cooks was counted as payroll, so $201,600 should have been $153,600, supporting $32,000 rather than $42,000. On November 6 counsel files a response documenting the EIDL spending, treating the draws as reasonable pay and the $10,000 PPP overage as a calculation error. Pursued administratively, that overage caps out at $20,000 plus $14,308 each for the loan and forgiveness applications; in an FCA suit, assuming damages equal the overage, $30,000 plus $28,616 to $57,238.

    Can a Colorado bankruptcy discharge an SBA loan tied to a fraud allegation?

    Usually yes. Under 11 U.S.C. 523(c), a section 523(a)(2) debt is discharged unless the creditor sues within 60 days after the first date set for the creditors’ meeting (Rule 4007(c)). Proof is by a preponderance under Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991), and proven fraud takes multiplied damages with it under Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213 (1998). Because the FCA requires no specific intent, a verdict under it does not settle intent to deceive; United States v. Saavedra, Adv. No. 20-1062-t (Bankr. D.N.M. Sept. 30, 2021) declined to treat one as proving it. And revenue figures may be statements respecting financial condition under Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling, No. 16-1215 (U.S. June 4, 2018), forcing the government into section 523(a)(2)(B) and its reasonable-reliance element.

    Whether FCA penalties are nondischargeable fines under section 523(a)(7) is unsettled, and the firm found no Tenth Circuit ruling. A completed Chapter 13 plan does not except (a)(7) debts, though criminal restitution survives under section 523(a)(13). Poor records can cost the entire discharge under section 727(a). In Subchapter V, section 1192(2) excludes 523(a) debts from a nonconsensual-plan discharge, and In re Cleary Packaging, LLC, 36 F.4th 509 (4th Cir. 2022), In re GFS Industries, LLC, 99 F.4th 223 (5th Cir. 2024), and BenShot, LLC v. 2 Monkey Trading, LLC, No. 23-12342 (11th Cir. July 9, 2025) apply that to corporations, against In re Off-Spec Solutions, LLC, 651 B.R. 862 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2023). Colorado followed the circuits in Marmic Fire & Safety Co. v. ETG Fire, LLC, Adv. No. 24-1225 TBM (Bankr. D. Colo. Mar. 20, 2025). A consensual plan does not help a corporation either, given section 1141(d)(6)(A).

    Filing does pause refund offset. The stay in section 362(a)(7) bars setoff, and section 362(b)(26) only exempts income tax refunds applied to income tax debts, so Treasury needs stay relief to take a refund for an SBA debt. The SBA’s September 23 release says the IRS is also opening examinations, which can end in a Colorado notice of deficiency with its own deadlines.

    Track Who brings it Standard Exposure Forum Bankruptcy
    Suspension SBA Suspected fraud Loss of SBA eligibility; no debt Agency action Not a debt
    Demand letter SBA, then Treasury Past due and enforceable Balance, fees, offset Agency review Dischargeable absent proven fraud
    Administrative FCA SBA with DOJ approval Reason to know; preponderance 2x plus $14,308 per claim SBA judge, in Colorado (a)(2) if fraud; (a)(7) contested
    Civil FCA U.S. Attorney, D. Colo. Knowingly; preponderance 3x plus $14,308 to $28,619 per claim U.S. District Court (a)(2) if fraud; (a)(7) contested
    Criminal referral DOJ Beyond reasonable doubt Up to 30 years; restitution U.S. District Court Restitution survives, (a)(13)

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Is an SBA suspension the same as being charged with fraud?

    No. A suspension bars future SBA loans and programs, but it is not a charge or a judgment. Fraud must be proven later in a separate proceeding.

    Can Treasury take my federal tax refund over an SBA debt?

    Yes, without a judgment, once the debt is certified as past due and enforceable. The SBA must first give notice and at least 60 days to dispute it.

    Does Social Security get taken too?

    Only in part. Treasury takes the lesser of 15 percent of the monthly benefit or the amount above $750.

    Should I call the SBA Inspector General hotline to explain my loan?

    Not before speaking with counsel. That office investigates, and what you tell its agents can be used against you.

    Can I discharge an EIDL in a Colorado Chapter 7?

    Generally yes, unless the government timely sues and proves fraud under section 523(a)(2).

    Does a Subchapter V discharge protect my LLC from SBA fraud claims?

    Probably not. The Colorado bankruptcy court has followed three circuits in holding that section 1192(2) keeps section 523(a) debts alive for corporate debtors; the Tenth Circuit has not ruled.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm handles PPP, EIDL, and other SBA loan problems for Colorado owners, from the first demand-letter response through Treasury offset disputes, Subchapter V cases, and the IRS examinations that can follow. The firm often sees files where the money was spent properly and the paperwork never caught up. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    The first written answer to an SBA letter shapes what follows, and the window is short. To have the letter and loan file reviewed before your deadline, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Colorado S Corporation Bankruptcy After Owoc: Who Pays the Tax on a Section 363 Sale?

    Colorado S Corporation Bankruptcy After Owoc: Who Pays the Tax on a Section 363 Sale?

    A Pueblo machine shop organized as an S corporation loses its largest customer and files Subchapter V. The lender agrees to a $6 million going-concern sale under 11 U.S.C. § 363, and every dollar goes to the bank. Then the CPA calls: the gain belongs on the owner’s personal return. That mismatch sits at the center of a Colorado S corporation bankruptcy, and an August 2026 Eleventh Circuit decision changes the owner’s options.

    Why does a Colorado S corporation bankruptcy sale put the gain on the owner’s Form 1040?

    Under 26 U.S.C. § 1366(a), each S corporation shareholder reports a pro rata share of the company’s income and gain, cash or no cash. Section 1399 says a bankruptcy case creates no separate taxable entity except where section 1398 applies, and section 1398 covers only individuals in Chapter 7 or 11. A corporation’s estate is not a separate taxpayer, so gain on a court-approved sale passes straight through.

    Colorado taxes that gain as well, at a flat 4.4% of federal taxable income under C.R.S. § 39-22-104(1.7). The proceeds are estate property under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) and go to creditors. The owner receives a K-1 and no check.

    What did the Eleventh Circuit decide in Owoc?

    John Owoc, sole shareholder of Vital Pharmaceuticals (maker of Bang energy drinks), elected S status in 1997. VPX filed Chapter 11 in 2022, a new board removed him as CEO, and in July 2023 the company sold its assets to a Monster Energy subsidiary. The bankruptcy court refused to confirm that the stay let him revoke or terminate the election, holding in In re Vital Pharmaceuticals, 655 B.R. 374 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2023), that the election was estate property.

    The Eleventh Circuit reversed in Owoc v. Liquidating Trustee, No. 24-14048 (11th Cir. Aug. 10, 2026). The stay in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) protects estate property, and an S election is not estate property because shareholders, not the corporation, decide whether it starts and whether it ends. The panel followed In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d 736 (3d Cir. 2013), and distinguished the loss carryback refunds treated as estate property in Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966), since an NOL is fixed at filing and shareholders cannot take it away. Quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972), it required “a legitimate claim of entitlement,” not mere enjoyment of a benefit.

    Two details matter. The corporation files the revocation statement, signed by someone authorized to sign its return (Treas. Reg. § 1.1362-6(a)), and Owoc conceded he could not make VPX’s new managers file. And the court remanded whether laches bars his request to terminate after the sale closed.

    Would a Colorado bankruptcy court follow Owoc, and can a trustee undo a revocation?

    A search of Tenth Circuit, Tenth Circuit BAP and District of Colorado bankruptcy decisions found no ruling, so a Colorado judge would write on a clean slate. On one side sit Majestic Star, Owoc and In re Health Diagnostic Laboratory, Inc., 578 B.R. 552 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2017), where a liquidating trustee lost an attempt to avoid a revocation made about five months before the petition. On the other is In re Trans-Lines West, Inc., 203 B.R. 653 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1996), which treated a revocation made 28 days before a Chapter 11 filing as a transfer the trustee could attack under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a).

    Section 548 reaches only a transfer of “an interest of the debtor in property,” and courts that call the election shareholder property make that element hard to meet. Breach of duty is the likelier fight in a Subchapter V case, where the owner usually runs the debtor in possession and would sign the revocation as its officer. Owoc had one shareholder; where there are several, nonconsenting holders may push back. See also the firm’s post on how trustees recover LLC distributions after Weinstein.

    What can an owner lawfully do with the S election before the sale year?

    Revocation under 26 U.S.C. § 1362(d)(1) needs consent from holders of more than half the outstanding shares, voting and nonvoting combined (Treas. Reg. § 1.1362-2(a)). One made by the 15th day of the third month (March 15 for a calendar-year company) is effective January 1 of that year; a later one takes effect the following January 1 unless it names a prospective date.

    A mid-year date carries a trap. Section 1362(e)(2) spreads the year’s income across the S and C short years day by day, so an October closing could leave most of the gain on the S side. Avoiding that takes a closing-of-the-books election under section 1362(e)(3), signed by every shareholder in the S short year and on the first day of the C short year.

    Termination is the other route. Moving one share to a corporation, a partnership or a nonresident alien breaks eligibility under section 1361(b)(1), ending the election that day under section 1362(d)(2)(B). Either way, section 1362(g) bars re-electing for five years without IRS consent. The post-termination transition period in section 1377(b) then lets the owner use losses suspended for lack of basis under section 1366(d)(3).

    S Corp Headed Into Bankruptcy? Contact Us Now

    How does the math work for a Pueblo manufacturer selling for $6 million?

    Hypothetical: a calendar-year Pueblo machining company, wholly owned by a Colorado resident, files Subchapter V in February 2027 and closes a § 363 sale that July for $6 million. Equipment and inventory bring their $1 million basis; the other $5 million is self-created goodwill with zero basis. The bank, owed $7.2 million, has a lien on everything. Assume the goodwill gain is long-term capital gain at the 20% rate in 26 U.S.C. § 1(h) and ignore the net investment income tax.

    With the election intact, the owner reports $5 million of gain, owing about $1,000,000 federal and $220,000 Colorado tax on a distribution of zero.

    Had the owner revoked in November 2026, effective January 1, 2027, the company would owe federal tax at 21% under 26 U.S.C. § 11(b), or $1,050,000, plus about $220,000 at Colorado’s 4.4% corporate rate under C.R.S. § 39-22-301. Those post-petition taxes are administrative expenses under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B), paid ahead of unsecured creditors, and a nonconsensual Subchapter V plan may stretch them out under 11 U.S.C. § 1191(e). That November revocation also falls inside section 548’s two-year reach.

    An offset often goes unnoticed. The gain raises the owner’s stock basis by $5 million under section 1367(a)(1), applied first under section 1367(b)(3). If the stock becomes worthless that same year, section 165(g) produces a capital loss that can absorb the capital gain, free of the $3,000 limit section 1211(b) sets against ordinary income. Worthlessness that slips into 2028, or ordinary recapture income, breaks the match.

    Should a Colorado S corporation make the PTE election in a bankruptcy sale year?

    Under C.R.S. § 39-22-343, an S corporation may elect annually, on its return, to pay Colorado tax at the entity level, at the corporate rate under section 39-22-344, with each owner taking a refundable credit under C.R.S. § 39-22-347. It exists only while federal law caps the individual SALT deduction, as 26 U.S.C. § 164(b)(6) now does.

    In a sale year the election shifts the Colorado slice ($220,000 above) from the owner to the estate as an administrative expense; the federal bill stays put. The choice belongs to the debtor in possession, which carries a trustee’s duties under 11 U.S.C. § 1184, and Owoc’s control test cuts against the owner here, because the entity makes this election on its own return. Not electing keeps the default; electing while creditors go unpaid is a choice the Subchapter V trustee will want explained.

    Approach Who bears tax on the sale gain What it takes Main risk
    Keep the S election Owner (Form 1040 and Colorado 104) Nothing Tax with no cash
    Revoke effective January 1 of the sale year Corporation: 21% federal, 4.4% Colorado Majority-of-shares consent; corporate statement by March 15 Avoidance or duty claims; five-year bar
    Mid-year revocation or share-transfer termination Split between owner and corporation Closing-of-the-books election signed by all affected shareholders Daily allocation; laches after the sale
    Keep S status, make the PTE election Federal: owner. Colorado: entity Election on the entity’s return Shifts Colorado tax to creditors

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Does filing bankruptcy end a company’s S corporation status?

    No. Filing is not a terminating event under section 1362, and under 26 U.S.C. § 1399 the corporate estate is not a separate taxpayer, so the election continues.

    Is Owoc binding on Colorado bankruptcy courts?

    No. Colorado is in the Tenth Circuit, which has not ruled, so Owoc and Majestic Star are persuasive only.

    What is the deadline to revoke an S election for the current year?

    For a calendar-year corporation, a revocation made by March 15 reaches back to January 1; a later one takes effect the next January 1 unless it names a prospective date.

    Can an owner revoke the election after the company files bankruptcy?

    The Third and Eleventh Circuits say the automatic stay does not block it. In Colorado the question is open, and the corporation must still file the statement.

    Will revoking the S election hurt the company’s creditors?

    It can. The C corporation then owes its own tax on the gain, and a post-petition tax of the estate is an administrative expense that comes ahead of unsecured claims.

    Can the owner deduct anything when the stock becomes worthless?

    Often. Pass-through gain raises stock basis, and a worthless-stock capital loss in the same year can absorb capital gain; timing and the gain’s character decide how much.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm works with Colorado owners where bankruptcy and tax overlap, from Subchapter V reorganizations and Chapter 11 asset sales to the tax structuring of a business sale. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    The S election is easiest to address before the sale year begins. To review the timing and numbers, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Colorado Foreclosure After Obduskey: Why the FDCPA Won’t Stop a Public Trustee Sale and What Will

    Colorado Foreclosure After Obduskey: Why the FDCPA Won’t Stop a Public Trustee Sale and What Will

    Colorado homeowners who get a letter from a foreclosure law firm often assume the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act lets them demand verification and slow things down. In a Colorado public trustee foreclosure, that assumption is mostly wrong. The Tenth Circuit said so in 2018, and the Supreme Court agreed the following year.

    So where does the real protection sit once a sale date is on the calendar? This post covers what Obduskey took away, how the Colorado process runs, and the federal tools that still work, ending with a timeline for a Lakewood homeowner who also has an IRS lien.

    What did Obduskey decide about the FDCPA and Colorado foreclosures?

    Dennis Obduskey asked the law firm foreclosing on his Colorado home to verify the debt under the FDCPA. It kept going, and he sued. In Obduskey v. Wells Fargo, 879 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2018), the court acknowledged a circuit split and held that “[e]ntities engaged in non-judicial foreclosure actions in Colorado are not debt collectors under the FDCPA.”

    A unanimous Supreme Court affirmed in Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP, 586 U.S. 466, 139 S. Ct. 1029 (2019). Its holding: “A business engaged in no more than nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings is not a ‘debt collector’ under the FDCPA, except for the limited purpose of §1692f(6).” The key was the last sentence of 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6), which says that “[f]or the purpose of section 1692f(6)” the term “also includes” a business whose principal purpose is enforcing security interests.

    What’s left is narrow. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6) still bars taking or threatening “nonjudicial action to effect dispossession or disablement of property” when there’s no present right to possession, no present intention to take it, or the property is exempt. Justice Sotomayor concurred, calling it “too close a case” for certainty and warning against a security interest used as a “stalking horse” for ordinary collection. Colorado’s own statute follows the same pattern: C.R.S. § 5-16-103(3)(d) treats a security-interest enforcer as a “collection agency” only for purposes of C.R.S. § 5-16-108(1)(f), the state version of the dispossession rule.

    How does a Colorado public trustee foreclosure move from notice to sale?

    In general terms, the lender records a Notice of Election and Demand (the NED) with the county public trustee. Under C.R.S. § 38-38-103, the public trustee mails a combined notice within 20 calendar days after recording and again 45 to 60 days before the first scheduled sale. For non-agricultural property, C.R.S. § 38-38-108 sets the sale no less than 110 and no more than 125 calendar days after the NED is recorded.

    The only judicial step is a motion in district court under C.R.C.P. 120 for an order authorizing the sale. The court looks at whether a default exists that permits a power of sale and checks Servicemembers Civil Relief Act status. The order isn’t a final judgment.

    The owner’s main state-law lifeline is the cure right in C.R.S. § 38-38-104. A written notice of intent to cure is due 15 calendar days before the sale, and the money by 12 noon the day before. Once the gavel falls, the owner has no redemption period for foreclosures started after January 1, 2008. Under C.R.S. § 38-38-302, only junior lienors redeem.

    Which federal servicing rules still apply in a Colorado foreclosure?

    Regulation X binds the servicer, so Obduskey doesn’t touch it. Under 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(f)(1), a servicer can’t make the first notice or filing that state law requires to start a judicial or non-judicial foreclosure until the loan is more than 120 days delinquent. A complete loss mitigation application filed in that window generally has to be decided first.

    After the foreclosure starts, § 1024.41(g) takes over: a complete application received more than 37 days before the sale bars the servicer from moving for an order of sale or conducting the sale until the borrower is found ineligible, rejects the offers, or defaults on an agreement. Under 12 C.F.R. § 1024.30, these rules cover only a principal residence, and small servicers are mostly exempt, though § 1024.41(j) keeps them to the 120-day rule.

    How does Chapter 13 stop a Colorado foreclosure sale, and when is it too late?

    A bankruptcy petition triggers the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), which halts lien enforcement against estate property. Under C.R.S. § 38-38-109, the holder then has one year after the stay ends to ask the public trustee to restart, or the foreclosure is withdrawn.

    Chapter 13 adds a cure. The plan can’t rewrite a mortgage on the principal residence because of 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2), but § 1322(b)(5) lets the debtor cure the default within a reasonable time while keeping up current payments. The deadline is § 1322(c)(1): the cure is available “until such residence is sold at a foreclosure sale that is conducted in accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law.” In In re McCarn, 218 B.R. 154 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1998), a Wyoming case, the Tenth Circuit’s bankruptcy appellate panel held the cure right ended at the sale despite a later state redemption period. Colorado owners don’t even have that period. File before the auction.

    Repeat filers get less. If one prior case was dismissed within the past year, § 362(c)(3) ends the stay on the 30th day unless the court extends it on a showing of good faith. With two or more such dismissals, § 362(c)(4) means no stay arises unless the court imposes one. A lender that proves a scheme involving multiple filings or unauthorized transfers can get in rem relief under § 362(d)(4), which, once recorded, binds later cases for two years.

    What does the timeline look like for a Lakewood homeowner with an IRS lien?

    Take a hypothetical Lakewood owner who is $27,400 behind on the mortgage. The NED is recorded with the Jefferson County Public Trustee on Friday, August 7, 2026, so the sale window runs from November 25 to December 10. Say the sale is set for Wednesday, December 2. If the Rule 120 notice sets an October 21 response date, that’s the deadline to contest the default there.

    For Regulation X, a complete application has to reach the servicer by October 25 to land more than 37 days before the sale. Under the cure statute, the notice of intent to cure is due by Tuesday, November 17, and the funds by noon on Tuesday, December 1. A Chapter 13 petition still preserves the § 1322(b)(5) cure if it’s filed before the December 2 sale. Spread over a 60-month plan, the $27,400 is roughly $457 a month on top of the regular payment, before the trustee’s commission.

    Now add a Notice of Federal Tax Lien filed in Jefferson County in 2024 for $38,000 of 2021 and 2022 income tax. Under 26 U.S.C. § 7425, if that lien was filed more than 30 days before the sale and the IRS doesn’t get written notice at least 25 days ahead, the sale leaves the lien in place. Even with notice, the IRS can redeem within 120 days, a right the owner no longer has. In Chapter 13, priority taxes have to be paid in full under § 1322(a)(2), while older balances may qualify for discharge of tax debt, depending on filing and assessment dates.

    Have a Colorado Foreclosure Sale Date? Contact Us Now

    How do the FDCPA, Regulation X, the cure right, and Chapter 13 compare?

    Protection Who it binds What it does Timing in a Colorado sale
    FDCPA after Obduskey Debt collectors; foreclosure-only firms only under § 1692f(6) Bars nonjudicial dispossession without a present right or intent Applies throughout, but narrow
    Regulation X, 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41 Mortgage servicers (principal residence) 120-day wait; dual-tracking limits once a complete application is in Application more than 37 days before sale
    Colorado cure, C.R.S. § 38-38-104 Holder and public trustee Reinstates the loan by paying the cure amount Intent 15 days before sale; funds by noon the day before
    Chapter 13, 11 U.S.C. §§ 362, 1322 All creditors, including the IRS Stops the sale; cures arrears over the plan Petition filed before the sale

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Can I still demand debt validation from a Colorado foreclosure firm?

    You can ask, but a firm doing nothing more than a nonjudicial foreclosure isn’t required to answer under the FDCPA after Obduskey. Your servicer still has its own obligations under Regulation X.

    Does the Rule 120 hearing let me challenge the whole loan?

    Generally no. The Rule 120 court looks at whether a default exists that authorizes the sale and at servicemember status. Broader disputes usually belong in a separate case.

    Is there a redemption period after a Colorado foreclosure sale?

    Not for the owner in foreclosures started after January 1, 2008. Junior lienors can redeem if they file a notice of intent within eight business days after the sale. The IRS has its own 120-day federal redemption right when its lien is discharged by the sale.

    Can I file Chapter 13 the morning of the sale?

    A petition filed before the sale stops it and keeps the cure right under § 1322(c)(1). Waiting until the last minute leaves little room for error, and repeat filers may get a shorter stay or none.

    Does Regulation X apply if my servicer is a small company?

    Small servicers are exempt from most of § 1024.41. They still can’t start a foreclosure until the loan is more than 120 days delinquent, and they can’t proceed while you’re performing under a loss mitigation agreement.

    What happens to an IRS lien when my Colorado home is foreclosed?

    If the IRS didn’t get proper notice before the sale, its lien stays on the property. If it did, the lien comes off but the IRS can redeem within 120 days. Either way, you still owe the tax.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm handles Colorado Chapter 13 cases filed to stop foreclosure sales, along with the tax side, including federal tax liens and IRS claims in bankruptcy. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    The days before the cure deadline matter most. If you’re facing a sale date, especially with tax debt in the picture, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Default Interest and Lender Fees in a Colorado Commercial Real Estate Bankruptcy: Section 506(b) After Desert Willow

    Default Interest and Lender Fees in a Colorado Commercial Real Estate Bankruptcy: Section 506(b) After Desert Willow

    An owner of a Denver warehouse or a Colorado Springs retail strip facing a public trustee sale eventually sees the lender’s payoff figure, and it usually runs well past principal and ordinary interest because the note has flipped to a default rate and the lender’s late charges and legal bills ride along. If the owner files Chapter 11 before the sale, a Colorado bankruptcy court decides how much of that default interest the lender actually gets, and under which law.

    A July 2026 New York ruling split those charges at the petition date. Here is what that split means for a Colorado owner under Section 506(b), with the numbers on a $4 million loan.

    What did the Desert Willow decision hold about Section 506(b)?

    In In re 1300 Desert Willow Rd., LLC, No. 25-11375 (PB) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2026) (bench decision), Judge Philip Bentley ruled on a single-asset debtor’s objection to its lender’s roughly $26 million claim. Oddly for a New York case, the collateral was an industrial plant in New Mexico, inside the Tenth Circuit.

    The court held that the word “reasonable” in Section 506(b) reaches only charges accruing after the petition. Earlier charges stand or fall under the law governing the loan, New York law there. The debtor still got relief, just from state law: prepetition late fees were struck as a penalty because they duplicated default interest. Postpetition late fees fell under Section 506(b), while default-rate interest after filing was allowed if the sale shows the lender oversecured.

    Why does the petition date split a Colorado lender’s claim in two?

    A claim is fixed “as of the date of the filing of the petition” and disallowed only if unenforceable “under any agreement or applicable law.” 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1). As the Supreme Court put it, “[c]reditors’ entitlements in bankruptcy arise in the first instance from the underlying substantive law creating the debtor’s obligation.” Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 549 U.S. 443 (2007).

    Postpetition amounts come in through 11 U.S.C. § 506(b), which gives a lender whose collateral exceeds its claim “interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided for under the agreement or State statute under which such claim arose.” United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989), read the interest clause as standing alone, while fees need both a contractual (or, since 2005, statutory) basis and reasonableness. An undersecured lender gets none of it, which is why the equity cushion drives everything below.

    Where do the Tenth Circuit and the District of Colorado stand?

    The firm has found no published Tenth Circuit decision choosing a side. The closest language is in In re Gledhill, 164 F.3d 1338 (10th Cir. 1999), which said oversecured creditors “are entitled to interest, penalties, attorney fees, and costs that accrue before the debtor’s bankruptcy petition is filed,” while later charges “are permitted only if authorized under 11 U.S.C. § 506(b).” That was framing, not a holding (the case was about a judgment lien), but it reads a lot like Judge Bentley’s line.

    The Tenth Circuit’s Bankruptcy Appellate Panel requires an allowed secured claim, oversecured status, a fee right in the agreement or a state statute, and a reasonable amount. In re Sun ‘N Fun Waterpark, LLC, 408 B.R. 361 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2009). And in Denver, Judge Matsch applied an 18 percent default rate instead of the 10 percent note rate from acceleration forward and upheld 4 percent late charges, but sent the fee award back for a proper reasonableness review. In re Neusteter Realty Co., 79 B.R. 30 (D. Colo. 1987).

    The other camp exists too. The en banc Eleventh Circuit applied reasonableness to fees whether they vested before or after filing, treating the excess as unsecured. In re Welzel, 275 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2001). The Fifth Circuit agreed in In re 804 Congress, L.L.C., 756 F.3d 368 (5th Cir. 2014).

    How does the Colorado public trustee timeline push owners into Chapter 11?

    For non-agricultural property, the first sale date falls 110 to 125 calendar days after the notice of election and demand is recorded. C.R.S. § 38-38-108(1). A notice of intent to cure is due 15 calendar days before the sale. C.R.S. § 38-38-104. Talks often run to the wire, so the petition lands days before the sale.

    A building producing substantially all of the owner’s income is often single asset real estate under 11 U.S.C. § 101(51B). A company whose main business is owning that property isn’t a small business debtor, so Subchapter V is out (and its debt cap has been $3,424,000 since April 1, 2025). Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3), the debtor then has 90 days from the order for relief to file a plan with a reasonable possibility of confirmation or start monthly payments at the “nondefault contract rate of interest” on the value of the lender’s interest. Those payments preserve the stay. They don’t stop default interest from accruing.

    Public Trustee Sale Date Approaching? Contact Us Now

    What does the math look like on a $4 million Colorado loan?

    Say a Denver LLC owns one industrial building appraised at $5.5 million, with a $4 million interest-only note at 6 percent ($20,000 a month) that jumps to 11 percent on default and charges 5 percent on late installments. The owner misses the February 2026 payment, the lender accelerates, and the owner files September 15.

    Over those seven and a half months, interest at 11 percent comes to $275,000, and $125,000 of it is the default spread. With eight $1,000 late charges and $40,000 of foreclosure fees, the claim is about $4,323,000 on the petition date. Under Desert Willow, that $125,000, the $8,000 and the $40,000 are tested under the note and Colorado law. Under Welzel, the fees and late charges would also face a reasonableness review.

    If the case runs a year, the 11 percent rate adds $440,000 (another $200,000 of spread), the lender bills $60,000 in fees, and the 6 percent Section 362(d)(3) payments cover about $259,000. All of that is a Section 506(b) question, and with a cushion still above $900,000 the lender stays oversecured. The spread alone totals about $325,000.

    Colorado lets parties agree to rates up to 45 percent a year, C.R.S. § 5-12-103, and the 8 percent rate in C.R.S. § 5-12-102 applies only absent an agreed rate. A penalty challenge to prepetition charges would likely run through the liquidated damages test in Klinger v. Adams County School District No. 50, 130 P.3d 1027 (Colo. 2006). Whether a duplicative late charge fails that test is a state-law question for Colorado-licensed counsel.

    Can cure and reinstatement under Section 1124(2) stop the default rate?

    A plan can leave the loan unimpaired by curing the default, reinstating the original maturity, and compensating the lender for reliance damages. 11 U.S.C. § 1124(2). That undoes acceleration, so after confirmation the note runs at 6 percent again, saving about $16,667 a month for the rest of the term.

    The default interest already accrued is harder. Under 11 U.S.C. § 1123(d), the cure amount “shall be determined in accordance with the underlying agreement and applicable nonbankruptcy law,” and the Ninth Circuit read that to require default interest the note calls for. In re New Investments, Inc., 840 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2016). A Colorado debtor would parse the note and point to the state cure statute, which leaves out principal due only by acceleration and caps interest during a sale continuance at the regular rate. Whether that carries into a bankruptcy cure is an argument, not settled law.

    Which law governs each charge in a Colorado case?

    Charge Governing law (Desert Willow view) Burden Remedies
    Prepetition default interest Note and Colorado law, § 502(b)(1) Filed claim is prima facie valid (Rule 3001(f)); objector must rebut State-law enforceability or penalty challenge
    Prepetition late charges and fees Note and Colorado law; Welzel courts add § 506(b) reasonableness Same shifting burden Duplication and penalty arguments
    Postpetition default interest § 506(b), only if oversecured Desert Willow presumes the contract default rate; debtor must rebut Valuation fight; cure and reinstatement
    Postpetition fees and late charges § 506(b) reasonableness Lender must meet the four Sun ‘N Fun elements Reasonableness and duplication objections

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Does Desert Willow bind a Colorado bankruptcy court?

    No. A D. Colo. judge can treat it only as persuasive, though its reasoning tracks language the Tenth Circuit used in Gledhill.

    Can a lender collect default interest after a Colorado Chapter 11 filing?

    Only if it’s oversecured. Section 506(b) lets an oversecured lender add postpetition interest, and courts often start from the contract rate, including a default rate. An undersecured lender gets no postpetition interest.

    Can a single-asset real estate company use Subchapter V?

    Generally no. The small business debtor definition excludes a company whose primary activity is owning single asset real estate, so most Colorado building owners file under regular Chapter 11.

    What does the 90-day SARE deadline require?

    File a plan with a reasonable possibility of confirmation, or start monthly interest payments at the nondefault contract rate. If the SARE finding comes late, the deadline can run 30 days from that finding. Missing it invites stay relief.

    Does curing the loan in a plan wipe out default interest already charged?

    Not automatically, because Section 1123(d) ties the cure amount to the loan documents and applicable nonbankruptcy law. Reinstatement does stop the default rate going forward.

    Who decides whether a late charge on a Colorado loan is a penalty?

    The bankruptcy court, when it rules on a claim objection. Under the Desert Willow view, it would apply Colorado contract law to prepetition charges.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm represents business owners in Chapter 11 and Subchapter V cases, including objections to a lender’s default interest and fees, and handles the real estate tax side of a restructuring. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    Once a notice of election and demand is recorded, the clock is running. To go over the loan documents before the sale date, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Kittrell and the Ten-Year Reach-Back: Can a Colorado Bankruptcy Trustee Unwind a Children’s Trust?

    Kittrell and the Ten-Year Reach-Back: Can a Colorado Bankruptcy Trustee Unwind a Children’s Trust?

    Plenty of Colorado business owners set up a trust for their kids years ago, often around the time they signed a personal guaranty on a bank or SBA loan. If the business later fails and a Chapter 7 case follows, the bankruptcy trustee will look hard at that trust, and the belief that it’s safe because four years have passed can be badly wrong.

    A July 2026 decision out of Arizona shows why. This post asks which federal bankruptcy rules and Colorado statutes can still reach a children’s trust funded seven or eight years before the petition.

    What did the bankruptcy court decide in Kittrell?

    In Linscott v. Kittrell (In re Kittrell), Adv. No. 4:22-ap-00206-BMW (Bankr. D. Ariz. July 24, 2026), a Chapter 7 trustee sued two debtors and the Kittrell Children’s Trust they formed in October 2014, about seven years and four months before their February 2022 petition. They moved their whole business into the trust while two judgments were unpaid and a loan suit was pending, and named themselves trustees. The court ruled for the trustee on both theories, found the holdings worth at least $15 million at filing, and entered the $6.5 million judgment the trustee requested.

    Irrevocability and anti-reversion clauses didn’t help. The couple’s son could, acting in a non-fiduciary capacity, add descendants of the Kittrells’ parents as beneficiaries (a group that includes the Kittrells) and could revoke and distribute to that group. That made them "clearly contingent beneficiaries." Their conduct finished the job: trust assets pledged for personal loans, business losses claimed on their own returns, personal debts paid from a trust sale.

    How does the ten-year reach-back in § 548(e) work?

    11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) reaches transfers made "on or within 2 years before the date of the filing of the petition," on either an actual-intent or a constructive fraud theory. Section 548(e)(1), added in 2005, stretches that to ten years when the transfer went "to a self-settled trust or similar device," the debtor made it, the debtor "is a beneficiary of such trust or similar device," and the debtor acted with "actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud" a present or future creditor. Once a transfer is avoided, § 550(a) lets the trustee recover the property or its value from the initial transferee.

    There’s no constructive fraud prong, so intent must be proved, usually through badges of fraud. Kittrell used a Ninth Circuit list: pending or threatened litigation, transfer of substantially all assets, insolvency, a special relationship with the transferee, and retained use of the property. Colorado’s list in C.R.S. § 38-8-105(2) overlaps and adds concealment and lack of reasonably equivalent value. A transfer to your own children’s trust looks like an insider deal, and a gift brings in nothing.

    Why is a Colorado children’s trust treated as self-settled if the parents aren’t named beneficiaries?

    The Code doesn’t define "beneficiary," so Kittrell borrowed Arizona’s definition, which reaches anyone with "any present or future interest, vested or contingent." A Colorado case would apply Colorado law, but the drafting lesson travels. Protector powers, broad powers of appointment, and a power to move assets into another trust the settlor created can each give the parents a contingent interest unless the document expressly bars any exercise for their benefit.

    CPAs will rightly push back on one point. Many legitimate irrevocable trusts are grantor trusts on purpose, often through a substitution power like 26 U.S.C. § 675(4)(C), so the parents report the income. Kittrell’s trust had that power too. Grantor-trust reporting alone shouldn’t turn a trust into a self-settled one; in Kittrell it came packaged with a husband treating trust assets as his own.

    Does Colorado law protect a self-settled trust from creditors in bankruptcy?

    No. Colorado has no domestic asset protection trust statute. C.R.S. § 38-10-111 makes transfers "made in trust for the use of the person making the same" void "as against the creditors existing of such person." The text names existing creditors, but in In re Cohen, 8 P.3d 429 (Colo. 1999), a discipline case, the Colorado Supreme Court said such a trust "could not and did not protect the settlor-beneficiary from future creditors," while noting that spendthrift trusts for others are generally valid in Colorado.

    That matters under 11 U.S.C. § 541. The estate takes "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property," and § 541(c)(2) excludes only trust transfer restrictions "enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law," which Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992), reads broadly enough to cover state spendthrift law. A child’s interest in a grandparent’s spendthrift trust generally stays out of the child’s estate. A settlor’s own interest gets no such cover, and § 541 has no reach-back. It looks at the petition date.

    Can a Colorado resident sidestep the problem with a Wyoming or Nevada trust?

    Several states allow self-settled spendthrift trusts, including Nevada under Nev. Rev. Stat. § 166.040 and Wyoming under Wyo. Stat. § 4-10-510. In Waldron v. Huber (In re Huber), 493 B.R. 798 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2013), a Washington developer funded an Alaska trust in 2008 as the market collapsed. Applying Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 270, the court found Alaska had little real connection and applied Washington’s statute voiding self-settled trusts as strong public policy. It also avoided the transfer under § 548(e).

    Huber doesn’t bind Colorado courts, but § 38-10-111 plays the role Washington’s statute did. And § 548(e) is federal, so the chosen state’s shorter limitations period doesn’t control it.

    How would a 2026 Colorado bankruptcy play out for a Durango business owner?

    In 2018 a hypothetical Durango owner, call her Dana, guarantees a $900,000 SBA 7(a) loan for her outfitting company. In March 2019 she deeds a paid-off rental duplex worth $520,000 to an irrevocable trust for her two children, with her brother as trustee. A protector can add any descendant of Dana’s parents as a beneficiary, and Dana keeps collecting the rent. The company closes in 2024, the guaranty is called, and Dana files Chapter 7 in the District of Colorado in September 2026.

    Count back. Section 548(a) reaches only September 2024. Through 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) the trustee can use the Colorado Voidable Transactions Act, but C.R.S. § 38-8-110 cuts off an actual-intent claim four years after the transfer or, if later, one year after it "was or could reasonably have been discovered." A deed recorded in La Plata County in 2019 wasn’t hidden. Where the United States holds an unsecured claim, some courts let the trustee borrow the six-year period in 28 U.S.C. § 3306(b), as in Samson v. Spencer (In re Spencer), Adv. No. 22-3016 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 2023), though courts are split. Even that stops at September 2020. The firm’s post on LLC member distributions in a Colorado bankruptcy covers the Act’s four-year rule in more detail.

    Section 548(e) runs back to September 2016. Under Kittrell’s reasoning, the protector power makes Dana a contingent beneficiary, and the badges line up: a shaky guaranty, an insider transferee, no consideration, retained rent. The § 541 claim runs alongside it, and if Dana holds an equitable interest, the trust may have to turn the duplex over under § 542(a).

    Defending a Family Trust in a Colorado Bankruptcy? Contact Us Now

    Theory What the trustee must show Reach-back Who benefits
    § 548(a)(1) Actual intent, or inadequate value plus insolvency 2 years All creditors, through the estate
    § 548(e)(1) Self-settled trust, debtor is a beneficiary, actual intent 10 years All creditors; trust liable under § 550(a)
    § 544(b) with the Colorado Voidable Transactions Act A real unsecured creditor who could avoid the transfer 4 years, or 1 year after discovery for actual intent All creditors
    § 541 property of the estate Debtor’s equitable interest or self-benefiting power, unprotected by an enforceable spendthrift clause None; petition date All creditors, via turnover under § 542(a)

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Is a trust for my children safe in a Colorado bankruptcy once four years have passed?

    Not necessarily. Colorado’s four-year clock governs only the state-law claims a trustee borrows through § 544(b). If the trust is self-settled and funded with actual intent to hinder creditors, § 548(e) reaches back ten years, and a § 541 claim has no look-back at all.

    Does naming only my children as beneficiaries keep a trust from being self-settled?

    Not always. In Kittrell, the son’s power to add his parents as beneficiaries made them contingent beneficiaries, and their personal use of trust assets added a vested interest.

    Can a Colorado resident rely on a Nevada or Wyoming asset protection trust in bankruptcy?

    It’s risky. Huber applied the home state’s policy against self-settled trusts instead of the chosen state’s law, and Colorado has a comparable rule in C.R.S. § 38-10-111. Section 548(e) applies regardless of the trust’s chosen law.

    Is a spendthrift trust my parents created for me protected in my own bankruptcy?

    Generally, yes, if you didn’t fund it and the spendthrift clause is enforceable under Colorado law. Section 541(c)(2) honors restrictions enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law.

    Does reporting a trust’s income on my personal return make it self-settled?

    Not by itself, since many irrevocable trusts are grantor trusts by design. In Kittrell the reporting mattered because it came with personal use of trust assets and the husband holding himself out as owner.

    What can the trustee recover if a transfer to a trust is avoided?

    Under § 550(a), the trustee recovers the property or, if the court orders, its value from the initial transferee, usually the trust. The Kittrell court measured value at the petition date, not the 2014 transfer date, to restore the estate.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm represents debtors, and the relatives and trusts sued with them, when a Chapter 7 trustee attacks a family trust, and it maps reach-back exposure before a Colorado business owner files. Phillip Zagotti, a JD and CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado, and he reads the trust instrument and the tax returns side by side. Related services include Chapter 7 bankruptcy, clawback defense, SBA loan and business debt, and trust and estate tax planning. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    If a trustee has sent a demand letter about a trust you funded, or you are thinking about filing with a trust funded in the last ten years, have the timeline reviewed first. To start, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Colorado LLC Distributions in Bankruptcy: How a Trustee Recovers What Members Took After Weinstein

    Colorado LLC Distributions in Bankruptcy: How a Trustee Recovers What Members Took After Weinstein

    A creditor chasing a judgment against a Colorado LLC often learns two things at once: the company is empty, and its members took money out while the bills went unpaid. Colorado’s LLC statute makes a member repay money pulled out of a company that couldn’t afford it, if the member knew, but the Colorado Supreme Court held in 2013 that only the LLC can enforce it.

    Bankruptcy changes the analysis. Once the LLC is a debtor, whether the members file or a creditor forces the case, the question becomes what a trustee can recover. This post answers that for a Colorado LLC bankruptcy, with a Fort Collins example.

    What did Weinstein v. Colborne Foodbotics decide about Colorado LLC creditors?

    Colborne held an arbitration award of roughly $225,000 against a Boulder LLC that couldn’t pay. It sued the members and managers personally and lost on both theories in Weinstein v. Colborne Foodbotics, LLC, 2013 CO 33, 302 P.3d 263 (Colo. 2013).

    Under C.R.S. § 7-80-606(1), an LLC can’t make a distribution that leaves its liabilities above the fair value of its assets. Subsection (2) makes a member who knew of the violation “liable to the limited liability company for the amount of the distribution.” The court held that “absent express statutory authority, an LLC’s creditor may not assert a claim against the members of the LLC for unlawful distribution,” and it declined to carry the corporate rule on duties to creditors over to LLC managers. Subsection (3) adds a three-year cutoff.

    Why does a Colorado LLC bankruptcy put the distribution claim back in play?

    Weinstein decided who owns the claim, and the answer was the company. When the company files, 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) pulls “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property” into the estate, including its claims against its own members. With the estate’s representative as plaintiff, standing stops being the problem.

    In Chapter 7 that’s an independent trustee charged by 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(1) to “collect and reduce to money the property of the estate.” And if the three-year period was still open at filing, 11 U.S.C. § 108(a) gives the trustee until the later of its end or two years after the order for relief.

    Which bankruptcy avoidance claims reach distributions to Colorado LLC members?

    The LLC statute requires proof the member knew. Constructive fraud doesn’t. Under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B), a trustee can avoid a transfer made within two years before the petition if the debtor received less than reasonably equivalent value while insolvent or thinly capitalized. An equity draw gives the company nothing back.

    Separately, 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) lets the trustee use state law available to an actual unsecured creditor. In Colorado that means the Colorado Voidable Transactions Act, the name S.B. 25-133 gave the old fraudulent transfer act effective August 6, 2025, for claims filed after that date. C.R.S. § 38-8-106(1) covers transfers without reasonably equivalent value by an insolvent debtor, and § 38-8-110 allows four years. The 2025 bill also stretched the insider preference claim in § 38-8-106(2) from one year to four.

    Preference law under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) needs a payment on an antecedent debt, so it fits member loan repayments, not equity draws, and reaches back one year for insiders. Once a transfer is avoided, 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) lets the trustee recover from the initial transferee or the party benefited.

    In Lewis v. Takacs (In re Stone Pine Investment Banking, LLC), No. 21-1423 (10th Cir. Dec. 19, 2023) (unpublished), the Tenth Circuit affirmed a Colorado LLC trustee’s judgment against the owners, manager, and a member-controlled entity under § 544(b) and the Colorado act, and allowed equitable tolling after evidence that insiders delayed filing because “the four year clock has run on several transactions.”

    How would a trustee plead $400,000 in distributions from a Fort Collins LLC?

    Picture a Fort Collins mechanical subcontractor run by its two members. After losing its biggest customer in early 2025, it paid $320,000 in owner draws between April 2025 and February 2026, $160,000 to each member, plus $80,000 repaying one member’s 2024 loan. It filed Chapter 7 on March 16, 2026. At the first draw its books showed about $1.15 million in liabilities against assets worth roughly $760,000, and a steel supplier had gone unpaid since January 2025.

    Count one is the company’s own § 7-80-606 claim for the $320,000, with the bank’s covenant default letters as proof of knowledge. Count two seeks the same draws under § 548(a)(1)(B), where knowledge drops out and the case becomes a valuation fight. Count three uses § 544(b), with the steel supplier as the creditor whose claim predates every transfer, to plead § 38-8-106(1) against the draws and § 38-8-106(2) against the loan repayment. Count four pleads that repayment as an insider preference.

    The loan repayment stays out of the fraud counts because § 548(d)(2)(A) treats satisfying a debt as value. Under 11 U.S.C. § 550(d) the trustee gets one satisfaction, so exposure is $160,000 for one member and $240,000 for the other. A voluntary petition is the order for relief, so 11 U.S.C. § 546(a) generally gives the trustee until March 2028 to sue. Because it’s a subcontractor, the members may also face Colorado’s contractor trust fund rules.

    If some draws were tax distributions paid directly to the IRS, United States v. Miller, 604 U.S. ___, No. 23-824 (2025), reversing the Tenth Circuit, holds that sovereign immunity still bars a § 544(b) claim against the United States that rests on state law. The trustee would turn to § 548, or to the members as the parties the payments benefited.

    Does it matter whether the LLC files Chapter 7, Subchapter V, or Chapter 11?

    Yes. In Chapter 7 an outside trustee controls the claims. In Subchapter V, 11 U.S.C. § 1184 gives the debtor in possession a trustee’s powers, so the company the members run decides whether to sue them.

    Under 11 U.S.C. § 1191(a), confirmation requires the 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) test, so a dissenting creditor must get at least Chapter 7 value, and that value includes what a trustee would recover from the members. A party can ask the court under 11 U.S.C. § 1183(b)(2) to have the Subchapter V trustee investigate, and 11 U.S.C. § 1185(a) removes the debtor in possession for cause, such as fraud or gross mismanagement. Chapter 11 is similar under 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a), with 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) permitting a trustee for cause.

    Can a creditor force a Colorado LLC into bankruptcy to reach those distributions?

    Often. Under 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1), three or more creditors with noncontingent, undisputed claims totaling at least $21,050 (as adjusted April 1, 2025) can file. If the company has fewer than 12 qualifying creditors, § 303(b)(2) lets one creditor file, and insiders and recipients of voidable transfers aren’t counted, so the members who took the money don’t count.

    A dismissal other than by consent can bring costs and fees under § 303(i), plus damages for bad faith. Check what the members can actually pay first.

    What can a member do after receiving a trustee demand letter?

    Treat it as an opening position. Insolvency is usually the best ground, because a careful valuation at each distribution date can defeat every count that depends on it. Draws that paid for real work may support a value argument, and a loan repayment may fit the ordinary course or new value defenses in § 547(c)(2) and (c)(4).

    Got a Trustee Demand Letter, or a Debtor LLC That Went Dark? Contact Us Now

    Theory Who brings it Reach-back Knowledge needed? Fort Collins example
    C.R.S. § 7-80-606 The LLC, so in bankruptcy the trustee or debtor in possession Three years, extended by § 108(a) Yes $320,000 in draws
    11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B) Trustee or debtor in possession Two years No $320,000 in draws
    § 544(b) with C.R.S. § 38-8-106(1) Trustee, through an actual creditor Four years No $320,000 in draws
    § 544(b) with C.R.S. § 38-8-106(2) Trustee, through an actual creditor Four years Reasonable cause to believe insolvency $80,000 loan repayment
    11 U.S.C. § 547(b) Trustee or debtor in possession One year for insiders No $80,000 loan repayment

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Can a creditor sue Colorado LLC members directly for an unlawful distribution?

    Not under the LLC statute. Weinstein v. Colborne Foodbotics, LLC held that § 7-80-606(2) liability runs only to the company. In bankruptcy the trustee or debtor in possession can pursue it.

    Does a bankruptcy trustee have to prove the members knew the LLC was insolvent?

    Only for the claim under the LLC statute. Constructive fraud claims under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B) and the Colorado Voidable Transactions Act turn on value and the company’s finances, not what the member knew.

    How far back can a trustee reach to recover distributions from a Colorado LLC?

    Section 548 reaches two years before the petition, and the Colorado act, used through § 544(b), generally reaches four. Insider preferences under § 547 reach one year.

    Is repaying a member’s loan to the LLC treated like a distribution?

    Usually not. Repaying a real debt counts as value, so trustees attack loan repayments under the insider preference rules in 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) and C.R.S. § 38-8-106(2).

    Can one creditor put a Colorado LLC into involuntary bankruptcy?

    Sometimes. If the company has fewer than 12 qualifying creditors, one creditor holding at least $21,050 in undisputed, noncontingent claims can file under 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(2).

    What changes if the LLC files Subchapter V instead of Chapter 7?

    In Subchapter V the debtor in possession holds the claims against the members, so the members’ own company decides whether to sue them. Creditors can push back at confirmation or seek removal of the debtor in possession for cause.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm represents members facing trustee demands and creditors trying to reach money that left a failing company, in Chapter 7 and Subchapter V cases and in preference and clawback defense. Phillip Zagotti, an attorney and CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    If you took distributions from a Colorado LLC now in bankruptcy, or one that owes you money has gone quiet, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Undisclosed Lawsuits in a Colorado Bankruptcy: Judicial Estoppel After Keathley

    Undisclosed Lawsuits in a Colorado Bankruptcy: Judicial Estoppel After Keathley

    A Colorado Springs warehouse worker is two years into a Chapter 13 plan when a delivery van runs a red light on Academy Boulevard. Within months she has an injury lawyer and a real claim, but nothing in her bankruptcy case mentions it. In Colorado, that gap has long handed the defense a judicial estoppel argument strong enough to end the lawsuit.

    The Supreme Court changed how that argument is decided this June, and it named the Tenth Circuit’s rule as one of the two it was correcting. Here is what the Court held, why it matters more in Colorado than in most places, and what a debtor in the District of Colorado bankruptcy court with a pending or new claim should do now.

    What did the Supreme Court decide in Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction?

    Thomas Keathley was paying creditors in full through an Arkansas Chapter 13 plan when he was hurt in a 2021 Mississippi car wreck. He told his bankruptcy lawyer he planned to sue, yet nobody amended his schedules, and he disclosed the claim only after the defendant moved for summary judgment. The lower courts applied the Fifth Circuit’s rule that an omission is inadvertent only if the debtor didn’t know the facts behind the claim or had no motive to hide it.

    In Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc., 608 U.S. ___, No. 25-6 (June 11, 2026), Justice Jackson wrote for a unanimous Court that “courts should look to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the omission.” The old rule was “too rigid and too broad,” because almost every debtor knows the facts of his own injury and almost any omission could theoretically help him. The holding is narrow. Working from the equitable framework of New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742 (2001), the Court assumed without deciding that judicial estoppel applies in bankruptcy, and it left open whether bad faith is required.

    Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, concurred to question whether the doctrine has any sound footing. Justice Sotomayor doubted that equity ever calls for estoppel while the bankruptcy case is still open, since the bankruptcy judge can sanction the debtor, modify the plan, or convert the case.

    Why does Keathley hit Colorado and the Tenth Circuit so directly?

    Footnote 3 of the opinion cites Eastman v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 493 F.3d 1151, 1157 (10th Cir. 2007), as the Tenth Circuit’s version of the rejected test. Eastman’s railroad worker told the trustee he had no injury suit pending, took a no-asset Chapter 7 discharge, and was estopped. The court called his later reopening “inconsequential.”

    Queen v. TA Operating, LLC, 734 F.3d 1081 (10th Cir. 2013), went further: the debtors amended only after the defendant alerted the trustee, then valued their claim at $400,000 and called it fully exempt. The Colorado case is Anderson v. Seven Falls Co., 696 F. App’x 341 (10th Cir. 2017) (unpublished), a D. Colo. suit over an ankle injury at Seven Falls in Colorado Springs, where the panel refused to adopt the Ninth Circuit’s subjective-intent approach in Ah Quin v. County of Kauai. Keathley quoted Ah Quin with approval. The two-factor screen Colorado federal courts used for nearly two decades is gone, though the three New Hampshire factors still apply.

    What does a Colorado bankruptcy debtor have to disclose, and when?

    The estate takes “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.” 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). That includes claims nobody has filed yet. Question 33 of Schedule A/B asks for claims against third parties “whether or not you have filed a lawsuit,” and question 9 of the Statement of Financial Affairs asks about lawsuits in the past year, personal-injury cases included.

    Chapter 13 adds a wrinkle. Under 11 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(1), property acquired after filing and before the case is closed, dismissed, or converted is also estate property, so an injury in year two of the plan counts. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1007(h) is often cited here, but its 14-day supplemental schedule reaches only § 541(a)(5) items like inheritances, not a new tort claim. Keathley flagged a split on whether any continuing duty to disclose exists and didn’t resolve it.

    The practical answer is amendment. Rule 1009(a) permits amending a schedule “at any time before the case is closed,” with notice to the trustee. Colorado’s L.B.R. 1009-1 adds a notice substantially in the form of L.B.F. 1009-1.1 and a certificate of service. A closed case can be reopened under 11 U.S.C. § 350(b) “to administer assets, to accord relief to the debtor, or for other cause.”

    Pending Lawsuit and a Bankruptcy Case? Contact Us Now

    How are federal judges applying the new standard so far?

    An early example from within the circuit is Gaines v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., No. CIV-25-661-R (W.D. Okla. Aug. 31, 2026). The judge set the two-factor screen aside and borrowed the Eleventh Circuit’s checklist from Slater v. United States Steel Corp., which weighs things like the debtor’s sophistication, how and when the filings were corrected, and whether bankruptcy counsel was told.

    The plaintiff still lost. She had sworn “no” on question 33 while actively litigating, listed a different lawsuit elsewhere in her papers, and sought reopening only after defense counsel found the bankruptcy. Keathley lets a court hear the whole story, but a sworn denial followed by a late, unfinished fix is still a bad story.

    Who owns the claim, the debtor or the bankruptcy trustee?

    A Chapter 7 trustee must “collect and reduce to money the property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(1). Unscheduled property is not abandoned at closing and, under § 554(d), stays in the estate, which leaves the trustee, not the debtor, holding the claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a)(3) gives the trustee a reasonable time to step in before dismissal, and Eastman’s footnote 3 said estopping a trustee who hasn’t played games is likely inappropriate, at least as far as creditors need the money.

    Anderson shows the cost to the debtor. The trustee substituted in, and recovery was capped at creditor claims plus fees: a $45,662.04 judgment on a claim pleaded at over $5 million. In Chapter 13, § 1306(b) generally leaves the debtor in possession of estate property, which is why Keathley sued in his own name, and 11 U.S.C. § 1329 lets the plan be modified once money comes in.

    What should a Colorado Springs debtor with a new claim during Chapter 13 do?

    Back to the warehouse worker. Say she filed in March 2024 with a 60-month, $410-a-month plan projected to pay about $9,000 on $61,000 of unsecured debt. The crash leaves $27,500 in unpaid medical bills, and her lawyer expects about $140,000. After a one-third fee ($46,667), $3,000 in costs, and the providers, roughly $62,800 remains.

    Colorado opted out of the federal exemptions in C.R.S. § 13-54-107, and C.R.S. § 13-54-102(1)(n) exempts personal-injury proceeds “except for obligations incurred for treatment of any kind for such injuries or collection of such damages.” If that exemption fits, disclosure may cost her little, while concealment puts all $140,000 at risk. She should tell her Chapter 13 counsel in writing, amend Schedules A/B and C with the local notice, value the claim honestly rather than the way the Queens did, and talk to the trustee before signing any settlement. Keathley told his lawyer and stopped. A filed amendment is what protects her.

    Issue Tenth Circuit before Keathley After Keathley
    Inadvertence test No knowledge or no motive (Eastman, Queen) Totality of the circumstances
    Ah Quin approach Declined (Anderson) Quoted with approval
    Correcting after being caught “Inconsequential” (Eastman) A factor, but late fixes still hurt (Gaines)
    Telling bankruptcy counsel No excuse One circumstance among several
    Trustee pursuing the claim Likely not estopped, up to creditor needs (Eastman n.3) Unchanged
    Case still open No distinction Sotomayor concurrence doubts estoppel

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Does Keathley mean a Colorado debtor can no longer be judicially estopped?

    No. It changed only how courts decide whether an omission was inadvertent or a mistake. A debtor who denies a known claim under oath can still lose it.

    Is a personal-injury claim exempt in a Colorado bankruptcy?

    Colorado debtors use the state list, and C.R.S. § 13-54-102(1)(n) covers injury proceeds except amounts owed for treatment or collection. The claim still has to be scheduled and the exemption claimed.

    Do I have to disclose an injury claim that arose after I filed Chapter 13?

    Under 11 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(1), it is estate property. The Supreme Court left open whether a continuing duty to disclose exists, but a prompt Rule 1009(a) amendment is the safer course and is a circumstance courts weigh.

    Can I reopen a closed Colorado bankruptcy case to list a lawsuit?

    Yes, under 11 U.S.C. § 350(b). Eastman gave no weight to reopening after exposure, but after Keathley the timing and reason for the fix are part of the analysis.

    Does a Colorado state court use the same judicial estoppel test?

    Not necessarily. Estate of Burford v. Burford, 935 P.2d 943 (Colo. 1997), lists elements including an intentional effort to mislead and proceedings involving the same parties. How a Colorado court applies that to a bankruptcy omission is a state-law question.

    What happens to my lawsuit if the bankruptcy trustee steps in?

    The trustee gets a reasonable time to join or substitute under Rule 17(a)(3). If the debtor is estopped, the recovery may be limited to creditor claims plus fees, as in Anderson, leaving the debtor nothing more.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm handles bankruptcy matters including amended schedules in Chapter 13 cases, reopening closed Chapter 7 cases, and coordinating with injury and employment counsel when a claim touches a bankruptcy estate. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    If you have an open bankruptcy case and a claim that never made it onto your schedules, the order of the next steps matters. To review your filings and timeline, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Colorado Plan Releases After Purdue: What the Tenth Circuit Decided in 1990

    Colorado Plan Releases After Purdue: What the Tenth Circuit Decided in 1990

    When the Supreme Court decided Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 603 U.S. 204 (2024), commentators called it a rupture in Chapter 11 practice. For a Pueblo or Grand Junction company reorganizing in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado, the change was small. Since 1990 the Tenth Circuit has read 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) to stop a confirmed plan from permanently shielding a non-debtor from its own liability on the debtor’s debts.

    The live questions concern exculpation clauses and an August 2026 Voyager Digital ruling on post-confirmation conduct. Owners usually ask something simpler: can a Subchapter V plan deal with their bank guaranty?

    What did the Tenth Circuit decide in Western Real Estate Fund?

    In Landsing Diversified Properties-II v. First National Bank & Trust Co. of Tulsa (In re Western Real Estate Fund, Inc.), 922 F.2d 592 (10th Cir. 1990) (per curiam), an Oklahoma Chapter 11 debtor fired its litigation lawyer, and the bankruptcy court enjoined him from collecting his unpaid fee from a non-debtor in state court.

    The Tenth Circuit vacated most of it. “Congress did not intend to extend such benefits to third-party bystanders,” the court wrote, and “the stay may not be extended post-confirmation in the form of a permanent injunction that effectively relieves the nondebtor from its own liability to the creditor.” On rehearing in Abel v. West, 932 F.2d 898 (10th Cir. 1991), the panel limited the surviving injunction to the period “pending confirmation of a reorganization plan.”

    Did Purdue change the rules for Colorado Chapter 11 plans?

    Less than elsewhere. Purdue barred any plan release that “effectively seeks to discharge claims against a nondebtor without the consent of affected claimants,” and its circuit-split footnote grouped Western Real Estate Fund with the Fifth and Ninth Circuit decisions refusing such releases.

    Purdue did close one door. In In re Midway Gold US, Inc., 575 B.R. 475 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2017), Chief Judge Michael E. Romero read Western Real Estate Fund as “limited in scope” to co-debtor and guarantor releases and would have allowed others under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) in “very limited” circumstances. Purdue forecloses that, reading the catchall in 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(6) to reach only debtor-focused provisions.

    Why can’t a Subchapter V plan release the owner’s personal guaranty?

    Here is a hypothetical. A Pueblo metal fabrication shop in Subchapter V owes $1.1 million to a local bank, which the owner guaranteed, and $400,000 to trade creditors. The collateral is worth $700,000, and the plan pays unsecured claims, including the bank’s $400,000 deficiency, 20 cents on the dollar. Ignoring interest, the bank collects $780,000. The owner wants the plan to release him on the remaining $320,000.

    That is the release Western Real Estate Fund forbids. Section 524(e) says discharge “does not affect the liability of any other entity on, or the property of any other entity for, such debt.” The Chapter 11 discharge in 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1)(A) and the Subchapter V discharge in 11 U.S.C. § 1192 both run only to the debtor. Even Midway Gold said a guarantor release would be “expressly barred by § 524(e).” After confirmation the bank can sue him, and if he has $310,000 of equity in a Pueblo West house, the homestead exemption in C.R.S. § 38-41-201 ($250,000, or $350,000 for elderly or disabled owners) leaves part of it exposed.

    How is exculpation different from a third-party release?

    A release wipes out creditors’ claims against someone else. Exculpation sets a standard of care for estate fiduciaries during the case, excepting gross negligence, willful misconduct, and fraud.

    Midway Gold refused to exculpate secured lenders, who were not estate fiduciaries, struck an advice-of-counsel shield, and confined protection to acts during the case. In In re Rocking M Media, LLC, No. 22-20242 (Bankr. D. Kan. Aug. 2, 2024), a Kansas bankruptcy court noted that “[t]he Tenth Circuit has not addressed the validity of exculpation clauses,” followed Midway Gold, and refused to carve a liquidating trustee’s future conduct out of the clause.

    The Fifth Circuit reads Tenth Circuit law more strictly; in NexPoint Advisors, L.P. v. Highland Capital Management, L.P. (In re Highland Capital Management, L.P.), 48 F.4th 419 (5th Cir. 2022), it said it and “the Tenth Circuit hold § 524(e) categorically bars third-party exculpations absent express authority in another provision of the Bankruptcy Code.” One such provision is 11 U.S.C. § 1125(e), which protects good-faith plan solicitation and plan securities transactions.

    What does the Voyager ruling add about future conduct?

    Voyager Digital’s 2023 cryptocurrency plan required large coin trades before in-kind distributions and exculpated the people executing them. On an appeal by the United States and the U.S. Trustee, in In re Voyager Digital Holdings, Inc., No. 23-CV-2171 (LTS) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2026) (amended opinion), Chief Judge Laura Taylor Swain vacated the clause, concluding that “[n]othing in the Bankruptcy Code or the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity empowered the Bankruptcy Court to approve the Exculpation Provision.” She also held that 11 U.S.C. § 1142(a) displaces only nonbankruptcy law “relating to financial condition,” and that quasi-judicial immunity belongs in a later suit as a defense, not in an advance grant.

    Voyager does not bind Colorado courts, but it fits 28 U.S.C. § 959(b), which requires a debtor in possession to operate “according to the requirements of the valid laws of the State.” A Weld County oilfield service company in Subchapter V cannot use its plan to pre-clear future dealings with regulators. Voyager’s real addition is the government-enforcement limit.

    Does an opt-out ballot count as consent in Colorado?

    Purdue declined “to express a view on what qualifies as a consensual release,” and courts have split. In re Smallhold, Inc., No. 24-10267 (CTG) (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 25, 2024), held silence is not consent, while In re Spirit Airlines, Inc., No. 24-11988 (SHL) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2025), approved an opt-out. We have found no Tenth Circuit appellate ruling. Midway Gold adds that consent “does not confer this Court with jurisdiction” over disputes among non-debtors. In Subchapter V, the guaranteed lender simply signs a release or does not.

    What options does a Pueblo or Greeley owner-guarantor have?

    A § 105(a) injunction protects the owner only until confirmation under Abel v. West. A gatekeeper clause fares no better: the Barton doctrine, which the Tenth Circuit applied to trustees in Satterfield v. Malloy, 700 F.3d 1231 (10th Cir. 2012), protects court officers, and an owner sued on a guaranty is not acting as one.

    The cleanest path is the owner’s own case. An owner holding 20 percent or more of the company’s outstanding voting securities is an “affiliate” under 11 U.S.C. § 101(2)(A), and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1015(b) permits joint administration. He then gets his own stay and discharge, subject to the usual exceptions and Colorado’s exemptions.

    The other route is paying for consent. Suppose a Greeley HVAC contractor’s owner puts $150,000 of outside money into the plan, and the bank signs a release effective when plan payments finish. A signed agreement satisfies every court’s test for consent. Front-loading payments on the guaranteed debt also shrinks exposure.

    Plan provision What it does Status in the Tenth Circuit after Purdue Leading authority
    Nonconsensual guarantor release Ends creditor claims against a non-debtor Barred since 1990 Western Real Estate Fund; Purdue
    Signed or opt-in release Creditor affirmatively releases a non-debtor Permitted; Purdue reserved the issue Purdue; Midway Gold
    Opt-out “deemed consent” release Treats silence as consent Unsettled; no circuit ruling located Smallhold; Spirit Airlines
    Exculpation of estate fiduciaries Limits fiduciaries’ in-case liability Approved when limited to fiduciaries Midway Gold; Rocking M Media
    Exculpation of future conduct Pre-clears post-confirmation acts Vulnerable under § 959(b) and persuasive authority Voyager (S.D.N.Y. 2026)
    Section 105(a) injunction for the owner Stays suits against a non-debtor Temporary, until confirmation Western Real Estate Fund; Abel v. West

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Can a Colorado Chapter 11 plan release my personal guaranty without the bank’s consent?

    No. The Tenth Circuit held in 1990 that Section 524(e) bars a confirmed plan from permanently relieving a non-debtor of its own liability on the debtor’s debt, and Purdue reached the same result nationally in 2024. A guarantor is released only by the lender’s agreement or in the guarantor’s own bankruptcy.

    Is exculpation the same thing as a release?

    No. A release extinguishes creditors’ claims against a non-debtor. Exculpation protects estate fiduciaries, such as the debtor in possession and its officers, for conduct during the case, excepting gross negligence, willful misconduct, and fraud. The leading Colorado decision limits it to true fiduciaries.

    Does the Voyager decision apply in Colorado?

    It does not bind the District of Colorado, because it is a Southern District of New York ruling. Colorado bankruptcy judges can still find it persuasive on shielding future conduct from government enforcement, and federal law already requires a debtor in possession to follow valid state law.

    Will not returning my ballot count as consenting to a release?

    It depends on the court and the plan’s wording. Some courts accept opt-outs with clear disclosure, while others require an affirmative act such as voting or checking an opt-in box. We have not found a Tenth Circuit appellate ruling, so read every ballot and notice carefully.

    Can the bankruptcy court stop my bank from suing me on the guaranty while the company reorganizes?

    Possibly, for a limited time. The Tenth Circuit has allowed a temporary Section 105 injunction protecting a non-debtor when it helps the reorganization, but on rehearing it limited that protection to the period before plan confirmation. After confirmation, the lender can generally pursue the guarantor.

    Should the owner of a small Colorado business file bankruptcy alongside the company?

    Sometimes. If the guaranty exceeds what the owner can pay, his own case provides a stay and a discharge the company’s plan cannot, and the cases can often be jointly administered. The answer turns on Colorado’s exemptions and what the lender will accept.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm represents Colorado businesses and their owners in Subchapter V reorganizations and Chapter 11 cases, including plan drafting and guaranty negotiations tied to SBA loans and other business debt. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. District Court and the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado and can weigh the tax side of guaranty settlements and debt forgiveness. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    If your company is heading toward Subchapter V and you signed a personal guaranty, plan for it before the petition is filed. To discuss your situation, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Colorado Contractors Short on Cash: Trust Fund Debts and Bankruptcy Choices

    Colorado Contractors Short on Cash: Trust Fund Debts and Bankruptcy Choices

    Builder insolvencies in Australia have roughly tripled in a few years, and commentary there focuses on insolvent trading rules that make directors pay personally. American law has no general counterpart. In Colorado, an owner’s personal risk arrives through a narrower door: progress draws owed to subs and suppliers, and payroll withholding owed to the IRS.

    A diverted draw can be nondischargeable, and withheld payroll tax, once converted into a penalty against a responsible person, is a priority tax no individual discharge reaches. Knowing how those debts behave lets an owner pick a path before a supplier’s lawsuit or a revenue officer sets the timing.

    Listen to this post

    North Star Tax and Legal Briefing: Colorado Contractors Short on Cash

    A five-minute audio version of this article. Trust fund draws, the Bullock intent standard, the payroll tax penalty that survives without it, and how a workout, Chapter 7, and Subchapter V compare.

    Download the MP3 · Episode page on Podbean

    Show / hide the episode transcript

    Builder failures in Australia have roughly tripled in a few years, and the commentary there is all about directors paying personally for trading while insolvent. American law has no rule like that. But if you run a construction company in Colorado and cash is getting tight, do not relax. Your personal risk arrives through two narrower doors. The first is the progress draw you spent on the wrong job. The second is the payroll tax you withheld from your crew and never sent to the I R S. One of those debts follows you out of bankruptcy only if a supplier can prove what you knew. The other follows you without anyone proving bad intent at all.

    Colorado has a trust fund statute for construction money. When an owner or general contractor pays a draw to a contractor or subcontractor, that money is held in trust for the subs, laborers, and suppliers who did the work that draw paid for. A draw on a Pueblo school remodel belongs to that remodel’s suppliers. The statute does not require a separate bank account for every job. It does require separate records of account for each project. Using a Loveland draw to pay Greeley invoices is the violation. And a violation is theft under Colorado law, which opens the civil theft remedy: three times actual damages, plus attorney fees. Here is the distinction to hold onto. The supplier’s claim is a state law trust claim. The I R S claim on withheld payroll tax is a federal priority tax. They behave very differently once you file.

    Start with the supplier. In a two thousand seven decision, the Colorado Supreme Court held that a trust fund claimant does not need a perfected mechanic’s lien, or even time left to file one. A supplier that let the lien deadline pass can still argue your draws were held in trust for it. The Tenth Circuit treats that statute as creating the kind of trust that lets the debt survive an individual’s discharge. The company form does not protect you either. Colorado courts hold anyone in complete control of the money personally liable.

    Now the point that cuts the other way. Since the Supreme Court’s Bullock decision in two thousand thirteen, the supplier has to prove you knew the money was trust money, or were grossly reckless about it. In the Cupit case, a roofing company owner who simply paid the oldest bills first did not have that mental state, until the day another supplier served him with a trust fund complaint. Everything diverted after that date was excepted from discharge and trebled as theft. In a second Colorado case the builder won outright: every vendor was paid, the records were adequate, and no culpable state of mind was proved. Records and notice decide these cases.

    Payroll tax works differently, and this is where owners get hurt. When you withhold income tax and the employee share of Social Security and Medicare, then use it to pay someone else, the I R S can assess a penalty equal to that withheld amount against every responsible person who willfully failed to pay it over. Willful does not mean evil. Paying other creditors instead is the evidence. And unlike the supplier, the I R S does not have to prove knowledge or recklessness at the discharge stage. That penalty is a priority tax that no individual discharge reaches, in Chapter seven, eleven, or thirteen. Owners pay suppliers first because the supplier is the one calling. The tax is the debt that survives anyway. The front end fix is boring: separate records for every job, and payroll deposits made before anyone else gets a check.

    So what does the company do? A workout has no automatic stay, so one civil theft lawsuit can unravel it. Chapter seven gives an L L C no discharge, and the company’s case does nothing for the owner personally. Subchapter Vee, for companies under the current cap of three million four hundred twenty-four thousand dollars, lets the company pay priority taxes over up to five years, and when the plan requires it, the court can send those payments to the trust fund taxes first, which shrinks the owner’s own penalty exposure. This week, pull the draw history and vendor payments for every open job and check that the money stayed with the project. Confirm your last two quarters of payroll deposits actually went in. If either number is off, get it reviewed before a demand letter or a revenue officer sets the schedule. That’s what we do at North Star Law Firm. The initial consultation is free, and the full written analysis with citations is at c o dash legal dot net.

    What does Colorado’s trust fund statute require when a contractor gets paid?

    Under C.R.S. § 38-22-127(1), funds disbursed to a contractor or subcontractor on a construction project “shall be held in trust” for the subs, laborers, and suppliers with lien or bond rights for the work that draw paid for. A draw on a Pueblo school remodel belongs to that remodel’s suppliers.

    Subsection (2) excuses a good faith dispute or setoff, and subsection (3) switches the statute off where the contractor posted a bond or the owner signed a written release. Subsection (4) requires “separate records of account for each project,” though not separate bank accounts. Using a Loveland draw to pay Greeley invoices is the problem. Subsection (5) makes a violation theft, which opens the civil theft remedy in C.R.S. § 18-4-405: three times actual damages plus attorney fees.

    A missed lien deadline does not end the exposure. On certification from the Tenth Circuit, the Colorado Supreme Court held that a trust fund claimant need not have a perfected lien or still be able to perfect one. Fowler & Peth, Inc. v. Regan, 151 P.3d 1281 (Colo. 2007). In the follow-on opinion, Fowler & Peth, Inc. v. Regan (In re Regan), 477 F.3d 1209, 1211 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007), the panel adopted the view that the statute “creates such a trust,” meaning the express or technical trust 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) requires. Colorado bankruptcy judges rely on that footnote.

    Can the owner of a Colorado LLC or corporation be personally liable?

    Yes, if the owner controlled the money. In Flooring Design Associates, Inc. v. Novick, 923 P.2d 216 (Colo. App. 1995), a vice-president who diverted trust funds to other corporate bills was held personally liable. Colorado bankruptcy courts apply the same rule to anyone in complete control of an entity’s finances. An LLC does not shield a member’s own handling of trust money.

    One boundary helps owners. In Yale v. AC Excavating, Inc., 2013 CO 9, an LLC manager’s own “survival loan” to his company was not trust money. Draws from an owner or general contractor remain trust funds, measured job by job, and a civil theft finding can triple the exposure.

    Colorado Contractor Behind on Suppliers or Payroll Tax? Contact Us Now

    How did Bullock change the discharge fight in Colorado?

    Before 2013, the Tenth Circuit BAP counted even a negligent failure to account as defalcation. In re Storie, 216 B.R. 283 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1997). Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 569 U.S. 267 (2013), now requires “knowledge of, or gross recklessness in respect to, the improper nature of the fiduciary behavior.”

    In In re Cupit, 514 B.R. 42 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2014), aff’d, 541 B.R. 739 (D. Colo. 2015), a roofing company owner who paid the oldest bills first lacked that mental state until August 5, 2011, when another supplier served him with a trust fund complaint. Later diversions met Bullock: $47,775.56 was excepted from discharge and trebled to $143,326.68 as theft. In Fuller v. Clasby, Adv. No. 23-01212 (Bankr. D. Colo. Nov. 26, 2024), the defense won: the builder had paid every vendor, its cost breakdown satisfied subsection (4), and no culpable state of mind was proved. Records and notice decide these cases.

    Where do unpaid payroll taxes fit?

    Under 26 U.S.C. § 6672, the IRS can assess a penalty equal to unpaid withheld income tax and employee FICA against any responsible person who willfully failed to pay it over. IRS guidance says “no evil intent or bad motive is required,” and paying other creditors instead is evidence of willfulness.

    Unlike a supplier, the IRS need not prove knowledge or gross recklessness at the discharge stage. The penalty is a tax “required to be collected or withheld” under 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(C), and § 523(a)(1)(A) excepts it from an individual’s discharge. Owners often pay suppliers first, yet the tax is the debt that survives without proof of bad intent.

    How do a workout, Chapter 7, and Subchapter V compare?

    A workout has no automatic stay, so one civil theft lawsuit can unravel it. Chapter 7 gives a corporation or LLC no discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1); a trustee collects receivables and retainage and closes the company. Under § 524(e), the company’s case does nothing for the owner.

    Subchapter V eligibility runs through the small business debtor definition in 11 U.S.C. § 101(51D), which § 1182(1) adopts. Since the April 1, 2025 adjustment (90 Fed. Reg. 8941), the cap is $3,424,000; the temporary $7,500,000 limit sunset June 21, 2024. The Senate and House each passed bills in 2026 (S. 3977 and H.R. 7730) to restore $7.5 million, but neither is law at this writing.

    The plan is due within 90 days under § 1189(b) and can be confirmed without a creditor vote if it commits three to five years of disposable income under § 1191(c). Priority taxes must be paid within five years of the petition under § 1129(a)(9)(C), and United States v. Energy Resources Co., 495 U.S. 545 (1990), lets the court direct those payments to trust fund taxes first when the plan requires it, shrinking the owner’s penalty exposure.

    For a plan confirmed over objection, § 1192(2) withholds discharge of debts “of the kind specified in section 523(a).” The Fourth Circuit applied that to an LLC in Cantwell-Cleary Co. v. Cleary Packaging, LLC, 36 F.4th 509 (4th Cir. 2022), and the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits agree. The Tenth Circuit has not ruled.

    What might this look like for a Colorado Springs drywall subcontractor?

    Hypothetically, Quartzcrest Wallboard LLC (fictional) in Colorado Springs has one member, Dana. It received $640,000 in draws on three jobs near Briargate but owes its board and stud supplier $162,000 on them after Dana moved $118,000 to payroll and truck notes on a losing fourth job. It missed two quarters of Form 941 deposits totaling $84,000, of which $62,000 is trust fund tax. General contractors hold $71,000 in retainage, and the bank line is $260,000 with Dana’s guarantee.

    In Chapter 7, the LLC dissolves and Dana still faces $118,000 of trust fund exposure (up to $354,000 if theft is proved) and a $62,000 penalty that a personal Chapter 7 would not clear. In Subchapter V, the $84,000 runs about $1,400 a month over 60 months before interest, applied first to the $62,000 trust portion, while retainage and roughly $3,300 a month over three years retire the supplier’s $118,000.

    Debt Company in Chapter 7 Company in Subchapter V Owner’s personal exposure
    Diverted draws owed to supplier No entity discharge Paid through plan; § 1192(2) argument in a cramdown Liable if in control; nondischargeable only with Bullock intent
    Civil theft treble damages No entity discharge Plan treatment or settlement Nondischargeable with the base debt (Cupit)
    Withheld income tax and employee FICA Priority claim Paid within five years; can go to trust portion first § 6672 penalty; nondischargeable
    Employer share of FICA Priority claim Paid within five years Not part of the § 6672 penalty
    Bank line with guarantee Collateral liquidated Secured claim under the plan Guarantee generally dischargeable personally
    Retainage owed to company Collected by trustee Collected to fund the plan Held in trust for that job’s suppliers once received

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Does a Colorado supplier need a recorded mechanic’s lien to bring a trust fund claim?

    No. The Colorado Supreme Court held in 2007 that a claimant under C.R.S. § 38-22-127 needs neither a perfected lien nor time remaining to file one. A supplier that let the lien deadline pass can still claim that project draws were held in trust for it.

    Is putting all project money in one bank account a trust fund violation?

    Not by itself. The statute does not require a separate bank account for each project, so long as trust funds are not misspent. It does require separate records of account for each project, and without them a contractor struggles to prove where the money went.

    Can a trust fund claim be discharged in the owner’s personal Chapter 7?

    Sometimes. After Bullock v. BankChampaign, the supplier must prove knowledge or gross recklessness. Colorado bankruptcy courts have found that standard met after an owner was put on notice of trust fund duties, and not met where the owner lacked awareness or kept adequate records.

    Is the trust fund recovery penalty ever dischargeable?

    Not for an individual in Chapter 7, 11, or 13. It is treated as a priority tax the debtor had to collect or withhold. An owner can still dispute responsible-person status or willfulness, and a company plan can pay down the underlying taxes.

    Can an LLC in Subchapter V discharge a supplier’s trust fund claim?

    With a consensual plan, ordinary Chapter 11 discharge rules apply. For a plan confirmed over objection, three federal circuits hold that section 523(a) debts survive even for an LLC; the Tenth Circuit has not decided. The LLC’s discharge never releases the owner’s own liability.

    What is the Subchapter V debt limit right now?

    Since April 1, 2025, it has been $3,424,000 in noncontingent, liquidated debts, at least half from business activity. Bills to restore the lapsed $7,500,000 limit passed each chamber in 2026, so a contractor near the line should confirm the figure on the filing date.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm represents Colorado contractors and business owners in Chapter 7 and Subchapter V cases in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to that court and to the U.S. Tax Court, so the firm can address the plan and the trust fund recovery penalty together. See the firm’s pages on Subchapter V reorganization, Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and discharging tax debt. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    The order in which draws, suppliers, and payroll deposits are addressed affects what survives a bankruptcy. To review the numbers before a demand letter or a revenue officer sets the schedule, contact North Star Law Firm.