Category: Bankruptcy

  • Your Customer Filed Chapter 11 in Colorado: 503(b)(9), Reclamation and Critical Vendors

    Your Customer Filed Chapter 11 in Colorado: 503(b)(9), Reclamation and Critical Vendors

    Ingrid runs a precision machine shop in Loveland that makes hydraulic valve bodies for a Front Range equipment maker. On Thursday, October 1, 2026, the maker filed a Subchapter V case in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. It owes her $146,000 on four invoices, and by afternoon its buyer was asking whether the next order could ship on net-30, adding that she might be a “critical vendor.” (Ingrid and her numbers are illustrative.)

    Each invoice now has a different value, and some deadlines run in days. Here is how I sort a supplier’s rights, in the order the clock runs.

    My customer filed Chapter 11 in Colorado. What can I do the day after?

    11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6) stays “any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case.” No more past-due calls, and no holding a new order hostage to the old balance.

    The stay does not make you a lender. Unless a contract obligates you to sell on credit, you can demand cash in advance on new orders. Anything you deliver after the filing on terms is an administrative expense under § 503(b)(1)(A), payable in the ordinary course under § 363(c)(1).

    A written supply agreement is usually an executory contract the debtor may assume or reject under § 365(a), and § 365(e)(1) bars ending it under a clause triggered by the filing. If the debtor assumes it, § 365(b)(1) requires a cure of your defaults. Read yours before refusing an order.

    Is my unpaid invoice a section 503(b)(9) claim?

    Part of it may be. Section 503(b)(9) gives administrative priority to “the value of any goods received by the debtor within 20 days before the date of commencement of a case,” if sold in the ordinary course of the debtor’s business. That ranks second under § 507(a)(2), ahead of all general unsecured creditors.

    The statute says goods. A Western Slope trucking company sells a service, and in In re Goody’s Family Clothing, Inc., 401 B.R. 131 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009), a vendor that inspected and ticketed apparel got no priority. And “received” means physical possession: in In re World Imports, Ltd., 862 F.3d 338 (3d Cir. 2017), furniture shipped from China more than 20 days before the filing but delivered inside the window qualified. The court used the UCC definition, which Colorado enacted in C.R.S. § 4-2-103(1)(c). I found no Tenth Circuit or BAP decision on point; a Colorado judge would likely start from the same text. Keep your delivery receipts.

    Priority is not prompt payment. Chapter 11 normally requires cash on the effective date under § 1129(a)(9)(A), but § 1191(e) lets a nonconsensual Subchapter V plan pay administrative claims over its term. Official Form 410 is not for administrative expenses, so request 503(b)(9) payment separately under § 503(a).

    Can I still reclaim the goods under section 546(c)?

    Under C.R.S. § 4-2-702(2), a seller that discovers the buyer received goods on credit while insolvent may reclaim them on demand within ten days after receipt. Section 546(c)(1) carries that right into bankruptcy for goods received while insolvent within 45 days before the filing, if the written demand comes within 45 days after receipt or, when that period ends after the filing, within 20 days after the case began. I calendar the earlier date.

    The right is “subject to the prior rights of a holder of a security interest in such goods or the proceeds thereof.” Most operating companies owe a bank with a blanket inventory lien, so reclamation rarely recovers much. Send the demand anyway. If you miss it, § 546(c)(2) preserves the 503(b)(9) claim.

    Customer Filed Bankruptcy and Owes You? Contact Us Now

    What does a critical vendor letter in a Colorado bankruptcy actually mean?

    The debtor wants to pay some old invoices now, ahead of other creditors, if you keep supplying. The Code never says so; debtors cite § 363(b)(1) and § 105(a) and call it the doctrine of necessity.

    In In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2004), Judge Easterbrook called that doctrine “just a fancy name for a power to depart from the Code” and required the debtor to “prove, and not just allege,” that vendors would quit without payment and that the other creditors would still benefit. Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. 451 (2017), noted that courts approve such orders when the payments “enable a successful reorganization and make even the disfavored creditors better off.”

    I found no published Tenth Circuit, BAP, or District of Colorado opinion on a critical vendor motion. In Colorado they arrive as first-day motions under L.B.R. 2081-1 (expedited consideration in the first 21 days). Expect a trade agreement requiring customary terms for the whole case, with a clawback if you stop. Small Subchapter V debtors seldom ask, since every dollar comes out of the unsecured pool. A larger Front Range manufacturer relying on a single-source part might.

    When is the proof of claim bar date in a Colorado Subchapter V case?

    Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3002(c)‘s 70-day rule covers voluntary Chapter 7 cases and Chapter 12 and 13 cases, not Chapter 11. Under Rule 3003(c)(3), “the court must set the time,” and Colorado’s bankruptcy court says on its Subchapter V page that a 70-day deadline “will be established in the Notice of Meeting of Creditors issued in each case.” In larger Chapter 11 cases, a bar date order under L.B.R. 3003-1 may also set an administrative claim deadline.

    A scheduled claim is deemed filed under § 1111(a) unless listed as disputed, contingent, or unliquidated. Check the schedules and claims register on PACER (big cases use a claims agent under 28 U.S.C. § 156(c)). If your claim is wrong or flagged, file through the court’s ePOC page.

    There is no standard payout. A plan confirmed over objection must devote projected disposable income for three years, or up to five, under § 1191(c)(2), and § 1129(a)(7) guarantees at least Chapter 7 value, which can be little.

    How would a $146,000 receivable split if a Loveland supplier’s customer filed?

    Using Ingrid’s illustrative numbers and an October 1, 2026 petition, the 20-day window covers receipts from September 11 through September 30, the 45-day window starts August 17, and the 90-day preference period starts July 3.

    Invoice one ($38,000, delivered July 28) is general unsecured. Invoice two ($41,000, delivered August 26) is outside 20 days; its reclamation demand was due October 21 and likely loses to the bank’s lien. Invoice three ($15,000) shipped by common carrier September 9 and arrived September 14, so under World Imports it qualifies. Invoice four ($52,000, received September 16) does too. That is $67,000 of 503(b)(9) priority and $79,000 unsecured, with a proof of claim due December 10, 2026 if the notice counts 70 days from the petition.

    Can the debtor take back payments I received before the bankruptcy?

    Possibly, often a year later. Section 547(b) reaches payments on old debt made within 90 days before the filing, while the debtor was insolvent (presumed under § 547(f)), that paid you more than Chapter 7 would. Under § 546(a), suit generally must be filed within two years after the order for relief.

    Do not assume the money is gone. The plaintiff must act on “reasonable due diligence,” weighing your “known or reasonably knowable affirmative defenses,” though § 547(g) makes you prove them. Ordinary course payments are protected by § 547(c)(2). Later shipments on credit count as new value under § 547(c)(4): if Ingrid was paid $30,000 on August 3 for a June invoice, her unpaid August 26 shipment exceeds it. In business cases filed on or after April 1, 2025, § 547(c)(9) bars recovering transfers totaling under $8,575, and 28 U.S.C. § 1409(b) sends suits against a non-insider on a non-consumer debt under $31,425 to your home district.

    Never ignore a summons from an out-of-state case (see default judgments against Colorado vendors).

    Claim bucket Statute What qualifies When it is paid Deadline to assert
    Twenty-day goods § 503(b)(9) Goods physically received within 20 days before filing Effective date, or over a Subchapter V cramdown plan Deadline set by order or plan
    Reclamation § 546(c) Goods received while insolvent within 45 days before filing Return of goods, behind prior liens Written demand within 45 days of receipt or 20 days after filing
    Critical vendor payment §§ 363(b)(1), 105(a) Suppliers the debtor proves it cannot replace Early, per the order Debtor moves, often within 21 days
    Postpetition deliveries § 503(b)(1)(A) Goods or services provided after filing Ordinary course Any administrative claim deadline
    General unsecured claim §§ 1111(a), 1191(c)(2) Everything else Pro rata, often over three to five years 70 days in D. Colo. Subchapter V; court-set otherwise

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Can I stop shipping to a customer that filed Chapter 11 in Colorado?

    Unless a contract requires credit terms, you can ask for cash in advance. A supply agreement generally cannot be ended because of the filing, so check yours first.

    Do services qualify for a section 503(b)(9) claim?

    No. The statute covers goods, and courts have denied priority to service vendors. Prepetition freight, labor and repair charges are usually general unsecured claims.

    Do I still need a proof of claim if my debt is on the debtor’s schedules?

    In a Chapter 11 or Subchapter V case, a scheduled claim is deemed filed unless listed as disputed, contingent, or unliquidated. If it is wrong or flagged, file by the noticed deadline.

    Is a critical vendor payment the same as being paid in full?

    Not necessarily. The order may pay only part of the balance, and if you stop supplying on customary terms the debtor can usually claw the payment back.

    What should I do if I get a preference demand letter?

    Pull a year of invoices and payments and compare payment timing inside and outside the 90 days. Ordinary course and new value defenses often shrink the demand.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm represents Colorado suppliers in their customers’ Chapter 11 and Subchapter V cases, from 503(b)(9) requests and proofs of claim through preference and clawback defense. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    The reclamation window can close within three weeks of the filing. If a customer has filed and still owes you, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Will Bankruptcy Cost Me My Colorado License? Section 525(a) After In re Lacher

    Will Bankruptcy Cost Me My Colorado License? Section 525(a) After In re Lacher

    Devin sells houses in Fort Collins. The small brokerage he opened with a partner failed, and the partner now holds an $85,000 judgment against him for Devin’s share of the lease and payroll. He is more worried about his broker’s license, and a complaint a former client filed with the Colorado Real Estate Commission last spring.

    Federal law has shielded licensees since 1978, but the shield is narrower than people expect, and a 2025 decision about a California lawyer shows where it stops.

    Can a Colorado agency deny or revoke my license because I filed bankruptcy?

    Not if bankruptcy is the only reason. 11 U.S.C. § 525(a) says a “governmental unit” (a State and its agencies, per § 101(27)) may not “deny, revoke, suspend, or refuse to renew a license, permit, charter, franchise, or other similar grant” to a debtor solely because of the filing. Insolvency is also off limits, as is the fact that the person “has not paid a debt that is dischargeable in the case.”

    “Solely” does the heavy lifting. In FCC v. NextWave Personal Communications Inc., 537 U.S. 293 (2003), the FCC canceled a Chapter 11 debtor’s licenses for missed payments, citing its regulatory purpose. “In our view, that factor is irrelevant,” the Court said; “the failure to pay a dischargeable debt must alone be the proximate cause” of the cancellation.

    Section 525(b) covers private employers, and only firing or discrimination “with respect to employment.” Section 525(c) covers student grants and loans.

    Can Colorado suspend my driver’s license over an accident judgment discharged in bankruptcy?

    In Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971), Arizona suspended the license of an uninsured driver over an accident judgment he had discharged; the Supreme Court struck the law under the Supremacy Clause. The Senate report on the 1978 Code (S. Rep. No. 95-989) says § 525 “codifies the result of Perez.”

    C.R.S. § 42-7-401(1) requires suspension when a driver fails “for a period of thirty days” to satisfy a qualifying accident judgment, but C.R.S. § 42-7-402(2) says a later “discharge in bankruptcy” relieves the debtor “from any of the requirements of this article.” A judgment for injury caused by intoxicated driving is excepted from discharge by 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9), so neither rule reaches it.

    What does section 525(a) not protect a Colorado licensee from?

    Misconduct. In Lacher v. State Bar of California (In re Lacher), 669 B.R. 548 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2025), a lawyer spent two decades fighting a fee award, violating court orders and commingling client trust funds along the way. The panel held the proximate cause was “Ms. Lacher’s own poor choices while attempting to avoid payment of a judgment, not the unpaid debt or her bankruptcy filing.”

    Debts that survive bankruptcy are also outside it. Recent priority taxes (§ 523(a)(1)(A)), domestic support (§ 523(a)(5)) and government fines (§ 523(a)(7)) are not discharged in Chapter 7, nor is a debt a creditor successfully excepts.

    So is credit. Ayes v. U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, 473 F.3d 104 (4th Cir. 2006), held a VA home loan guaranty is not an “other similar grant,” noting Congress protected only student loans in § 525(c).

    Worried Bankruptcy Will Touch Your Colorado License? Contact Us Now

    Do DORA licensing boards treat bankruptcy as a ground for discipline?

    Not in the statutes I reviewed. C.R.S. § 12-20-404 supplies a regulator’s remedies once a ground exists in the practice act for that profession. The grounds for brokers (§ 12-10-217(1)), mortgage loan originators (§ 12-10-713(1)), nurses (§ 12-255-120(1)) and dentists (§ 12-220-201(1)) never mention bankruptcy. Electricians and plumbers are disciplined through the same process (§ 12-115-122; § 12-155-113).

    Adjacent grounds are another matter. Brokers answer for commingling, “dishonest dealing,” and under § 12-10-217(1)(v) for fraud or conversion of trust funds “that results in the entry of a civil judgment for damages.” Insurance producers face “financial irresponsibility” under C.R.S. § 10-2-801(1)(i); originators must show “demonstrated financial responsibility” under 12 U.S.C. § 5104(b)(3). The Senate report permits weighing “future financial responsibility or ability,” which I read as how you handle money now, not the filing or a discharged balance.

    A board fine is usually a § 523(a)(7) debt that survives Chapter 7, and ignoring it can be discipline for violating a board order (§ 12-10-217(1)(m); § 12-255-120(1)(g)). A completed Chapter 13 differs: § 1328(a) excepts criminal fines but not § 523(a)(7) civil fines, and a discharged fine is protected by § 525(a) and the § 524(a)(2) injunction.

    If an application or renewal asks about bankruptcy, answer truthfully; § 525(a) bars acting on a truthful yes alone. A false no is its own ground: “material misstatement of fact in an application” for brokers (§ 12-10-217(1)(s)) and originators (§ 12-10-713(1)(r)), and “materially untrue information” for insurance producers (§ 10-2-801(1)(a)).

    How do Colorado liquor, marijuana, sales tax and child support licenses fare in bankruptcy?

    Liquor licensing turns on whether the applicant’s “character, record, and reputation” satisfy the licensing authorities (C.R.S. § 44-3-307(1)(a)). The filing cannot stand in for bad character.

    Marijuana licensees hit an earlier wall. In Arenas v. U.S. Trustee (In re Arenas), 535 B.R. 845 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2015), a Colorado medical marijuana licensee’s Chapter 7 was dismissed and conversion to Chapter 13 denied because no trustee could administer marijuana assets lawfully. A DEA rule effective April 28, 2026 (91 Fed. Reg. 22714) moved state-licensed medical marijuana to Schedule III; adult-use marijuana stays in Schedule I. Unpaid marijuana taxes also bar a license under C.R.S. § 44-10-307(1)(e).

    Child support and sales tax fall outside § 525(a). Support is nondischargeable; C.R.S. § 26-13-126 allows suspension for an obligor more than six months behind and paying under half the current amount, and § 362(b)(2)(D) keeps the stay from stopping it. Collected sales tax is held “in trust” under C.R.S. § 39-26-118(1)(a) (compare contractor trust fund debts). It is a priority tax under § 507(a)(8)(C), nondischargeable under § 523(a)(1)(A) and § 1328(a)(2), and the license can be revoked after a hearing (C.R.S. § 39-26-103(4)). Chapter 13 can still pay it in “deferred cash payments” under § 1322(a)(2).

    What can I do if a Colorado agency targets my license after bankruptcy?

    I found no published Tenth Circuit or Tenth Circuit BAP decision applying § 525(a) to a license. The closest local case is Ellis v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security (In re Ellis), 493 B.R. 818 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2013), where a Chapter 13 debtor was found unsuitable for an armed-guard job on a Denver federal contract over about $47,837 in debts. Applying NextWave, Judge Brooks held the debts were not the sole cause because the debtor had not supplied requested bankruptcy papers, but rejected the agency’s immunity defense.

    Relief comes from the bankruptcy court, and § 106(a) abrogates sovereign immunity for §§ 524 and 525. Contempt for violating the discharge order requires “no fair ground of doubt” that the order barred the conduct (Taggart v. Lorenzen, 587 U.S. 554 (2019)). Agencies may cite Younger abstention and Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982); Lacher held that neither Younger nor the Eleventh Amendment blocks enforcing the discharge or § 525(a).

    How would section 525(a) apply to a Fort Collins real estate broker?

    Illustrative example (hypothetical facts). Devin files Chapter 7 on November 2, 2026, and his creditors’ meeting is first set for December 7. Under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007(c), his former partner has until February 5, 2027 to sue over dischargeability. No complaint is filed, so the $85,000 contract judgment is discharged.

    The Commission cannot refuse renewal, or condition it on paying the partner, because Devin filed or because that debt is unpaid. If the client complaint alleges he kept a buyer’s $6,000 earnest money in the brokerage operating account, that is commingling under § 12-10-217(1)(i), and it proceeds as if he had never filed. A resulting fine (up to $2,500 per offense) is a government debt outside § 525(a). Had the partner’s judgment rested on fraud, § 12-10-217(1)(v) would give the Commission a ground no discharge removes.

    Colorado license Who issues it Action for the filing or an unpaid dischargeable debt? What the agency can still act on
    Driver’s license (accident judgment) Department of Revenue No: § 42-7-402(2), Perez Nondischargeable judgments
    DORA professional licenses Title 12 boards and commissions No: § 525(a), NextWave Fraud, commingling, false applications
    Liquor license State and local authorities No Character and record apart from the filing
    Marijuana business license State and local authorities Mostly academic after Arenas Unpaid marijuana taxes
    Child-support suspension Licensing agency, on support agency notice § 525(a) inapplicable Arrears over six months
    Sales tax license Department of Revenue § 525(a) inapplicable Revocation after a hearing

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Can a Colorado licensing board ask whether I filed bankruptcy?

    Nothing in section 525(a) prevents the question. It stops the agency from acting solely because of the filing or an unpaid dischargeable debt. A false answer is a separate ground for discipline.

    Does filing bankruptcy stop a DORA disciplinary case?

    No. Section 362(b)(4) exempts regulatory proceedings by a governmental unit from the automatic stay, so the case proceeds on the conduct alleged.

    Will Chapter 7 discharge a fine my licensing board imposed?

    Usually not, because section 523(a)(7) excepts government fines that are not compensation for actual loss. A completed Chapter 13 can discharge civil fines provided for by the plan.

    Can Colorado suspend my driver’s license for an accident judgment I discharged?

    C.R.S. 42-7-402(2) says a discharge relieves the judgment debtor of the article’s requirements, matching Perez v. Campbell. Judgments excepted from discharge, such as intoxicated-driving injuries, are different.

    Can a Colorado marijuana business file bankruptcy?

    Generally not under In re Arenas, because a trustee cannot lawfully administer marijuana assets. Whether the 2026 Schedule III rule for medical marijuana changes that is still open.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm represents Colorado individuals and business owners in Chapter 7 bankruptcy and Chapter 13 plans, including cases where a license or tax debt of uncertain dischargeability shapes the strategy. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    Separating the bankruptcy question from the conduct question is easiest before you file. If your license pays the bills and the debt is closing in, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Can a Colorado Subchapter V Company Still Owe a Fraud Debt After 2 Monkey Trading?

    Can a Colorado Subchapter V Company Still Owe a Fraud Debt After 2 Monkey Trading?

    Marisol owns an oilfield-services LLC in Grand Junction. After work slowed and a merchant cash advance covered payroll, the company owes about $1.9 million. The funder’s lawyer says the funding application overstated receivables, so its balance “will survive any bankruptcy.” Her question for me is narrow: if the company files under Subchapter V, does that one debt go away?

    It depends on whether the plan is confirmed with creditor votes or over their objection. Three federal courts of appeals have ruled on the second situation, and so has a Colorado bankruptcy judge.

    Does a Colorado LLC’s Subchapter V discharge cover a debt the creditor calls fraud?

    Subchapter V, the small business track inside Chapter 11, has two discharge rules. If each impaired class accepts, the court confirms under 11 U.S.C. § 1191(a). A class accepts when creditors holding two-thirds of the dollars and more than half of the claims that vote say yes (§ 1126(c)). The discharge then comes at confirmation from § 1141(d)(1), and § 1141(d)(2) applies the § 523 exceptions only to “a debtor who is an individual.”

    SBA borrowers should know the one carve-out. Section 1141(d)(6)(A) leaves a corporation, which under § 101(9)(A) includes an LLC, liable for a § 523(a)(2)(A) or (2)(B) fraud debt “owed to a domestic governmental unit,” or owed because of a False Claims Act suit. A private funder’s claim is not on that list.

    If a class votes no, the debtor can still ask for confirmation under § 1191(b), a cramdown, if the plan is fair and equitable. Section 1181(c) then turns off § 1141(d), and the discharge comes from § 1192 after plan payments. Section 1192(2) excepts “any debt … of the kind specified in section 523(a),” but § 523(a) says a § 1192 discharge “does not discharge an individual debtor” from those debts. Whether an LLC is caught is the whole fight, and it only arises in a cramdown.

    What have the federal appeals courts said about section 523(a) and corporate debtors?

    Three circuits say the exceptions reach companies. In Cantwell-Cleary Co. v. Cleary Packaging, LLC, 36 F.4th 509 (4th Cir. 2022), an LLC owing a $4.7 million tortious interference judgment proposed to pay under 3 percent of it. The court read § 1192(2) as pointing to a kind of debt, not a kind of debtor, while conceding the statutory fit is “clumsy.”

    Avion Funding, L.L.C. v. GFS Industries, L.L.C. (In re GFS Industries, L.L.C.), 99 F.4th 223 (5th Cir. 2024) is the cash advance case. Avion paid $190,000 for $299,800 of receivables after GFS said it did not anticipate a Chapter 11 filing; GFS filed two weeks later, and Avion’s § 523(a)(2)(B) claim was allowed to proceed.

    In BenShot, LLC v. 2 Monkey Trading, LLC (In re 2 Monkey Trading, LLC), 142 F.4th 1323 (11th Cir. 2025), decided July 9, 2025, a jury had found the debtors acted maliciously in a false advertising case. The majority joined the other two circuits. Judge Luck dissented, noting that most bankruptcy courts had read § 523(a) as limited to individuals.

    Those courts include In re Satellite Restaurants Inc. Crabcake Factory USA, 626 B.R. 871 (Bankr. D. Md. 2021) and the Ninth Circuit’s appellate panel in In re Off-Spec Solutions, LLC, 651 B.R. 862 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2023), which called its own result “vexing.” As of October 23, 2026, the Supreme Court’s docket shows no certiorari petition in any of the three.

    Creditor Says Your Company’s Debt Survives Subchapter V? Contact Us Now

    Has the Tenth Circuit or a Colorado bankruptcy court decided this?

    The Tenth Circuit has not, and I found no Tenth Circuit BAP decision. But in 2021, in the Revelant Holdings case, Chief Judge Romero held that § 1192(2) reaches only individuals and denied creditors’ stipulated request for more time to sue as moot. Judge Sweeney reversed in Synergetic Oil Tools, Inc. v. Revelant Holdings LLC, No. 1:21-cv-02213-CNS (D. Colo. Mar. 28, 2023), finding the Fourth Circuit persuasive.

    Then, in Marmic Fire & Safety Co. v. ETG Fire, LLC (In re ETG Fire, LLC), 670 B.R. 884 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2025), Judge McNamara refused to dismiss a competitor’s § 523(a)(6) trade secret complaint. He found Cleary and GFS “far more compelling and persuasive” than Off-Spec, and held that a company’s intent can be shown through managers and employees acting for it.

    None of this binds the next Colorado judge or the Tenth Circuit, and the “individual debtor” text gives a debtor a serious appellate argument. Still, with three circuits, a Colorado district judge and the latest published Colorado bankruptcy opinion aligned, I tell owners to assume a cramdown leaves fraud-type debts open to challenge.

    What does a creditor have to file to keep a fraud debt alive in a Colorado Subchapter V case?

    Under § 523(c)(1), the debtor “shall be discharged” from a (2), (4) or (6) debt unless the creditor asks and the court rules. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007(c), restyled effective December 1, 2024, requires the complaint “within 60 days after the first date set for the §341(a) meeting of creditors.” Extensions require cause and a motion “filed before the time expires,” and Rule 9006(b)(3) allows nothing beyond that. A funder that sleeps past it generally loses the issue, and as Revelant shows, the date usually passes before anyone knows whether the plan will be consensual.

    The creditor must then prove its claim by a preponderance of the evidence, Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991). Against a company, the usual theories are (2)(B), a materially false written statement about financial condition that the creditor reasonably relied on and that was made to deceive, and (6), willful and malicious injury. A receivables figure likely qualifies, because a statement about a single asset can concern financial condition, Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling, 584 U.S. 709 (2018). An oral version falls outside (2)(A) and fails (2)(B)’s writing requirement.

    Does my company’s Subchapter V discharge protect me on a personal guaranty?

    No. Under § 524(e), discharging the company’s debt “does not affect the liability of any other entity” on it. Cash advance agreements routinely include an owner guaranty.

    If the owner files her own case, § 523(a)(2) applies to her directly in every chapter. A written statement about her LLC’s receivables is one “respecting … an insider’s financial condition,” since a company she controls is her insider under § 101(31)(A)(iv). That is how funders usually plead against owners: (2)(B), built on the application she signed. For EIDL collection and fraud referrals, see the earlier post on the SBA demand letter and Treasury offset.

    How would this play out for a Grand Junction oilfield-services company in 2026?

    Eligibility first. A case filed October 25, 2026 faces the $3,424,000 limit in § 101(51D), in effect since April 1, 2025 (90 Fed. Reg. 8941). H.R. 7730 would raise it to $7,500,000 for cases commenced on or after enactment; it passed the House September 16 and the Senate September 28, 2026, but as of October 23 the official record showed no signature.

    Illustrative example (hypothetical facts). Marisol’s LLC owes a bank $620,000 on equipment, the SBA $430,000 on an EIDL loan, the funder a claimed $265,000, and trade creditors $555,000, about $1.87 million. It files November 2, 2026. The first date set for the creditors’ meeting is December 3, so the funder’s complaint is due February 1, 2027.

    Say the funder sues on time under (2)(B). It holds about 32 percent of the unsecured dollars, so trade creditors can carry that class over its no vote. If every impaired class accepts, the plan is confirmed under § 1191(a) and the funder’s unpaid balance is discharged at confirmation. If the SBA’s class rejects instead, the plan becomes a cramdown, and a funder that proves deliberate overstatement keeps its debt past the § 1192 discharge. The other unsecured debt is still discharged after plan payments, and Marisol still owes whatever she guaranteed.

    So Subchapter V usually remains the better route. Section 523(a) reaches only the debts a creditor proves, not the whole discharge, and the vote count often deserves more attention than the fraud letter.

    Question Consensual plan, company (§ 1191(a)) Cramdown plan, company (§ 1191(b)) Cramdown plan, individual owner (§ 1191(b))
    Discharge section § 1141(d)(1), at confirmation § 1192, after plan payments § 1192, after plan payments
    Does § 523(a) apply? Only the narrow § 1141(d)(6) exceptions Split; recent rulings say yes Yes, by its own terms
    Who has ruled Statute Three circuits and ETG Fire vs. Off-Spec; no Tenth Circuit ruling No dispute
    What the creditor files Government proves a § 1141(d)(6) debt Complaint within 60 days after first date set for § 341 meeting Same deadline
    What the owner still owes Any guaranty Any guaranty Her own surviving § 523(a) debts

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Can a cash advance funder block my Colorado LLC’s Subchapter V discharge?

    No, only its own debt is at stake. Even under the circuit view, it must file a timely complaint and prove fraud or willful and malicious injury.

    Does section 523(a) apply if my Subchapter V plan is consensual?

    For a company, generally not. The discharge comes from section 1141(d), which reaches only the narrow government fraud, False Claims Act and fraudulent tax debts in section 1141(d)(6).

    When must a creditor file a nondischargeability complaint in Subchapter V?

    Within 60 days after the first date set for the meeting of creditors, under Rule 4007(c). The court can extend that only on a motion filed before the deadline runs.

    Has the Tenth Circuit decided whether a corporate Subchapter V debtor is subject to section 523(a)?

    Not as of October 23, 2026. A Colorado district judge and a Colorado bankruptcy judge have followed the Fourth Circuit.

    What is the Subchapter V debt limit for a Colorado case filed in late October 2026?

    It is $3,424,000 unless H.R. 7730 becomes law first. If it does, cases filed on or after enactment get $7,500,000.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm represents Colorado businesses and owners in Subchapter V reorganizations, Chapter 11 cases, and SBA loan and business debt problems, including discharge disputes. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    The vote count and the complaint deadline both take shape early in a case. If a creditor says its debt will survive your company’s bankruptcy, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • SEC Asset Freeze in Colorado: Bankruptcy, Receivership and Tax After Reven Holdings

    SEC Asset Freeze in Colorado: Bankruptcy, Receivership and Tax After Reven Holdings

    Three founders of a Castle Rock software company learn on a Monday that the SEC sued them under seal last week and a federal judge has frozen the company’s accounts and their own. Payroll runs Friday. By lunch someone asks whether bankruptcy would unlock the money.

    On October 14, 2026, the Tenth Circuit affirmed this kind of freeze against a Colorado biotech company and its principals in SEC v. Reven Holdings, Inc., Nos. 24-1235 and 24-1309. The opinion is silent on bankruptcy, receivers, and taxes, the questions owners ask first.

    What does an SEC asset freeze do to a Colorado company and its owners?

    A freeze bars the company and named individuals from moving money or property without permission. In Reven a temporary restraining order and freeze entered January 3, 2023, before the defendants were heard, became a preliminary injunction on March 29, 2024.

    The order allowed “necessary and reasonable living expenses” and, from March 2023, payments to attorneys keeping the company’s patents alive. In July 2024 the court let third parties pay company bills and let the principals spend new outside income, or court-approved borrowing, on patent upkeep and legal fees. Some release motions were granted the day they were filed.

    There was no hearing because both sides asked to vacate it and the defense never asked to reset it, and Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b) lets a court rule on the papers. Want a hearing? Move for one.

    What standard did SEC v. Reven Holdings apply in the Tenth Circuit?

    The four factors of Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008), because Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney, 602 U.S. 339 (2024), requires them unless Congress clearly says otherwise, and the securities statutes do not. SEC v. Pros International, Inc., 994 F.2d 767 (10th Cir. 1993), a permanent-injunction case, adds no element. The SEC got no presumption of irreparable harm; the court found it in likely repeat violations and the risk to funds for “any disgorgement or other future judgment.” Barring future violations altered the status quo, so the SEC needed a “strong showing” on the merits and balance of harms.

    The court never sized the freeze to a disgorgement estimate. It did not cite Liu v. SEC, 591 U.S. 71 (2020), which limits disgorgement to net profits awarded for victims, or the 2021 disgorgement amendments to 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d). It accepted that all of the defendants’ assets might be at stake. A narrower, numbers-based request remains untested.

    Why did the bank records decide the compensation question?

    Offering memoranda put the principals’ pay at $1.62 million in 2019, $1.98 million (later stated as $1.8 million) in 2020, and $2.16 million in 2021. The SEC’s accountant worked from the company’s Wells Fargo records and found $5.35 million, $3.36 million, and $6.65 million. By my arithmetic, $15.36 million was paid against roughly $5.6 million to $5.8 million disclosed.

    The method is ordinary forensic accounting. I pull every outflow from the operating accounts, identify each payee, and sort insider transfers by person and year, whatever the memo line says, and set that schedule beside what investors were told. Reven pointed to employment agreements allowing more pay, but those said what could be paid, while the memoranda claimed to report what was paid. Bank statements win because a third party produced them as the money moved, which is why a bankruptcy trustee or IRS examiner starts there too.

    Facing an SEC Asset Freeze? Contact Us Now

    Can a frozen Colorado company file Chapter 11, Subchapter V, or Chapter 7?

    Yes. An asset freeze and bankruptcy can run at once, though a retainer from frozen funds needs a carve-out. Filing will not stop the SEC. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) exempts a governmental unit’s exercise of “police and regulatory power,” including enforcement of “a judgment other than a money judgment.” Eddleman v. U.S. Department of Labor, 923 F.2d 782 (10th Cir. 1991), asks whether the action serves public policy or the government’s pecuniary interest. The SEC may litigate to judgment, but SEC v. Brennan, 230 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2000), held that ordering assets repatriated toward a disgorgement judgment violated the stay.

    The SEC may be heard on any Chapter 11 issue, § 1109(a). Fraud is cause for a trustee under § 1104(a)(1); Subchapter V drops § 1104, § 1181(a), but § 1185(a) removes the debtor in possession for the same cause. Filing mid-lawsuit also draws bad-faith challenges.

    Subchapter V eligibility, under § 1182(1) and § 101(51D), caps noncontingent, liquidated debts at $3,424,000. As I read it, an SEC claim no court has reduced to a number is unliquidated and does not count. H.R. 7730 would raise the cap to $7,500,000 for later cases; it passed the House September 16 and the Senate September 28, 2026, but was unsigned as of October 16.

    Illustrative example (hypothetical facts): the Castle Rock TRO is entered Monday, October 5, 2026. Friday’s payroll is $46,000, and $9,800 withheld last pay period is undeposited. Tuesday’s carve-out motion carries a two-week budget, tax deposit first, because unpaid withholding can become the founders’ personal debt under 26 U.S.C. § 6672. The company owes $2.1 million to its bank, landlord, and vendors and expects a $6 million disgorgement demand, so Subchapter V is available. If the carve-out keeps payroll moving and nobody seeks a receiver, I would usually hold the petition until it solves a problem the freeze does not.

    Receivership vs bankruptcy in Colorado: what changes for investors?

    Reven had no receiver; the court refused even a liquidation agent. A receiver is a “custodian” under § 101(11). Once a petition is filed, § 543 limits it to preserving property and requires turnover, unless the court excuses compliance under § 543(d)(1) because creditors are better served. The court may instead dismiss or suspend the case under § 305(a). I found no Tenth Circuit or BAP decision applying either to an SEC receiver.

    A federal receiver controls property in each district where it files its papers within ten days, 28 U.S.C. § 754, and must obey valid state law, 28 U.S.C. § 959(b). It distributes under a plan the district court approves with “broad powers and wide discretion,” SEC v. Vescor Capital Corp., 599 F.3d 1189 (10th Cir. 2010). Bankruptcy follows § 507 and § 726, and § 510(b) drops a shareholder’s fraud claim to the level of the stock.

    C.R.S. § 11-51-602 of the Colorado Securities Act lets the Securities Commissioner sue in Denver District Court without proving irreparable injury or posting bond, and seek restitution or disgorgement. In 2022 the Division of Securities announced a freeze and a receiver in a $26 million fraud case.

    Can SEC disgorgement be discharged in bankruptcy?

    For an individual, generally not. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19) covers securities-law debts from a judgment, settlement, or order for a “disgorgement payment,” entered “before, on, or after” the petition date. A company gets no Chapter 7 discharge, § 727(a)(1). A reorganizing corporation is discharged except under § 1141(d)(6), and I found no Tenth Circuit ruling on whether that reaches an SEC fraud claim.

    Under a nonconsensual Subchapter V plan, § 1192 excepts debts “of the kind specified in section 523(a),” and the Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits apply that to companies, most recently in BenShot, LLC v. 2 Monkey Trading, LLC, No. 23-12342 (11th Cir. July 9, 2025). In re Off-Spec Solutions, LLC, 651 B.R. 862 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2023), disagreed. Colorado’s bankruptcy court sided with the circuits in In re ETG Fire, LLC, Adv. No. 24-1225 (Bankr. D. Colo. Mar. 17, 2025). The Tenth Circuit has not ruled.

    How does the IRS treat frozen accounts and SEC payments?

    A freeze moves nothing; the company keeps filing and reporting its own income. A receiver holding “all or substantially all” of a corporation’s property files instead, 26 U.S.C. § 6012(b)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-3(b)(4). A segregated, court-supervised fund for claims from a violation of law can be a qualified settlement fund, Treas. Reg. § 1.468B-1(c).

    Under 26 U.S.C. § 162(f), amounts paid to a government over a violation of law on or after December 22, 2017, are nondeductible unless the order identifies them as restitution and the taxpayer proves it. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-21(e)(4)(i)(B) lets disgorgement qualify when paid to harmed investors or a fund for them, not when it exceeds net profits or goes to the government’s general account. Agencies report on Form 1098-F under 26 U.S.C. § 6050X at $50,000 or more, Treas. Reg. § 1.6050X-1(f)(6).

    Setting Who controls assets How investors are paid Who files the corporate return
    SEC asset freeze Owners, through carve-outs Nothing until judgment or settlement The company
    Federal receivership Receiver (28 U.S.C. § 754) District court-approved plan Receiver, if it holds substantially all
    Chapter 11 or Subchapter V Debtor, unless removed (§ 1104, § 1185) Plan under Code priorities; § 510(b) Company, or trustee if appointed
    Chapter 7 Trustee § 726 order; § 510(b) Trustee

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Can I pay my lawyer while the SEC has my assets frozen?

    Only as the order allows. In Reven the court let the principals use new outside income and court-approved borrowing for legal fees. Ask with a specific budget.

    Does filing bankruptcy stop an SEC lawsuit in Colorado?

    No. Section 362(b)(4) lets the SEC keep litigating to judgment. Collecting a money judgment is stayed.

    Does the SEC’s claim count against the Subchapter V debt limit?

    The limit counts only noncontingent, liquidated debts, so a disputed claim not yet reduced to judgment should not count. A prepetition disgorgement judgment would.

    Is SEC disgorgement tax deductible?

    Generally not, under § 162(f). It can qualify as restitution if the order identifies it that way and it goes to harmed investors.

    Did the Tenth Circuit tie the freeze to investor losses?

    No. It computed no cap and did not discuss Liu or the 2021 amendments.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm represents Colorado businesses and their owners in Chapter 11, Subchapter V, and Chapter 7 cases and in the IRS disputes that follow a business collapse. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    Settlement wording is tax wording, so shape it before anyone signs. If an SEC complaint or freeze has reached your company, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Colorado Vendors and Out-of-State Bankruptcy Default Judgments After Coney Island

    Colorado Vendors and Out-of-State Bankruptcy Default Judgments After Coney Island

    The owner of a Longmont parts distributor let an envelope sit on the counter for a week in March before opening it. Inside were a summons from a bankruptcy court in Texas and a Chapter 7 trustee’s complaint demanding back $24,000 a failed customer had paid it. The address line named no one. The owner took it for a collection letter and put it in a drawer.

    That drawer is where most default judgments I review begin. In January the Supreme Court decided how long a business has to argue such a judgment is void, in Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton, 607 U.S. 155 (2026). The answer is not “forever.”

    What should a Colorado business check when a bankruptcy trustee lawsuit is served by mail?

    A mailed bankruptcy lawsuit is a real lawsuit. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7004(b) allows service by first-class mail, and Rule 7004(d) lets the trustee serve anywhere in the United States.

    Read the address block. For a corporation, LLC or partnership, Rule 7004(b)(3) requires mailing to an officer, managing agent, general agent, or authorized agent. Since December 1, 2022, Rule 7004(i) says no one has to be named if the envelope is directed to a title, such as “Attn: President.” An envelope bearing only the company name is the defect alleged in Coney Island. Sole proprietors are served as individuals under Rule 7004(b)(1), and Rule 7004(h) generally requires certified mail to an officer of an insured bank.

    Then compare dates. Rule 7004(e) requires mailing within 7 days after the summons issues, and the answer clock runs from issuance too: Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7012(a)(1) allows 30 days unless the court sets another time. Ten days in a mailroom leaves twenty.

    Is a default judgment in a bankruptcy adversary proceeding void if mail service was wrong?

    It can be. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024 brings in Fed. R. Civ. P. 60, and Rule 60(b)(4) reaches a judgment that “is void.” In Hukill v. Oklahoma Native American Domestic Violence Coalition, 542 F.3d 794 (10th Cir. 2008), certified mail signed for by an unauthorized person failed the service statute, and a default judgment over $100,000 had to be vacated although the defendants never denied knowing of the suit.

    The Supreme Court declined to say whether the Coney Island envelope made that judgment void. And a win only erases the judgment; the trustee can serve again and start over.

    How long do you have to file a void judgment Rule 60(b)(4) motion after Coney Island?

    A reasonable time, the Court held, affirming In re Vista-Pro Automotive, LLC, 109 F.4th 438 (6th Cir. 2024). Justice Alito wrote for eight Justices; Justice Sotomayor concurred in the judgment, objecting only to the majority’s remark that a reasonable time “may well be all that due process demands.” Rule 60(c)(1) says a “motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time,” and a voidness motion is one. The rule caps its first three grounds at one year and makes no exception for void judgments.

    Colorado defendants lost ground. V.T.A., Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 597 F.2d 220 (10th Cir. 1979), said Rule 60(b)(4) “is not subject to any time limitation” since void judgments are nullities, and Orner v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307 (10th Cir. 1994), an appeal from D. Colo., repeated it. The Supreme Court listed V.T.A. among the rejected decisions, beside the Fifth Circuit’s Jackson v. FIE Corp., 302 F.3d 515 (5th Cir. 2002).

    I found no Tenth Circuit decision applying Coney Island as of October 16, 2026, so “reasonable” in D. Colo. is a prediction. But with a default judgment, “it might be reasonable for a defendant not to seek relief before learning about a plaintiff’s attempted enforcement.” The Sixth Circuit started the clock when the movant knew or should have known the basis for the motion and weighed delay against prejudice. My read: weeks after a garnishment is defensible, a year after a demand letter is not.

    Default Judgment From Another State? Contact Us Now

    Can a Texas or Delaware bankruptcy court make a Colorado vendor defend a preference lawsuit there?

    Usually. Under Rule 7004(f), proper service establishes personal jurisdiction if consistent with the Constitution, so the test is Fifth Amendment due process, not Texas contacts. Peay v. BellSouth Medical Assistance Plan, 205 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2000), rejected a bare national-contacts test and asks whether the forum is “fair and reasonable to the defendant,” but the defendant bears that burden, and it succeeds “only in highly unusual cases.” The Tenth Circuit BAP applied Peay to Rule 7004 in Christensen v. Madsen (In re Madsen), BAP No. UT-13-094 (10th Cir. BAP Aug. 25, 2014) (unpublished), which places the Fifth Circuit in the national-contacts camp.

    Venue is the better question. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1409(b), a trustee suing a noninsider on a non-consumer debt under $31,425 must sue where the defendant resides, for cases filed on or after April 1, 2025 (90 Fed. Reg. 8941). But subsection (b) covers proceedings “arising in or related to” the case, and a preference claim arises under the Code itself. In re Sunbridge Capital, Inc., Adv. No. 11-06113 (Bankr. D. Kan. July 27, 2011), and a 2007 New Mexico ruling it cites kept avoidance claims out of § 1409(b), as did In re Petland Discounts, Inc., Adv. Pro. No. 20-08088 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2021). Other courts disagree.

    A transfer motion under 28 U.S.C. § 1412 is the fallback. Raise either in the first response: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1), applied through Rule 7012(b), waives an omitted venue defense, and 28 U.S.C. § 1406(b) preserves jurisdiction over a party who never objects.

    What happens when an out-of-state bankruptcy judgment is registered in Colorado?

    Once final, usually after the 14-day appeal period in Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a)(1), a bankruptcy money judgment can be registered in D. Colo. under 28 U.S.C. § 1963 and enforced like a local judgment. Colorado’s Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, C.R.S. § 13-53-101 et seq., offers a state-court route with a mailed notice and a ten-day wait before execution under C.R.S. § 13-53-104. Under Rule 60(c)(2), a Rule 60(b) motion does not suspend the judgment, so a stay must be requested.

    Illustrative example (hypothetical facts): a Houston fleet-repair company that paid our distributor $24,000 in the prior 90 days files Chapter 7 on Monday, November 3, 2025. The summons issues Monday, March 9, 2026, and is mailed March 11 to the bare company name. The answer is due April 8. Default judgment enters June 15. The trustee registers it in D. Colo. on October 1, and on October 7 the distributor learns of a garnishment.

    A Rule 60(b)(4) motion filed in Texas by October 28, three weeks later and 135 days after judgment, has a solid reasonable-time argument. Its weak spot is the March envelope the owner opened and shelved. Waiting to raise voidness against Colorado collection is riskier: the clock keeps running, and I have not seen the Tenth Circuit decide whether a registering court will hear the motion. I would file in Texas and seek a pause in Colorado.

    What should a Colorado vendor do with a preference lawsuit instead of ignoring it?

    Calendar 30 days from issuance and call the trustee’s lawyer about an extension, which Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)(1) allows for cause if requested in time. Under 11 U.S.C. § 547(c), a payment is protected to the extent it was a substantially contemporaneous exchange for new value, paid an ordinary-course debt in the ordinary course or on ordinary business terms, or was followed by new unpaid shipments. The vendor bears that burden under § 547(g). In business cases filed on or after April 1, 2025, transfers totaling under $8,575 are protected by § 547(c)(9), and § 547(b) requires trustees to weigh knowable defenses with “reasonable due diligence.”

    Counts under 11 U.S.C. § 548 or state law through 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) raise other issues, covered in defending a trustee’s fraudulent transfer complaint. Most settle, since a small estate pays for every hour of litigation, though Chapter 7 cases can stay open long enough for a trustee to keep collecting. Whether a creditor hires a Colorado bankruptcy attorney or counsel admitted in Texas, answering on time keeps every argument alive.

    Choice Deadline What it can win Main risk
    Answer or move to dismiss 30 days after issuance (Rule 7012(a)(1)) § 547(c) defenses, venue Defense cost
    Extension from trustee’s counsel Before the answer date (Rule 9006(b)(1)) Time to build the record An undocumented promise
    Rule 60(b)(4) motion after default Reasonable time (Rule 60(c)(1)) Vacatur for defective service Delay after notice; case restarts
    Wait for Colorado enforcement None fixed; the clock may run A stay, then the motion Collection continues

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Is a bankruptcy lawsuit served by regular mail valid?

    Usually. Rule 7004(b) allows first-class mail nationwide. A company’s envelope must go to an officer or agent, or to a title such as “Attn: President.”

    When is the answer due in a bankruptcy adversary proceeding?

    Thirty days after the summons was issued, under Rule 7012(a)(1), unless the court sets another date. Count from the issuance date, not the day it arrived.

    Can a void default judgment still be set aside years later?

    Only if the motion comes within a reasonable time. Coney Island ended the Tenth Circuit’s no-deadline rule from V.T.A. and Orner.

    Does a small preference claim have to be filed in Colorado?

    Not necessarily. Several courts, including two inside the Tenth Circuit, hold that § 1409(b) does not cover preference claims. The objection is waived if left out of your first response.

    What defenses does a vendor have to a preference lawsuit?

    The main ones under § 547(c) are contemporaneous exchange, ordinary course, and subsequent new value. Business cases filed on or after April 1, 2025, also have an $8,575 floor.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm represents Colorado businesses sued by bankruptcy trustees, including in preference and clawback defense, and advises creditors in Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 cases. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    A default judgment is easier to fight the week it surfaces than a year later. If a trustee’s complaint or a registered judgment has reached your business, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Company Paid My Personal Taxes Before Bankruptcy? Colorado Trustee Recovery After Miller

    Company Paid My Personal Taxes Before Bankruptcy? Colorado Trustee Recovery After Miller

    In April 2025 the owner of a small trucking company in Greeley had a lean month and a large personal tax bill. He wired the IRS the balance on his own 2024 Form 1040 from the company’s account. Seventeen months later the company is in Chapter 7, and the trustee’s letter says that money belonged to the company’s creditors.

    Most commentary since March 2025 asks whether the IRS must give that money back. The owner’s question is more personal: if the IRS keeps it, does the trustee come after me? Often, yes, depending on the path the money took and how long ago it moved.

    If my company paid my personal taxes before bankruptcy, who can the trustee sue?

    Follow the wire. Company money went to the IRS; the owner’s account got the credit. Once a transfer is avoided, 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) lets the trustee recover its value from “the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit such transfer was made.”

    The Tenth Circuit applied that language in Rupp v. Markgraf, 95 F.3d 936 (10th Cir. 1996), where a company’s check went straight to its principal’s judgment creditors. The creditors were initial transferees, and the principal was “liable as the person for whose benefit the transfer was made.” If the company pays the owner’s creditor directly, the creditor is the initial transferee and the owner is the beneficiary. If the company pays the owner and he pays the creditor, the owner is the initial transferee. Neither gets the good-faith defense § 550(b) gives later transferees, and § 550(d) limits the estate to one recovery.

    What does United States v. Miller mean for 544(b) claims against the IRS in Colorado?

    Miller began in a Utah bankruptcy, inside the Tenth Circuit. A trustee sued the United States over 2014 payments a transportation company made on two principals’ personal income taxes. The payments were too old for § 548, so the trustee used 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1), which reaches transfers “voidable under applicable law by a creditor holding an unsecured claim,” with Utah law supplying the claim. The Tenth Circuit agreed in Miller v. United States (In re All Resort Group, Inc.), 71 F.4th 1247 (10th Cir. 2023). Until March 2025, a Colorado trustee could do the same with Colorado’s statute.

    That door is closed. On March 26, 2025, the Supreme Court reversed 8 to 1 in an opinion by Justice Jackson, with Justice Gorsuch dissenting alone. United States v. Miller, 604 U.S. ___, 145 S. Ct. 839 (2025). Section 106(a)(1) lifts the government’s immunity for claims under listed Code sections, including §§ 544, 548 and 550. Section 106(a)(5) says it creates no claim that would not otherwise exist. Outside bankruptcy no Colorado creditor could sue the IRS under state law, so neither can a § 544(b) trustee.

    Two points get lost. Section 548 has no state claim inside it, so a trustee suing the IRS within its two-year window is unaffected. And Miller shields the IRS, not the owner. The Court declined to decide whether a creditor could void such payments “by suing the two shareholders who orchestrated those payments,” leaving that for remand. The Tenth Circuit remanded in an unpublished order on May 1, 2025, and I found no ruling on that theory. Whether the IRS can be the triggering creditor is covered in our post on defending a fraudulent transfer complaint in Colorado.

    Company Paid Your Personal Taxes? Contact Us Now

    How far back can a bankruptcy trustee recover a tax payment in Colorado?

    Section 548(a)(1) reaches transfers within two years before the petition. Under § 548(a)(1)(B), the trustee shows the company got less than reasonably equivalent value while insolvent or thinly capitalized. Value is usually missing: § 548(d)(2)(A) counts paying a debt “of the debtor,” and the tax was the owner’s. The owner has no immunity to raise.

    Past two years, the trustee needs Colorado law. Senate Bill 25-133 renamed the Colorado Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act the Colorado Voidable Transactions Act for claims filed after August 2025, keeping the section numbers. C.R.S. § 38-8-105(1)(b) and § 38-8-106(1) cover transfers without reasonably equivalent value by an undercapitalized or insolvent debtor. C.R.S. § 38-8-110 allows four years after the transfer; an actual-intent claim under § 38-8-105(1)(a) gets four years or, if later, one year after discovery. An unpaid fuel supplier can serve as the triggering creditor, and § 38-8-109(2) permits judgment against “the person for whose benefit the transfer was made.”

    The catch: aiming § 544(b) at the owner while the IRS keeps the money is the theory Miller left open, and I found no Tenth Circuit, Tenth Circuit BAP, or District of Colorado decision on it. The trustee must also sue within § 546(a), generally two years after the order for relief.

    Does it matter whether the books call it a distribution, a loan, or wages?

    A great deal. For tax purposes the payment went to the owner; in a C corporation that is usually a constructive dividend under 26 U.S.C. § 301(c). In an S corporation, including an LLC that elected S status, it is a § 1368 distribution, tax-free up to stock basis and reducing basis under § 1367(a)(2)(A).

    With several owners, an S corporation must keep one class of stock under 26 U.S.C. § 1361(b)(1)(D). Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-1(l)(2)(i) looks to the governing documents, so one owner’s payment does not by itself create a second class, though uneven distributions still get “appropriate tax effect.” Colorado LLC distributions raise separate issues, covered in our post on LLC member distributions and the trustee.

    The ledger shapes the bankruptcy fight too. Booked as a loan, the payment may need no avoidance; a matured receivable must be paid to the trustee under 11 U.S.C. § 542(b). If it repaid money the company owed the owner, it can be an insider preference within a year under § 547(b)(4)(B). Repaying the estate does not reopen the earlier return; I usually see the repayment treated as a contribution restoring basis.

    How would this play out for a Greeley trucking LLC in Chapter 7?

    Illustrative only. A Greeley trucking LLC taxed as an S corporation has one member. On April 14, 2025, with fuel bills past due, the company wires $62,000 to the IRS for his 2024 balance. It files Chapter 7 in the District of Colorado on September 15, 2026. If his basis covered $62,000, the distribution was not taxed again.

    The wire is 17 months old, inside § 548’s window. The trustee may sue the IRS under §§ 548 and 550(a)(1), or sue the member as beneficiary. If the IRS pays the estate, I would expect it to treat his 2024 balance as unpaid again, so the cost lands on him either way. The trustee generally has until September 15, 2028 to file.

    Move the wire to March 10, 2024, outside § 548. The Colorado period runs to March 10, 2028, but after Miller it cannot be used against the IRS, and suing the member depends on the beneficiary theory holding up. Had the money passed through his own account first, he would be the initial transferee, and a state-law claim against him would be routine.

    Can I discharge what I owe the trustee, and are payroll taxes different?

    If the member files his own case, the 2024 tax was paid. What remains is the estate’s claim, dischargeable unless a creditor or the trustee proves an exception under § 523(a)(4) (embezzlement or larceny), § 523(a)(6) (willful and malicious injury), or § 523(a)(2)(A), which Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581 (2016), read to reach fraudulent conveyance schemes. Under § 523(c)(1) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007(c), that complaint is due 60 days after the first date set for the meeting of creditors.

    Payroll taxes differ. A company paying its own withheld payroll taxes pays its own debt, leaving no personal benefit to claw back. The owner’s real exposure is the trust fund recovery penalty in 26 U.S.C. § 6672(a), equal to the unpaid tax, imposed on a responsible person who willfully fails to pay it over.

    How the money moved Who the trustee can pursue Time limit Effect of Miller
    Company wired the IRS within two years The IRS or the owner, one recovery § 548: two years None
    Company wired the IRS two to four years before Owner, if the beneficiary theory holds C.R.S. § 38-8-110: four years Bars the claim against the IRS
    Company paid the owner, who paid the IRS Owner as initial transferee Two or four years Largely irrelevant
    Company’s own payroll taxes No clawback; IRS may assess § 6672 IRS assessment rules None

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Can a trustee make the IRS return a tax payment my company made for me?

    Within two years before the petition, possibly, under § 548. For older payments that rest on Colorado law, Miller says no.

    Does Miller protect me as the business owner?

    No, it protects the IRS. The owner can still face a § 548 claim, and possibly a state-law claim on the theory Miller left open.

    Did Colorado change its fraudulent transfer law in 2025?

    Yes. Senate Bill 25-133 renamed it the Colorado Voidable Transactions Act. The four-year periods and the one-year discovery rule for actual-intent claims remain.

    Is a company paying my personal taxes taxable to me?

    It is treated as a payment to you. In an S corporation it is a distribution taxed only above basis; in a C corporation it is usually a constructive dividend.

    Can I discharge a trustee’s judgment in my own bankruptcy?

    Generally yes. A creditor or the trustee must prove an exception, such as embezzlement or actual fraud, in a complaint filed within 60 days after the first date set for the creditors’ meeting.

    Has Congress changed the law after Miller?

    Not as of October 16, 2026. Section 106 has not been amended since 2010, and I found no bill to change the result.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm represents Colorado business owners in Chapter 7 cases, clawback defense, and IRS disputes after a company fails. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    The books from that year will shape your defense. If a trustee has asked about that payment, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Frozen Out of a Colorado LLC in Bankruptcy: Which Member Claims Are Direct or Derivative?

    Frozen Out of a Colorado LLC in Bankruptcy: Which Member Claims Are Direct or Derivative?

    A chef in Glenwood Springs owns 30 percent of the LLC that owns her downtown building, and the operating agreement gives her alone the right to run the ground-floor restaurant. The managing members stopped returning her calls a year ago, and now the LLC has filed Chapter 11 with a buyer lined up. She wants to sue. The first thing a Colorado bankruptcy attorney will ask is not whether she was wronged but whose claim it is.

    Minority LLC member rights in Colorado turn on that question, because a claim that belongs to a bankrupt LLC belongs to the estate.

    In a bankruptcy, who decides direct vs. derivative claims for a Colorado LLC?

    State law. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979), holds that “[p]roperty interests are created and defined by state law” in bankruptcy unless “some federal interest requires a different result.” In Sender v. Simon, 84 F.3d 1299 (10th Cir. 1996), the Tenth Circuit read Colorado partnership law to decide that a claim belonged to the debtor and so to the estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).

    The Second Circuit’s Little Hearts Marks Family II L.P. v. Carter (In re 305 East 61st Street Group LLC), 130 F.4th 272 (2d Cir. 2025), is sometimes framed as a Butner case, but the opinion never cites Butner. The parties agreed New York law governed, and New York’s appellate divisions had already borrowed Delaware’s test from Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031 (Del. 2004).

    What test do Colorado courts use to separate direct and derivative claims?

    The rule grew out of shareholder cases. Nicholson v. Ash, 800 P.2d 1352 (Colo. App. 1990), allowed a personal suit only for breach of a duty owed to the stockholder causing injury “unique to himself and not suffered by the other stockholders.” For LLCs the key case is Young v. Bush, 277 P.3d 916 (Colo. App. 2012): a member sues directly only for injuries “separate and distinct from the injury to the LLC or the other members,” judged by asking who suffered the harm and who would receive the remedy.

    Those two questions came from First Horizon Merchant Services, Inc. v. Wellspring Capital Management, LLC, 166 P.3d 166 (Colo. App. 2007), which took them from Tooley while applying Delaware law. So Colorado has absorbed Tooley‘s core without adopting it by name, and I found no Colorado Supreme Court decision on the LLC question.

    The LLC Act says members’ and managers’ duties run “to the limited liability company” (C.R.S. § 7-80-404), so fiduciary claims start out derivative. And size is no shortcut: applying Colorado law in Combs v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 382 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 2004), the Tenth Circuit kept mismanagement claims derivative even in a close corporation with one minority holder.

    Outside bankruptcy, derivative suits follow C.R.S. §§ 7-80-713 to 7-80-719, including the demand rule in § 7-80-714.

    What happens to an LLC member’s derivative claims once a Colorado bankruptcy is filed?

    They become estate property. Delgado Oil Co. v. Torres, 785 F.2d 857 (10th Cir. 1986), arose from a Chapter 11 filed in Colorado: a creditor’s fiduciary claim against a director was “maintainable only through the debtor corporation,” so the district court lacked jurisdiction to try it. A post-petition derivative suit also runs into 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3), which stays any act “to exercise control over property of the estate.”

    The trustee or debtor in possession now decides whether to sue, settle, or sell. Buying the claim is often the cleanest exit, since estate property can be sold after notice and a hearing under 11 U.S.C. § 363(b). Forcing abandonment under 11 U.S.C. § 554(b) is harder, because the claim must be burdensome or of inconsequential value. In re MS55, Inc., 477 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2007), acknowledged that courts let creditors’ committees sue insiders in the debtor’s name when the debtor in possession refuses, but set no test for a single member.

    A plan can settle estate claims or hand them to a litigation trust under 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3), and 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a) binds creditors and equity holders whether or not they accepted it. Manager releases are a separate fight; see our post on Colorado plan releases after Purdue.

    Frozen Out of an LLC That Filed Bankruptcy? Contact Us Now

    Can an LLC member frozen out in Colorado get a trustee when the managers run the Chapter 11?

    This may be her key motion, because a debtor in possession acts through the managers she accuses. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) requires a trustee for cause, including fraud, dishonesty, or gross mismanagement by current management, and § 1104(a)(2) allows one when it serves creditors, equity holders, and the estate. Short of that, § 1104(c) provides an examiner to investigate management. The request must come from a “party in interest,” and since the list in 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) begins with “including,” a member with money at stake will argue she qualifies.

    How would the claims sort out for a hypothetical Glenwood Springs restaurant owner?

    Illustrative hypothetical. Red Mountain Block LLC owns the building and is taxed as a partnership, the default for a multi-member LLC under Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(1)(i). Ana (40 percent) and Ben (20 percent) manage it; Cal holds 10 percent, and Dana, our chef, holds 30. The operating agreement gives Dana alone the right to run the ground-floor restaurant at a fixed rent through 2034, plus a right of first offer on any sale. In 2026 the managers file Chapter 11 in the District of Colorado and sell the building for $6,200,000 to a company Ana’s brother controls, never offering it to Dana.

    Her claim that they sold cheaply to an insider is derivative, because every member lost in proportion and the recovery belongs to the estate. Her claims that Ana and Ben broke her restaurant right and her first-offer right look direct under Young, since nobody else held those rights. That tracks Little Hearts, which held Tooley does not even apply to a member suing on her own contract rights. Those claims survive the plan unless it validly releases the managers.

    Now the K-1. Assume a $3,400,000 basis in the building, so the sale produces $2,800,000 of gain and Dana’s 2026 K-1 shows $840,000, assuming percentage allocations that hold up under 26 U.S.C. § 704(b). Under 26 U.S.C. § 1399 the filing creates no separate taxable entity, and partners report their shares “whether or not distributed” (Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1(a)). If the estate holds all the cash, Dana reports $840,000 anyway, and Colorado starts from the same federal taxable income under C.R.S. § 39-22-104.

    Say her outside basis was $1,300,000, including a $1,170,000 share of a $3,900,000 mortgage. The gain adds $840,000 under 26 U.S.C. § 705(a). Paying off the mortgage is a $1,170,000 deemed distribution under 26 U.S.C. § 752(b), leaving $970,000. If the plan pays her $400,000 in 2027, she has a $570,000 capital loss under 26 U.S.C. § 731(a)(2), usable against ordinary income at $3,000 a year under 26 U.S.C. § 1211(b). That is phantom income in full: gain one year, a stranded loss the next.

    What should a Colorado LLC operating agreement say before bankruptcy is on the table?

    I look first at whether a member’s rights are written as her own. Exclusive use rights, puts and calls, first-offer and preemptive rights, and tag-along or drag-along terms framed as promises to a named member are the kind of rights Little Hearts treated as direct and that fit Young‘s separate-and-distinct test. C.R.S. § 7-80-108 lets the agreement restrict fiduciary duties unless that is “manifestly unreasonable,” but it cannot unreasonably limit the information rights in C.R.S. § 7-80-408.

    A mandatory tax-distribution clause is the best answer to Dana’s K-1, though after filing the court controls the cash. Distributions members took before the filing raise the opposite issue, covered in how a trustee recovers LLC distributions after Weinstein. Drafting these terms is work for Colorado-licensed counsel; my side is bankruptcy and tax.

    Dana’s claim Likely classification Who controls it after filing After a confirmed plan
    Cheap sale to an insider Derivative Trustee or debtor in possession Kept by the estate or plan trust
    Pre-filing waste and mismanagement Derivative, even in a small LLC Trustee or debtor in possession Kept by the estate or plan trust
    Breach of her exclusive restaurant and first-offer rights, against the managers Likely direct Dana Survives unless the managers are validly released
    Contract damages against the LLC itself Her own claim, against the debtor Filed in the case Paid only as the plan provides

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Can I sue the managers of my Colorado LLC after the LLC files bankruptcy?

    Only on claims that are yours directly. Claims for harm to the company belong to the estate, and the automatic stay keeps members from pursuing them.

    Has Colorado adopted the Tooley test?

    Not by name in any decision I found. Young v. Bush uses Tooley’s two questions, borrowed through First Horizon, alongside the older Nicholson v. Ash rule.

    Does it help that my LLC has only a few members?

    Not for classification. Applying Colorado law in Combs, the Tenth Circuit kept mismanagement claims derivative even in a close corporation.

    Do I still need to make a demand under C.R.S. 7-80-714?

    Outside bankruptcy, yes, with a 30-day wait unless an exception applies. After the filing the claim belongs to the estate, so the practical route runs through the trustee or the bankruptcy court.

    Will I owe tax on the building sale if I received no money?

    Quite possibly. Your K-1 share of the gain is taxable whether or not cash is distributed, and a later liquidation loss may not offset it.

    Can I ask for a trustee if the managers control the Chapter 11?

    Yes. Section 1104(a) allows a trustee for cause, including gross mismanagement by current management, and § 1104(c) provides for an examiner.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm advises LLC members on how a company bankruptcy affects their claims and their taxes, including Chapter 11 cases and the tax side of asset sales. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    The trustee motion and sale-year tax planning have short windows. If your LLC is in or near bankruptcy and you have been shut out, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Bankruptcy Trustee Sued You in Colorado? Defending a Fraudulent Transfer Complaint

    Bankruptcy Trustee Sued You in Colorado? Defending a Fraudulent Transfer Complaint

    An equipment rental and parts yard in Montrose opens a summons from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Denver. The Chapter 7 trustee for a Grand Junction contractor it supplied for years wants back the $180,000 the contractor paid over its last 18 months, calling it a fraudulent transfer and a preference. Every dollar paid a real invoice, the owner says. That may be true, but a bankruptcy trustee lawsuit in Colorado shrinks only when the defendant makes the trustee prove each element of each count.

    What is a Colorado bankruptcy trustee actually suing for?

    Trustees plead several theories. Under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A), a transfer made within two years before the petition can be avoided if the debtor made it with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor. Section 548(a)(1)(B) is the constructive version: less than reasonably equivalent value, while the debtor was insolvent or in another form of financial distress the statute lists. A preference count under 11 U.S.C. § 547 usually rides along, and 11 U.S.C. § 550 is what lets the trustee collect.

    State law comes in through 11 U.S.C. § 544(b), which lets the trustee use an avoidance claim held by a real unsecured creditor. In Colorado that meant the Colorado Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act until Senate Bill 25-133, signed April 7, 2025, renamed it the Colorado Voidable Transactions Act for claims filed after its effective date. The tests carried over: C.R.S. § 38-8-105(1)(a) covers actual intent, § 38-8-105(2) lists eleven “badges of fraud” (a transfer to an insider is one), and constructive claims sit in § 38-8-105(1)(b) and § 38-8-106(1).

    How far back can a bankruptcy trustee reach in Colorado?

    Section 548 reaches back two years. Under C.R.S. § 38-8-110, the Colorado statute reaches four, and an actual-intent claim can also be brought within one year after the transfer was or reasonably could have been discovered, if that is later. A payment made three years before the petition is outside § 548 but inside the Colorado statute, which is why most complaints here plead both. The 2025 amendment stretched the insider-preference claim in § 38-8-106(2) from one year to four.

    That longer reach needs a “triggering creditor.” In United States v. Miller, 604 U.S. 518 (2025), which came up through the Tenth Circuit, the Supreme Court confirmed that a § 544(b) trustee must identify an actual creditor who could have avoided the transfer outside bankruptcy, and takes that creditor’s limitations and defenses with it. Ask which creditor the complaint names.

    Some trustees name the IRS to borrow its ten-year collection period under 26 U.S.C. § 6502. The Tenth Circuit has not ruled, and I found no District of Colorado decision. A New Mexico bankruptcy court refused in Wagner v. Ultima Homes, Inc. (In re Vaughan Co.), 498 B.R. 297 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2013); a 2022 Kansas bankruptcy decision is reported to have allowed it. No court of appeals has decided it; the Fifth Circuit’s MC Asset Recovery LLC v. Commerzbank A.G. (In re Mirant Corp.), 675 F.3d 530 (5th Cir. 2012), held only that the federal Debt Collection Procedures Act is not “applicable law” under § 544(b). A different ten-year rule, for self-settled trusts, is covered in the Kittrell post.

    The trustee has its own clock: 11 U.S.C. § 546(a) generally requires suit within two years after the order for relief, and before the case closes.

    Sued by a Colorado Bankruptcy Trustee? Contact Us Now

    What does Rule 9(b) require in a fraudulent transfer complaint?

    Bankruptcy Rule 7009 applies Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), which demands particularity about the circumstances of fraud but lets intent be alleged generally. The Tenth Circuit’s version is the “who, what, when, where and how” in United States ex rel. Sikkenga v. Regence Bluecross Blueshield of Utah, 472 F.3d 702 (10th Cir. 2006), building on Koch v. Koch Industries, Inc., 203 F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 2000). Sikkenga is a False Claims Act case; I found no Tenth Circuit opinion squarely applying it to an actual-intent transfer count, though bankruptcy courts in the circuit do. In Soule v. Galaz (In re Galaz), Adv. No. 21-1016-R (Bankr. N.D. Okla. Oct. 20, 2021), pleaded badges (an insider, no consideration, poor disclosure) were enough.

    For a vendor, the useful example is Mendelsohn v. Dole Fresh Fruit Co. (In re Barnett Corp.), Adv. Pro. No. 8-24-08121-AST (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2026). The complaint described misconduct by the debtor’s principal but never tied it to the 33 payments the defendant received, so Chief Judge Trust gave the trustee 21 days to replead. Intent has to attach to the transfers being sued on.

    Constructive counts are usually tested under Rule 8 and the plausibility standard of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). A list of dates and amounts still does not show what the debtor got back, and big loans do not show insolvency on the payment dates. I did not locate a published District of Colorado bankruptcy decision choosing between the two standards for these counts.

    Should a Colorado defendant move to dismiss or answer?

    Under Bankruptcy Rule 7012(a), the answer is due 30 days after the summons issued unless the court sets another date. A motion to dismiss usually ends with leave to amend, so its value lies in pinning the trustee to facts and removing counts that cannot be fixed. Barnett dismissed a § 502(d) claim-disallowance count outright because the defendant had filed no proof of claim. Counts time-barred on their face, or lacking a triggering creditor, are other targets. When a motion would only produce a longer complaint, I usually prefer a prompt answer pleading every affirmative defense. Fraudulent transfer defense in Colorado is mostly won with documents, and any Colorado bankruptcy attorney will ask for the ledger early.

    How would a Montrose equipment supplier defend $180,000 in payments?

    Illustrative example: the Grand Junction contractor filed Chapter 7 on March 16, 2026. Between September 2024 and February 2026 it paid the Montrose supplier $180,000 on open account, all inside the § 548 window. Three payments totaling $45,000 fell within the 90-day preference period.

    Start with value. Paying an existing debt is “value” under § 548(d)(2)(A) and C.R.S. § 38-8-104(1), so a payment matched to an invoice for parts or rental at market rates defeats the constructive theory dollar for dollar. Build a ledger tying every payment to a delivery ticket, because § 38-8-109(7), added in 2025, puts the burden of proving the state-law defenses on the transferee. A non-insider vendor paid on its usual terms shows few badges, and good faith plus value is a defense under both § 548(c) and C.R.S. § 38-8-109(1).

    Now suppose $30,000 paid for a skid steer the contractor’s owner bought for his own place near Olathe. The contractor satisfied someone else’s debt, and the amended § 38-8-109(1) protects only value “given to the debtor.” That slice is real exposure. On the preference count, the ordinary-course defense in § 547(c)(2) and the new-value defense in § 547(c)(4) can cut the $45,000; if the supplier later shipped $22,000 more on credit and was never paid, the figure may fall to about $23,000.

    That makes the realistic risk closer to $53,000 than $180,000, and settlement talks in a preference clawback defense should start there. Under § 502(d), the supplier’s own claim is disallowed until it pays. Once it pays, 11 U.S.C. § 502(h) treats the resulting claim as a prepetition claim, filed alongside the unpaid invoices. Chapter 7 dividends are often small.

    Do family members and insiders face different rules in a Colorado bankruptcy?

    Yes. A transfer to an insider is itself a badge of fraud, § 547(b)(4)(B) extends the preference period for insiders to one year, and the Colorado insider-preference claim now runs four years. In Lofstedt v. Kendall (In re Kendall), No. 13-1224 (10th Cir. May 1, 2014) (unpublished), the Tenth Circuit affirmed a Colorado bankruptcy judgment avoiding transfers to the debtor’s wife and a family trust after the court found seven of the eleven badges. Section 550(b) shields only later transferees, never the first recipient. LLC members should read the Weinstein distributions post.

    Count Reach-back What the trustee must plead Main defenses
    § 548(a)(1)(A) actual intent 2 years Facts tying intent to these transfers (Rule 9(b)) § 548(c) good faith and value
    § 548(a)(1)(B) constructive 2 years Value shortfall plus insolvency or other distress Reasonably equivalent value
    § 544(b) with C.R.S. § 38-8-105 or -106 4 years (discovery rule for intent) Same, plus a real triggering creditor § 38-8-109; limitations under § 38-8-110
    § 547 preference 90 days; 1 year for insiders Antecedent debt, insolvency, better-than-Chapter 7 recovery § 547(c) ordinary course, new value

    Frequently Asked Questions

    How long does a Colorado bankruptcy trustee have to file a fraudulent transfer lawsuit?

    Generally two years after the order for relief under 11 U.S.C. 546(a), and before the case closes. The transfers themselves can be up to two years old under section 548 or up to four years old under the Colorado statute.

    Is the Colorado Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act still the law?

    Its substance is, under a new name. Senate Bill 25-133 renamed it the Colorado Voidable Transactions Act in 2025, kept the core tests, and changed some burdens and the insider-preference deadline.

    Can a trustee use the IRS to reach back ten years in Colorado?

    That question is open in the Tenth Circuit. A New Mexico bankruptcy court said no in 2013, and other bankruptcy courts have allowed it.

    Does Rule 9(b) apply to a fraudulent transfer claim?

    Courts apply it to actual-intent counts, though intent itself may be alleged generally. Constructive counts are usually judged under Rule 8, which still requires facts about value and insolvency.

    If I pay the trustee, do I get anything back?

    You get an unsecured claim for what you returned under section 502(h). Whether it pays much depends on what the estate collects.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm defends vendors, lenders, family members and business owners sued by bankruptcy trustees, through preference and clawback defense and broader bankruptcy representation, including Chapter 7 cases. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    The answer deadline in an adversary proceeding is short, and matching payments to invoices takes time. If a trustee’s complaint has arrived, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Bad Faith Bankruptcy Filings in Colorado: Can a Mid-Lawsuit Subchapter V Case Survive?

    Bad Faith Bankruptcy Filings in Colorado: Can a Mid-Lawsuit Subchapter V Case Survive?

    A Loveland LLC owns a light-industrial building off U.S. 34. Its bank has a judicial foreclosure pending in Larimer County District Court, a contractor and a former member are suing it, and summary judgment is set for Thursday morning. On Wednesday afternoon the LLC files a Subchapter V petition, and the hearing comes off the calendar. The bank’s lawyer starts drafting a motion to dismiss, calling the petition a bad faith bankruptcy filing.

    Owner and lender both need to know what a Colorado bankruptcy judge does with a case filed mid-lawsuit against a handful of creditors. The Tenth Circuit’s answer surprises people.

    Is filing Chapter 11 to stop a lawsuit a bad faith bankruptcy filing in Colorado?

    Not automatically. Stopping litigation is part of the automatic stay’s job. In In re Koffler, No. 25-14914-JGR (Bankr. D. Colo. May 18, 2026), Judge Rosania wrote that “Timing alone does not establish bad faith” and that a debtor may file to stay a foreclosure. The Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel said in In re McHugh, BAP No. CO-24-20 (10th Cir. BAP Sept. 30, 2025) (unpublished), that filing in place of an appeal bond “is not bad faith per se.”

    The risk sits in 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b), which requires the court, on a party in interest’s request, to dismiss or convert a Chapter 11 case “for cause.” The sixteen examples in § 1112(b)(4) never mention bad faith, but In re Pacific Rim Investments, LLP, 243 B.R. 768 (D. Colo. 2000), held that a bad faith filing is cause under both § 1112(b) and the stay-relief statute.

    Keep the tools apart. Chapter 11 dismissal for cause ends the case, stay relief under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) frees one creditor, and 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) asks later whether the plan was “proposed in good faith.”

    What test does the Tenth Circuit use to dismiss a Chapter 11 case for cause?

    A totality-of-the-circumstances test with no separate futility element. Carolin Corp. v. Miller, 886 F.2d 693 (4th Cir. 1989), requires two findings: the “objective futility” of any reorganization plus the petitioner’s “subjective bad faith.” Colorado courts do not. In Pacific Rim, the debtor filed three days before a Denver District Court foreclosure trial, and the case was dismissed even though the building had equity and a plan was on file. Judge Kane affirmed, rejecting the argument that an ability to reorganize defeats a bad-faith finding.

    I have not found a published Tenth Circuit opinion setting a § 1112(b) bad-faith test. Its published guidance comes from two sanctions appeals: In re Courtesy Inns, Ltd., 40 F.3d 1084 (10th Cir. 1994), where a motel owner filed in Colorado the day before a foreclosure sale, and In re Nursery Land Development, Inc., 91 F.3d 1414 (10th Cir. 1996), which listed “classic badges” like one asset, one creditor, and no employees.

    The working standard comes from the BAP. In In re Frontline Medical Services LLC, 665 B.R. 818 (10th Cir. BAP 2024), an appeal from the Colorado bankruptcy court, the panel listed eight factors drawn from Nursery Land and asked whether “the cumulative effect of the relevant factors gives rise to an inescapable conclusion” that bankruptcy is being misused. The movant must prove cause by a preponderance of the evidence. Reorganization prospects are one factor, not a gate.

    Does a two-party dispute or eve-of-hearing timing get the case dismissed?

    Usually only with more. Frontline was a Subchapter V case filed during a fee fight with a former law firm, one of only two impaired unsecured creditors. Dismissal was denied. Frontline ran a real business with cash flow, and the BAP called a two-party dispute “simply one factor.”

    The losing debtors had more against them. In McHugh, a solvent broker filed after a garnishment froze his accounts, never sought a stay pending his state appeal, and was converted to Chapter 7. In Koffler, a Snowmass debtor facing over $17 million in judgments leaned on a “friendly” $119 million claim that the court viewed as an effort to manufacture an accepting class. And Roberts v. Sender, No. 25-1103 (10th Cir. Mar. 31, 2026) (unpublished), recounts a Colorado debtor converted for bad faith after filing on the eve of a damages hearing.

    The pattern I see: timing makes judges look harder, and the operating business decides the outcome.

    Bankruptcy Filed on the Eve of Trial? Contact Us Now

    What changes in a Subchapter V Colorado case?

    Eligibility comes first. Under 11 U.S.C. § 1182(1), the debtor must be a “small business debtor” under 11 U.S.C. § 101(51D). Only noncontingent, liquidated debts count toward the cap, which stood at $3,424,000 as of September 2026, per the U.S. Trustee Program. Congress then passed H.R. 7730, the Bankruptcy Threshold Adjustment Act, restoring $7,500,000; the Senate cleared it September 28, 2026, but as of October 9, 2026, it awaited signature and reaches only cases filed after enactment. The definition also excludes a debtor whose primary activity is owning single asset real estate.

    Section 1112 still applies, since 11 U.S.C. § 1181(a) does not exclude it. The plan is due within 90 days under 11 U.S.C. § 1189(b), and missing that deadline is separate cause under § 1112(b)(4)(J). The trustee under 11 U.S.C. § 1183 must “facilitate the development of a consensual plan,” can be ordered to investigate, and is a party in interest under 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b), which supports standing to seek dismissal.

    A plan funded by a lawsuit recovery has a problem. For a nonconsensual plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1191(c)(3) requires that the debtor “will be able” to pay, or a reasonable likelihood plus “appropriate remedies,” and Frontline reversed a confirmation that skipped that finding. Koffler adds that rehabilitation is not “the mere possibility that contingent litigation or disputed assets may someday produce value.”

    Should a Colorado creditor seek stay relief or bring a motion to dismiss bankruptcy for bad faith?

    Often both. Stop collecting and file a notice of the bankruptcy in the state case. Stay relief fits when the state case is ready for trial; In re Curtis, 40 B.R. 795 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984), lists trial readiness and the “balance of hurt” among its factors. For a stay protecting property, such as a foreclosure, § 362(e)(1) ends the stay 30 days after the request unless the court continues it. In Pacific Rim the creditor won both forms of relief.

    A dismissal hearing must begin within 30 days under § 1112(b)(3), though Koffler held a preliminary hearing and then set a full evidentiary hearing for “compelling circumstances.” Once cause is shown, the debtor must prove unusual circumstances under § 1112(b)(2); filing reports and showing up at the § 341 meeting is “the minimum level of participation required.” Refiling bars are limited by In re Frieouf, 938 F.2d 1099 (10th Cir. 1991).

    Watch for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1452, generally within 90 days under Bankruptcy Rule 9027(a)(2); the creditor’s answer is remand “on any equitable ground” or abstention under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c). A Colorado bankruptcy attorney on the creditor side should also read the schedules, because undisclosed lawsuits carry their own consequences.

    How would a Loveland Subchapter V filing play out?

    Illustrative only. The LLC’s building is appraised at $2.9 million; four bays lease for $18,000 a month, and the LLC’s cabinet shop, with seven employees, uses the fifth. The bank is owed $2.1 million. A roofer claims a disputed $340,000 invoice, a former member seeks unliquidated buyout damages, and trade debt is $85,000. Leaving out the member’s claim, countable debt is about $2.53 million. Colorado lenders can also foreclose through the county public trustee under C.R.S. § 38-38-101; this bank chose court. The LLC files Wednesday, November 18, 2026.

    The bank moves November 30 to dismiss or, alternatively, for stay relief, so absent consent the hearing must begin by December 30. It argues eve-of-hearing timing, few creditors, and that the building is single asset real estate, which would end Subchapter V eligibility. The LLC answers with payroll, tenants, equity, and a plan filed well before the February 16, 2027 deadline. Its weak spot is any plan dollar that depends on beating the roofer’s claim. A judge applying Frontline could keep the case, let the roofer’s claim proceed in Larimer County, and require a sale deadline as the § 1191(c)(3) remedy.

    Tool Statute Timing What it does
    Motion to dismiss for cause § 1112(b) Hearing begins within 30 days Ends or converts the case
    Stay relief § 362(d)(1) Stay on property lapses in 30 days unless continued Sends one dispute back to state court
    Eligibility objection §§ 1182(1), 101(51D) Early in the case Removes Subchapter V treatment
    Plan good-faith objection § 1129(a)(3) At confirmation Blocks a plan, not the filing
    Remand or abstention 28 U.S.C. §§ 1452(b), 1334(c) After any removal Returns state claims to state court

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Is it bad faith to file bankruptcy right before a hearing in Colorado?

    Not by itself. Colorado judges treat timing as probative but weigh it with everything else, especially whether a real business exists to reorganize.

    Does the Tenth Circuit require proof that reorganization is futile?

    No. Colorado courts use a totality-of-the-circumstances test, and Pacific Rim affirmed a dismissal even though the debtor had equity and a plan.

    Can a Subchapter V trustee move to dismiss a case?

    The trustee is a party in interest under section 1109(b), and section 1112(b) lets a party in interest seek dismissal. In practice, creditors usually bring the motion.

    What is the Subchapter V debt limit in Colorado right now?

    It was $3,424,000 as of September 2026. A bill restoring $7,500,000 passed Congress that month but, as of October 9, 2026, had not been signed and would apply only to later-filed cases.

    Can a plan be funded by winning a lawsuit?

    Partly. A plan resting entirely on contingent litigation is hard to confirm under section 1191(c)(3) without a sale or liquidation remedy.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm represents business owners and creditors in contested Colorado reorganizations, including Subchapter V cases, Chapter 11 litigation, and broader bankruptcy planning. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    The 30-day hearing clock leaves little time to build the record on either side. If a lawsuit just collided with a bankruptcy petition, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Why Is My Colorado Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Still Open? Trustees, Homestead Fights, and the Barton Doctrine

    Why Is My Colorado Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Still Open? Trustees, Homestead Fights, and the Barton Doctrine

    A Westminster creditor checks PACER in October 2026 and finds that a Colorado Chapter 7 bankruptcy filed in 2024 still has no closing order. The discharge entered long ago, and the latest entry is a notice of appeal. That can be entirely proper: a Chapter 7 case can outlive the discharge by years when there is an asset worth fighting over.

    In May 2026 the en banc Ninth Circuit issued Phillips v. Goldman (In re Gilman), 176 F.4th 1152 (9th Cir. 2026), arising from a Los Angeles Chapter 7 filed in 2011 and still open. It does not bind Colorado courts, and the Tenth Circuit’s trustee-liability rules point the other way.

    How long does Chapter 7 take in Colorado, and what keeps a case open?

    A no-asset Chapter 7 in the District of Colorado commonly closes about four to six months after filing. That is a docket pattern, not a rule, and cases vary. Under 11 U.S.C. § 350(a) the court closes a case once the estate is fully administered and the trustee discharged, and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 5009(a) presumes full administration 30 days after the trustee’s final report if no one objects.

    Anything that delays the final report delays closing. 11 U.S.C. § 704(a) tells the trustee to liquidate estate property and close the estate “as expeditiously as is compatible with the best interests of parties in interest,” which in an asset case means selling property and paying a dividend. Litigation adds time, whether a preference suit or a lawsuit the debtor never scheduled. Because 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) sweeps in every interest the debtor held on the petition date, a trustee may also wait on a pre-petition tax refund. Death does not end the case either; Rule 1016(a) continues it as though the debtor had not died.

    Why does a Colorado homestead exemption fight in bankruptcy take so long?

    Colorado opted out of the federal exemptions in C.R.S. § 13-54-107, so state law alone protects a debtor’s house. C.R.S. § 38-41-201 exempts $250,000 of equity, or $350,000 when an owner, spouse, or dependent living there is 60 or older or disabled as the statute defines it. SB 22-086 set those figures in April 2022, up from $75,000 and $105,000. The exemption lasts only while the property is occupied as a home (C.R.S. § 38-41-203), and C.R.S. § 38-41-207 keeps segregated sale proceeds exempt for three years.

    The objection deadline is strict: 11 U.S.C. § 522(l) makes claimed property exempt unless someone objects, and Rule 4003(b)(1) allows 30 days after the 341 meeting concludes. A late objection fails even against a baseless claim, as Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638 (1992) held. A timely one can mean an evidentiary hearing and then an appeal, which 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(1) sends to the Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel unless a party elects district court.

    Is a Colorado debtor discharged while the case stays open?

    Usually, yes. An open case and a missing discharge are different problems. Rule 4004(c)(1) requires the court to grant the discharge promptly once the deadlines to object and to move to dismiss for abuse pass, which is 60 days after the first date set for the 341 meeting, unless an exception applies, such as a pending § 727 complaint. A pending exemption objection is not one of them. Fraud and willful-injury claims under § 523(c) share that 60-day window under Rule 4007(c).

    Hypothetical, for illustration only. An Aurora debtor, 57, files in March 2024 and claims a $340,000 homestead in a Lakewood house worth $700,000 with a $360,000 mortgage, asserting a qualifying disability. Within 30 days of the April 341 meeting, the trustee objects that the debtor is not disabled under the statute and had moved to Aurora. No § 727 or § 523(c) complaint is filed, so the discharge enters in late June 2024. After a 2025 trial the court caps the exemption at $250,000, leaving about $90,000 before sale costs. The debtor appeals to the BAP within the 14 days Rule 8002(a) allows, loses in late 2025, and takes the case to the Tenth Circuit. In October 2026 the house is unsold and the case open, yet the discharge has protected the debtor since June 2024. Only the equity remains in play.

    What can creditors and debtors do when a Colorado bankruptcy trustee lets a case sit?

    A creditor can ask the trustee directly under § 704(a)(7), then go to the U.S. Trustee; 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3) charges that office with supervising Chapter 7 trustees and acting to prevent undue delay. In court, a party can move to compel administration under § 704(a)(1) or seek removal for cause under 11 U.S.C. § 324(a).

    Debtors have 11 U.S.C. § 554(b), which lets the court order abandonment of property that is burdensome or of inconsequential value. Scheduled property left unadministered at closing returns to the debtor under § 554(c), but unscheduled property stays in the estate under § 554(d). Expect deference: Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267 (1951) noted that courts protect trustees from liability for “disinterested mistakes in business judgment.”

    Chapter 7 Case Stuck? Contact Us Now

    Can you sue a Chapter 7 trustee in Colorado under the Barton doctrine in the Tenth Circuit?

    Not without leave first. Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126 (1881) required permission of the appointing court before suing a receiver. Satterfield v. Malloy, 700 F.3d 1231 (10th Cir. 2012) applied that rule to bankruptcy trustees, called it jurisdictional, rejected relabeling claims as individual-capacity torts, and enforced it after the case closed. 28 U.S.C. § 959(a) excuses leave only for acts in carrying on business, and Satterfield held that renting and selling estate property during liquidation does not count. A creditor upset that a trustee never collected rent must ask the bankruptcy court first.

    Past that gate, the standards split. Sherr v. Winkler, 552 F.2d 1367, 1375 (10th Cir. 1977), reading Mosser, held a trustee personally liable only for willful and deliberate breaches, with negligence reaching the trustee only in an official capacity. Sherr is a Bankruptcy Act case but has not been overruled. In Phillips, by contrast, the en banc Ninth Circuit limited quasi-judicial immunity to functions tied to adjudicating rights to the estate, so a trustee acting “as a property manager” is not immune. Derived immunity there requires court approval after notice and candid disclosure. The court rejected an immunity line between ordinary and gross negligence, reaffirmed negligence-based personal liability, and applied, rather than overruled, its earlier Castillo and Bennett decisions. It did not reach the unchallenged limitations ruling. In Colorado, Phillips is persuasive only. The trustee’s certiorari petition, Goldman v. Phillips, No. 26-315, places the Tenth Circuit, through Sherr, on the willful-and-deliberate side; a response is due October 13, 2026.

    What tax returns does a long-open Colorado Chapter 7 estate generate?

    An individual’s Chapter 7 creates a separate taxpayer. Under 26 U.S.C. § 1398, the estate computes income like an individual, the trustee pays its tax, and it takes the debtor’s loss and credit carryovers, which return to the debtor when the estate ends. IRS Publication 908 has the trustee file Form 1041 for any year estate gross income meets the threshold, so a sale in year three means an estate return that year. Post-petition wages stay the debtor’s under § 1398(e) and § 541(a)(6). A pre-petition refund does not; Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642 (1974) treated one as estate property. A debtor with heavy income early in the filing year should weigh the § 1398(d)(2) election to split that year in two.

    Why the case stays open Who controls timing Typical remedy Authority
    Asset sale, claims review Trustee Status request; U.S. Trustee inquiry 11 U.S.C. § 704(a); 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3)
    Homestead objection Objector and court Litigate; timeliness defense § 522(l); Rule 4003(b); C.R.S. § 38-41-201
    Discharge or dischargeability suit Plaintiff Defend or settle §§ 727, 523(c); Rules 4004, 4007(c)
    Trustee litigation or awaited refund Trustee, third parties Motion to compel abandonment §§ 541(a)(1), 554(b)
    Appeal Losing party Brief or settle 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(1); Rule 8002
    Debtor’s death No one Administration continues Rule 1016(a)
    Trustee inaction Trustee Compel, remove, or seek leave to sue § 324(a); Satterfield; Sherr

    Frequently Asked Questions

    How long does Chapter 7 take in Colorado?

    A no-asset Colorado Chapter 7 often closes in four to six months, a docket pattern rather than a rule. Asset sales, exemption fights, and appeals can stretch it to years.

    Can I get my discharge if my Chapter 7 case is still open?

    Usually. Rule 4004(c)(1) requires a prompt discharge once the objection deadlines pass, unless an exception such as a pending § 727 complaint applies.

    What is the homestead exemption in a Colorado bankruptcy?

    C.R.S. § 38-41-201 protects $250,000 of equity, or $350,000 if an owner, spouse, or dependent living there is 60 or older or disabled. The property must be occupied as a home.

    How long does a trustee have to object to my Colorado exemptions?

    Rule 4003(b)(1) allows 30 days after the 341 meeting concludes or an amendment is filed, unless extended on a timely motion. Under Taylor v. Freeland and Kronz, a late objection fails.

    Can I sue my Chapter 7 trustee in Colorado?

    Satterfield v. Malloy requires leave of the bankruptcy court first, outside the narrow 28 U.S.C. § 959(a) exception. Sherr v. Winkler limits personal liability to willful and deliberate breaches.

    Does the Ninth Circuit’s Phillips v. Goldman decision apply in Colorado?

    No. It is persuasive only in the Tenth Circuit, and a certiorari petition asking the Supreme Court to resolve the split is pending.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm represents debtors and creditors in Colorado Chapter 7 cases, including homestead objections, discharge litigation, and requests for leave to sue a trustee. Because its bankruptcy work runs alongside tax practice, the firm also handles estate Form 1041 issues, refund disputes, and discharge of tax debt within its broader Colorado bankruptcy practice. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    When a Chapter 7 case has stalled or a trustee objection threatens a home, deadlines are short. To review the docket and the options, contact North Star Law Firm.