Hollis owns an electrical-supply distributor in Longmont. A Fort Lupton contractor that owed him about $71,000 sent three wires over seven weeks totaling $38,000, then filed Chapter 7 in Denver. Eleven months later the trustee’s lawyer sent a preference demand letter: return the $38,000, or pay $28,000 within 30 days.
Nobody accuses Hollis of wrongdoing. Bankruptcy still reaches payments made just before a filing, but the creditor has defenses, and the Tenth Circuit has said a good deal about them.
Can a Colorado bankruptcy trustee take back a payment your customer made before filing?
Yes. Under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b), a trustee can avoid a payment to a creditor on an antecedent debt, made while the debtor was insolvent and within 90 days before the petition, that let the creditor collect more than a Chapter 7 liquidation would pay. For an insider, such as an officer of a corporate debtor under § 101(31), the reach-back is one year. Section 550(a)(1) then lets the trustee recover the money.
The trustee carries those elements under § 547(g), helped by the § 547(f) presumption of insolvency during the 90 days; the creditor carries the § 547(c) defenses. Since February 19, 2020, § 547(b) has also required “reasonable due diligence in the circumstances of the case” that takes into account a party’s “known or reasonably knowable affirmative defenses.” In Rebein v. NutriQuest, LLC (In re Sandy Road Farms, LLC), Adv. No. 25-7001 (Bankr. D. Kan. Oct. 22, 2025), a Kansas bankruptcy court treated that diligence as a condition precedent that a general allegation satisfies. I found no Colorado ruling.
Why can a trustee reach payments Colorado law would leave alone?
The old rule is that a struggling debtor picks whom to pay. In Clarke v. White, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 178 (1838), often cited as Clark v. White, the Supreme Court upheld a failed Washington, D.C. merchant’s separate settlements with creditors: “The debtor may prefer one creditor, pay him fully, and exhaust his whole property.” Commentators link that race-to-the-courthouse rule with the Contracts Clause, though the opinion never mentions the Clause. Congress’s bankruptcy power overrides it.
Colorado law largely keeps it. Under the Colorado Voidable Transactions Act, renamed by S.B. 25-133 (Colo. Sess. Laws 2025, ch. 57), satisfying an antecedent debt is value under C.R.S. § 38-8-104(1), and the § 38-8-105(2) badges of intent rarely fit a supplier paid normally. The state preference rule, C.R.S. § 38-8-106(2), reaches only insiders with reasonable cause to believe the debtor was insolvent, and S.B. 25-133 stretched its deadline in § 38-8-110(1)(c) from one year to “not later than four years after the transfer was made” for claims filed on or after August 6, 2025. A trustee can generally use that claim through § 544(b)(1). Section 547, by contrast, reaches Hollis with no fraud at all.
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How does the Tenth Circuit apply the ordinary course of business defense?
Section 547(c)(2) protects payment of an ordinary-course debt if the payment was “(A) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee; or (B) made according to ordinary business terms.” Since 2005, either prong suffices. For (A), Payne v. Clarendon National Insurance Co. (In re Sunset Sales, Inc.), 220 B.R. 1005 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1998), aff’d, 195 F.3d 568 (10th Cir. 1999), weighs how long the parties dealt, changes in the amount or form of payment, unusual collection activity, and the circumstances. Late payments are typically not ordinary unless lateness was the normal pattern between the parties.
Prong (B) looks at the industry when debtors are healthy. In Clark v. Balcor Real Estate Finance, Inc. (In re Meridith Hoffman Partners), 12 F.3d 1549 (10th Cir. 1993), a lender’s post-default rent escrow failed because lenders used it “only in extraordinary circumstances, when debtors are in trouble.” Jubber v. SMC Electrical Products, Inc. (In re C.W. Mining Co.), 798 F.3d 983 (10th Cir. 2015) held that even a first-time deal can qualify, and that payment “shortly before or at the due date” generally does, as a $200,000 wire sent two days early did.
In Weinman v. Dragul (In re Cornerstar Wine & Liquor, LLC), No. 19-12135 EEB (Bankr. D. Colo. Mar. 10, 2023), Judge Brown protected three identical $500 repayments but not a $25,000 one, noting a two-year baseline is common “But that is not an absolute requirement.” No opinion sets a formula, so I build two years of invoice-to-payment days, with the average and the range, and compare each payment in the 90 days. Inside the range is defensible under (A). Outside it, or after a credit hold, you need (B) and trade evidence.
Do new value, a contemporaneous exchange or the small-preference floor protect a payment?
Under § 547(c)(4), a creditor that ships unsecured goods after being paid keeps the payment to that extent, unless the debtor paid for those goods with an otherwise unavoidable transfer. Only shipments after a wire offset it. Circuits split on whether new value must stay unpaid; finding no Tenth Circuit ruling, I count only shipments still open at filing. The contemporaneous exchange defense in § 547(c)(1) covers an intended exchange that was “in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange.” In Lowrey v. U.P.G., Inc. (In re Robinson Bros. Drilling, Inc.), 877 F.2d 32 (10th Cir. 1989), a $40,000 payment bought lien releases worth $7,884.97, and only that amount was protected; new value must be proved “with specificity,” and a promise of future business is not new value.
Section 547(c)(9) bars avoidance in a case filed by a debtor whose debts are not primarily consumer debts when the transfer’s aggregate value is under $8,575, the figure for cases filed on or after April 1, 2025 (90 Fed. Reg. 8941).
How would the numbers work for a Longmont supplier?
An illustration with hypothetical facts. The contractor filed on November 6, 2025, so the 90-day window opened August 8. For two years it had paid Hollis 38 to 55 days after invoice. On September 18 (day 49) it wired $11,000 on invoices 48 days old. On October 6 (day 31) it wired $15,000 on invoices 62 days old, after collection calls. On October 28 (day 9) it wired $12,000 on invoices 71 days old, a week after Hollis imposed a credit hold. Between the second and third wires he shipped $9,000 on October 10 and $6,500 on October 20, still unpaid at filing.
The September wire fits the history under § 547(c)(2)(A). The October 6 wire misses the range, but $15,500 of later shipments covers all $15,000 under § 547(c)(4). The October 28 wire followed a hold and no shipments came after it, so unless trade evidence shows 70-day pay is normal for Front Range electrical suppliers, $12,000 is exposed. Every wire exceeds $8,575. That $12,000 is well under the $28,000 offer, and whatever Hollis repays becomes an unsecured claim under § 502(h) on top of the $48,500 still owed. None of this predicts a result.
What should a Colorado creditor do after receiving a preference demand letter?
Do not pay on the letter, and do not ignore it. Under § 546(a), the trustee must sue within two years after the order for relief (longer if the first trustee is appointed late in that period) and before the case closes. A voluntary filing is the order for relief (§ 301(b)), so Hollis’s two years run from November 6, 2025. Section 502(d) lets the trustee block your own claim until an avoidable transfer is returned.
Pull two years of invoices and payment dates, delivery records and emails about holds. Answer in writing, and ask what diligence the trustee did on your defenses. If the case is in another state, 28 U.S.C. § 1409(b) requires a trustee recovering a non-consumer debt under $31,425 from a non-insider (cases filed on or after April 1, 2025) to sue where the defendant resides. If a complaint arrives, see our posts on default judgments in out-of-state bankruptcy adversaries and defending a fraudulent transfer complaint.
| Defense | Creditor must show | Evidence to pull | Tenth Circuit or D. Colo. treatment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Contemporaneous exchange, § 547(c)(1) | Intended, actual near-simultaneous exchange | COD terms, lien releases, dates | Robinson Bros. Drilling: protected only to the lien value proved |
| Ordinary course, § 547(c)(2) | Payment ordinary between the parties (A) or on industry terms (B) | Two years of days-to-pay, collection notes, trade data | Late and workout payments failed (Sunset Sales, Meridith Hoffman); routine ones held (C.W. Mining, Cornerstar) |
| New value, § 547(c)(4) | Unsecured goods or services given after the payment | Shipments and open invoices dated after each wire | No Tenth Circuit ruling found on “remains unpaid” |
| Small-preference floor, § 547(c)(9) | Business debtor; transfer under $8,575 (cases filed on or after April 1, 2025) | Payment amounts, debtor’s schedules | Applies by its terms |
Frequently Asked Questions
Do I have to return a payment because the trustee’s lawyer demands it?
No. A demand letter is not a judgment. The trustee must sue within the section 546(a) period and prove each element, and you can raise your defenses.
How far back can a bankruptcy trustee claw back payments in Colorado?
Ninety days for most creditors and one year for insiders under section 547(b)(4). For claims filed on or after August 6, 2025, Colorado’s insider-preference claim runs four years.
Does it matter that my customer paid late?
Often it decides the case. The Tenth Circuit BAP treats late payments as not ordinary unless lateness was your normal pattern with the debtor.
What is the small preference threshold for a business bankruptcy in 2026?
It is $8,575 for cases filed on or after April 1, 2025, when the debtor’s debts are not primarily consumer debts. A transfer below that aggregate value cannot be avoided as a preference.
If my customer filed bankruptcy in another state, where can the trustee sue me?
Under 28 U.S.C. section 1409(b), a trustee recovering a non-consumer debt under $31,425 from a non-insider must sue in your home district, the District of Colorado. Larger claims can go where the bankruptcy is pending under section 1409(a).
How North Star Law Firm Can Help
North Star Law Firm represents Colorado vendors, landlords, lenders and contractors in preference and clawback defense in Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 cases. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.
Payment records are easiest to gather early. If a trustee wants a pre-bankruptcy payment back, contact North Star Law Firm.
