Author: Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA

  • Company Paid My Personal Taxes Before Bankruptcy? Colorado Trustee Recovery After Miller

    Company Paid My Personal Taxes Before Bankruptcy? Colorado Trustee Recovery After Miller

    In April 2025 the owner of a small trucking company in Greeley had a lean month and a large personal tax bill. He wired the IRS the balance on his own 2024 Form 1040 from the company’s account. Seventeen months later the company is in Chapter 7, and the trustee’s letter says that money belonged to the company’s creditors.

    Most commentary since March 2025 asks whether the IRS must give that money back. The owner’s question is more personal: if the IRS keeps it, does the trustee come after me? Often, yes, depending on the path the money took and how long ago it moved.

    If my company paid my personal taxes before bankruptcy, who can the trustee sue?

    Follow the wire. Company money went to the IRS; the owner’s account got the credit. Once a transfer is avoided, 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) lets the trustee recover its value from “the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit such transfer was made.”

    The Tenth Circuit applied that language in Rupp v. Markgraf, 95 F.3d 936 (10th Cir. 1996), where a company’s check went straight to its principal’s judgment creditors. The creditors were initial transferees, and the principal was “liable as the person for whose benefit the transfer was made.” If the company pays the owner’s creditor directly, the creditor is the initial transferee and the owner is the beneficiary. If the company pays the owner and he pays the creditor, the owner is the initial transferee. Neither gets the good-faith defense § 550(b) gives later transferees, and § 550(d) limits the estate to one recovery.

    What does United States v. Miller mean for 544(b) claims against the IRS in Colorado?

    Miller began in a Utah bankruptcy, inside the Tenth Circuit. A trustee sued the United States over 2014 payments a transportation company made on two principals’ personal income taxes. The payments were too old for § 548, so the trustee used 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1), which reaches transfers “voidable under applicable law by a creditor holding an unsecured claim,” with Utah law supplying the claim. The Tenth Circuit agreed in Miller v. United States (In re All Resort Group, Inc.), 71 F.4th 1247 (10th Cir. 2023). Until March 2025, a Colorado trustee could do the same with Colorado’s statute.

    That door is closed. On March 26, 2025, the Supreme Court reversed 8 to 1 in an opinion by Justice Jackson, with Justice Gorsuch dissenting alone. United States v. Miller, 604 U.S. ___, 145 S. Ct. 839 (2025). Section 106(a)(1) lifts the government’s immunity for claims under listed Code sections, including §§ 544, 548 and 550. Section 106(a)(5) says it creates no claim that would not otherwise exist. Outside bankruptcy no Colorado creditor could sue the IRS under state law, so neither can a § 544(b) trustee.

    Two points get lost. Section 548 has no state claim inside it, so a trustee suing the IRS within its two-year window is unaffected. And Miller shields the IRS, not the owner. The Court declined to decide whether a creditor could void such payments “by suing the two shareholders who orchestrated those payments,” leaving that for remand. The Tenth Circuit remanded in an unpublished order on May 1, 2025, and I found no ruling on that theory. Whether the IRS can be the triggering creditor is covered in our post on defending a fraudulent transfer complaint in Colorado.

    Company Paid Your Personal Taxes? Contact Us Now

    How far back can a bankruptcy trustee recover a tax payment in Colorado?

    Section 548(a)(1) reaches transfers within two years before the petition. Under § 548(a)(1)(B), the trustee shows the company got less than reasonably equivalent value while insolvent or thinly capitalized. Value is usually missing: § 548(d)(2)(A) counts paying a debt “of the debtor,” and the tax was the owner’s. The owner has no immunity to raise.

    Past two years, the trustee needs Colorado law. Senate Bill 25-133 renamed the Colorado Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act the Colorado Voidable Transactions Act for claims filed after August 2025, keeping the section numbers. C.R.S. § 38-8-105(1)(b) and § 38-8-106(1) cover transfers without reasonably equivalent value by an undercapitalized or insolvent debtor. C.R.S. § 38-8-110 allows four years after the transfer; an actual-intent claim under § 38-8-105(1)(a) gets four years or, if later, one year after discovery. An unpaid fuel supplier can serve as the triggering creditor, and § 38-8-109(2) permits judgment against “the person for whose benefit the transfer was made.”

    The catch: aiming § 544(b) at the owner while the IRS keeps the money is the theory Miller left open, and I found no Tenth Circuit, Tenth Circuit BAP, or District of Colorado decision on it. The trustee must also sue within § 546(a), generally two years after the order for relief.

    Does it matter whether the books call it a distribution, a loan, or wages?

    A great deal. For tax purposes the payment went to the owner; in a C corporation that is usually a constructive dividend under 26 U.S.C. § 301(c). In an S corporation, including an LLC that elected S status, it is a § 1368 distribution, tax-free up to stock basis and reducing basis under § 1367(a)(2)(A).

    With several owners, an S corporation must keep one class of stock under 26 U.S.C. § 1361(b)(1)(D). Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-1(l)(2)(i) looks to the governing documents, so one owner’s payment does not by itself create a second class, though uneven distributions still get “appropriate tax effect.” Colorado LLC distributions raise separate issues, covered in our post on LLC member distributions and the trustee.

    The ledger shapes the bankruptcy fight too. Booked as a loan, the payment may need no avoidance; a matured receivable must be paid to the trustee under 11 U.S.C. § 542(b). If it repaid money the company owed the owner, it can be an insider preference within a year under § 547(b)(4)(B). Repaying the estate does not reopen the earlier return; I usually see the repayment treated as a contribution restoring basis.

    How would this play out for a Greeley trucking LLC in Chapter 7?

    Illustrative only. A Greeley trucking LLC taxed as an S corporation has one member. On April 14, 2025, with fuel bills past due, the company wires $62,000 to the IRS for his 2024 balance. It files Chapter 7 in the District of Colorado on September 15, 2026. If his basis covered $62,000, the distribution was not taxed again.

    The wire is 17 months old, inside § 548’s window. The trustee may sue the IRS under §§ 548 and 550(a)(1), or sue the member as beneficiary. If the IRS pays the estate, I would expect it to treat his 2024 balance as unpaid again, so the cost lands on him either way. The trustee generally has until September 15, 2028 to file.

    Move the wire to March 10, 2024, outside § 548. The Colorado period runs to March 10, 2028, but after Miller it cannot be used against the IRS, and suing the member depends on the beneficiary theory holding up. Had the money passed through his own account first, he would be the initial transferee, and a state-law claim against him would be routine.

    Can I discharge what I owe the trustee, and are payroll taxes different?

    If the member files his own case, the 2024 tax was paid. What remains is the estate’s claim, dischargeable unless a creditor or the trustee proves an exception under § 523(a)(4) (embezzlement or larceny), § 523(a)(6) (willful and malicious injury), or § 523(a)(2)(A), which Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581 (2016), read to reach fraudulent conveyance schemes. Under § 523(c)(1) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007(c), that complaint is due 60 days after the first date set for the meeting of creditors.

    Payroll taxes differ. A company paying its own withheld payroll taxes pays its own debt, leaving no personal benefit to claw back. The owner’s real exposure is the trust fund recovery penalty in 26 U.S.C. § 6672(a), equal to the unpaid tax, imposed on a responsible person who willfully fails to pay it over.

    How the money moved Who the trustee can pursue Time limit Effect of Miller
    Company wired the IRS within two years The IRS or the owner, one recovery § 548: two years None
    Company wired the IRS two to four years before Owner, if the beneficiary theory holds C.R.S. § 38-8-110: four years Bars the claim against the IRS
    Company paid the owner, who paid the IRS Owner as initial transferee Two or four years Largely irrelevant
    Company’s own payroll taxes No clawback; IRS may assess § 6672 IRS assessment rules None

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Can a trustee make the IRS return a tax payment my company made for me?

    Within two years before the petition, possibly, under § 548. For older payments that rest on Colorado law, Miller says no.

    Does Miller protect me as the business owner?

    No, it protects the IRS. The owner can still face a § 548 claim, and possibly a state-law claim on the theory Miller left open.

    Did Colorado change its fraudulent transfer law in 2025?

    Yes. Senate Bill 25-133 renamed it the Colorado Voidable Transactions Act. The four-year periods and the one-year discovery rule for actual-intent claims remain.

    Is a company paying my personal taxes taxable to me?

    It is treated as a payment to you. In an S corporation it is a distribution taxed only above basis; in a C corporation it is usually a constructive dividend.

    Can I discharge a trustee’s judgment in my own bankruptcy?

    Generally yes. A creditor or the trustee must prove an exception, such as embezzlement or actual fraud, in a complaint filed within 60 days after the first date set for the creditors’ meeting.

    Has Congress changed the law after Miller?

    Not as of October 16, 2026. Section 106 has not been amended since 2010, and I found no bill to change the result.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm represents Colorado business owners in Chapter 7 cases, clawback defense, and IRS disputes after a company fails. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    The books from that year will shape your defense. If a trustee has asked about that payment, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Colorado Tax Court Place of Trial: Denver, Albuquerque, or Remote After the 2026 Changes

    Colorado Tax Court Place of Trial: Denver, Albuquerque, or Remote After the 2026 Changes

    A Durango outfitter who runs fall elk hunts opens a notice of deficiency in October: $38,000 of additional 2024 income tax, plus a penalty. She wants to fight it in the U.S. Tax Court, and the petition asks something unexpected. Where should the trial be held? Her instinct says Denver, about 335 road miles away. Albuquerque is more than a hundred miles closer.

    The Tax Court reworked its trial locations on September 8, 2026. For a La Plata or Montezuma County taxpayer, the city, the small-or-regular choice and a remote trial now get weighed together, before filing.

    Where is a Colorado Tax Court case tried, and do I have to choose Denver?

    Denver is Colorado’s only Tax Court place of trial. The court’s places of trial list puts the courtroom in the Byron Rogers Federal Building, 1961 Stout Street, Room C502. Albuquerque and Salt Lake City are places of trial too, with “no permanent courtroom.”

    Under Tax Court Rule 140(a), a petitioner files a separate request for place of trial with the petition. On paper that is Form 5, revised in September 2026: “You may choose any location that is convenient to you.” Residence does not limit the choice. In DAWSON, the court’s e-filing system, it is step 4 of the petition process, “Case Procedure and Trial Location,” with a city dropdown.

    All of this happens inside the 90 days after the notice is mailed under 26 U.S.C. § 6213(a); a related post covers a missed Tax Court 90-day deadline in Colorado. The city can change later. Rule 140(b) allows a motion to change the place of trial “stating fully the reasons therefor,” but one filed after the notice setting the case for trial “may be deemed dilatory” unless the reason arose later or there was good reason to wait.

    What changed in the Tax Court trial locations in 2026?

    The September 8, 2026 announcement added Austin, Charlotte, Newark, Orlando and Sacramento, “bringing the total to 79.” It also opened every city to regular cases, which “eliminates the restriction on certain trial locations, which could be designated solely for small tax cases.” The announcement does not name those cities, and the court’s definitions page still says S-case trials are held in “several additional cities.”

    The change I would watch is the pilot. Beginning “no earlier than for the Fall 2027 term,” the court may put cases on a “reporting calendar.” Instead of a trial date, it “will assign a judge and issue a standing scheduling order governing pretrial proceedings,” with trial dates set “if necessary.” Traditional calendars continue.

    Can a Durango or Cortez taxpayer be tried in Albuquerque or Salt Lake City?

    Yes. By my estimates from OpenStreetMap routing (not court figures), Durango is about 216 road miles from Albuquerque and 335 from the Denver courthouse. Cortez is roughly 253 from Albuquerque, 348 from Salt Lake City and 379 from Denver. Western Slope readers should not assume Utah wins: Grand Junction and Montrose are both closer to Denver than to Salt Lake City.

    Frequency matters as much as miles. Across the five posted terms, Fall 2025 through Winter 2027, Albuquerque has one session, the week of May 4, 2026. Salt Lake City has three. Denver has five, including a November 2025 session canceled in the government shutdown. A city that rarely sits can mean a longer wait for trial.

    The trial city does not move your appeal. Under 26 U.S.C. § 7482(b)(1)(A), an individual appeals in the circuit of legal residence, fixed when the petition is filed, so a Coloradan goes to the Tenth Circuit (New Mexico and Utah sit there anyway under 28 U.S.C. § 41). The Tax Court therefore applies Tenth Circuit law. Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), aff’d, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971), follows an appellate decision “squarely in point where appeal from our decision lies to that Court of Appeals.” Golsen itself applied a Tenth Circuit decision.

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    Should a Colorado taxpayer elect a small tax case under $50,000?

    26 U.S.C. § 7463(a) allows small tax case procedure when the disputed deficiency stays within “$50,000 for any one taxable year” for income tax, and § 7463(e) counts penalties and additions to tax. Rules 170 through 174 supply the procedure; under Rule 174(b) trials run “as informally as possible.” Rule 172 lets a petitioner appear alone or with any admitted practitioner, such as a Colorado Tax Court attorney.

    The price is finality. An S decision “shall not be reviewed in any other court” and “shall not be treated as a precedent for any other case,” per § 7463(b). The IRS cannot appeal your win either.

    You elect by checking the small-case box on the petition form or in DAWSON; leave it blank and the case is regular. Rule 171(c) permits a request any time before trial, and the IRS may oppose. Leaving is harder. Before trial, Rule 171(d) lets the court remove the designation on its own or on motion; afterward, § 7463(d) allows discontinuance only on reasonable grounds to believe the amount exceeds the limit.

    Think twice when the case turns on law rather than receipts. Favorable Tenth Circuit precedent does its work through Golsen in a regular case, and an open question can be won on appeal only in a regular case. I see S cases fit best where the fight is substantiation: mileage logs, cash receipts, who paid for what.

    When does the Tax Court grant a remote trial?

    The court holds trials and hearings by Zoomgov under the same rules of decorum, and recording is prohibited. A party asks by filing a Motion to Proceed Remotely, due 31 days before the session under the court’s sample standing pretrial order.

    I have not found a published standard for granting it. The form shows what the judge weighs: reasons such as “distance from Courthouse, job/ caregiver constraints, health concerns,” whether everyone has a camera-equipped computer, and whether the other side objects. Each term also lists dedicated remote sessions, in Winter 2027 the weeks of March 8 (small) and March 22 (regular). Still, when credibility is the whole case or the judge needs original logbooks, the drive can be worth it.

    What happens at a Tax Court Denver trial session?

    The court’s trial session schedules show Denver sessions the weeks of February 2, April 6 (a swing session with Cheyenne) and June 15, 2026, none in Fall 2026, and a regular calendar the week of February 8, 2027. Spring 2027 was not posted when I checked on October 16, 2026.

    Under Rule 131(b), the trial notice comes with a standing pretrial order. The sample order counts back from opening day: pretrial memoranda at 21 days and the stipulation of facts at 14, with continuances sought by day 31 and granted “only in exceptional circumstances.” An expert’s report in a regular case needs a motion for leave 30 days out; a related post covers expert witnesses at the Denver trial session.

    Rule 91(a) requires stipulation “to the fullest extent to which complete or qualified agreement can or fairly should be reached.” I treat that stipulation as where the case gets built. The session opens with the calendar call under Rule 131(c), normally on Monday, when parties estimate trial time and cases are then tried “in due course, but not necessarily in the order listed.”

    Illustrative example (hypothetical facts): the outfitter’s notice shows a $38,000 deficiency plus a $7,600 accuracy-related penalty, 20 percent under 26 U.S.C. § 6662(a). With $45,600 in dispute for one year, an S case is available. Most of it is documented camp and livestock expenses; one smaller item turns on how a multi-year federal permit fee is deducted. An S case in Albuquerque saves about 120 miles each way, but it is final, and that city sat once in five terms. A regular case in Denver keeps a Tenth Circuit appeal. A remote motion saves the drive but puts her credibility on a screen. If the permit-fee point will recur, I would lean regular; if the fight is receipts, an S case with a remote request deserves a hard look.

    Option Miles from Durango Posted sessions, Fall 2025 to Winter 2027 Appeal Fits best when
    S case, Albuquerque About 216 One None; not precedent The dispute is documents and receipts
    Regular case, Denver About 335 Five, one canceled Tenth Circuit A legal question is worth preserving
    Either procedure, Salt Lake City About 393 (348 from Cortez) Three Tenth Circuit if regular A Cortez filer wants to avoid Denver
    Remote (Zoomgov) None Remote sessions each term Follows the procedure elected Distance or a busy season

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Do I have to live near the city I choose for my Tax Court trial?

    No. Form 5 says you may choose any location that is convenient to you. Your appeal still follows your legal residence.

    Can I change my Tax Court place of trial after filing?

    Yes, by a Rule 140(b) motion that states your reasons fully. File it before the notice setting the case for trial if you can, because a later motion may be treated as dilatory.

    Does the $50,000 small tax case limit include penalties?

    Yes. Section 7463(e) counts penalties and additions to tax as part of the deficiency in dispute, and for income tax the limit applies per taxable year.

    Can the IRS appeal if I win a small tax case?

    No. A decision under § 7463 cannot be reviewed in any other court, so neither side can appeal, and it is not precedent for other cases.

    When does the Tax Court reporting calendar pilot start?

    No earlier than the Fall 2027 term. Those cases get an assigned judge and a standing scheduling order instead of a trial date.

    If my Colorado case is tried in Salt Lake City, which court hears the appeal?

    The Tenth Circuit, because § 7482(b)(1)(A) looks to legal residence when the petition is filed. The trial city does not control it.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm represents Colorado taxpayers and their businesses in Tax Court litigation, IRS audit defense, penalty abatement, and IRS Appeals. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    The city and the S-or-regular choice are made in the petition, inside the 90-day window. If a notice of deficiency just reached you in southwest Colorado, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Form 872 in Colorado: Should You Sign the IRS Statute Extension After Fine?

    Form 872 in Colorado: Should You Sign the IRS Statute Extension After Fine?

    An S corporation owner in Colorado Springs has been under IRS examination for most of a year on her 2023 return. In October the revenue agent emails her a Form 872, Consent to Extend the Time to Assess Tax: the statute runs in April, the work is not done, and a signature by month’s end would help. Her bookkeeper says everyone signs these. Her business partner says never sign anything the IRS mails you. Each of them is half right.

    A Tax Court opinion from September raises the stakes, because it holds that the fixed-date form has no early exit once signed. Here is how I walk a Colorado client through the choice.

    Should I sign the Form 872 my IRS agent in Colorado sent me?

    Under 26 U.S.C. § 6501(a), the IRS must assess tax within three years after the return was filed. For an income tax deficiency, assessment generally waits until a notice of deficiency has gone out and the 90-day window to petition the Tax Court under 26 U.S.C. § 6213(a) has run, so agents ask months ahead.

    Section 6501(c)(4)(A) allows an extension when “both the Secretary and the taxpayer have consented in writing” before the period expires, and later written agreements can extend it again. Section 6501(c)(4)(B) requires the IRS, “on each occasion” it asks, to tell the taxpayer of the right to refuse, or to limit the extension “to particular issues or to a particular period of time.” IRM 25.6.22.3 says those rights are printed on Form 872 itself.

    Signing admits nothing about the tax. It keeps the case with the agent, where many audits resolve, and gives up your power to force a decision. I first ask whether the date can be earlier than the one typed in and whether the consent can be restricted. A restricted consent keeps the year open only for listed issues and lets the statute run on the rest. Under IRM 25.6.22.8.1, though, the taxpayer only has a right to request one; IRM 25.6.22.8.2 says the IRS generally agrees when the open issues can be described precisely and everything else is settled.

    What happens if I refuse to extend the IRS statute of limitations during an audit?

    Expect a notice of deficiency before the deadline, built on whatever is in the file. Mailing it suspends the assessment period under 26 U.S.C. § 6503(a)(1) for the 90-day petition window and, if you petition, until the Tax Court decision becomes final, plus 60 days. Refusing does not close the year; an earlier post compares Tax Court, a refund suit, and bankruptcy for a Colorado notice of deficiency.

    The quieter cost is Appeals. Under IRM 8.21.3.2.1, the IRS Independent Office of Appeals “will not accept a proposed deficiency case” when fewer than 365 days remain on the statute. Appeals is not lost entirely, though: under Rev. Proc. 2016-22, § 3.01, IRS Counsel generally refers a docketed Tax Court case to Appeals unless Appeals issued the notice. You just negotiate with a petition on file and a trial calendar ahead.

    So refusal is a tactic. I consider it when the agent’s theory is thin and our documents are already in the file; when the agent has not seen the records that would win the case, it usually hurts.

    IRS Asking You to Sign Form 872? Contact Us Now

    Can a Form 872-T end a Form 872 early?

    No, under Fine v. Commissioner, 167 T.C. No. 13 (Sept. 30, 2026). The taxpayers had signed Forms 872 extending 2015 (twice, finally to December 31, 2021) and 2016 (to June 30, 2021). After Appeals talks failed, their lawyer faxed Forms 872-T on September 11, 2020, checking the form’s only box, which is for a Form 872-A. The IRS mailed notices dated April 15, 2021, long after 90 days from the fax but inside the agreed dates.

    Granting the IRS partial summary judgment, Judge Ashford explained that Form 872 runs to a stated date. Form 872-A runs indefinitely and ends 90 days after an event printed on it, such as the IRS getting a Form 872-T from the taxpayer. Form 872-T names only Form 872-A; Form 872, for its part, never mentions Form 872-T. The court tied that design to § 6501(c)(4)(B): the protection is the right to limit or refuse each request, not a unilateral exit later. In its words, “only the passage of time can terminate Form 872.” The order issued October 5, 2026; the merits are still pending, so no appeal is possible yet.

    In Grunwald v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 85 (1986), an Appeals officer’s letter warning that a notice was coming did not end a Form 872-A, because only the termination form or an actual notice could. Fine borrows its line: “A deal is after all a deal.”

    Has the Tenth Circuit decided a Form 872 or Form 872-A case?

    On the open-ended form, yes. In Wall v. Commissioner, 875 F.2d 812 (10th Cir. 1989), the taxpayer signed a Form 872-A in 1980 and received a notice in late 1985. Rejecting his argument that the consent lapsed after a reasonable time, the court followed Estate of Camara v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 957 (1988), and noted that Form 872-A “provides a simple and effective method of terminating the waiver by requiring the use of Form 872-T.” Wall never filed one. The court left room for an “egregious case,” such as twenty years with no IRS contact.

    I found no Tenth Circuit decision on the Fine question. A Colorado individual’s case would be appealable there under 26 U.S.C. § 7482(b)(1)(A), and under Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), aff’d, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971), the Tax Court defers only to circuit precedent squarely on point. With none, a Colorado taxpayer gets Fine, and Wall‘s insistence on the exit printed on the form points the same way.

    How do you calculate the IRS assessment statute of limitations on a Colorado return?

    Under § 6501(b)(1), an early return counts as filed on the due date. The period stretches to six years if the return omits gross income exceeding 25 percent of the gross income it reports (§ 6501(e)(1)(A)). A fraudulent return filed to evade tax, or no return, has no limit under § 6501(c)(1) and (c)(3); a separate post covers the fraud exception when a preparer did the cheating. For an S corporation owner, the clock on her personal tax runs from her own Form 1040, not the corporation’s return. Bufferd v. Commissioner, 506 U.S. 523 (1993).

    Illustrative example (hypothetical facts). Our Colorado Springs owner files her 2023 Form 1040 on April 8, 2024. It is treated as filed on the April 15, 2024 due date, so the § 6501(a) period ends April 15, 2027. On October 16, 2026, 181 days remain, too few for Appeals. In November she signs a Form 872 extending the period to December 31, 2027. Under Fine, a later Form 872-T changes nothing. Had she signed a Form 872-A instead, and the IRS office handling her case received her Form 872-T on March 3, 2027, the IRS would have through June 1, 2027, the 90th day, to assess or mail a notice. A notice in that window starts the § 6503(a) suspension.

    Does a federal Form 872 keep the Colorado tax year open too?

    It appears so. Under C.R.S. § 39-21-107(2), Colorado must assess income tax “within one year after the expiration of the time provided for assessing a deficiency in federal income tax.” Because the state date is keyed to the federal one, a federal consent should move Colorado’s date too; in the example, from April 15, 2028 to December 31, 2028.

    The federal result must also be reported. C.R.S. § 39-22-601.5(2) requires a federal adjustments report, with payment, within 180 days after the final determination date. If it is timely, subsection (5)(a) gives the Department of Revenue until the later of the § 39-21-107(2) date or one year after filing. If it is skipped or understated, (5)(b) adds an outer date six years after the final determination date, absent fraud.

    Choice When the extra time ends Taxpayer’s early exit Appeals before a notice
    Form 872 (fixed date) The date on the form None; Form 872-T does not work (Fine) Available if 365 days remain
    Form 872-A (open-ended) 90 days after an event printed on the form Form 872-T, counted from IRS receipt Available
    Restricted consent The agreed date, for listed issues only Same as the form used Available for listed issues
    Refuse to sign Original § 6501 date, then suspended by a notice Not needed Usually lost; docketed referral possible

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Does signing Form 872 mean I agree with the IRS adjustments?

    No. A Form 872 only gives the IRS more time. You keep every argument on the merits, including the right to petition the Tax Court.

    Can I send Form 872-T to cancel a fixed-date Form 872?

    Not under Fine v. Commissioner. The Tax Court held that only the passage of time ends a Form 872, and the Tenth Circuit has not said otherwise.

    How long does the IRS have after it receives my Form 872-T on a Form 872-A?

    Ninety days after the IRS office considering the case receives it. A letter or phone call does not count, so keep proof of delivery.

    Will IRS Appeals take my case if the statute is close to expiring?

    Generally not before a notice if fewer than 365 days remain. After a Tax Court petition, IRS Counsel usually refers the case to Appeals unless Appeals issued the notice.

    Does extending the federal statute also extend Colorado’s?

    Colorado’s income tax period ends one year after the federal period, so a federal extension appears to carry Colorado along. A final federal change also triggers a Colorado report within 180 days.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm represents Colorado taxpayers and their businesses in IRS audit defense, including consent negotiations, IRS Appeals, Tax Court litigation, and the Colorado follow-on to a federal change. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    The terms of a consent are easiest to shape before anyone signs. If an agent has asked you for a Form 872 or Form 872-A, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • LLC vs S Corp vs C Corp in Colorado: The 2026 Tax Math for Business Owners

    LLC vs S Corp vs C Corp in Colorado: The 2026 Tax Math for Business Owners

    Two partners run a commercial heating and air conditioning company in Castle Rock. They formed a Colorado LLC in 2021, and this year the business will clear $400,000 before either takes a paycheck. A brother-in-law says they should have been an S corporation years ago; their banker likes the 21 percent corporate rate.

    Colorado is the easy part. Federal rules drive most of the answer, and owners rarely hear how each choice looks to an IRS examiner or a bankruptcy trustee.

    How does Colorado tax each business entity, and is the SALT parity election still worth making?

    Colorado taxes individuals at a flat 4.40 percent of federal taxable income under C.R.S. § 39-22-104(1.7)(c) and C corporations at 4.40 percent under C.R.S. § 39-22-301. The temporary TABOR cut in C.R.S. § 39-22-627 applies only after a refundable surplus, and fiscal year 2025-26 had none: the Legislative Council’s September 2026 forecast puts revenue $175.9 million under the cap, so 2026 stays at 4.40 percent.

    Colorado adds no franchise tax or gross receipts tax. The Colorado Limited Liability Company Act governs formation, but the label does not set the tax. A two-member LLC is a partnership by default under Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(1), and because Colorado starts from the federal return, the federal choice carries through. Colorado honors the S election. An S corporation with nonresident shareholders files a composite return and pays for them at the top rate under C.R.S. § 39-22-601(2.7)(d).

    The SALT Parity Act lets a partnership or S corporation pay the 4.40 percent itself (C.R.S. § 39-22-343), and each owner takes a refundable credit for its share under C.R.S. § 39-22-347. The annual election binds every owner and is made on the DR 0106 or DR 1705; the Department’s 2026 forms still offer it. The entity deducts the payment federally under Notice 2020-75, outside any owner’s cap.

    Since July 2025, 26 U.S.C. § 164(b)(7) sets the individual SALT cap at $40,400 for 2026, reduced by 30 percent of modified AGI above $505,000 but never below $10,000, with a return to $10,000 after 2029. Section 39-22-343(2) allows the election only while a federal cap exists, so it survives. Owners taking the standard deduction get nothing from the higher cap, so for them the entity-level deduction is pure savings. Owners with federal AGI over $500,000 ($1,000,000 joint) also add back their § 199A deduction under C.R.S. § 39-22-104(3)(o), made permanent by HB 25B-1001, as I explained in Colorado’s permanent QBI addback.

    LLC vs S corp in Colorado: where do the tax savings come from?

    Mostly from payroll tax. A working member of a multi-member LLC generally owes self-employment tax under 26 U.S.C. § 1402(a) on the whole share: 12.4 percent up to the 2026 wage base of $184,500, plus 2.9 percent Medicare without a ceiling (26 U.S.C. § 1401). An S corporation shareholder’s profit share is not self-employment income under Rev. Rul. 59-221, 1959-1 C.B. 225, which the Ninth Circuit applied in Durando v. United States, 70 F.3d 548 (9th Cir. 1995). Only wages carry FICA.

    The price is a reasonable salary. In David E. Watson, P.C. v. United States, 668 F.3d 1008 (8th Cir. 2012), a CPA paid himself $24,000 a year and took the rest as distributions; the court upheld treating $91,044 a year as wages. The IRS says it may reclassify distributions to the extent the owner’s own work produces the receipts. I found no Tenth Circuit decision on point.

    LLC members sometimes cite the limited partner exclusion in § 1402(a)(13). Sirius Solutions, L.L.L.P. v. Commissioner, No. 24-60240 (5th Cir. Jan. 16, 2026), read it broadly, but only for state-law limited partnerships, and it expressly left LLC members undecided. A Colorado member who runs the business should expect the tax.

    When does a C corporation beat an S corporation for a Colorado business?

    The 21 percent rate in 26 U.S.C. § 11(b) looks cheap until profit leaves. Dividends are taxed again under 26 U.S.C. § 1(h)(11), plus 3.8 percent under 26 U.S.C. § 1411 above $250,000 of joint modified AGI. Pass-through owners keep the 20 percent deduction in 26 U.S.C. § 199A, now permanent with a $150,000 joint phase-in range. Retaining profit defers the second tax, but past the $250,000 credit in § 535(c) the IRS can assert the 20 percent accumulated earnings tax in 26 U.S.C. § 531.

    The C corporation’s trump card is 26 U.S.C. § 1202. Stock issued after July 4, 2025 can exclude 50, 75 or 100 percent of gain after three, four or five years, capped at the greater of $15 million or ten times basis, if gross assets were $75 million or less at issuance. Section 1202(e)(3) excludes health, law, accounting, consulting and other service fields, so a Castle Rock HVAC contractor can qualify and a Greeley accounting practice cannot. The post on gifting qualified small business stock covers how the exclusion moves with the shares.

    What mistakes cost a Colorado company its S corporation status, and can they be fixed?

    26 U.S.C. § 1361(b)(1) allows at most 100 shareholders and one class of stock, and bars nonresident alien and most entity owners. I see them tested by distributions out of proportion to shares and by stock moved into an LLC or an unreviewed trust. A breach ends the election that day under 26 U.S.C. § 1362(d)(2), and § 1362(g) bars a new one for five years without IRS consent. Section 1362(f) can cure inadvertent terminations.

    A missed deadline is more forgiving. The election is due by the 15th day of the third month of the tax year under § 1362(b), but Rev. Proc. 2013-30 grants relief within three years and 75 days with a reasonable-cause statement. An LLC files Form 2553 alone, since a timely S election is a deemed classification election under Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(c)(1)(v)(C).

    Converting a C corporation carries a cost: 26 U.S.C. § 1374 taxes built-in gain at 21 percent on assets sold within five years. Existing S corporations that restructure often use an F reorganization, a “mere change in identity, form, or place of organization” under 26 U.S.C. § 368(a)(1)(F), to keep the election.

    Which entity choices draw IRS exams, and what happens if the business fails?

    An S corporation paying its owner little or nothing is the pattern I see turn into an employment tax exam most reliably. LLC exams ask whether a member’s draws are really guaranteed payments. C corporations get the mirror image: the IRS says the salary is too high and part is a dividend, not the “reasonable allowance for salaries” that 26 U.S.C. § 162(a)(1) allows.

    No entity shields anyone from the trust fund recovery penalty. Under 26 U.S.C. § 6672, a responsible person who willfully fails to pay over withheld payroll tax owes it personally, and the Tenth Circuit treats reckless disregard as willful (Finley v. United States, 123 F.3d 1342 (10th Cir. 1997) (en banc)). Personal guaranties survive any entity form.

    In bankruptcy, Owoc v. Liquidating Trustee, No. 24-14048 (11th Cir. Aug. 10, 2026), held that a corporate debtor’s S election is not estate property, following In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d 736 (3d Cir. 2013). The Tenth Circuit has not ruled; I covered the sale consequences in Colorado S corporation bankruptcy after Owoc.

    What do the numbers look like for a Castle Rock business earning $400,000?

    Illustrative only: two equal owners, 2026, $400,000 of profit before owner pay, all Colorado income. Each owner files jointly, has no other household income, and takes the $32,200 standard deduction. I used the brackets in Rev. Proc. 2025-32 and ignored unemployment insurance, FAMLI premiums and retirement plans.

    As a default LLC, each owner reports $200,000 and pays about $28,234 of self-employment tax. As an S corporation paying each owner $75,000, assumed reasonable, the company passes about $119,263 to each owner. As a C corporation with the same salaries, it owes $10,495 to Colorado and $47,886 federal, then distributes half of the $180,144 left. Those dividends fall in the 0 percent bracket here, which flatters the C corporation, and $90,072 stays inside, still facing a second tax.

    The S corporation saves about $25,000 over the LLC, and the parity election adds about $1,750. A higher salary shrinks that gap, so the salary must be defensible before it is efficient.

    Structure (illustrative, both owners) Federal income tax SE tax or FICA Colorado tax Total 2026
    Default LLC (partnership) $32,944 $56,469 $10,820 $100,232
    S corporation, $150,000 total salaries $39,660 $22,950 $12,162 $74,773
    S corporation plus SALT parity election $37,814 $22,950 $12,255 $73,018
    C corporation, same salaries, half distributed $57,166 $22,950 $18,225 $98,341, plus later tax on $90,072 retained

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Is an S corporation better than an LLC for a Colorado business?

    Not automatically. The S election saves payroll tax only on profit above a reasonable salary, so it pays once profit comfortably exceeds what the owners must be paid.

    What is Colorado’s business income tax rate for 2026?

    It is 4.40 percent for individuals, including pass-through owners, and for C corporations. No TABOR reduction applies because fiscal year 2025-26 had no surplus.

    Can a Colorado LLC be taxed as an S corporation?

    Yes. The LLC files Form 2553, which also counts as its election to be classified as a corporation. It stays an LLC under Colorado law.

    Does the SALT parity election in Colorado still make sense after the federal cap increase?

    For most owners, yes. Owners who take the standard deduction get nothing from the $40,400 cap, while the entity-level deduction under Notice 2020-75 sits outside the cap.

    What if we missed the S corporation election deadline?

    Rev. Proc. 2013-30 allows late relief within three years and 75 days of the intended effective date if there was reasonable cause. The company files Form 2553 with the required statements.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm advises Colorado owners on business entity selection and Colorado state tax elections, and handles the reasonable-compensation and payroll tax disputes that follow through IRS audit defense. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    Entity elections are easiest to change before the year closes. If you are weighing an S election, a parity election or a conversion for 2027, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Gifting QSBS in Colorado: Section 1202 Gifts to Children and Trusts After the OBBBA

    Gifting QSBS in Colorado: Section 1202 Gifts to Children and Trusts After the OBBBA

    A Fort Collins software founder closes a seed round in early 2026, and her C corporation issues her common stock for $50,000. A buyer may pay $30 million for those shares around 2031. Her corporate lawyer built the company to qualify under section 1202. What she asks a Colorado tax attorney is who should own the stock on the day it sells: her, her two grown children, or trusts for them.

    Colorado makes that decision cleaner than it would be on the West Coast. Here is how the pieces fit when everyone involved lives here.

    Does Colorado capital gains tax apply to QSBS gain that section 1202 excludes?

    No, if the gain is excluded federally. Colorado taxes “federal taxable income, as determined pursuant to section 63 of the internal revenue code” at a flat rate under C.R.S. § 39-22-104(1.7)(c). Excluded gain never reaches that figure. I found no QSBS addback in § 39-22-104(3) or on the 2025 Form DR 0104; Colorado’s high-earner addback targets the qualified business income deduction instead (see Colorado’s permanent QBI addback).

    The 2026 rate is 4.40 percent, because the TABOR rate cut in C.R.S. § 39-22-627 requires a refund obligation and the Legislative Council’s September 2026 forecast reports fiscal year 2025-26 revenue $175.9 million under the cap. Colorado’s own capital gain subtraction, C.R.S. § 39-22-518, has reached only certain agricultural land held by Schedule F filers since 2022, so it plays no role.

    California is the opposite. Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 18152 says section 1202 “does not apply.” The state’s own exclusion in § 18152.5 fell apart after Cutler v. Franchise Tax Board, 208 Cal. App. 4th 1247 (2012), struck its in-state conditions, and it expired on January 1, 2016.

    What did the One Big Beautiful Bill Act change in the QSBS rules?

    Pub. L. 119-21, signed July 4, 2025, rewrote the exclusion for later-acquired stock. Under 26 U.S.C. § 1202(a)(1)(B) and (a)(5), half the gain is excluded after three years and all of it after five, with a 75 percent step at four. The per-issuer cap in § 1202(b)(4)(B) is $15 million for newer stock, up from $10 million, indexed under § 1202(b)(5) for taxable years beginning after 2026. The gross-asset ceiling in § 1202(d)(1) rose to $75 million for stock issued after enactment.

    The cap belongs to each taxpayer, which is why gifts matter at all. The partial tiers carry a cost: at three or four years, the unexcluded part of capped gain is “section 1202 gain,” taxed at up to 28 percent under 26 U.S.C. § 1(h)(4) and (h)(7). Married founders should plan on one shared cap, since § 1202(b)(3) gives a spouse filing separately half.

    What carries over in a qualified small business stock gift?

    Section 1202(h)(1) and (h)(2)(A) let a donee step into the donor’s shoes on how the shares were acquired and how long they were held. That satisfies the original-issue rule in § 1202(c)(1)(B). Basis is separate: the child or trust takes the founder’s basis under 26 U.S.C. § 1015(a), and 26 U.S.C. § 1223(2) tacks the holding period too. Founder basis is usually tiny, so the ten-times-basis alternative in § 1202(b)(1)(B) rarely helps a donee.

    A gift does not cure defects, and redemptions are where I see founders get hurt. Under § 1202(c)(3)(A), a buyback from the holder or a related person in a four-year window starting two years before issuance disqualifies the stock unless it is de minimis under Treas. Reg. § 1.1202-2(a) ($10,000 or less, or 2 percent or less). “Related” uses 26 U.S.C. § 267(b), which reaches children and a grantor’s own trustee. Buying out a child’s trust soon after issuance can taint the founder’s shares.

    Colorado adds nothing to the gift’s cost. It has no gift tax, and its estate tax under C.R.S. § 39-23.5-103 equals a federal credit that ended for deaths after 2004. Rev. Proc. 2025-32 puts the 2026 federal annual exclusion at $19,000 per donee and the basic exclusion amount under 26 U.S.C. § 2010(c)(3) at $15 million. Value is fixed on the gift date under 26 U.S.C. § 2512(a), so early gifts use little exemption, and the Form 709 is due the next April 15 under 26 U.S.C. § 6075(b). Spouses should also read our post on portability in Colorado.

    Does a section 1202 gift to a trust multiply the exclusion for a Colorado family?

    Only if the trust is a separate taxpayer. A grantor trust adds nothing; under 26 U.S.C. § 671 its sale lands on the grantor’s return and her cap. A non-grantor trust funded with a completed gift files its own return and has its own $15 million. A trust “administered in this state” is a Colorado resident trust under C.R.S. § 39-22-103(10), and C.R.S. § 39-22-401 starts its Colorado income from federal taxable income. Where the trust is administered matters little for gain under the cap, and much more for gain above it.

    The federal brake is 26 U.S.C. § 643(f) and Treas. Reg. § 1.643(f)-1, final since 2019. Trusts with substantially the same grantor and primary beneficiary are combined when avoiding federal income tax was a principal purpose for creating or funding them, and spouses count as one person. One trust per child is the conventional structure. Four trusts for the same two children invite aggregation.

    Treasury’s 2025-2026 Priority Guidance Plan lists a § 1202 project, and practitioner reports quote a senior Treasury official saying in May 2026 that Treasury does not like stacking. As of early October 2026 I have found no notice or proposed regulation, and no Tenth Circuit or Tax Court decision on trust stacking. A Denver trial would likely turn on § 643(f) facts, chiefly who benefits from each trust and why it was formed.

    What records, rollovers and surtaxes should a Colorado startup founder plan for?

    Qualification gets proved years later, in a buyer’s diligence or an IRS exam. Beyond the cap table and a log of every repurchase, the item most often missing is a balance sheet for each issue date showing gross assets under $75 million, with contributed property at fair market value under § 1202(d)(2). Option-pricing valuations under 26 U.S.C. § 409A help, but a gift appraisal is its own document.

    For an early exit, 26 U.S.C. § 1045(a) lets a noncorporate taxpayer who held QSBS over six months defer gain by buying replacement QSBS within 60 days, and Colorado follows. Under 26 U.S.C. § 1411(c)(1)(A)(iii), the 3.8 percent net investment income tax reaches gain only “to the extent taken into account in computing taxable income,” so excluded gain escapes it and gain over the cap does not.

    How would a $30 million QSBS exit look for a Fort Collins founder?

    Illustrative only. Elena, who is single, buys common stock at original issue in February 2026 for $50,000. In December 2026, with an appraisal valuing each one-third block at $600,000, she either keeps everything or gives a third to each of two adult children (or to two non-grantor trusts run by a Loveland trustee). A buyer pays $30 million in March 2031. I ignore indexing, brackets and other income, and assume the trusts survive § 643(f).

    If Elena sells alone, $15 million is excluded. Federal tax on the rest is about $3.57 million, including $570,000 of net investment income tax, and Colorado adds $660,000. With the gifts, each of three owners has $10 million of gain under the cap, and federal and Colorado tax on the sale is zero whether children or trusts hold the blocks. The gifts use about $1.2 million of exemption. A child living in California, though, owes California tax on her block.

    Move Elena to California and the federal results hold, but California taxes all $30 million in each version, reaching trusts with a California trustee or non-contingent beneficiary under Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 17742(a). At the 12.3 percent top rate plus the 1 percent surcharge in § 17043, that is close to $4.0 million. Those top rates lapse after 2030 unless voters pass Proposition 3 on November 3, 2026. If they lapse, the bill is roughly $3.1 million.

    Illustrative scenario Federal gain excluded Federal tax on the sale Colorado tax State tax if all lived in California
    (a) Elena sells all the stock $15 million About $3.57 million $660,000 About $3.1 to $4.0 million
    (b) Outright gifts to two adult children $30 million $0 $0 About $3.1 to $4.0 million
    (c) Gifts to two Colorado non-grantor trusts $30 million, if § 643(f) does not combine the trusts $0 $0 About $3.1 to $4.0 million

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Does Colorado tax gain that section 1202 excludes?

    No. Colorado starts from federal taxable income and, as of October 2026, has no addback for excluded QSBS gain. Gain above the federal cap is taxed at 4.40 percent for 2026.

    Does gifting QSBS restart the holding period?

    No. Section 1202(h) credits the recipient with the donor’s holding period and manner of acquisition. The recipient also takes the donor’s basis under section 1015.

    Does Colorado have a gift tax on transfers of startup stock?

    No. Colorado has no gift tax and no estate tax for deaths after 2004, so only federal transfer tax applies. For 2026 the annual exclusion is $19,000 per recipient and the basic exclusion amount is $15 million.

    Does a grantor trust get its own $15 million cap?

    No. The grantor reports a grantor trust’s income, so its sale uses the grantor’s cap. Only a separate-taxpayer trust that section 643(f) does not combine with others has its own.

    What if the company sells after three years instead of five?

    For stock acquired after July 4, 2025, half of eligible gain is excluded at three years and 75 percent at four. The unexcluded part of capped gain is taxed federally at up to 28 percent, and Colorado taxes whatever stays in federal taxable income.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm advises founders and trustees on the income tax side of gifting and selling closely held shares, including business sale tax structuring, trust and estate tax planning, and Colorado state tax questions. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    QSBS gifts work best made early, while the stock is still cheap to value. If you hold founder stock in a Colorado company and are weighing gifts to family or trusts, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Colorado 501(c)(3) Revocation: The 90-Day Section 7428 Deadline and Automatic Revocation

    Colorado 501(c)(3) Revocation: The 90-Day Section 7428 Deadline and Automatic Revocation

    The treasurer of a youth ski club in Steamboat Springs signs for a certified IRS letter saying the club no longer qualifies under section 501(c)(3) and the revocation is final. In Durango, a volunteer soccer coach hears from the city that her league shows as “revoked” in the IRS database, though nobody ever audited it.

    Both boards will say their nonprofit lost tax-exempt status. The two problems have different deadlines, and one has no court remedy at all. Start with which letter you are holding.

    Did the IRS revoke your Colorado nonprofit’s 501(c)(3) status, or did the law revoke it automatically?

    A 501(c)(3) revocation in Colorado usually comes one of two ways. The first is an examination that ends in a final adverse determination letter, which opens the door to a court case under 26 U.S.C. § 7428.

    The second is automatic revocation under 26 U.S.C. § 6033(j)(1). If an organization fails to file its Form 990, 990-EZ, or 990-N for three consecutive years, its exemption is “considered revoked” as of the due date of the third missed filing. Section 7428(b)(4) bars any section 7428 action over that kind of revocation, and section 12.02 of Rev. Proc. 2026-5 denies those organizations Appeals consideration. The IRS’s automatic revocation page says the law prohibits it from undoing a proper automatic revocation.

    In my experience the automatic version is far more common in Colorado: a volunteer-run mountain-town club whose treasurer filed the 990-N for years, then moved on. Those boards often hunt for a court remedy they do not have. Their path is reinstatement.

    When does the 90-day section 7428 clock start, and what has to happen first?

    Section 7428(b)(3) requires the pleading to be filed “before the 91st day after the date of such mailing” when the IRS sends its determination by certified or registered mail. The mailing date controls, not the opening date. If the last day falls on a weekend or a District of Columbia holiday, 26 U.S.C. § 7503 moves it to the next business day.

    The court must also find that the organization exhausted its administrative remedies under section 7428(b)(2). IRS Publication 892 gives an audited organization 30 days from the proposed revocation letter to protest and ask for Appeals, and it warns that skipping the protest can defeat exhaustion. A withdrawn protest does not count either, and a board arguing against retroactive revocation must put its request under 26 U.S.C. § 7805(b) in writing to the agent before the final letter issues (Rev. Proc. 2026-5, sections 9.09 and 12.04).

    The 270-day rule in section 7428(b)(2) mostly helps applicants the IRS has not acted on, and section 10.06 of the 2026 procedure stops that count while an IRS information request is outstanding.

    Nonprofit Revocation Letter from the IRS? Contact Us Now

    Which court should a Colorado nonprofit choose for a section 7428 declaratory judgment?

    Only three courts can hear it: the U.S. Tax Court, the Court of Federal Claims (28 U.S.C. § 1507), and the federal district court in Washington, D.C. Because 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) excludes tax disputes other than section 7428 actions, the District of Colorado is out. The choices differ for an individual’s Colorado notice of deficiency.

    A Tax Court section 7428 decision is reviewed in the circuit where the group keeps its principal office or agency on the day the petition is filed, under 26 U.S.C. § 7482(b)(1)(D). For a club in Routt or La Plata County, that is the Tenth Circuit; the other two forums appeal to the Federal Circuit and the D.C. Circuit. The Tax Court has a Denver location, and its Rule 212 lets the petitioner request a place for submission.

    I found no Tenth Circuit decision reviewing a section 7428 judgment. Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), upheld a retroactive revocation in a payroll tax refund suit, since section 7428 did not yet exist. Church of World Peace, Inc. v. IRS, 715 F.2d 492 (10th Cir. 1983), dismissed a suit to block an IRS records demand, noting the organization would keep its section 7428 rights. Since Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), has the Tax Court follow the appellate circuit’s precedent and there is none here, the Tax Court’s own section 7428 case law would govern.

    Evidence rules favor the Tax Court in a revocation. Under Tax Court Rule 217, an initial-application case is ordinarily decided on the administrative record (the file built at the IRS), and new evidence needs good cause. Colorado State Chiropractic Society v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-8, refused to add an affidavit the society could have supplied during 31 months of IRS review. A revocation case is decided on the record alone only if both sides agree it is complete, and the court may find different facts. I still treat the protest stage as the trial record.

    What happens to donors, income tax, and Colorado filings while the case is pending?

    Filing does not freeze the revocation, but section 7428(c) protects donors within limits. If the organization files on time and loses, gifts made from publication of the revocation until the court first rules against it stay deductible, capped at $1,000 per individual for that period (a married couple counts as one). Gifts from other exempt charities are covered; individuals responsible for the conduct behind the revocation are not.

    A corporation that loses exemption is taxed at 21 percent under 26 U.S.C. § 11(b) and must file a return under 26 U.S.C. § 6012(a)(2), which means Form 1120. Colorado follows: C.R.S. § 39-22-112 exempts an organization from state income tax only in years it meets the federal requirements, and C.R.S. § 39-22-301 sets a 4.40 percent corporate rate for 2025 and later, before any temporary TABOR reduction.

    Two state items belong with Colorado counsel. Secretary of State registration under C.R.S. § 6-16-104 does not depend on 501(c)(3) status, but it reports that status and changes. For sales tax, the Department of Revenue’s charitable organization guidance treats an IRS 501(c)(3) letter as a provisional presumption of qualifying, so a revoked organization loses that footing.

    How does automatic revocation reinstatement work for a Colorado nonprofit that stopped filing?

    Rev. Proc. 2014-11 sets out four routes. The streamlined route in section 4 covers a first-time revoked organization that was eligible to file the 990-EZ or 990-N each missed year. It must apply within 15 months after the later of the revocation letter or the date its name was posted on the IRS list, and approval restores exemption back to the revocation date.

    Section 5 covers other organizations applying inside those 15 months; they need a reasonable cause statement for at least one of the three years plus paper annual returns for the missed years. After 15 months, section 6 requires reasonable cause for all three years. Section 7 reinstates only from the new filing date. Under Rev. Proc. 2026-5, sections 4 and 7 can use Form 1023-EZ ($275 fee) if the organization meets its limits, while sections 5 and 6 require Form 1023 ($600).

    How would the deadlines play out for a hypothetical Steamboat Springs or Durango youth-sports club?

    Illustrative only. The Steamboat Springs club lost in Appeals, and its final adverse determination letter went out by certified mail on Wednesday, September 2, 2026. The 90th day, the last day to petition the Tax Court, is Tuesday, December 1, 2026. A family giving $2,500 after the IRS publishes the revocation keeps only $1,000 of the deduction if the club loses.

    The Durango league, a calendar-year group with about $30,000 a year in receipts, skipped its 990-N for 2022, 2023 and 2024. The third filing was due May 15, 2025, so revocation took effect that day. Assume the IRS posted its name on August 12, 2025. The streamlined window closes November 12, 2026. If the league meets the 1023-EZ limits, a 1023-EZ marked for streamlined retroactive reinstatement and filed by then would reach back to May 15, 2025, with no back 990-N filings required. Miss it, and the league is into section 6.

    Issue Examination revocation Automatic revocation, § 6033(j)
    Trigger Audit and final adverse determination letter Three straight years with no 990, 990-EZ, or 990-N
    IRS Appeals Yes, protest within 30 days of the proposed letter No
    Court remedy Section 7428 petition: Tax Court, Court of Federal Claims, or D.D.C. None; § 7428(b)(4) bars it
    Key deadline Before the 91st day after certified mailing 15 months from letter or list posting for the easier retroactive routes
    Donors Up to $1,000 per individual under § 7428(c) if timely filed Gifts made before the list posting stay deductible
    Appeal path for a Colorado organization Tenth Circuit from Tax Court Not applicable

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Can a Colorado nonprofit sue over a revocation in Denver federal district court?

    No. Section 7428 allows only the Tax Court, the Court of Federal Claims, and the district court for the District of Columbia. The Tax Court does sit in Denver, with appeals to the Tenth Circuit.

    Is the 90-day deadline in section 7428 flexible?

    Treat it as fixed. The petition must be filed before the 91st day after the certified or registered mailing, with a next-business-day rule only for weekends and legal holidays.

    Can we appeal an automatic revocation for not filing the 990-N?

    No court or Appeals remedy exists. The organization applies for reinstatement under Rev. Proc. 2014-11, and timing decides whether reinstatement reaches back to the revocation date.

    Are donations deductible after a nonprofit lost tax-exempt status in Colorado?

    It depends on timing. Gifts made before an automatically revoked organization appears on the IRS list remain deductible, and in a timely section 7428 case individual donors are protected up to $1,000 each.

    Does a revoked club owe income tax?

    It can. A revoked corporation generally files Form 1120, and Colorado follows federal status. Retroactive reinstatement can remove that exposure for the gap years.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm represents nonprofit boards facing revocation, from the protest through IRS Appeals and Tax Court litigation, and helps organizations clean up the unfiled returns behind automatic revocation. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    Whether the clock is 90 days or 15 months, the date on the IRS letter drives the options. If your organization has a revocation letter or has turned up on the IRS list, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Frozen Out of a Colorado LLC in Bankruptcy: Which Member Claims Are Direct or Derivative?

    Frozen Out of a Colorado LLC in Bankruptcy: Which Member Claims Are Direct or Derivative?

    A chef in Glenwood Springs owns 30 percent of the LLC that owns her downtown building, and the operating agreement gives her alone the right to run the ground-floor restaurant. The managing members stopped returning her calls a year ago, and now the LLC has filed Chapter 11 with a buyer lined up. She wants to sue. The first thing a Colorado bankruptcy attorney will ask is not whether she was wronged but whose claim it is.

    Minority LLC member rights in Colorado turn on that question, because a claim that belongs to a bankrupt LLC belongs to the estate.

    In a bankruptcy, who decides direct vs. derivative claims for a Colorado LLC?

    State law. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979), holds that “[p]roperty interests are created and defined by state law” in bankruptcy unless “some federal interest requires a different result.” In Sender v. Simon, 84 F.3d 1299 (10th Cir. 1996), the Tenth Circuit read Colorado partnership law to decide that a claim belonged to the debtor and so to the estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).

    The Second Circuit’s Little Hearts Marks Family II L.P. v. Carter (In re 305 East 61st Street Group LLC), 130 F.4th 272 (2d Cir. 2025), is sometimes framed as a Butner case, but the opinion never cites Butner. The parties agreed New York law governed, and New York’s appellate divisions had already borrowed Delaware’s test from Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031 (Del. 2004).

    What test do Colorado courts use to separate direct and derivative claims?

    The rule grew out of shareholder cases. Nicholson v. Ash, 800 P.2d 1352 (Colo. App. 1990), allowed a personal suit only for breach of a duty owed to the stockholder causing injury “unique to himself and not suffered by the other stockholders.” For LLCs the key case is Young v. Bush, 277 P.3d 916 (Colo. App. 2012): a member sues directly only for injuries “separate and distinct from the injury to the LLC or the other members,” judged by asking who suffered the harm and who would receive the remedy.

    Those two questions came from First Horizon Merchant Services, Inc. v. Wellspring Capital Management, LLC, 166 P.3d 166 (Colo. App. 2007), which took them from Tooley while applying Delaware law. So Colorado has absorbed Tooley‘s core without adopting it by name, and I found no Colorado Supreme Court decision on the LLC question.

    The LLC Act says members’ and managers’ duties run “to the limited liability company” (C.R.S. § 7-80-404), so fiduciary claims start out derivative. And size is no shortcut: applying Colorado law in Combs v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 382 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 2004), the Tenth Circuit kept mismanagement claims derivative even in a close corporation with one minority holder.

    Outside bankruptcy, derivative suits follow C.R.S. §§ 7-80-713 to 7-80-719, including the demand rule in § 7-80-714.

    What happens to an LLC member’s derivative claims once a Colorado bankruptcy is filed?

    They become estate property. Delgado Oil Co. v. Torres, 785 F.2d 857 (10th Cir. 1986), arose from a Chapter 11 filed in Colorado: a creditor’s fiduciary claim against a director was “maintainable only through the debtor corporation,” so the district court lacked jurisdiction to try it. A post-petition derivative suit also runs into 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3), which stays any act “to exercise control over property of the estate.”

    The trustee or debtor in possession now decides whether to sue, settle, or sell. Buying the claim is often the cleanest exit, since estate property can be sold after notice and a hearing under 11 U.S.C. § 363(b). Forcing abandonment under 11 U.S.C. § 554(b) is harder, because the claim must be burdensome or of inconsequential value. In re MS55, Inc., 477 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2007), acknowledged that courts let creditors’ committees sue insiders in the debtor’s name when the debtor in possession refuses, but set no test for a single member.

    A plan can settle estate claims or hand them to a litigation trust under 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3), and 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a) binds creditors and equity holders whether or not they accepted it. Manager releases are a separate fight; see our post on Colorado plan releases after Purdue.

    Frozen Out of an LLC That Filed Bankruptcy? Contact Us Now

    Can an LLC member frozen out in Colorado get a trustee when the managers run the Chapter 11?

    This may be her key motion, because a debtor in possession acts through the managers she accuses. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) requires a trustee for cause, including fraud, dishonesty, or gross mismanagement by current management, and § 1104(a)(2) allows one when it serves creditors, equity holders, and the estate. Short of that, § 1104(c) provides an examiner to investigate management. The request must come from a “party in interest,” and since the list in 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) begins with “including,” a member with money at stake will argue she qualifies.

    How would the claims sort out for a hypothetical Glenwood Springs restaurant owner?

    Illustrative hypothetical. Red Mountain Block LLC owns the building and is taxed as a partnership, the default for a multi-member LLC under Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(1)(i). Ana (40 percent) and Ben (20 percent) manage it; Cal holds 10 percent, and Dana, our chef, holds 30. The operating agreement gives Dana alone the right to run the ground-floor restaurant at a fixed rent through 2034, plus a right of first offer on any sale. In 2026 the managers file Chapter 11 in the District of Colorado and sell the building for $6,200,000 to a company Ana’s brother controls, never offering it to Dana.

    Her claim that they sold cheaply to an insider is derivative, because every member lost in proportion and the recovery belongs to the estate. Her claims that Ana and Ben broke her restaurant right and her first-offer right look direct under Young, since nobody else held those rights. That tracks Little Hearts, which held Tooley does not even apply to a member suing on her own contract rights. Those claims survive the plan unless it validly releases the managers.

    Now the K-1. Assume a $3,400,000 basis in the building, so the sale produces $2,800,000 of gain and Dana’s 2026 K-1 shows $840,000, assuming percentage allocations that hold up under 26 U.S.C. § 704(b). Under 26 U.S.C. § 1399 the filing creates no separate taxable entity, and partners report their shares “whether or not distributed” (Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1(a)). If the estate holds all the cash, Dana reports $840,000 anyway, and Colorado starts from the same federal taxable income under C.R.S. § 39-22-104.

    Say her outside basis was $1,300,000, including a $1,170,000 share of a $3,900,000 mortgage. The gain adds $840,000 under 26 U.S.C. § 705(a). Paying off the mortgage is a $1,170,000 deemed distribution under 26 U.S.C. § 752(b), leaving $970,000. If the plan pays her $400,000 in 2027, she has a $570,000 capital loss under 26 U.S.C. § 731(a)(2), usable against ordinary income at $3,000 a year under 26 U.S.C. § 1211(b). That is phantom income in full: gain one year, a stranded loss the next.

    What should a Colorado LLC operating agreement say before bankruptcy is on the table?

    I look first at whether a member’s rights are written as her own. Exclusive use rights, puts and calls, first-offer and preemptive rights, and tag-along or drag-along terms framed as promises to a named member are the kind of rights Little Hearts treated as direct and that fit Young‘s separate-and-distinct test. C.R.S. § 7-80-108 lets the agreement restrict fiduciary duties unless that is “manifestly unreasonable,” but it cannot unreasonably limit the information rights in C.R.S. § 7-80-408.

    A mandatory tax-distribution clause is the best answer to Dana’s K-1, though after filing the court controls the cash. Distributions members took before the filing raise the opposite issue, covered in how a trustee recovers LLC distributions after Weinstein. Drafting these terms is work for Colorado-licensed counsel; my side is bankruptcy and tax.

    Dana’s claim Likely classification Who controls it after filing After a confirmed plan
    Cheap sale to an insider Derivative Trustee or debtor in possession Kept by the estate or plan trust
    Pre-filing waste and mismanagement Derivative, even in a small LLC Trustee or debtor in possession Kept by the estate or plan trust
    Breach of her exclusive restaurant and first-offer rights, against the managers Likely direct Dana Survives unless the managers are validly released
    Contract damages against the LLC itself Her own claim, against the debtor Filed in the case Paid only as the plan provides

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Can I sue the managers of my Colorado LLC after the LLC files bankruptcy?

    Only on claims that are yours directly. Claims for harm to the company belong to the estate, and the automatic stay keeps members from pursuing them.

    Has Colorado adopted the Tooley test?

    Not by name in any decision I found. Young v. Bush uses Tooley’s two questions, borrowed through First Horizon, alongside the older Nicholson v. Ash rule.

    Does it help that my LLC has only a few members?

    Not for classification. Applying Colorado law in Combs, the Tenth Circuit kept mismanagement claims derivative even in a close corporation.

    Do I still need to make a demand under C.R.S. 7-80-714?

    Outside bankruptcy, yes, with a 30-day wait unless an exception applies. After the filing the claim belongs to the estate, so the practical route runs through the trustee or the bankruptcy court.

    Will I owe tax on the building sale if I received no money?

    Quite possibly. Your K-1 share of the gain is taxable whether or not cash is distributed, and a later liquidation loss may not offset it.

    Can I ask for a trustee if the managers control the Chapter 11?

    Yes. Section 1104(a) allows a trustee for cause, including gross mismanagement by current management, and § 1104(c) provides for an examiner.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm advises LLC members on how a company bankruptcy affects their claims and their taxes, including Chapter 11 cases and the tax side of asset sales. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    The trustee motion and sale-year tax planning have short windows. If your LLC is in or near bankruptcy and you have been shut out, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Bankruptcy Trustee Sued You in Colorado? Defending a Fraudulent Transfer Complaint

    Bankruptcy Trustee Sued You in Colorado? Defending a Fraudulent Transfer Complaint

    An equipment rental and parts yard in Montrose opens a summons from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Denver. The Chapter 7 trustee for a Grand Junction contractor it supplied for years wants back the $180,000 the contractor paid over its last 18 months, calling it a fraudulent transfer and a preference. Every dollar paid a real invoice, the owner says. That may be true, but a bankruptcy trustee lawsuit in Colorado shrinks only when the defendant makes the trustee prove each element of each count.

    What is a Colorado bankruptcy trustee actually suing for?

    Trustees plead several theories. Under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A), a transfer made within two years before the petition can be avoided if the debtor made it with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor. Section 548(a)(1)(B) is the constructive version: less than reasonably equivalent value, while the debtor was insolvent or in another form of financial distress the statute lists. A preference count under 11 U.S.C. § 547 usually rides along, and 11 U.S.C. § 550 is what lets the trustee collect.

    State law comes in through 11 U.S.C. § 544(b), which lets the trustee use an avoidance claim held by a real unsecured creditor. In Colorado that meant the Colorado Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act until Senate Bill 25-133, signed April 7, 2025, renamed it the Colorado Voidable Transactions Act for claims filed after its effective date. The tests carried over: C.R.S. § 38-8-105(1)(a) covers actual intent, § 38-8-105(2) lists eleven “badges of fraud” (a transfer to an insider is one), and constructive claims sit in § 38-8-105(1)(b) and § 38-8-106(1).

    How far back can a bankruptcy trustee reach in Colorado?

    Section 548 reaches back two years. Under C.R.S. § 38-8-110, the Colorado statute reaches four, and an actual-intent claim can also be brought within one year after the transfer was or reasonably could have been discovered, if that is later. A payment made three years before the petition is outside § 548 but inside the Colorado statute, which is why most complaints here plead both. The 2025 amendment stretched the insider-preference claim in § 38-8-106(2) from one year to four.

    That longer reach needs a “triggering creditor.” In United States v. Miller, 604 U.S. 518 (2025), which came up through the Tenth Circuit, the Supreme Court confirmed that a § 544(b) trustee must identify an actual creditor who could have avoided the transfer outside bankruptcy, and takes that creditor’s limitations and defenses with it. Ask which creditor the complaint names.

    Some trustees name the IRS to borrow its ten-year collection period under 26 U.S.C. § 6502. The Tenth Circuit has not ruled, and I found no District of Colorado decision. A New Mexico bankruptcy court refused in Wagner v. Ultima Homes, Inc. (In re Vaughan Co.), 498 B.R. 297 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2013); a 2022 Kansas bankruptcy decision is reported to have allowed it. No court of appeals has decided it; the Fifth Circuit’s MC Asset Recovery LLC v. Commerzbank A.G. (In re Mirant Corp.), 675 F.3d 530 (5th Cir. 2012), held only that the federal Debt Collection Procedures Act is not “applicable law” under § 544(b). A different ten-year rule, for self-settled trusts, is covered in the Kittrell post.

    The trustee has its own clock: 11 U.S.C. § 546(a) generally requires suit within two years after the order for relief, and before the case closes.

    Sued by a Colorado Bankruptcy Trustee? Contact Us Now

    What does Rule 9(b) require in a fraudulent transfer complaint?

    Bankruptcy Rule 7009 applies Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), which demands particularity about the circumstances of fraud but lets intent be alleged generally. The Tenth Circuit’s version is the “who, what, when, where and how” in United States ex rel. Sikkenga v. Regence Bluecross Blueshield of Utah, 472 F.3d 702 (10th Cir. 2006), building on Koch v. Koch Industries, Inc., 203 F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 2000). Sikkenga is a False Claims Act case; I found no Tenth Circuit opinion squarely applying it to an actual-intent transfer count, though bankruptcy courts in the circuit do. In Soule v. Galaz (In re Galaz), Adv. No. 21-1016-R (Bankr. N.D. Okla. Oct. 20, 2021), pleaded badges (an insider, no consideration, poor disclosure) were enough.

    For a vendor, the useful example is Mendelsohn v. Dole Fresh Fruit Co. (In re Barnett Corp.), Adv. Pro. No. 8-24-08121-AST (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2026). The complaint described misconduct by the debtor’s principal but never tied it to the 33 payments the defendant received, so Chief Judge Trust gave the trustee 21 days to replead. Intent has to attach to the transfers being sued on.

    Constructive counts are usually tested under Rule 8 and the plausibility standard of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). A list of dates and amounts still does not show what the debtor got back, and big loans do not show insolvency on the payment dates. I did not locate a published District of Colorado bankruptcy decision choosing between the two standards for these counts.

    Should a Colorado defendant move to dismiss or answer?

    Under Bankruptcy Rule 7012(a), the answer is due 30 days after the summons issued unless the court sets another date. A motion to dismiss usually ends with leave to amend, so its value lies in pinning the trustee to facts and removing counts that cannot be fixed. Barnett dismissed a § 502(d) claim-disallowance count outright because the defendant had filed no proof of claim. Counts time-barred on their face, or lacking a triggering creditor, are other targets. When a motion would only produce a longer complaint, I usually prefer a prompt answer pleading every affirmative defense. Fraudulent transfer defense in Colorado is mostly won with documents, and any Colorado bankruptcy attorney will ask for the ledger early.

    How would a Montrose equipment supplier defend $180,000 in payments?

    Illustrative example: the Grand Junction contractor filed Chapter 7 on March 16, 2026. Between September 2024 and February 2026 it paid the Montrose supplier $180,000 on open account, all inside the § 548 window. Three payments totaling $45,000 fell within the 90-day preference period.

    Start with value. Paying an existing debt is “value” under § 548(d)(2)(A) and C.R.S. § 38-8-104(1), so a payment matched to an invoice for parts or rental at market rates defeats the constructive theory dollar for dollar. Build a ledger tying every payment to a delivery ticket, because § 38-8-109(7), added in 2025, puts the burden of proving the state-law defenses on the transferee. A non-insider vendor paid on its usual terms shows few badges, and good faith plus value is a defense under both § 548(c) and C.R.S. § 38-8-109(1).

    Now suppose $30,000 paid for a skid steer the contractor’s owner bought for his own place near Olathe. The contractor satisfied someone else’s debt, and the amended § 38-8-109(1) protects only value “given to the debtor.” That slice is real exposure. On the preference count, the ordinary-course defense in § 547(c)(2) and the new-value defense in § 547(c)(4) can cut the $45,000; if the supplier later shipped $22,000 more on credit and was never paid, the figure may fall to about $23,000.

    That makes the realistic risk closer to $53,000 than $180,000, and settlement talks in a preference clawback defense should start there. Under § 502(d), the supplier’s own claim is disallowed until it pays. Once it pays, 11 U.S.C. § 502(h) treats the resulting claim as a prepetition claim, filed alongside the unpaid invoices. Chapter 7 dividends are often small.

    Do family members and insiders face different rules in a Colorado bankruptcy?

    Yes. A transfer to an insider is itself a badge of fraud, § 547(b)(4)(B) extends the preference period for insiders to one year, and the Colorado insider-preference claim now runs four years. In Lofstedt v. Kendall (In re Kendall), No. 13-1224 (10th Cir. May 1, 2014) (unpublished), the Tenth Circuit affirmed a Colorado bankruptcy judgment avoiding transfers to the debtor’s wife and a family trust after the court found seven of the eleven badges. Section 550(b) shields only later transferees, never the first recipient. LLC members should read the Weinstein distributions post.

    Count Reach-back What the trustee must plead Main defenses
    § 548(a)(1)(A) actual intent 2 years Facts tying intent to these transfers (Rule 9(b)) § 548(c) good faith and value
    § 548(a)(1)(B) constructive 2 years Value shortfall plus insolvency or other distress Reasonably equivalent value
    § 544(b) with C.R.S. § 38-8-105 or -106 4 years (discovery rule for intent) Same, plus a real triggering creditor § 38-8-109; limitations under § 38-8-110
    § 547 preference 90 days; 1 year for insiders Antecedent debt, insolvency, better-than-Chapter 7 recovery § 547(c) ordinary course, new value

    Frequently Asked Questions

    How long does a Colorado bankruptcy trustee have to file a fraudulent transfer lawsuit?

    Generally two years after the order for relief under 11 U.S.C. 546(a), and before the case closes. The transfers themselves can be up to two years old under section 548 or up to four years old under the Colorado statute.

    Is the Colorado Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act still the law?

    Its substance is, under a new name. Senate Bill 25-133 renamed it the Colorado Voidable Transactions Act in 2025, kept the core tests, and changed some burdens and the insider-preference deadline.

    Can a trustee use the IRS to reach back ten years in Colorado?

    That question is open in the Tenth Circuit. A New Mexico bankruptcy court said no in 2013, and other bankruptcy courts have allowed it.

    Does Rule 9(b) apply to a fraudulent transfer claim?

    Courts apply it to actual-intent counts, though intent itself may be alleged generally. Constructive counts are usually judged under Rule 8, which still requires facts about value and insolvency.

    If I pay the trustee, do I get anything back?

    You get an unsecured claim for what you returned under section 502(h). Whether it pays much depends on what the estate collects.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm defends vendors, lenders, family members and business owners sued by bankruptcy trustees, through preference and clawback defense and broader bankruptcy representation, including Chapter 7 cases. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    The answer deadline in an adversary proceeding is short, and matching payments to invoices takes time. If a trustee’s complaint has arrived, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Bad Faith Bankruptcy Filings in Colorado: Can a Mid-Lawsuit Subchapter V Case Survive?

    Bad Faith Bankruptcy Filings in Colorado: Can a Mid-Lawsuit Subchapter V Case Survive?

    A Loveland LLC owns a light-industrial building off U.S. 34. Its bank has a judicial foreclosure pending in Larimer County District Court, a contractor and a former member are suing it, and summary judgment is set for Thursday morning. On Wednesday afternoon the LLC files a Subchapter V petition, and the hearing comes off the calendar. The bank’s lawyer starts drafting a motion to dismiss, calling the petition a bad faith bankruptcy filing.

    Owner and lender both need to know what a Colorado bankruptcy judge does with a case filed mid-lawsuit against a handful of creditors. The Tenth Circuit’s answer surprises people.

    Is filing Chapter 11 to stop a lawsuit a bad faith bankruptcy filing in Colorado?

    Not automatically. Stopping litigation is part of the automatic stay’s job. In In re Koffler, No. 25-14914-JGR (Bankr. D. Colo. May 18, 2026), Judge Rosania wrote that “Timing alone does not establish bad faith” and that a debtor may file to stay a foreclosure. The Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel said in In re McHugh, BAP No. CO-24-20 (10th Cir. BAP Sept. 30, 2025) (unpublished), that filing in place of an appeal bond “is not bad faith per se.”

    The risk sits in 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b), which requires the court, on a party in interest’s request, to dismiss or convert a Chapter 11 case “for cause.” The sixteen examples in § 1112(b)(4) never mention bad faith, but In re Pacific Rim Investments, LLP, 243 B.R. 768 (D. Colo. 2000), held that a bad faith filing is cause under both § 1112(b) and the stay-relief statute.

    Keep the tools apart. Chapter 11 dismissal for cause ends the case, stay relief under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) frees one creditor, and 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) asks later whether the plan was “proposed in good faith.”

    What test does the Tenth Circuit use to dismiss a Chapter 11 case for cause?

    A totality-of-the-circumstances test with no separate futility element. Carolin Corp. v. Miller, 886 F.2d 693 (4th Cir. 1989), requires two findings: the “objective futility” of any reorganization plus the petitioner’s “subjective bad faith.” Colorado courts do not. In Pacific Rim, the debtor filed three days before a Denver District Court foreclosure trial, and the case was dismissed even though the building had equity and a plan was on file. Judge Kane affirmed, rejecting the argument that an ability to reorganize defeats a bad-faith finding.

    I have not found a published Tenth Circuit opinion setting a § 1112(b) bad-faith test. Its published guidance comes from two sanctions appeals: In re Courtesy Inns, Ltd., 40 F.3d 1084 (10th Cir. 1994), where a motel owner filed in Colorado the day before a foreclosure sale, and In re Nursery Land Development, Inc., 91 F.3d 1414 (10th Cir. 1996), which listed “classic badges” like one asset, one creditor, and no employees.

    The working standard comes from the BAP. In In re Frontline Medical Services LLC, 665 B.R. 818 (10th Cir. BAP 2024), an appeal from the Colorado bankruptcy court, the panel listed eight factors drawn from Nursery Land and asked whether “the cumulative effect of the relevant factors gives rise to an inescapable conclusion” that bankruptcy is being misused. The movant must prove cause by a preponderance of the evidence. Reorganization prospects are one factor, not a gate.

    Does a two-party dispute or eve-of-hearing timing get the case dismissed?

    Usually only with more. Frontline was a Subchapter V case filed during a fee fight with a former law firm, one of only two impaired unsecured creditors. Dismissal was denied. Frontline ran a real business with cash flow, and the BAP called a two-party dispute “simply one factor.”

    The losing debtors had more against them. In McHugh, a solvent broker filed after a garnishment froze his accounts, never sought a stay pending his state appeal, and was converted to Chapter 7. In Koffler, a Snowmass debtor facing over $17 million in judgments leaned on a “friendly” $119 million claim that the court viewed as an effort to manufacture an accepting class. And Roberts v. Sender, No. 25-1103 (10th Cir. Mar. 31, 2026) (unpublished), recounts a Colorado debtor converted for bad faith after filing on the eve of a damages hearing.

    The pattern I see: timing makes judges look harder, and the operating business decides the outcome.

    Bankruptcy Filed on the Eve of Trial? Contact Us Now

    What changes in a Subchapter V Colorado case?

    Eligibility comes first. Under 11 U.S.C. § 1182(1), the debtor must be a “small business debtor” under 11 U.S.C. § 101(51D). Only noncontingent, liquidated debts count toward the cap, which stood at $3,424,000 as of September 2026, per the U.S. Trustee Program. Congress then passed H.R. 7730, the Bankruptcy Threshold Adjustment Act, restoring $7,500,000; the Senate cleared it September 28, 2026, but as of October 9, 2026, it awaited signature and reaches only cases filed after enactment. The definition also excludes a debtor whose primary activity is owning single asset real estate.

    Section 1112 still applies, since 11 U.S.C. § 1181(a) does not exclude it. The plan is due within 90 days under 11 U.S.C. § 1189(b), and missing that deadline is separate cause under § 1112(b)(4)(J). The trustee under 11 U.S.C. § 1183 must “facilitate the development of a consensual plan,” can be ordered to investigate, and is a party in interest under 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b), which supports standing to seek dismissal.

    A plan funded by a lawsuit recovery has a problem. For a nonconsensual plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1191(c)(3) requires that the debtor “will be able” to pay, or a reasonable likelihood plus “appropriate remedies,” and Frontline reversed a confirmation that skipped that finding. Koffler adds that rehabilitation is not “the mere possibility that contingent litigation or disputed assets may someday produce value.”

    Should a Colorado creditor seek stay relief or bring a motion to dismiss bankruptcy for bad faith?

    Often both. Stop collecting and file a notice of the bankruptcy in the state case. Stay relief fits when the state case is ready for trial; In re Curtis, 40 B.R. 795 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984), lists trial readiness and the “balance of hurt” among its factors. For a stay protecting property, such as a foreclosure, § 362(e)(1) ends the stay 30 days after the request unless the court continues it. In Pacific Rim the creditor won both forms of relief.

    A dismissal hearing must begin within 30 days under § 1112(b)(3), though Koffler held a preliminary hearing and then set a full evidentiary hearing for “compelling circumstances.” Once cause is shown, the debtor must prove unusual circumstances under § 1112(b)(2); filing reports and showing up at the § 341 meeting is “the minimum level of participation required.” Refiling bars are limited by In re Frieouf, 938 F.2d 1099 (10th Cir. 1991).

    Watch for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1452, generally within 90 days under Bankruptcy Rule 9027(a)(2); the creditor’s answer is remand “on any equitable ground” or abstention under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c). A Colorado bankruptcy attorney on the creditor side should also read the schedules, because undisclosed lawsuits carry their own consequences.

    How would a Loveland Subchapter V filing play out?

    Illustrative only. The LLC’s building is appraised at $2.9 million; four bays lease for $18,000 a month, and the LLC’s cabinet shop, with seven employees, uses the fifth. The bank is owed $2.1 million. A roofer claims a disputed $340,000 invoice, a former member seeks unliquidated buyout damages, and trade debt is $85,000. Leaving out the member’s claim, countable debt is about $2.53 million. Colorado lenders can also foreclose through the county public trustee under C.R.S. § 38-38-101; this bank chose court. The LLC files Wednesday, November 18, 2026.

    The bank moves November 30 to dismiss or, alternatively, for stay relief, so absent consent the hearing must begin by December 30. It argues eve-of-hearing timing, few creditors, and that the building is single asset real estate, which would end Subchapter V eligibility. The LLC answers with payroll, tenants, equity, and a plan filed well before the February 16, 2027 deadline. Its weak spot is any plan dollar that depends on beating the roofer’s claim. A judge applying Frontline could keep the case, let the roofer’s claim proceed in Larimer County, and require a sale deadline as the § 1191(c)(3) remedy.

    Tool Statute Timing What it does
    Motion to dismiss for cause § 1112(b) Hearing begins within 30 days Ends or converts the case
    Stay relief § 362(d)(1) Stay on property lapses in 30 days unless continued Sends one dispute back to state court
    Eligibility objection §§ 1182(1), 101(51D) Early in the case Removes Subchapter V treatment
    Plan good-faith objection § 1129(a)(3) At confirmation Blocks a plan, not the filing
    Remand or abstention 28 U.S.C. §§ 1452(b), 1334(c) After any removal Returns state claims to state court

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Is it bad faith to file bankruptcy right before a hearing in Colorado?

    Not by itself. Colorado judges treat timing as probative but weigh it with everything else, especially whether a real business exists to reorganize.

    Does the Tenth Circuit require proof that reorganization is futile?

    No. Colorado courts use a totality-of-the-circumstances test, and Pacific Rim affirmed a dismissal even though the debtor had equity and a plan.

    Can a Subchapter V trustee move to dismiss a case?

    The trustee is a party in interest under section 1109(b), and section 1112(b) lets a party in interest seek dismissal. In practice, creditors usually bring the motion.

    What is the Subchapter V debt limit in Colorado right now?

    It was $3,424,000 as of September 2026. A bill restoring $7,500,000 passed Congress that month but, as of October 9, 2026, had not been signed and would apply only to later-filed cases.

    Can a plan be funded by winning a lawsuit?

    Partly. A plan resting entirely on contingent litigation is hard to confirm under section 1191(c)(3) without a sale or liquidation remedy.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm represents business owners and creditors in contested Colorado reorganizations, including Subchapter V cases, Chapter 11 litigation, and broader bankruptcy planning. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    The 30-day hearing clock leaves little time to build the record on either side. If a lawsuit just collided with a bankruptcy petition, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Missed the Tax Court 90-Day Deadline in Colorado? Equitable Tolling After Kings Road

    Missed the Tax Court 90-Day Deadline in Colorado? Equitable Tolling After Kings Road

    A landscaping contractor moves from Grand Junction to Fort Collins in May and never tells the IRS. In October a balance-due letter reaches the new house, citing a notice of deficiency she never saw. That notice went to her old Mesa County address in June, and the 90-day window to petition the U.S. Tax Court closed weeks ago. Her first question is the one I hear most in this spot: can a missed Tax Court deadline be forgiven?

    In September the Tax Court said yes for partnerships under the 2015 audit rules. For a Colorado individual holding an ordinary notice of deficiency, that court’s answer is still no. The reasons point to the routes that remain open after day 91.

    Can equitable tolling save a missed Tax Court deadline for a Colorado taxpayer?

    Equitable tolling lets a court accept a late filing when the filer acted diligently and something extraordinary beyond its control got in the way. It is unavailable if the deadline is “jurisdictional,” a limit on the court’s power to hear the case at all. Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner, 596 U.S. 199 (2022), held the 30-day deadline for appealing a collection hearing nonjurisdictional because Congress never clearly said otherwise.

    The Tax Court declined to carry that over to the deficiency deadline in 26 U.S.C. § 6213(a). In Hallmark Research Collective v. Commissioner, 159 T.C. 126 (2022), a petition filed on day 91 stayed dismissed, and the court held the limit jurisdictional and closed to tolling.

    Under Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), aff’d, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971), the Tax Court follows a court of appeals decision squarely in point when the appeal lies to that court. An individual appeals in the circuit of legal residence under 26 U.S.C. § 7482(b)(1)(A), which for Colorado is the Tenth Circuit. I found no Tenth Circuit decision on § 6213(a) since Boechler. Its published precedent, Foster v. Commissioner, 445 F.2d 799 (10th Cir. 1971), affirmed dismissal of a late petition for lack of jurisdiction. So a Colorado petitioner gets Hallmark today. Tolling requires preserving the argument and persuading the Tenth Circuit that Foster no longer controls.

    Which federal appeals courts allow tolling of the deficiency deadline?

    Four do. Culp v. Commissioner, 75 F.4th 196 (3d Cir. 2023), came first, then Buller v. Commissioner, 160 F.4th 266 (2d Cir. 2025), and Oquendo v. Commissioner, 148 F.4th 820 (6th Cir. 2025). On August 11, 2026, Maniktala v. Commissioner, No. 25-1366 (8th Cir.), joined them, setting aside a 1977 precedent that never analyzed the question. Pre-Boechler Seventh and Ninth Circuit decisions still call it jurisdictional.

    Six days after Maniktala, Kyick Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, No. 25-1429 (1st Cir. Aug. 17, 2026), took a third path: not jurisdictional, but mandatory and immune from tolling. It relied on Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel, 146 S. Ct. 1074 (2026), which refused to toll the federal removal deadline. A Tenth Circuit win on jurisdiction would not guarantee tolling.

    The Supreme Court denied the government’s petition in Culp on June 24, 2024, and as of October 9, 2026, I found no grant on § 6213(a). The House passed H.R. 5349, the Tax Court Improvement Act, which would let the Tax Court toll the deficiency deadline for filings after enactment. It went to Senate Finance in December 2025, and I found no later action.

    Why can a Colorado partnership get equitable tolling when an individual cannot?

    Big Apple Tompkins Realty LLC v. Commissioner, 167 T.C. No. 7 (Aug. 5, 2026), treats the 90-day deadline in 26 U.S.C. § 6234(a), which governs partnerships under the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (BBA), as nonjurisdictional. Section 6234(a) says only that a partnership “may file,” and the court’s grant of power sits in a separate subsection, so Boechler‘s clear-statement test was not met.

    History explains the different result. Hallmark leaned on nearly a century of courts reading the deficiency deadline as jurisdictional while Congress kept the words. The BBA replaced the old TEFRA regime outright, and TEFRA’s layered partner deadlines were a main reason North Wall Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, 165 T.C. 143 (2025), kept those deadlines jurisdictional.

    Kings Road Property, LLC v. Commissioner, 167 T.C. No. 11 (Sept. 21, 2026), then tolled a BBA petition filed 16 days late. Counsel had pulled a transcript showing nothing and called the IRS, which said no final notice had gone out. It had been mailed March 25, 2025, and both copies came back undeliverable. Returned mail alone, the court said, might not have sufficed. A Colorado partnership appeals to the Tenth Circuit under § 7482(b)(1)(E), and absent a ruling there on the BBA deadline, Kings Road controls.

    Missed a Tax Court Deadline? Contact Us Now

    How do you count the Tax Court 90-day deadline in Colorado?

    Count 90 days from the mailing date, or 150 if the notice was addressed to someone outside the United States. A last day falling on a weekend or a District of Columbia legal holiday rolls forward under § 6213(a) and 26 U.S.C. § 7503. The notice also prints a last day, and a petition filed by that printed date is timely even if the IRS miscounted.

    Under 26 U.S.C. § 7502, a Postal Service postmark by the last day counts as filing; I want a certified mail receipt. Private carriers count only for IRS-designated services; anything else is filed when it arrives. Electronic filing is safer, and Tax Court Rule 22(d) treats it as timely through 11:59 p.m. eastern time, which is 9:59 p.m. in Colorado.

    What if the notice of deficiency went to an old Colorado address?

    It is probably still valid. Under 26 U.S.C. § 6212(b)(1), a notice mailed to the last known address is sufficient. Treas. Reg. § 301.6212-2 treats that as the address on the latest properly processed return unless the IRS got clear and concise notice of a new one, such as Form 8822 or a postal change-of-address record. Receipt is immaterial. Armstrong v. Commissioner, 15 F.3d 970 (10th Cir. 1994), held that the IRS’s duty of diligence ends when the notice is mailed. That is why Kings Road needed the misinformation, not just the returned envelopes.

    Illustrative example (hypothetical facts): our contractor files her 2025 return from Grand Junction in April 2026, moves in May, and files no Form 8822. A notice of deficiency for 2023 is dated Monday, June 22, 2026. Day 90 is Sunday, September 20, so her last day is Monday, September 21. She petitions on Tuesday, October 13, 113 days after the notice and 22 days late. Grand Junction was her last known address, the notice stands, and under Hallmark the case is dismissed. Even in a tolling circuit, an unreported move looks weak beside Kings Road‘s record.

    What are the options after a missed Tax Court deadline in Colorado?

    Whether the adviser is a Colorado tax attorney or an enrolled agent, the first job is sequencing. Audit reconsideration under IRM 4.13.1 covers an unpaid assessment where the taxpayer moved and missed the IRS’s letters, and a jurisdictional dismissal does not bar it.

    Once collection begins, a hearing under 26 U.S.C. § 6330 allows a challenge to the tax itself if the person “did not receive” the notice, with Tax Court review afterward. Someone with the cash can pay in full, as Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960) requires (it came up through the Tenth Circuit), claim a refund within 26 U.S.C. § 6511, wait six months under 26 U.S.C. § 6532(a)(1), and sue in the District of Colorado or the Court of Federal Claims. A doubt-as-to-liability offer under Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1(b)(1) needs a real dispute about the amount. A related post compares Tax Court, a refund suit, and bankruptcy for a Colorado notice of deficiency.

    Colorado follows the federal result: C.R.S. § 39-22-601.5 requires a report of final federal adjustments within 180 days after the final determination date.

    Route after day 90 Pay first? Contest the amount? Main limit
    Late Tax Court petition seeking tolling No Only if the petition is accepted Hallmark and Foster govern Colorado for now
    Audit reconsideration No Yes, with new documentation IRS discretion; needs new information or an IRS error
    Collection due process hearing No Yes, if the notice was not received Only after a collection notice; 30 days to seek review
    Refund suit, D. Colo. or Court of Federal Claims Yes, in full Yes § 6511 claim window and six-month wait
    Doubt-as-to-liability offer No Yes, by negotiation Needs a real dispute about the amount

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Is the Tax Court 90-day deadline jurisdictional for Colorado taxpayers?

    In the Tax Court, yes. That court follows Hallmark Research Collective, and the Tenth Circuit has not ruled on the question since Boechler.

    Has the Supreme Court agreed to decide whether the deficiency deadline can be tolled?

    Not as of October 9, 2026. It denied review in Culp in 2024, and the circuits now take three different positions on jurisdiction and tolling.

    Does Kings Road help an individual with a late deficiency petition?

    Not directly. Kings Road applies to partnership petitions under § 6234(a), and the Tax Court still treats § 6213(a) differently. Its facts do show what a strong tolling record looks like.

    What time is the e-filing cutoff on the last day for a Colorado filer?

    Tax Court Rule 22(d) sets the cutoff at 11:59 p.m. eastern time. In Colorado that is 9:59 p.m. Mountain time.

    Is a notice of deficiency valid if I never received it?

    Usually, if the IRS mailed it to your last known address. Non-receipt can still let you contest the tax at a collection due process hearing.

    Do I have to tell Colorado about a federal deficiency?

    Generally yes. C.R.S. § 39-22-601.5 requires a report of final federal adjustments within 180 days after the final determination date.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm represents Colorado taxpayers and their businesses in Tax Court litigation, IRS Appeals and CDP hearings, audit defense and reconsideration, and offers in compromise. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    Each route after a missed petition runs on its own clock, so the order matters. If a notice of deficiency slipped past you, contact North Star Law Firm.