Author: Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA

  • Tax Court Expert Witnesses at the Denver Trial Session: What Airbnb and Rule 143(g) Mean for Colorado Taxpayers

    Tax Court Expert Witnesses at the Denver Trial Session: What Airbnb and Rule 143(g) Mean for Colorado Taxpayers

    Picture a Boulder software company, a Littleton family partnership fighting over the discount on a gifted interest, or a Western Slope ranch whose conservation easement the IRS values at a fraction of the deduction. Each of those disputes can land at the Tax Court’s Denver trial session, and each will turn on whose expert the judge believes. A precedential opinion issued September 2, 2026 changes how experts can be used before trial.

    The opinion is Airbnb, Inc. & Subsidiaries v. Commissioner, 167 T.C. No. 9 (2026), Docket No. 12423-24, by Judge Emin Toro. It is a $4.2 billion transfer pricing fight, but its procedural rule applies just as well to a Colorado S corporation.

    What did the Tax Court decide in Airbnb about expert declarations?

    Both sides sought a discovery protective order under Rule 103 governing access to Airbnb’s source code. The Commissioner wanted the secured review room in Austin, Texas, where his software consultant worked, and attached two declarations from that consultant attacking Airbnb’s proposed terms. Airbnb moved to strike them as noncompliant expert reports.

    The court refused. Rule 143(g)’s report requirements, it held, do not reach declarations filed to support a pretrial discovery motion. Rule 143 sits in the Title of the rules headed “Trials,” and subsection (g) is triggered only for a party “who calls an expert witness.” No trial had taken place, the IRS had not firmly chosen its trial experts, and the declarations dealt with discovery procedure rather than the merits. A footnote added that Rule 143(g)(3) can excuse a written report for testimony limited to industry practice, which described most of what the consultant said. Any legal opinion in the declarations, the court said, it would simply disregard.

    What does Rule 143(g) require of a trial expert at the Denver Tax Court trial session?

    At trial the rule is strict. Under Tax Court Rule 143(g), a retained expert must sign a written report containing every opinion with its basis and reasons, the facts or data considered, supporting exhibits, qualifications with publications from the past 10 years, cases from the past 4 years in which the expert testified, and the compensation being paid. The report is received as the expert’s direct testimony.

    Timing is where Colorado petitioners get hurt. Once the case is calendared, reports must be served and submitted no later than 30 days before the call of the trial calendar. Late testimony is “excluded altogether” unless the party shows good cause and the opponent is not unduly prejudiced. And Rule 143(g)(3) says the court ordinarily will not excuse a report where the opinion rests on comparable sales or statistical data, which covers nearly every valuation or compensation study.

    How far can an expert go on legal questions when appeal lies to the Tenth Circuit?

    For a Colorado resident, or a corporation with its principal place of business here, 26 U.S.C. § 7482(b)(1) sends the appeal to the Tenth Circuit. Under Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), aff’d, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971), the Tax Court follows controlling precedent of that circuit, and 26 U.S.C. § 7453 makes the Federal Rules of Evidence govern regular Tax Court cases.

    The Tenth Circuit’s leading case is Specht v. Jensen, 853 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1988) (en banc). A lawyer-expert in a civil rights trial explained search and seizure law, then told the jury the searches were illegal. That exceeded Rule 702. The court drew a narrow line: an expert may refer to the law and use legal terms to explain facts, but “[i]n no instance can a witness be permitted to define the law of the case.” Since Rule 704(a) allows opinions on ultimate factual issues, a CPA can say a founder’s market pay was $150,000. Testifying that the pay “was reasonable under section 162” is a different matter.

    Specht was a jury case, and the Tax Court sits alone. Airbnb quoted United States v. Brown, 415 F.3d 1257, 1269 (11th Cir. 2005): there is “less need for the gatekeeper to keep the gate when the gatekeeper is keeping the gate only for himself.” It also relied on Nationwide Transport Finance v. Cass Information Systems, Inc., 523 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2008) and Torres v. County of Oakland, 758 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1985), which asks whether a witness’s word carries a legal meaning distinct from ordinary usage.

    Does filing a consultant’s declaration give up the consulting-expert shield?

    Rule 70(c)(4)(C) generally bars discovery of facts known or opinions held by a retained expert who is not expected to testify, absent exceptional circumstances. That lets a taxpayer test a position privately with a forensic accountant.

    Airbnb did not rule on waiver. But a declaration on the public docket discloses exactly the opinions that rule protects, and the IRS will argue the door is open. If the consultant is later designated for trial, the declaration becomes cross-examination material, and Rule 70(c)(4)(B) already leaves discoverable any facts, data, or assumptions counsel gave a testifying expert. The safer course is to support a discovery motion with a fact witness or a second consultant and keep the trial expert off the motion papers. A Rule 103 order can then control how trade secrets, customer lists, or code are disclosed, including when and where.

    Issue Trial expert report (Rule 143(g)) Declaration on a discovery motion (Airbnb) Consulting expert (Rule 70(c)(4)(C))
    Required contents Opinions and reasons, data, exhibits, qualifications, publications, testimony list, compensation No Rule 143(g) checklist Nothing filed
    Timing 30 days before calendar call With the motion or response Any time
    Discoverability Drafts protected; counsel-supplied facts, data, assumptions are not Public once filed Generally barred absent exceptional circumstances
    Impeachment risk High on cross High if declarant later testifies Low while undisclosed
    Who decides Trial judge under Rules 702 and 143(g) Motion judge, who may disregard legal opinion Not offered as evidence

    What makes a forensic accountant’s Tax Court report hold up?

    Since its 2023 amendment, Rule 702 requires the proponent to show it is “more likely than not” that the testimony rests on sufficient facts and reliable methods reliably applied. The Tax Court policed this before the amendment. In Boltar, L.L.C. v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 326 (2011), a conservation easement case, it excluded the taxpayer’s appraisal entirely for skipping the before-and-after method, ignoring contiguous parcels, and assuming infeasible development, rather than admitting it and then giving it no weight.

    From the accountant’s side, the reports that hold up list every assumption and say which came from counsel. Each number traces to a document the IRS can check. The writer applies the legal standard without arguing its meaning, and fees and prior testimony are disclosed plainly. Conceding a weak point openly often buys more credibility than any chart.

    How would the pretrial calendar run for a Boulder S corporation?

    Hypothetical. A Boulder software S corporation (call it the company) paid its founder no W-2 wages for 2023 and 2024 while distributing $420,000 each year. The IRS issues a notice of employment tax determination treating $195,000 a year as wages. The company petitions under 26 U.S.C. § 7436, which lets the court decide status and the proper amount of tax. Because the tax is under $50,000 per quarter, small case procedure is available, but § 7436(c) decisions cannot be appealed and need not follow the Federal Rules of Evidence. The company files as a regular case.

    Say calendar call at the Denver session is Monday, June 7, 2027. The IRS demands every customer contract and the commit logs. Rule 70(a)(2) requires discovery motions at least 45 days before calendar call, so the protective order motion goes in by Friday, April 23, supported by the engineering manager’s declaration rather than the CPA expert’s. Reports are due 30 days out, a Saturday, so counsel serves Friday, May 7. The CPA puts market pay for the founder’s coding and management mix at $110,000 against the IRS expert’s $195,000, and stays on facts.

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    For the earlier forum decision, see holding a Colorado notice of deficiency: Tax Court, refund suit, or bankruptcy.

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Where does the Tax Court hold trials in Denver?

    The court lists the Byron Rogers Federal Building, 1961 Stout Street, as its Denver place of trial. The notice of trial confirms the courtroom for each session.

    Is a declaration attached to a discovery motion evidence at trial?

    No. Rule 143(c) says ex parte affidavits and declarations do not constitute evidence, and Airbnb ruled that the Rule 143(g) report requirements do not apply to them.

    Can my CPA testify that my position is correct under the tax code?

    Not in that form. In a case appealable to the Tenth Circuit, Specht v. Jensen bars an expert from defining the law of the case, though the CPA can give factual opinions such as market compensation or value.

    What happens if my expert report is served late?

    Rule 143(g)(2) excludes the testimony altogether unless you show good cause and the delay does not unduly prejudice the IRS.

    Can an industry practice witness testify without a report?

    Possibly. Rule 143(g)(3) lets the court allow that for testimony limited to industry practice or rebuttal, but rarely for opinions built on comparable sales or statistical data.

    Can a protective order keep my source code or customer list away from the IRS?

    Rule 103 lets the court limit how a trade secret is disclosed and set the time and place of review, but it rarely blocks relevant discovery entirely.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm handles Tax Court litigation for Colorado individuals and closely held businesses, from the audit through expert discovery and trial, along with related tax defense work. The firm sees expert problems start well before trial, often when a consultant’s work gets filed without a plan, and Phillip’s forensic accounting and expert witness background shapes how reports are built and attacked. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    If a valuation or compensation study will decide your Tax Court case, the deadlines run from the trial notice, not from when you feel ready. To review your calendar and expert plan, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Why Is My Colorado Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Still Open? Trustees, Homestead Fights, and the Barton Doctrine

    Why Is My Colorado Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Still Open? Trustees, Homestead Fights, and the Barton Doctrine

    A Westminster creditor checks PACER in October 2026 and finds that a Colorado Chapter 7 bankruptcy filed in 2024 still has no closing order. The discharge entered long ago, and the latest entry is a notice of appeal. That can be entirely proper: a Chapter 7 case can outlive the discharge by years when there is an asset worth fighting over.

    In May 2026 the en banc Ninth Circuit issued Phillips v. Goldman (In re Gilman), 176 F.4th 1152 (9th Cir. 2026), arising from a Los Angeles Chapter 7 filed in 2011 and still open. It does not bind Colorado courts, and the Tenth Circuit’s trustee-liability rules point the other way.

    How long does Chapter 7 take in Colorado, and what keeps a case open?

    A no-asset Chapter 7 in the District of Colorado commonly closes about four to six months after filing. That is a docket pattern, not a rule, and cases vary. Under 11 U.S.C. § 350(a) the court closes a case once the estate is fully administered and the trustee discharged, and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 5009(a) presumes full administration 30 days after the trustee’s final report if no one objects.

    Anything that delays the final report delays closing. 11 U.S.C. § 704(a) tells the trustee to liquidate estate property and close the estate “as expeditiously as is compatible with the best interests of parties in interest,” which in an asset case means selling property and paying a dividend. Litigation adds time, whether a preference suit or a lawsuit the debtor never scheduled. Because 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) sweeps in every interest the debtor held on the petition date, a trustee may also wait on a pre-petition tax refund. Death does not end the case either; Rule 1016(a) continues it as though the debtor had not died.

    Why does a Colorado homestead exemption fight in bankruptcy take so long?

    Colorado opted out of the federal exemptions in C.R.S. § 13-54-107, so state law alone protects a debtor’s house. C.R.S. § 38-41-201 exempts $250,000 of equity, or $350,000 when an owner, spouse, or dependent living there is 60 or older or disabled as the statute defines it. SB 22-086 set those figures in April 2022, up from $75,000 and $105,000. The exemption lasts only while the property is occupied as a home (C.R.S. § 38-41-203), and C.R.S. § 38-41-207 keeps segregated sale proceeds exempt for three years.

    The objection deadline is strict: 11 U.S.C. § 522(l) makes claimed property exempt unless someone objects, and Rule 4003(b)(1) allows 30 days after the 341 meeting concludes. A late objection fails even against a baseless claim, as Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638 (1992) held. A timely one can mean an evidentiary hearing and then an appeal, which 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(1) sends to the Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel unless a party elects district court.

    Is a Colorado debtor discharged while the case stays open?

    Usually, yes. An open case and a missing discharge are different problems. Rule 4004(c)(1) requires the court to grant the discharge promptly once the deadlines to object and to move to dismiss for abuse pass, which is 60 days after the first date set for the 341 meeting, unless an exception applies, such as a pending § 727 complaint. A pending exemption objection is not one of them. Fraud and willful-injury claims under § 523(c) share that 60-day window under Rule 4007(c).

    Hypothetical, for illustration only. An Aurora debtor, 57, files in March 2024 and claims a $340,000 homestead in a Lakewood house worth $700,000 with a $360,000 mortgage, asserting a qualifying disability. Within 30 days of the April 341 meeting, the trustee objects that the debtor is not disabled under the statute and had moved to Aurora. No § 727 or § 523(c) complaint is filed, so the discharge enters in late June 2024. After a 2025 trial the court caps the exemption at $250,000, leaving about $90,000 before sale costs. The debtor appeals to the BAP within the 14 days Rule 8002(a) allows, loses in late 2025, and takes the case to the Tenth Circuit. In October 2026 the house is unsold and the case open, yet the discharge has protected the debtor since June 2024. Only the equity remains in play.

    What can creditors and debtors do when a Colorado bankruptcy trustee lets a case sit?

    A creditor can ask the trustee directly under § 704(a)(7), then go to the U.S. Trustee; 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3) charges that office with supervising Chapter 7 trustees and acting to prevent undue delay. In court, a party can move to compel administration under § 704(a)(1) or seek removal for cause under 11 U.S.C. § 324(a).

    Debtors have 11 U.S.C. § 554(b), which lets the court order abandonment of property that is burdensome or of inconsequential value. Scheduled property left unadministered at closing returns to the debtor under § 554(c), but unscheduled property stays in the estate under § 554(d). Expect deference: Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267 (1951) noted that courts protect trustees from liability for “disinterested mistakes in business judgment.”

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    Can you sue a Chapter 7 trustee in Colorado under the Barton doctrine in the Tenth Circuit?

    Not without leave first. Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126 (1881) required permission of the appointing court before suing a receiver. Satterfield v. Malloy, 700 F.3d 1231 (10th Cir. 2012) applied that rule to bankruptcy trustees, called it jurisdictional, rejected relabeling claims as individual-capacity torts, and enforced it after the case closed. 28 U.S.C. § 959(a) excuses leave only for acts in carrying on business, and Satterfield held that renting and selling estate property during liquidation does not count. A creditor upset that a trustee never collected rent must ask the bankruptcy court first.

    Past that gate, the standards split. Sherr v. Winkler, 552 F.2d 1367, 1375 (10th Cir. 1977), reading Mosser, held a trustee personally liable only for willful and deliberate breaches, with negligence reaching the trustee only in an official capacity. Sherr is a Bankruptcy Act case but has not been overruled. In Phillips, by contrast, the en banc Ninth Circuit limited quasi-judicial immunity to functions tied to adjudicating rights to the estate, so a trustee acting “as a property manager” is not immune. Derived immunity there requires court approval after notice and candid disclosure. The court rejected an immunity line between ordinary and gross negligence, reaffirmed negligence-based personal liability, and applied, rather than overruled, its earlier Castillo and Bennett decisions. It did not reach the unchallenged limitations ruling. In Colorado, Phillips is persuasive only. The trustee’s certiorari petition, Goldman v. Phillips, No. 26-315, places the Tenth Circuit, through Sherr, on the willful-and-deliberate side; a response is due October 13, 2026.

    What tax returns does a long-open Colorado Chapter 7 estate generate?

    An individual’s Chapter 7 creates a separate taxpayer. Under 26 U.S.C. § 1398, the estate computes income like an individual, the trustee pays its tax, and it takes the debtor’s loss and credit carryovers, which return to the debtor when the estate ends. IRS Publication 908 has the trustee file Form 1041 for any year estate gross income meets the threshold, so a sale in year three means an estate return that year. Post-petition wages stay the debtor’s under § 1398(e) and § 541(a)(6). A pre-petition refund does not; Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642 (1974) treated one as estate property. A debtor with heavy income early in the filing year should weigh the § 1398(d)(2) election to split that year in two.

    Why the case stays open Who controls timing Typical remedy Authority
    Asset sale, claims review Trustee Status request; U.S. Trustee inquiry 11 U.S.C. § 704(a); 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3)
    Homestead objection Objector and court Litigate; timeliness defense § 522(l); Rule 4003(b); C.R.S. § 38-41-201
    Discharge or dischargeability suit Plaintiff Defend or settle §§ 727, 523(c); Rules 4004, 4007(c)
    Trustee litigation or awaited refund Trustee, third parties Motion to compel abandonment §§ 541(a)(1), 554(b)
    Appeal Losing party Brief or settle 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(1); Rule 8002
    Debtor’s death No one Administration continues Rule 1016(a)
    Trustee inaction Trustee Compel, remove, or seek leave to sue § 324(a); Satterfield; Sherr

    Frequently Asked Questions

    How long does Chapter 7 take in Colorado?

    A no-asset Colorado Chapter 7 often closes in four to six months, a docket pattern rather than a rule. Asset sales, exemption fights, and appeals can stretch it to years.

    Can I get my discharge if my Chapter 7 case is still open?

    Usually. Rule 4004(c)(1) requires a prompt discharge once the objection deadlines pass, unless an exception such as a pending § 727 complaint applies.

    What is the homestead exemption in a Colorado bankruptcy?

    C.R.S. § 38-41-201 protects $250,000 of equity, or $350,000 if an owner, spouse, or dependent living there is 60 or older or disabled. The property must be occupied as a home.

    How long does a trustee have to object to my Colorado exemptions?

    Rule 4003(b)(1) allows 30 days after the 341 meeting concludes or an amendment is filed, unless extended on a timely motion. Under Taylor v. Freeland and Kronz, a late objection fails.

    Can I sue my Chapter 7 trustee in Colorado?

    Satterfield v. Malloy requires leave of the bankruptcy court first, outside the narrow 28 U.S.C. § 959(a) exception. Sherr v. Winkler limits personal liability to willful and deliberate breaches.

    Does the Ninth Circuit’s Phillips v. Goldman decision apply in Colorado?

    No. It is persuasive only in the Tenth Circuit, and a certiorari petition asking the Supreme Court to resolve the split is pending.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm represents debtors and creditors in Colorado Chapter 7 cases, including homestead objections, discharge litigation, and requests for leave to sue a trustee. Because its bankruptcy work runs alongside tax practice, the firm also handles estate Form 1041 issues, refund disputes, and discharge of tax debt within its broader Colorado bankruptcy practice. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    When a Chapter 7 case has stalled or a trustee objection threatens a home, deadlines are short. To review the docket and the options, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Colorado ITIN Filers After the IRS-ICE Ruling: What Section 6103 Protects and What Not Filing Costs

    Colorado ITIN Filers After the IRS-ICE Ruling: What Section 6103 Protects and What Not Filing Costs

    A worker on the line at a Greeley beef plant has filed every spring with an ITIN. Since September she has asked one question: if she files this year, who can see her address? For Colorado ITIN filers, mixed-status households, and their employers, the answer turns on section 6103 and what the courts ordered, but also on what the Code does to a person who stops filing. This post covers tax law only, as of October 2026, and describes consequences, not choices.

    What does section 6103 taxpayer confidentiality protect?

    Under 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a), returns and return information "shall be confidential" unless Title 26 authorizes disclosure. Return information under § 6103(b)(2) includes a taxpayer’s identity, which § 6103(b)(6) defines as name, mailing address, and taxpayer identifying number, an ITIN included. Unauthorized disclosure exposes the United States to damages of at least $1,000 per disclosure under 26 U.S.C. § 7431, and willful disclosure by a federal employee is a felony under § 7213(a)(1).

    The rule has always had exceptions; the table below lists several. The disputed one, § 6103(i)(2), lets a federal agency head request information other than "taxpayer return information" for a nontax criminal investigation, in writing, giving the taxpayer’s name and address, the periods, the authority, and the specific reason. Since § 6103(i)(2)(C) says identity is not taxpayer return information, an address can be reached that way.

    C.R.S. § 39-21-113(4)(a) bars the Department of Revenue from divulging return information "except in accordance with judicial order or as otherwise provided by law," and C.R.S. § 24-74-103 bars state employees from disclosing non-public personal identifying information, including tax records and addresses, to assist federal immigration enforcement unless law or a court order, warrant, or subpoena requires it.

    What did the courts decide about IRS-ICE data sharing?

    In Centro de Trabajadores Unidos v. Bessent, No. 1:25-cv-00677 (D.D.C.), a facial challenge to the April 2025 IRS-DHS agreement, Judge Dabney Friedrich denied a preliminary injunction on May 12, 2025, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed on February 24, 2026, 167 F.4th 1218. The Congressional Research Service’s Legal Sidebar LSB11413 (updated September 17, 2026) reports that the panel read § 6103(i)(2) to permit address disclosure on a compliant request.

    Center for Taxpayer Rights v. IRS, No. 1:25-cv-00457-CKK (D.D.C.), attacked how the IRS processed ICE’s requests. On November 21, 2025, Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly stayed the IRS procedure and barred disclosures except in strict compliance with § 6103(i)(2), 815 F. Supp. 3d 1. In Center for Taxpayer Rights v. IRS, No. 26-5006 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 8, 2026), Judges Millett, Pillard, and Wilkins affirmed. The IRS had released 47,289 records, most by matching a name to an SSN or ITIN. Its procedure accepted "any random five or nine digits" as the address and never confirmed that recipients were "personally and directly engaged" in a qualifying investigation, and the court found both likely unlawful.

    In Community Economic Development Center of Southeastern Massachusetts v. Bessent, No. 1:25-cv-12822-IT (D. Mass. Feb. 5, 2026), Judge Indira Talwani enjoined DHS and ICE from "inspecting, viewing, using" return information already disclosed; the First Circuit hears argument October 7, 2026, per CRS.

    Does the D.C. Circuit’s ruling reach taxpayers in Colorado?

    The Tenth Circuit has not ruled, but the order runs against the IRS procedure itself. Rejecting a challenge based on Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831 (2025), the panel said "CASA does not control the scope of relief available under" 5 U.S.C. § 705, because a stay acts on the agency action rather than on particular parties. The IRS is stayed from using that procedure wherever the taxpayer lives. Still, these rulings are preliminary, and CRS notes Congress could amend § 6103(i)(2). The duty to file has not changed. So far the courts have held the IRS to section 6103, though the litigation is not over.

    Provision What it permits Who asks, and how Status after the litigation
    § 6103(d) Sharing with state tax agencies Written request by the state agency head Not at issue
    § 6103(k)(6) Limited IRS disclosures to gather facts in tax cases IRS employee, as needed Not at issue
    § 6103(i)(1) Returns for a nontax federal criminal case Ex parte court order on a Justice Department application Not at issue
    § 6103(i)(2) Non-taxpayer return information, including address, for nontax criminal investigations Agency head's written request; release only to personnel personally and directly engaged D.C. Circuit (Sept. 8, 2026): IRS procedure likely violates the address and engagement conditions; stay affirmed
    § 6103(i)(3) IRS notice of nontax crimes or imminent danger The IRS, on its own initiative Not at issue

    Does not filing make Colorado ITIN filers invisible to the IRS?

    No. Under 26 U.S.C. § 6051, employers issue W-2s and file copies with the government, so a Weld County packing plant, a Mesa County orchard, a Front Range framing contractor, or a Summit County resort reports wages either way. Paying cash does not help the employer, since § 3403 makes it liable for tax it should have withheld.

    When no return arrives, § 6020(b) lets the IRS prepare one, using only single or married-filing-separately status in its automated program (IRM 5.18.1.6.11.2), so head-of-household rates and child credits vanish. With no return, § 6501(c)(3) allows assessment "at any time," and § 6651 adds 5 percent a month, up to 25 percent, for not filing (triple if fraudulent) plus 0.5 percent a month for not paying. Under § 6109(i)(3), an ITIN unused for three consecutive years expires, requiring a new Form W-7; Treas. Reg. § 301.6109-1(d)(3) calls it a tax-filing number, not an employment number.

    Worked example: what does a Greeley worker with three unfiled years stand to lose?

    Hypothetical. Take a different Greeley meatpacking worker who qualifies as head of household, holds an ITIN, and is a tax resident under the substantial presence test. Her children, ages 5 and 9 at the end of 2024, are citizens with Social Security numbers. She earned $40,000 in W-2 wages, with $1,500 withheld, in each of 2022 through 2024 and filed none of those returns.

    Take 2024. After the $21,900 standard deduction her tax is $1,841, which the $4,000 child tax credit erases, and the $2,159 balance is refundable: a federal refund of $3,659. No federal earned income credit applies, since § 32(c)(1)(E) and (m) require an SSN valid for employment, and from 2025 Pub. L. 119-21 amended § 24(h)(7) to require the parent’s SSN for the child credit too. C.R.S. § 39-22-123.5(2.5) has allowed the state earned income credit without a work-eligible SSN since 2020, about $1,660 here at 50 percent. The child tax credit under C.R.S. § 39-22-129(4.5) adds $600 for the 5-year-old, and the Department of Revenue’s 2024 table for the Family Affordability Tax Credit, C.R.S. § 39-22-130, adds $2,100 and $1,575. All are refundable: about $5,900 in Colorado credits for one year.

    Withholding counts as paid on April 15 after the tax year under § 6513(b)(1), and § 6511(b)(2)(A) limits a late-return refund to tax paid in the prior three years. Her 2022 federal refund expired April 15, 2026; 2023 follows on April 15, 2027. Colorado runs longer: under C.R.S. § 39-21-108(1)(a), no refund is paid if the return is not filed within four years of its due date.

    If the IRS moves first on 2024, a single-status computation yields $2,816 of tax, or $1,316 after withholding, plus about $296 for failure to file, then failure-to-pay charges (§ 6651(g)(2)) and interest. A $3,659 refund becomes a bill above $1,700. She can still file to replace the substitute, but past the § 6511 window her credits only reduce what she owes.

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    How do unfiled years affect discharging tax debt in a Colorado bankruptcy?

    Under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(B), tax is not discharged if no return was filed, or if a late return was filed within two years before the petition, and the paragraph closing § 523(a) excludes § 6020(b) returns from the definition of "return." In In re Mallo, 774 F.3d 1313 (10th Cir. 2014), the Tenth Circuit held that Forms 1040 filed after the IRS had assessed were not returns, because filing requirements include deadlines. In the District of Colorado, tax assessed through a substitute return survives a Chapter 7 discharge, and late-return tax often does too.

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Did the D.C. Circuit hold that the IRS can never give ICE a taxpayer’s address?

    No. It held that the IRS’s procedure likely violated section 6103(i)(2) and affirmed a preliminary stay; the statute still permits disclosure on a fully compliant request.

    Does the IRS still learn about wages if a worker does not file?

    Yes. Employers file W-2 information under 26 U.S.C. § 6051, and the IRS can use it to prepare a substitute for return under § 6020(b).

    How long does a Colorado taxpayer have to claim a refund on an unfiled return?

    For federal withholding, generally three years from the April 15 after the tax year. Colorado pays no refund if its return is not filed within four years of the due date.

    Can Colorado ITIN filers claim the Colorado earned income tax credit?

    Yes. Since 2020, C.R.S. § 39-22-123.5 has allowed it to residents who would qualify for the federal credit but for lacking an SSN valid for employment.

    Is there a deadline for the IRS to assess tax for a year with no return?

    No. Under 26 U.S.C. § 6501(c)(3), tax may be assessed at any time if no return is filed.

    Can taxes from unfiled years be discharged in a Colorado bankruptcy?

    Usually not. Section 523(a)(1)(B) blocks discharge where no return was filed, and in the Tenth Circuit neither a substitute return nor, under In re Mallo, a return filed after assessment counts.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm represents Colorado households and employers on unfiled tax returns, substitute-for-return assessments, penalty abatement, and whether older tax debt can be discharged in bankruptcy. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    Each unfiled year has its own refund deadline and assessment exposure. To review transcripts and deadlines for a household or workforce, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Chapter 12 Bankruptcy in Colorado: Selling Farmland and the Section 1232 Capital Gains Fix

    Chapter 12 Bankruptcy in Colorado: Selling Farmland and the Section 1232 Capital Gains Fix

    Picture a potato grower outside Center farming ground his family bought in the late 1990s. With the operating line tapped out, his exit is selling two quarter-sections. NASS counted 10.80 million hundredweight of Colorado potatoes in storage on February 1, 2025, and russet varieties covered 89.3 percent of reported San Luis Valley potato acres in 2023. Here, Chapter 12 bankruptcy in Colorado often beats Chapter 11, largely because of the tax bill.

    Most bankruptcy chapters make the farmer pay the capital gains tax on that sale in full. A 2017 statute makes Chapter 12 the exception.

    Who qualifies as a Colorado family farmer for Chapter 12?

    Under 11 U.S.C. § 101(18), an individual or married couple qualifies if debts are under the cap, at least half of the noncontingent, liquidated debts come from farming, and more than half of gross income came from farming in the prior tax year or in each of the second and third years before filing. The Family Farmer Relief Act of 2019, Pub. L. 116-51, set the cap at $10,000,000, and 90 Fed. Reg. 8941 (Feb. 4, 2025) raised it to $12,562,250 from April 1, 2025. Family fishermen (§ 101(19A)) face a $2,568,000 cap. In re Mongeau, 633 B.R. 387 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2021), decided inside the Tenth Circuit, held a couple who wound down before filing still eligible.

    Per the U.S. Trustee Program’s trustee list, Colorado has no standing Chapter 12 trustee; one is assigned case by case through the Denver office. Colorado opts out of the federal exemptions (C.R.S. § 13-54-107), so a farm residence falls under the C.R.S. § 38-41-201 homestead exemption ($250,000, or $350,000 for an elderly or disabled owner, spouse, or dependent), and C.R.S. § 13-54-102(1)(g) shields up to $100,000 of livestock, crops, and machinery per couple when agriculture is the principal occupation.

    Why can a Chapter 12 farmer sell land over an undersecured lender’s objection?

    In Chapter 11 and its Subchapter V, a sale under 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) strips liens only if a § 363(f) condition is met. The usual route, § 363(f)(3), asks whether the price exceeds “the aggregate value of all liens.” Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Knupfer (In re PW, LLC), 391 B.R. 25 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008), measured that against the liens’ face amount. On that reading, a lender owed $2.5 million on land bringing $2.4 million can block it.

    Section 1206 permits, “in addition to” § 363(f), a sale of “farmland, farm equipment, or property used to carry out a commercial fishing operation” free and clear, with the lien attaching to proceeds. The farmer exercises that power as debtor in possession under § 1203, and because it remains a § 363(b) sale, the lender keeps its § 363(k) credit bid unless limited for cause.

    What can a Chapter 12 plan sale under section 1222(b)(8) add?

    Section 1222(b)(8) lets the plan “provide for the sale of all or any part of the property of the estate.” Chapter 11 relies on § 1123(b)(4) and the cramdown sale in § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii), which Subchapter V imports through § 1191(c)(1) even though § 1181(a) disables § 1129(b). In re Ditech Holding Corp., 606 B.R. 544 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019), called § 363(f) relief “narrower than that afforded to a debtor under a confirmed plan.”

    The plan is the negotiating table: a lender eager for a sale may let the family keep the home quarter or sell after harvest. Secured claims are protected by § 1225(a)(5). The plan is due in 90 days under § 1221, and § 1224 wants confirmation heard within 45 days after that.

    How does section 1232 change capital gains tax on selling farmland in bankruptcy?

    In Hall v. United States, 566 U.S. 506 (2012), a 5 to 4 Court held that about $29,000 of tax on a farm sold mid-case was not “incurred by the estate” under § 503(b), because a Chapter 12 estate is not a separate taxpayer under 26 U.S.C. § 1399. The plan could neither pay nor discharge it.

    Section 1005 of Division B of Pub. L. 115-72 (Oct. 26, 2017) added 11 U.S.C. § 1232. It covers “any unsecured claim of a governmental unit” arising before the petition, or after it and before discharge, “as a result of the sale, transfer, exchange, or other disposition of any property used in the debtor’s farming operation.” That claim is treated as prepetition and unsecured, loses priority under § 507, must be provided for in the plan, and is discharged under § 1228. It is not limited to capital gains, so equipment recapture appears covered, though ground leased to a neighbor may not count.

    Section 1232(b) runs the liquidation test as if the claim were ordinary prepetition debt, and § 1232(c) lifts the § 523(a)(1)(A) and (B) discharge exceptions. Under § 1232(d), a farmer filing a postpetition return serves it and the claim calculation on the taxing authority, which has 180 days to file a claim; after that the debtor may file one the government cannot amend.

    How is the 1232 claim computed, and does it reach Colorado income tax?

    The statute is silent on the math, and IRM 5.9.9.10.3 sends caseworkers to Area Counsel. The leading case is Colorado’s. In In re Ficken, 430 B.R. 663 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2010), after eastern Colorado ranchers sold cattle under their plan, the panel endorsed the marginal method: prepare the real return, then a pro forma return without the qualifying sales, and protect the difference. Knudsen v. IRS, 581 F.3d 696 (8th Cir. 2009), agreed. Both construed the old § 1222(a)(2)(A), and Hall overtook Ficken on postpetition sales, so using the method under § 1232 is a strong argument, not settled law.

    Section 101(27) defines “governmental unit” to include a State and its departments, so the Colorado Department of Revenue’s claim on the same gain should be treated the same way. Colorado’s C.R.S. § 39-22-518 capital gain subtraction survives for Schedule F filers selling assessor-classified agricultural land acquired from May 9, 1994 through June 3, 2009 and held five years, capped at $100,000 yearly. But a qualified taxpayer cannot have overdue state tax liabilities, which include uncollectible ones “resulting from bankruptcy.”

    What does the math look like for a San Luis Valley potato operation?

    Hypothetical. A married couple farming as sole proprietors near Center owe $3.2 million, $2.5 million of it to their operating lender. They bought 320 acres in 1998 for $400,000 and have a $2.4 million buyer, a gain of about $2,000,000. Federal tax at 20 percent is roughly $400,000 (simplified; active farm gain escapes the 3.8 percent tax under 26 U.S.C. § 1411(c)(1)(A)(iii)). After the $100,000 subtraction, Colorado’s 4.4 percent rate in C.R.S. § 39-22-104(1.7)(c) yields $83,600.

    Under § 1206 the sale closes anyway. Say $200,000 of the lender’s claim ends up unsecured, next to $400,000 owed to vendors. Section 1232 adds the $400,000 federal claim and, on the text, the $83,600 state claim, for a pool of about $1,083,600. If the plan pays that pool $180,000 from disposable income, each creditor gets about 16.6 cents: roughly $66,400 to the IRS and $13,900 to the state. The balance is discharged.

    The couple also fits under the $3,424,000 Subchapter V limit in § 101(51D), but an individual’s Chapter 11 estate is a separate taxpayer under 26 U.S.C. § 1398, so tax on a postpetition sale is a § 507(a)(2) administrative expense, payable in full on the effective date under § 1129(a)(9)(A) or across a nonconsensual plan under § 1191(e). A sale the year before filing creates a § 507(a)(8) priority claim, also paid in full. About $483,600 gets paid either way, if PW did not block the sale.

    Selling Farm Assets Under Pressure? Contact Us Now

    Feature § 363 sale (Ch. 11 / Sub V) § 1206 sale (Ch. 12) Plan sale (Ch. 11 / Sub V) Plan sale (Ch. 12)
    Free and clear over objecting lienholder Only under § 363(f); PW limits (f)(3) Yes; lien moves to proceeds Yes, § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) Yes, § 1222(b)(8) with § 1225(a)(5)
    Credit bid Yes, § 363(k) Yes, § 363(k) Yes, § 363(k) No express provision
    Tax on gain Paid in full as priority § 1232: pro rata, dischargeable Paid in full as priority § 1232: pro rata, dischargeable
    Timing Motion; can close early Motion; can close early At confirmation Plan in 90 days
    Bargaining room Sale terms only Sale terms only Claim treatment and proceeds Retained acres, timing, carve-outs

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Can a Colorado farmer file Chapter 12 after selling off most of the equipment?

    Sometimes. In In re Mongeau, a Kansas bankruptcy court found a couple who had sold most of their farm assets still eligible.

    What is the Chapter 12 debt limit for a family farmer?

    For cases filed since April 1, 2025, aggregate debts cannot exceed $12,562,250 under 11 U.S.C. § 101(18).

    Does section 1232 cover a farmland sale made after filing?

    Yes. It reaches tax claims arising after the petition and before discharge, the gap Hall v. United States exposed.

    What happens to the section 1232 claim if the case is dismissed?

    The claim is discharged only under section 1228, so a dismissal leaves the full tax owed.

    Can the operating lender block a Chapter 12 sale of farmland?

    Not by withholding consent, because section 1206 permits a free-and-clear sale with the lien moving to the proceeds, though the lender may still credit bid.

    Is the Colorado Department of Revenue’s claim covered by section 1232?

    The text reaches any governmental unit, which includes a State, but no controlling Tenth Circuit ruling was located, so the plan should name the state claim.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm handles Colorado bankruptcy filings for farm and ranch families and the tax side of a land sale, including how farm-sale taxes and older IRS balances are discharged in bankruptcy, when Subchapter V fits better, and the Colorado Department of Revenue side. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    Decisions made before a listing is signed fix most of the tax result. To review a Chapter 12 filing or a planned sale, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • SBA Demand Letter in Colorado: Suspension, Treasury Offset, and Bankruptcy After the 2026 EIDL and PPP Fraud Sweep

    SBA Demand Letter in Colorado: Suspension, Treasury Offset, and Bankruptcy After the 2026 EIDL and PPP Fraud Sweep

    The SBA’s September 14, 2026 announcement lists 10,138 suspended Colorado borrowers tied to $558,956,242 in PPP and COVID EIDL approvals. Most will first hear about it from a 30-day letter. If you are holding an SBA demand letter in Colorado, the deadline is real, but the letter is the government’s opening position, not a ruling against you.

    What does an EIDL fraud suspension actually do to a Colorado borrower?

    Per that release, a suspended borrower loses access to future SBA small business and disaster loans and to other SBA programs, including 8(a) contracting. That is an eligibility bar, not a judgment, and it creates no debt. The demand letter comes separately. The SBA Inspector General’s Operation No Doze notice says the letters assert a debt to the United States and explain how to pay or respond; the first 8,000 or so go to Kansas and Missouri. The same operation includes a criminal surge that the Justice Department says reached more than 160 defendants, and a suspension alone does not put you there.

    What happens when the 30 days on a Colorado SBA demand letter run out?

    Collection. Under 31 C.F.R. 285.12, an agency relying on Treasury for offset generally must send a delinquent debt to Treasury’s Cross-Servicing program within 120 days, and 31 U.S.C. 3717(e) passes collection costs to the debtor along with a penalty charge of up to 6 percent a year. The SBA puts interest and fees at up to 28 percent; Treasury’s public cross-servicing pages post no current rate.

    31 U.S.C. 3720A and 26 U.S.C. 6402(d) let Treasury apply your federal income tax refund to the SBA debt without a lawsuit. Section 3716 reaches federal salaries (up to 15 percent of disposable pay under 31 C.F.R. 285.7) and Social Security, which 31 C.F.R. 285.4 limits to the lesser of 15 percent or the amount above $750 a month. Offset has no time limit. It can also be reported to credit bureaus under 31 U.S.C. 3711(e) and posted to HUD’s CAIVRS database, which FHA mortgage lenders check.

    How does the administrative False Claims Act differ from a DOJ case in Colorado?

    The Administrative False Claims Act is the renamed Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act, 31 U.S.C. 3801-3812. Reckless disregard is enough; no intent to defraud is required. Under section 3802 and 13 C.F.R. part 142, the SBA can assess up to twice the false amount plus up to $14,308 per claim. Section 3803 requires Justice Department sign-off, limits the process to claims of $1 million or less (indexed), and holds the hearing in the district where you live or do business, which for a Colorado owner means here, before an SBA administrative law judge. Miss the SBA’s 30-day answer deadline and the default is the maximum.

    A suit under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729 would come from the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Colorado, with treble damages plus $14,308 to $28,619 per claim under 28 C.F.R. 85.5. PPP and EIDL fraud now carry a 10-year limitations period (15 U.S.C. 636(a)(36)(W)). Criminal exposure under 18 U.S.C. 1014, 1040, and 1343 runs as high as 30 years.

    What should a Colorado owner do during the 30 days?

    First, do not call the OIG hotline to explain. Section 3803(a)(1) makes the Inspector General the investigator and preserves that office’s duty to report crimes to the Attorney General, so a casual explanation can become evidence. Then rebuild the file: applications, loan agreement, any personal guaranty, and bank statements tracing the proceeds. EIDL revenue proof means 2019 returns and, for a Colorado retailer or restaurant, state sales tax returns (Form DR 0100), an independent record of gross sales. PPP proof means Forms 941 and payroll registers.

    Next, find out why the loan was flagged. Enforcement targets duplicate applications, phantom businesses, padded headcounts, and personal spending, but data matching also misfires, for example on a mismatched EIN. Section 3716(a) lets you inspect the SBA’s records and request review, and section 3720A(b) allows at least 60 days to dispute before refund offset. An owner who spent the money properly but kept a thin file is nowhere near one who bought a boat. The written response should prove which you are, measured against 13 C.F.R. 123.303.

    Got an SBA Demand Letter? Contact Us Now

    How would the 30 days play out for a Colorado Springs restaurant?

    Hypothetical: an Old Colorado City restaurant LLC got a $150,000 EIDL in 2020 and a $42,000 PPP loan forgiven in 2021. Its letter is dated Tuesday, October 13, 2026 and arrives October 16. Counting 30 days from the letter date (its own wording controls), the deadline is Thursday, November 12.

    By October 19 the owner has counsel, and on October 20 counsel requests the SBA’s records. By October 30 the bank trail accounts for all but $9,500 of the EIDL, which the owner took as draws in place of salary. The PPP file holds the real problem: $48,000 paid to two 1099 cooks was counted as payroll, so $201,600 should have been $153,600, supporting $32,000 rather than $42,000. On November 6 counsel files a response documenting the EIDL spending, treating the draws as reasonable pay and the $10,000 PPP overage as a calculation error. Pursued administratively, that overage caps out at $20,000 plus $14,308 each for the loan and forgiveness applications; in an FCA suit, assuming damages equal the overage, $30,000 plus $28,616 to $57,238.

    Can a Colorado bankruptcy discharge an SBA loan tied to a fraud allegation?

    Usually yes. Under 11 U.S.C. 523(c), a section 523(a)(2) debt is discharged unless the creditor sues within 60 days after the first date set for the creditors’ meeting (Rule 4007(c)). Proof is by a preponderance under Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991), and proven fraud takes multiplied damages with it under Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213 (1998). Because the FCA requires no specific intent, a verdict under it does not settle intent to deceive; United States v. Saavedra, Adv. No. 20-1062-t (Bankr. D.N.M. Sept. 30, 2021) declined to treat one as proving it. And revenue figures may be statements respecting financial condition under Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling, No. 16-1215 (U.S. June 4, 2018), forcing the government into section 523(a)(2)(B) and its reasonable-reliance element.

    Whether FCA penalties are nondischargeable fines under section 523(a)(7) is unsettled, and the firm found no Tenth Circuit ruling. A completed Chapter 13 plan does not except (a)(7) debts, though criminal restitution survives under section 523(a)(13). Poor records can cost the entire discharge under section 727(a). In Subchapter V, section 1192(2) excludes 523(a) debts from a nonconsensual-plan discharge, and In re Cleary Packaging, LLC, 36 F.4th 509 (4th Cir. 2022), In re GFS Industries, LLC, 99 F.4th 223 (5th Cir. 2024), and BenShot, LLC v. 2 Monkey Trading, LLC, No. 23-12342 (11th Cir. July 9, 2025) apply that to corporations, against In re Off-Spec Solutions, LLC, 651 B.R. 862 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2023). Colorado followed the circuits in Marmic Fire & Safety Co. v. ETG Fire, LLC, Adv. No. 24-1225 TBM (Bankr. D. Colo. Mar. 20, 2025). A consensual plan does not help a corporation either, given section 1141(d)(6)(A).

    Filing does pause refund offset. The stay in section 362(a)(7) bars setoff, and section 362(b)(26) only exempts income tax refunds applied to income tax debts, so Treasury needs stay relief to take a refund for an SBA debt. The SBA’s September 23 release says the IRS is also opening examinations, which can end in a Colorado notice of deficiency with its own deadlines.

    Track Who brings it Standard Exposure Forum Bankruptcy
    Suspension SBA Suspected fraud Loss of SBA eligibility; no debt Agency action Not a debt
    Demand letter SBA, then Treasury Past due and enforceable Balance, fees, offset Agency review Dischargeable absent proven fraud
    Administrative FCA SBA with DOJ approval Reason to know; preponderance 2x plus $14,308 per claim SBA judge, in Colorado (a)(2) if fraud; (a)(7) contested
    Civil FCA U.S. Attorney, D. Colo. Knowingly; preponderance 3x plus $14,308 to $28,619 per claim U.S. District Court (a)(2) if fraud; (a)(7) contested
    Criminal referral DOJ Beyond reasonable doubt Up to 30 years; restitution U.S. District Court Restitution survives, (a)(13)

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Is an SBA suspension the same as being charged with fraud?

    No. A suspension bars future SBA loans and programs, but it is not a charge or a judgment. Fraud must be proven later in a separate proceeding.

    Can Treasury take my federal tax refund over an SBA debt?

    Yes, without a judgment, once the debt is certified as past due and enforceable. The SBA must first give notice and at least 60 days to dispute it.

    Does Social Security get taken too?

    Only in part. Treasury takes the lesser of 15 percent of the monthly benefit or the amount above $750.

    Should I call the SBA Inspector General hotline to explain my loan?

    Not before speaking with counsel. That office investigates, and what you tell its agents can be used against you.

    Can I discharge an EIDL in a Colorado Chapter 7?

    Generally yes, unless the government timely sues and proves fraud under section 523(a)(2).

    Does a Subchapter V discharge protect my LLC from SBA fraud claims?

    Probably not. The Colorado bankruptcy court has followed three circuits in holding that section 1192(2) keeps section 523(a) debts alive for corporate debtors; the Tenth Circuit has not ruled.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm handles PPP, EIDL, and other SBA loan problems for Colorado owners, from the first demand-letter response through Treasury offset disputes, Subchapter V cases, and the IRS examinations that can follow. The firm often sees files where the money was spent properly and the paperwork never caught up. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    The first written answer to an SBA letter shapes what follows, and the window is short. To have the letter and loan file reviewed before your deadline, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Colorado S Corporation Bankruptcy After Owoc: Who Pays the Tax on a Section 363 Sale?

    Colorado S Corporation Bankruptcy After Owoc: Who Pays the Tax on a Section 363 Sale?

    A Pueblo machine shop organized as an S corporation loses its largest customer and files Subchapter V. The lender agrees to a $6 million going-concern sale under 11 U.S.C. § 363, and every dollar goes to the bank. Then the CPA calls: the gain belongs on the owner’s personal return. That mismatch sits at the center of a Colorado S corporation bankruptcy, and an August 2026 Eleventh Circuit decision changes the owner’s options.

    Why does a Colorado S corporation bankruptcy sale put the gain on the owner’s Form 1040?

    Under 26 U.S.C. § 1366(a), each S corporation shareholder reports a pro rata share of the company’s income and gain, cash or no cash. Section 1399 says a bankruptcy case creates no separate taxable entity except where section 1398 applies, and section 1398 covers only individuals in Chapter 7 or 11. A corporation’s estate is not a separate taxpayer, so gain on a court-approved sale passes straight through.

    Colorado taxes that gain as well, at a flat 4.4% of federal taxable income under C.R.S. § 39-22-104(1.7). The proceeds are estate property under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) and go to creditors. The owner receives a K-1 and no check.

    What did the Eleventh Circuit decide in Owoc?

    John Owoc, sole shareholder of Vital Pharmaceuticals (maker of Bang energy drinks), elected S status in 1997. VPX filed Chapter 11 in 2022, a new board removed him as CEO, and in July 2023 the company sold its assets to a Monster Energy subsidiary. The bankruptcy court refused to confirm that the stay let him revoke or terminate the election, holding in In re Vital Pharmaceuticals, 655 B.R. 374 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2023), that the election was estate property.

    The Eleventh Circuit reversed in Owoc v. Liquidating Trustee, No. 24-14048 (11th Cir. Aug. 10, 2026). The stay in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) protects estate property, and an S election is not estate property because shareholders, not the corporation, decide whether it starts and whether it ends. The panel followed In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d 736 (3d Cir. 2013), and distinguished the loss carryback refunds treated as estate property in Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966), since an NOL is fixed at filing and shareholders cannot take it away. Quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972), it required “a legitimate claim of entitlement,” not mere enjoyment of a benefit.

    Two details matter. The corporation files the revocation statement, signed by someone authorized to sign its return (Treas. Reg. § 1.1362-6(a)), and Owoc conceded he could not make VPX’s new managers file. And the court remanded whether laches bars his request to terminate after the sale closed.

    Would a Colorado bankruptcy court follow Owoc, and can a trustee undo a revocation?

    A search of Tenth Circuit, Tenth Circuit BAP and District of Colorado bankruptcy decisions found no ruling, so a Colorado judge would write on a clean slate. On one side sit Majestic Star, Owoc and In re Health Diagnostic Laboratory, Inc., 578 B.R. 552 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2017), where a liquidating trustee lost an attempt to avoid a revocation made about five months before the petition. On the other is In re Trans-Lines West, Inc., 203 B.R. 653 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1996), which treated a revocation made 28 days before a Chapter 11 filing as a transfer the trustee could attack under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a).

    Section 548 reaches only a transfer of “an interest of the debtor in property,” and courts that call the election shareholder property make that element hard to meet. Breach of duty is the likelier fight in a Subchapter V case, where the owner usually runs the debtor in possession and would sign the revocation as its officer. Owoc had one shareholder; where there are several, nonconsenting holders may push back. See also the firm’s post on how trustees recover LLC distributions after Weinstein.

    What can an owner lawfully do with the S election before the sale year?

    Revocation under 26 U.S.C. § 1362(d)(1) needs consent from holders of more than half the outstanding shares, voting and nonvoting combined (Treas. Reg. § 1.1362-2(a)). One made by the 15th day of the third month (March 15 for a calendar-year company) is effective January 1 of that year; a later one takes effect the following January 1 unless it names a prospective date.

    A mid-year date carries a trap. Section 1362(e)(2) spreads the year’s income across the S and C short years day by day, so an October closing could leave most of the gain on the S side. Avoiding that takes a closing-of-the-books election under section 1362(e)(3), signed by every shareholder in the S short year and on the first day of the C short year.

    Termination is the other route. Moving one share to a corporation, a partnership or a nonresident alien breaks eligibility under section 1361(b)(1), ending the election that day under section 1362(d)(2)(B). Either way, section 1362(g) bars re-electing for five years without IRS consent. The post-termination transition period in section 1377(b) then lets the owner use losses suspended for lack of basis under section 1366(d)(3).

    S Corp Headed Into Bankruptcy? Contact Us Now

    How does the math work for a Pueblo manufacturer selling for $6 million?

    Hypothetical: a calendar-year Pueblo machining company, wholly owned by a Colorado resident, files Subchapter V in February 2027 and closes a § 363 sale that July for $6 million. Equipment and inventory bring their $1 million basis; the other $5 million is self-created goodwill with zero basis. The bank, owed $7.2 million, has a lien on everything. Assume the goodwill gain is long-term capital gain at the 20% rate in 26 U.S.C. § 1(h) and ignore the net investment income tax.

    With the election intact, the owner reports $5 million of gain, owing about $1,000,000 federal and $220,000 Colorado tax on a distribution of zero.

    Had the owner revoked in November 2026, effective January 1, 2027, the company would owe federal tax at 21% under 26 U.S.C. § 11(b), or $1,050,000, plus about $220,000 at Colorado’s 4.4% corporate rate under C.R.S. § 39-22-301. Those post-petition taxes are administrative expenses under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B), paid ahead of unsecured creditors, and a nonconsensual Subchapter V plan may stretch them out under 11 U.S.C. § 1191(e). That November revocation also falls inside section 548’s two-year reach.

    An offset often goes unnoticed. The gain raises the owner’s stock basis by $5 million under section 1367(a)(1), applied first under section 1367(b)(3). If the stock becomes worthless that same year, section 165(g) produces a capital loss that can absorb the capital gain, free of the $3,000 limit section 1211(b) sets against ordinary income. Worthlessness that slips into 2028, or ordinary recapture income, breaks the match.

    Should a Colorado S corporation make the PTE election in a bankruptcy sale year?

    Under C.R.S. § 39-22-343, an S corporation may elect annually, on its return, to pay Colorado tax at the entity level, at the corporate rate under section 39-22-344, with each owner taking a refundable credit under C.R.S. § 39-22-347. It exists only while federal law caps the individual SALT deduction, as 26 U.S.C. § 164(b)(6) now does.

    In a sale year the election shifts the Colorado slice ($220,000 above) from the owner to the estate as an administrative expense; the federal bill stays put. The choice belongs to the debtor in possession, which carries a trustee’s duties under 11 U.S.C. § 1184, and Owoc’s control test cuts against the owner here, because the entity makes this election on its own return. Not electing keeps the default; electing while creditors go unpaid is a choice the Subchapter V trustee will want explained.

    Approach Who bears tax on the sale gain What it takes Main risk
    Keep the S election Owner (Form 1040 and Colorado 104) Nothing Tax with no cash
    Revoke effective January 1 of the sale year Corporation: 21% federal, 4.4% Colorado Majority-of-shares consent; corporate statement by March 15 Avoidance or duty claims; five-year bar
    Mid-year revocation or share-transfer termination Split between owner and corporation Closing-of-the-books election signed by all affected shareholders Daily allocation; laches after the sale
    Keep S status, make the PTE election Federal: owner. Colorado: entity Election on the entity’s return Shifts Colorado tax to creditors

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Does filing bankruptcy end a company’s S corporation status?

    No. Filing is not a terminating event under section 1362, and under 26 U.S.C. § 1399 the corporate estate is not a separate taxpayer, so the election continues.

    Is Owoc binding on Colorado bankruptcy courts?

    No. Colorado is in the Tenth Circuit, which has not ruled, so Owoc and Majestic Star are persuasive only.

    What is the deadline to revoke an S election for the current year?

    For a calendar-year corporation, a revocation made by March 15 reaches back to January 1; a later one takes effect the next January 1 unless it names a prospective date.

    Can an owner revoke the election after the company files bankruptcy?

    The Third and Eleventh Circuits say the automatic stay does not block it. In Colorado the question is open, and the corporation must still file the statement.

    Will revoking the S election hurt the company’s creditors?

    It can. The C corporation then owes its own tax on the gain, and a post-petition tax of the estate is an administrative expense that comes ahead of unsecured claims.

    Can the owner deduct anything when the stock becomes worthless?

    Often. Pass-through gain raises stock basis, and a worthless-stock capital loss in the same year can absorb capital gain; timing and the gain’s character decide how much.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm works with Colorado owners where bankruptcy and tax overlap, from Subchapter V reorganizations and Chapter 11 asset sales to the tax structuring of a business sale. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    The S election is easiest to address before the sale year begins. To review the timing and numbers, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • IRS Statute of Limitations in Colorado After Murrin: When a Preparer’s Fraud Keeps Old Tax Years Open

    IRS Statute of Limitations in Colorado After Murrin: When a Preparer’s Fraud Keeps Old Tax Years Open

    Picture a retired Fort Collins couple who signed whatever their longtime storefront preparer handed them. In 2026 an IRS letter arrives proposing tax for 2016, a year they assumed was long closed, because the preparer padded their returns. The first question a Colorado tax attorney hears is whether the IRS statute of limitations has already run. In the U.S. Tax Court, the honest answer right now is that it probably has not, even though the couple did nothing wrong.

    That answer hardened this summer, when the Supreme Court declined to settle the question.

    Did the Supreme Court resolve the preparer fraud question in Murrin?

    No. The Supreme Court docket in Murrin v. Commissioner, No. 25-988, shows the petition was considered at the June 18, 2026 conference and denied on June 22. The case came from Murrin v. Commissioner, 158 F.4th 527 (3d Cir. 2025), which held that 26 U.S.C. § 6501(c)(1) applies to any “false or fraudulent return with the intent to evade tax,” whoever held the intent. The parties stipulated that the preparer, not the Murrins, committed fraud on their 1990s returns.

    The Third Circuit openly parted ways with BASR Partnership v. United States, 795 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2015), where a divided panel required the taxpayer’s own intent. Other appellate cases are thinner. In City Wide Transit, Inc. v. Commissioner, 709 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2013), the taxpayer conceded the legal rule, and the Third Circuit declined to rely on it for that reason. In Finnegan v. Commissioner, 926 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2019), the court found the challenge waived and never reached the merits. A cert denial decides nothing, but the split now stands.

    Which IRS statute of limitations rule governs a Colorado case in Tax Court Denver?

    The Tax Court’s rule comes from Allen v. Commissioner, 128 T.C. 37 (2007): a preparer’s intent to evade is enough. The court reaffirmed Allen in Murrin (T.C. Memo. 2024-10) and declined to revisit it after BASR.

    Under Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), aff’d, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971), the Tax Court follows a court of appeals decision squarely in point when the appeal would go to that circuit. A Colorado individual appeals to the Tenth Circuit under 26 U.S.C. § 7482(b)(1)(A). The Murrin Supreme Court briefing, which surveyed the circuits, cites no Tenth Circuit decision on whose intent counts, and research for this post found none. The nearest is Davis v. Commissioner, 184 F.2d 86 (10th Cir. 1950), which threw out a fraud penalty against taxpayers who gave their accountant full information. That is a penalty holding, so a judge at the Tax Court’s Denver trial location should be expected to apply Allen.

    The Tenth Circuit is writing on a clean slate and could adopt BASR, but only if the taxpayer preserves the issue. Finnegan shows what happens otherwise.

    Does paying first and suing for a refund change the limitations answer?

    It can. A refund suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) may go to the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado or to the Court of Federal Claims. The Court of Federal Claims is bound by BASR. A Denver district judge is bound by neither Allen nor BASR.

    Getting there is expensive. Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960), requires full payment of the assessment first, which on a decade-old year includes the interest. The claim must be timely under 26 U.S.C. § 6511(a), which for an old year usually means within two years of payment, and 26 U.S.C. § 6532(a)(1) bars suit for six months unless the IRS rules sooner.

    BASR is also less settled than its reputation. It involved an outside shelter lawyer, a concurring judge suggested an “authorized agent” might count, and the government argued in Murrin that BASR left the preparer question open. A related post covers the broader trade-offs in choosing between Tax Court, a refund suit, or bankruptcy after a Colorado notice of deficiency.

    How would preparer fraud play out for a hypothetical Fort Collins couple?

    Hypothetical: Dana and Luis’s preparer added $28,000 a year of invented Schedule C expenses and charitable gifts to their timely 2016, 2017 and 2018 joint returns. At an assumed 25 percent bracket for 2016 and 2017 and 22 percent for 2018, the federal deficiencies are $7,000, $7,000 and $6,160, or $20,160 in all. A 20 percent accuracy penalty under 26 U.S.C. § 6662 would add $4,032. Interest under 26 U.S.C. § 6601(a) runs from each original due date and compounds daily, so the 2016 balance has been growing for more than nine years.

    Every ordinary deadline is gone: the last three-year period closed in 2022 and the last six-year period under § 6501(e) in 2025. The six-year rule would not have helped anyway, because it reaches omitted gross income, and padded deductions omit none. The IRS’s case rests entirely on § 6501(c)(1).

    Colorado follows. C.R.S. 39-22-104 taxes federal taxable income, at 4.63 percent for those years, so each $28,000 adjustment carries about $1,296 of Colorado tax before interest. C.R.S. 39-21-107(2) gives the state one year beyond the federal assessment period, 39-21-107(4) has a Colorado fraud exception worded much like the federal one, and C.R.S. 39-22-601.5 requires a report of final federal adjustments within 180 days.

    What should a Colorado taxpayer do in the first 30 days after the IRS letter?

    Pull IRS account and return transcripts for every year named. They confirm filing dates and what has been assessed. If a notice of deficiency has issued, the 90-day petition deadline in 26 U.S.C. § 6213(a) controls. A corrected amended return will not start a new clock; Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464 U.S. 386 (1984), held that § 6501(c)(1) still applies after one is filed.

    Then document the preparer. Any taxpayer, Colorado residents included, can file a Form 14157 return preparer complaint, and an individual Form 1040 filer whose preparer altered the return without consent can use Form 14157-A to request account changes, with significant supporting evidence. The government can pursue the preparer under 26 U.S.C. § 6694(b) (the greater of $5,000 or 75 percent of the preparer’s income from the return), 26 U.S.C. § 6701, and an injunction under 26 U.S.C. § 7407. None of that shrinks the taxpayer’s bill, but a complaint on file helps the penalty defense.

    Preparer Fraud Letter from the IRS? Contact Us Now

    What can a Colorado tax attorney still win if the limitations defense fails?

    An open period is not a proven case. Tax Court Rule 142(b) and 26 U.S.C. § 7454(a) put the burden on the IRS to prove fraud by clear and convincing evidence. The Murrins stipulated to it. Nobody else has to, and proving a preparer’s intent a decade later is real work.

    Penalties are a separate fight. The 75 percent fraud penalty in 26 U.S.C. § 6663 fits an innocent taxpayer poorly, and on a joint return § 6663(c) requires that spouse’s own fraud. The accuracy penalty yields to reasonable cause and good faith under 26 U.S.C. § 6664(c)(1). United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241 (1985), accepts reliance on a professional’s substantive advice, and Neonatology Associates, P.A. v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 43 (2000), aff’d, 299 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2002), looks at the adviser’s competence, the completeness of what the taxpayer disclosed, and good-faith reliance. Ms. Murrin conceded her penalties. Nobody should do that by default.

    On the collection side, a hearing under 26 U.S.C. § 6330 will not reopen a liability the taxpayer could have contested after a notice of deficiency, but it still offers installment agreements, offers in compromise, and spousal defenses. Under Rev. Proc. 2016-22, IRS Counsel generally refers a docketed Tax Court case to Appeals for settlement consideration, and the split gives Appeals something to weigh.

    Forum Pay first? Limitations rule today Appeal goes to
    U.S. Tax Court (Denver trial site) No; petition within 90 days of the notice Allen: preparer fraud keeps the period open Tenth Circuit, no ruling yet
    Refund suit, D. Colo. Yes, full payment, then a timely § 6511 claim Open; neither Allen nor BASR binds Tenth Circuit
    Refund suit, Court of Federal Claims Yes, same rules BASR: taxpayer intent required, though the preparer question is disputed Federal Circuit

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Did the Supreme Court decide Murrin v. Commissioner?

    No. It denied certiorari on June 22, 2026, leaving the Third Circuit’s decision and the circuit split in place.

    Can the IRS assess tax at any time if my preparer committed fraud without my knowledge?

    In the Tax Court, yes, under Allen v. Commissioner, if the IRS proves the preparer’s fraud by clear and convincing evidence. The Court of Federal Claims follows BASR instead.

    Has the Tenth Circuit ruled on preparer fraud and the statute of limitations?

    No Tenth Circuit decision on that question was found. Until one exists, the Tax Court applies Allen to Colorado cases.

    Does the six-year rule apply when a preparer inflated deductions?

    Usually not. Section 6501(e) reaches omitted gross income, and padded deductions alone do not omit income.

    Will Colorado also assess if the IRS does?

    Very likely. Colorado’s income tax assessment period runs one year past the federal period under C.R.S. 39-21-107(2), and final federal adjustments must be reported to the state within 180 days.

    Can I avoid penalties if my preparer caused the problem?

    Often there is a real argument. The accuracy penalty does not apply with reasonable cause and good faith, and reliance on a competent preparer who had complete information can qualify.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm represents individuals and businesses facing old-year deficiency notices and fraud-based assessments, including Tax Court litigation, penalty abatement, and IRS Appeals and CDP hearings. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    In preparer-fraud cases the choice of court and the preservation of the limitations issue usually happen in the first few weeks. If an IRS letter has reopened a year you thought was closed, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Colorado Foreclosure After Obduskey: Why the FDCPA Won’t Stop a Public Trustee Sale and What Will

    Colorado Foreclosure After Obduskey: Why the FDCPA Won’t Stop a Public Trustee Sale and What Will

    Colorado homeowners who get a letter from a foreclosure law firm often assume the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act lets them demand verification and slow things down. In a Colorado public trustee foreclosure, that assumption is mostly wrong. The Tenth Circuit said so in 2018, and the Supreme Court agreed the following year.

    So where does the real protection sit once a sale date is on the calendar? This post covers what Obduskey took away, how the Colorado process runs, and the federal tools that still work, ending with a timeline for a Lakewood homeowner who also has an IRS lien.

    What did Obduskey decide about the FDCPA and Colorado foreclosures?

    Dennis Obduskey asked the law firm foreclosing on his Colorado home to verify the debt under the FDCPA. It kept going, and he sued. In Obduskey v. Wells Fargo, 879 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2018), the court acknowledged a circuit split and held that “[e]ntities engaged in non-judicial foreclosure actions in Colorado are not debt collectors under the FDCPA.”

    A unanimous Supreme Court affirmed in Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP, 586 U.S. 466, 139 S. Ct. 1029 (2019). Its holding: “A business engaged in no more than nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings is not a ‘debt collector’ under the FDCPA, except for the limited purpose of §1692f(6).” The key was the last sentence of 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6), which says that “[f]or the purpose of section 1692f(6)” the term “also includes” a business whose principal purpose is enforcing security interests.

    What’s left is narrow. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6) still bars taking or threatening “nonjudicial action to effect dispossession or disablement of property” when there’s no present right to possession, no present intention to take it, or the property is exempt. Justice Sotomayor concurred, calling it “too close a case” for certainty and warning against a security interest used as a “stalking horse” for ordinary collection. Colorado’s own statute follows the same pattern: C.R.S. § 5-16-103(3)(d) treats a security-interest enforcer as a “collection agency” only for purposes of C.R.S. § 5-16-108(1)(f), the state version of the dispossession rule.

    How does a Colorado public trustee foreclosure move from notice to sale?

    In general terms, the lender records a Notice of Election and Demand (the NED) with the county public trustee. Under C.R.S. § 38-38-103, the public trustee mails a combined notice within 20 calendar days after recording and again 45 to 60 days before the first scheduled sale. For non-agricultural property, C.R.S. § 38-38-108 sets the sale no less than 110 and no more than 125 calendar days after the NED is recorded.

    The only judicial step is a motion in district court under C.R.C.P. 120 for an order authorizing the sale. The court looks at whether a default exists that permits a power of sale and checks Servicemembers Civil Relief Act status. The order isn’t a final judgment.

    The owner’s main state-law lifeline is the cure right in C.R.S. § 38-38-104. A written notice of intent to cure is due 15 calendar days before the sale, and the money by 12 noon the day before. Once the gavel falls, the owner has no redemption period for foreclosures started after January 1, 2008. Under C.R.S. § 38-38-302, only junior lienors redeem.

    Which federal servicing rules still apply in a Colorado foreclosure?

    Regulation X binds the servicer, so Obduskey doesn’t touch it. Under 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(f)(1), a servicer can’t make the first notice or filing that state law requires to start a judicial or non-judicial foreclosure until the loan is more than 120 days delinquent. A complete loss mitigation application filed in that window generally has to be decided first.

    After the foreclosure starts, § 1024.41(g) takes over: a complete application received more than 37 days before the sale bars the servicer from moving for an order of sale or conducting the sale until the borrower is found ineligible, rejects the offers, or defaults on an agreement. Under 12 C.F.R. § 1024.30, these rules cover only a principal residence, and small servicers are mostly exempt, though § 1024.41(j) keeps them to the 120-day rule.

    How does Chapter 13 stop a Colorado foreclosure sale, and when is it too late?

    A bankruptcy petition triggers the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), which halts lien enforcement against estate property. Under C.R.S. § 38-38-109, the holder then has one year after the stay ends to ask the public trustee to restart, or the foreclosure is withdrawn.

    Chapter 13 adds a cure. The plan can’t rewrite a mortgage on the principal residence because of 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2), but § 1322(b)(5) lets the debtor cure the default within a reasonable time while keeping up current payments. The deadline is § 1322(c)(1): the cure is available “until such residence is sold at a foreclosure sale that is conducted in accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law.” In In re McCarn, 218 B.R. 154 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1998), a Wyoming case, the Tenth Circuit’s bankruptcy appellate panel held the cure right ended at the sale despite a later state redemption period. Colorado owners don’t even have that period. File before the auction.

    Repeat filers get less. If one prior case was dismissed within the past year, § 362(c)(3) ends the stay on the 30th day unless the court extends it on a showing of good faith. With two or more such dismissals, § 362(c)(4) means no stay arises unless the court imposes one. A lender that proves a scheme involving multiple filings or unauthorized transfers can get in rem relief under § 362(d)(4), which, once recorded, binds later cases for two years.

    What does the timeline look like for a Lakewood homeowner with an IRS lien?

    Take a hypothetical Lakewood owner who is $27,400 behind on the mortgage. The NED is recorded with the Jefferson County Public Trustee on Friday, August 7, 2026, so the sale window runs from November 25 to December 10. Say the sale is set for Wednesday, December 2. If the Rule 120 notice sets an October 21 response date, that’s the deadline to contest the default there.

    For Regulation X, a complete application has to reach the servicer by October 25 to land more than 37 days before the sale. Under the cure statute, the notice of intent to cure is due by Tuesday, November 17, and the funds by noon on Tuesday, December 1. A Chapter 13 petition still preserves the § 1322(b)(5) cure if it’s filed before the December 2 sale. Spread over a 60-month plan, the $27,400 is roughly $457 a month on top of the regular payment, before the trustee’s commission.

    Now add a Notice of Federal Tax Lien filed in Jefferson County in 2024 for $38,000 of 2021 and 2022 income tax. Under 26 U.S.C. § 7425, if that lien was filed more than 30 days before the sale and the IRS doesn’t get written notice at least 25 days ahead, the sale leaves the lien in place. Even with notice, the IRS can redeem within 120 days, a right the owner no longer has. In Chapter 13, priority taxes have to be paid in full under § 1322(a)(2), while older balances may qualify for discharge of tax debt, depending on filing and assessment dates.

    Have a Colorado Foreclosure Sale Date? Contact Us Now

    How do the FDCPA, Regulation X, the cure right, and Chapter 13 compare?

    Protection Who it binds What it does Timing in a Colorado sale
    FDCPA after Obduskey Debt collectors; foreclosure-only firms only under § 1692f(6) Bars nonjudicial dispossession without a present right or intent Applies throughout, but narrow
    Regulation X, 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41 Mortgage servicers (principal residence) 120-day wait; dual-tracking limits once a complete application is in Application more than 37 days before sale
    Colorado cure, C.R.S. § 38-38-104 Holder and public trustee Reinstates the loan by paying the cure amount Intent 15 days before sale; funds by noon the day before
    Chapter 13, 11 U.S.C. §§ 362, 1322 All creditors, including the IRS Stops the sale; cures arrears over the plan Petition filed before the sale

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Can I still demand debt validation from a Colorado foreclosure firm?

    You can ask, but a firm doing nothing more than a nonjudicial foreclosure isn’t required to answer under the FDCPA after Obduskey. Your servicer still has its own obligations under Regulation X.

    Does the Rule 120 hearing let me challenge the whole loan?

    Generally no. The Rule 120 court looks at whether a default exists that authorizes the sale and at servicemember status. Broader disputes usually belong in a separate case.

    Is there a redemption period after a Colorado foreclosure sale?

    Not for the owner in foreclosures started after January 1, 2008. Junior lienors can redeem if they file a notice of intent within eight business days after the sale. The IRS has its own 120-day federal redemption right when its lien is discharged by the sale.

    Can I file Chapter 13 the morning of the sale?

    A petition filed before the sale stops it and keeps the cure right under § 1322(c)(1). Waiting until the last minute leaves little room for error, and repeat filers may get a shorter stay or none.

    Does Regulation X apply if my servicer is a small company?

    Small servicers are exempt from most of § 1024.41. They still can’t start a foreclosure until the loan is more than 120 days delinquent, and they can’t proceed while you’re performing under a loss mitigation agreement.

    What happens to an IRS lien when my Colorado home is foreclosed?

    If the IRS didn’t get proper notice before the sale, its lien stays on the property. If it did, the lien comes off but the IRS can redeem within 120 days. Either way, you still owe the tax.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm handles Colorado Chapter 13 cases filed to stop foreclosure sales, along with the tax side, including federal tax liens and IRS claims in bankruptcy. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    The days before the cure deadline matter most. If you’re facing a sale date, especially with tax debt in the picture, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Default Interest and Lender Fees in a Colorado Commercial Real Estate Bankruptcy: Section 506(b) After Desert Willow

    Default Interest and Lender Fees in a Colorado Commercial Real Estate Bankruptcy: Section 506(b) After Desert Willow

    An owner of a Denver warehouse or a Colorado Springs retail strip facing a public trustee sale eventually sees the lender’s payoff figure, and it usually runs well past principal and ordinary interest because the note has flipped to a default rate and the lender’s late charges and legal bills ride along. If the owner files Chapter 11 before the sale, a Colorado bankruptcy court decides how much of that default interest the lender actually gets, and under which law.

    A July 2026 New York ruling split those charges at the petition date. Here is what that split means for a Colorado owner under Section 506(b), with the numbers on a $4 million loan.

    What did the Desert Willow decision hold about Section 506(b)?

    In In re 1300 Desert Willow Rd., LLC, No. 25-11375 (PB) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2026) (bench decision), Judge Philip Bentley ruled on a single-asset debtor’s objection to its lender’s roughly $26 million claim. Oddly for a New York case, the collateral was an industrial plant in New Mexico, inside the Tenth Circuit.

    The court held that the word “reasonable” in Section 506(b) reaches only charges accruing after the petition. Earlier charges stand or fall under the law governing the loan, New York law there. The debtor still got relief, just from state law: prepetition late fees were struck as a penalty because they duplicated default interest. Postpetition late fees fell under Section 506(b), while default-rate interest after filing was allowed if the sale shows the lender oversecured.

    Why does the petition date split a Colorado lender’s claim in two?

    A claim is fixed “as of the date of the filing of the petition” and disallowed only if unenforceable “under any agreement or applicable law.” 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1). As the Supreme Court put it, “[c]reditors’ entitlements in bankruptcy arise in the first instance from the underlying substantive law creating the debtor’s obligation.” Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 549 U.S. 443 (2007).

    Postpetition amounts come in through 11 U.S.C. § 506(b), which gives a lender whose collateral exceeds its claim “interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided for under the agreement or State statute under which such claim arose.” United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989), read the interest clause as standing alone, while fees need both a contractual (or, since 2005, statutory) basis and reasonableness. An undersecured lender gets none of it, which is why the equity cushion drives everything below.

    Where do the Tenth Circuit and the District of Colorado stand?

    The firm has found no published Tenth Circuit decision choosing a side. The closest language is in In re Gledhill, 164 F.3d 1338 (10th Cir. 1999), which said oversecured creditors “are entitled to interest, penalties, attorney fees, and costs that accrue before the debtor’s bankruptcy petition is filed,” while later charges “are permitted only if authorized under 11 U.S.C. § 506(b).” That was framing, not a holding (the case was about a judgment lien), but it reads a lot like Judge Bentley’s line.

    The Tenth Circuit’s Bankruptcy Appellate Panel requires an allowed secured claim, oversecured status, a fee right in the agreement or a state statute, and a reasonable amount. In re Sun ‘N Fun Waterpark, LLC, 408 B.R. 361 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2009). And in Denver, Judge Matsch applied an 18 percent default rate instead of the 10 percent note rate from acceleration forward and upheld 4 percent late charges, but sent the fee award back for a proper reasonableness review. In re Neusteter Realty Co., 79 B.R. 30 (D. Colo. 1987).

    The other camp exists too. The en banc Eleventh Circuit applied reasonableness to fees whether they vested before or after filing, treating the excess as unsecured. In re Welzel, 275 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2001). The Fifth Circuit agreed in In re 804 Congress, L.L.C., 756 F.3d 368 (5th Cir. 2014).

    How does the Colorado public trustee timeline push owners into Chapter 11?

    For non-agricultural property, the first sale date falls 110 to 125 calendar days after the notice of election and demand is recorded. C.R.S. § 38-38-108(1). A notice of intent to cure is due 15 calendar days before the sale. C.R.S. § 38-38-104. Talks often run to the wire, so the petition lands days before the sale.

    A building producing substantially all of the owner’s income is often single asset real estate under 11 U.S.C. § 101(51B). A company whose main business is owning that property isn’t a small business debtor, so Subchapter V is out (and its debt cap has been $3,424,000 since April 1, 2025). Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3), the debtor then has 90 days from the order for relief to file a plan with a reasonable possibility of confirmation or start monthly payments at the “nondefault contract rate of interest” on the value of the lender’s interest. Those payments preserve the stay. They don’t stop default interest from accruing.

    Public Trustee Sale Date Approaching? Contact Us Now

    What does the math look like on a $4 million Colorado loan?

    Say a Denver LLC owns one industrial building appraised at $5.5 million, with a $4 million interest-only note at 6 percent ($20,000 a month) that jumps to 11 percent on default and charges 5 percent on late installments. The owner misses the February 2026 payment, the lender accelerates, and the owner files September 15.

    Over those seven and a half months, interest at 11 percent comes to $275,000, and $125,000 of it is the default spread. With eight $1,000 late charges and $40,000 of foreclosure fees, the claim is about $4,323,000 on the petition date. Under Desert Willow, that $125,000, the $8,000 and the $40,000 are tested under the note and Colorado law. Under Welzel, the fees and late charges would also face a reasonableness review.

    If the case runs a year, the 11 percent rate adds $440,000 (another $200,000 of spread), the lender bills $60,000 in fees, and the 6 percent Section 362(d)(3) payments cover about $259,000. All of that is a Section 506(b) question, and with a cushion still above $900,000 the lender stays oversecured. The spread alone totals about $325,000.

    Colorado lets parties agree to rates up to 45 percent a year, C.R.S. § 5-12-103, and the 8 percent rate in C.R.S. § 5-12-102 applies only absent an agreed rate. A penalty challenge to prepetition charges would likely run through the liquidated damages test in Klinger v. Adams County School District No. 50, 130 P.3d 1027 (Colo. 2006). Whether a duplicative late charge fails that test is a state-law question for Colorado-licensed counsel.

    Can cure and reinstatement under Section 1124(2) stop the default rate?

    A plan can leave the loan unimpaired by curing the default, reinstating the original maturity, and compensating the lender for reliance damages. 11 U.S.C. § 1124(2). That undoes acceleration, so after confirmation the note runs at 6 percent again, saving about $16,667 a month for the rest of the term.

    The default interest already accrued is harder. Under 11 U.S.C. § 1123(d), the cure amount “shall be determined in accordance with the underlying agreement and applicable nonbankruptcy law,” and the Ninth Circuit read that to require default interest the note calls for. In re New Investments, Inc., 840 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2016). A Colorado debtor would parse the note and point to the state cure statute, which leaves out principal due only by acceleration and caps interest during a sale continuance at the regular rate. Whether that carries into a bankruptcy cure is an argument, not settled law.

    Which law governs each charge in a Colorado case?

    Charge Governing law (Desert Willow view) Burden Remedies
    Prepetition default interest Note and Colorado law, § 502(b)(1) Filed claim is prima facie valid (Rule 3001(f)); objector must rebut State-law enforceability or penalty challenge
    Prepetition late charges and fees Note and Colorado law; Welzel courts add § 506(b) reasonableness Same shifting burden Duplication and penalty arguments
    Postpetition default interest § 506(b), only if oversecured Desert Willow presumes the contract default rate; debtor must rebut Valuation fight; cure and reinstatement
    Postpetition fees and late charges § 506(b) reasonableness Lender must meet the four Sun ‘N Fun elements Reasonableness and duplication objections

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Does Desert Willow bind a Colorado bankruptcy court?

    No. A D. Colo. judge can treat it only as persuasive, though its reasoning tracks language the Tenth Circuit used in Gledhill.

    Can a lender collect default interest after a Colorado Chapter 11 filing?

    Only if it’s oversecured. Section 506(b) lets an oversecured lender add postpetition interest, and courts often start from the contract rate, including a default rate. An undersecured lender gets no postpetition interest.

    Can a single-asset real estate company use Subchapter V?

    Generally no. The small business debtor definition excludes a company whose primary activity is owning single asset real estate, so most Colorado building owners file under regular Chapter 11.

    What does the 90-day SARE deadline require?

    File a plan with a reasonable possibility of confirmation, or start monthly interest payments at the nondefault contract rate. If the SARE finding comes late, the deadline can run 30 days from that finding. Missing it invites stay relief.

    Does curing the loan in a plan wipe out default interest already charged?

    Not automatically, because Section 1123(d) ties the cure amount to the loan documents and applicable nonbankruptcy law. Reinstatement does stop the default rate going forward.

    Who decides whether a late charge on a Colorado loan is a penalty?

    The bankruptcy court, when it rules on a claim objection. Under the Desert Willow view, it would apply Colorado contract law to prepetition charges.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm represents business owners in Chapter 11 and Subchapter V cases, including objections to a lender’s default interest and fees, and handles the real estate tax side of a restructuring. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    Once a notice of election and demand is recorded, the clock is running. To go over the loan documents before the sale date, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Kittrell and the Ten-Year Reach-Back: Can a Colorado Bankruptcy Trustee Unwind a Children’s Trust?

    Kittrell and the Ten-Year Reach-Back: Can a Colorado Bankruptcy Trustee Unwind a Children’s Trust?

    Plenty of Colorado business owners set up a trust for their kids years ago, often around the time they signed a personal guaranty on a bank or SBA loan. If the business later fails and a Chapter 7 case follows, the bankruptcy trustee will look hard at that trust, and the belief that it’s safe because four years have passed can be badly wrong.

    A July 2026 decision out of Arizona shows why. This post asks which federal bankruptcy rules and Colorado statutes can still reach a children’s trust funded seven or eight years before the petition.

    What did the bankruptcy court decide in Kittrell?

    In Linscott v. Kittrell (In re Kittrell), Adv. No. 4:22-ap-00206-BMW (Bankr. D. Ariz. July 24, 2026), a Chapter 7 trustee sued two debtors and the Kittrell Children’s Trust they formed in October 2014, about seven years and four months before their February 2022 petition. They moved their whole business into the trust while two judgments were unpaid and a loan suit was pending, and named themselves trustees. The court ruled for the trustee on both theories, found the holdings worth at least $15 million at filing, and entered the $6.5 million judgment the trustee requested.

    Irrevocability and anti-reversion clauses didn’t help. The couple’s son could, acting in a non-fiduciary capacity, add descendants of the Kittrells’ parents as beneficiaries (a group that includes the Kittrells) and could revoke and distribute to that group. That made them "clearly contingent beneficiaries." Their conduct finished the job: trust assets pledged for personal loans, business losses claimed on their own returns, personal debts paid from a trust sale.

    How does the ten-year reach-back in § 548(e) work?

    11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) reaches transfers made "on or within 2 years before the date of the filing of the petition," on either an actual-intent or a constructive fraud theory. Section 548(e)(1), added in 2005, stretches that to ten years when the transfer went "to a self-settled trust or similar device," the debtor made it, the debtor "is a beneficiary of such trust or similar device," and the debtor acted with "actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud" a present or future creditor. Once a transfer is avoided, § 550(a) lets the trustee recover the property or its value from the initial transferee.

    There’s no constructive fraud prong, so intent must be proved, usually through badges of fraud. Kittrell used a Ninth Circuit list: pending or threatened litigation, transfer of substantially all assets, insolvency, a special relationship with the transferee, and retained use of the property. Colorado’s list in C.R.S. § 38-8-105(2) overlaps and adds concealment and lack of reasonably equivalent value. A transfer to your own children’s trust looks like an insider deal, and a gift brings in nothing.

    Why is a Colorado children’s trust treated as self-settled if the parents aren’t named beneficiaries?

    The Code doesn’t define "beneficiary," so Kittrell borrowed Arizona’s definition, which reaches anyone with "any present or future interest, vested or contingent." A Colorado case would apply Colorado law, but the drafting lesson travels. Protector powers, broad powers of appointment, and a power to move assets into another trust the settlor created can each give the parents a contingent interest unless the document expressly bars any exercise for their benefit.

    CPAs will rightly push back on one point. Many legitimate irrevocable trusts are grantor trusts on purpose, often through a substitution power like 26 U.S.C. § 675(4)(C), so the parents report the income. Kittrell’s trust had that power too. Grantor-trust reporting alone shouldn’t turn a trust into a self-settled one; in Kittrell it came packaged with a husband treating trust assets as his own.

    Does Colorado law protect a self-settled trust from creditors in bankruptcy?

    No. Colorado has no domestic asset protection trust statute. C.R.S. § 38-10-111 makes transfers "made in trust for the use of the person making the same" void "as against the creditors existing of such person." The text names existing creditors, but in In re Cohen, 8 P.3d 429 (Colo. 1999), a discipline case, the Colorado Supreme Court said such a trust "could not and did not protect the settlor-beneficiary from future creditors," while noting that spendthrift trusts for others are generally valid in Colorado.

    That matters under 11 U.S.C. § 541. The estate takes "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property," and § 541(c)(2) excludes only trust transfer restrictions "enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law," which Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992), reads broadly enough to cover state spendthrift law. A child’s interest in a grandparent’s spendthrift trust generally stays out of the child’s estate. A settlor’s own interest gets no such cover, and § 541 has no reach-back. It looks at the petition date.

    Can a Colorado resident sidestep the problem with a Wyoming or Nevada trust?

    Several states allow self-settled spendthrift trusts, including Nevada under Nev. Rev. Stat. § 166.040 and Wyoming under Wyo. Stat. § 4-10-510. In Waldron v. Huber (In re Huber), 493 B.R. 798 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2013), a Washington developer funded an Alaska trust in 2008 as the market collapsed. Applying Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 270, the court found Alaska had little real connection and applied Washington’s statute voiding self-settled trusts as strong public policy. It also avoided the transfer under § 548(e).

    Huber doesn’t bind Colorado courts, but § 38-10-111 plays the role Washington’s statute did. And § 548(e) is federal, so the chosen state’s shorter limitations period doesn’t control it.

    How would a 2026 Colorado bankruptcy play out for a Durango business owner?

    In 2018 a hypothetical Durango owner, call her Dana, guarantees a $900,000 SBA 7(a) loan for her outfitting company. In March 2019 she deeds a paid-off rental duplex worth $520,000 to an irrevocable trust for her two children, with her brother as trustee. A protector can add any descendant of Dana’s parents as a beneficiary, and Dana keeps collecting the rent. The company closes in 2024, the guaranty is called, and Dana files Chapter 7 in the District of Colorado in September 2026.

    Count back. Section 548(a) reaches only September 2024. Through 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) the trustee can use the Colorado Voidable Transactions Act, but C.R.S. § 38-8-110 cuts off an actual-intent claim four years after the transfer or, if later, one year after it "was or could reasonably have been discovered." A deed recorded in La Plata County in 2019 wasn’t hidden. Where the United States holds an unsecured claim, some courts let the trustee borrow the six-year period in 28 U.S.C. § 3306(b), as in Samson v. Spencer (In re Spencer), Adv. No. 22-3016 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 2023), though courts are split. Even that stops at September 2020. The firm’s post on LLC member distributions in a Colorado bankruptcy covers the Act’s four-year rule in more detail.

    Section 548(e) runs back to September 2016. Under Kittrell’s reasoning, the protector power makes Dana a contingent beneficiary, and the badges line up: a shaky guaranty, an insider transferee, no consideration, retained rent. The § 541 claim runs alongside it, and if Dana holds an equitable interest, the trust may have to turn the duplex over under § 542(a).

    Defending a Family Trust in a Colorado Bankruptcy? Contact Us Now

    Theory What the trustee must show Reach-back Who benefits
    § 548(a)(1) Actual intent, or inadequate value plus insolvency 2 years All creditors, through the estate
    § 548(e)(1) Self-settled trust, debtor is a beneficiary, actual intent 10 years All creditors; trust liable under § 550(a)
    § 544(b) with the Colorado Voidable Transactions Act A real unsecured creditor who could avoid the transfer 4 years, or 1 year after discovery for actual intent All creditors
    § 541 property of the estate Debtor’s equitable interest or self-benefiting power, unprotected by an enforceable spendthrift clause None; petition date All creditors, via turnover under § 542(a)

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Is a trust for my children safe in a Colorado bankruptcy once four years have passed?

    Not necessarily. Colorado’s four-year clock governs only the state-law claims a trustee borrows through § 544(b). If the trust is self-settled and funded with actual intent to hinder creditors, § 548(e) reaches back ten years, and a § 541 claim has no look-back at all.

    Does naming only my children as beneficiaries keep a trust from being self-settled?

    Not always. In Kittrell, the son’s power to add his parents as beneficiaries made them contingent beneficiaries, and their personal use of trust assets added a vested interest.

    Can a Colorado resident rely on a Nevada or Wyoming asset protection trust in bankruptcy?

    It’s risky. Huber applied the home state’s policy against self-settled trusts instead of the chosen state’s law, and Colorado has a comparable rule in C.R.S. § 38-10-111. Section 548(e) applies regardless of the trust’s chosen law.

    Is a spendthrift trust my parents created for me protected in my own bankruptcy?

    Generally, yes, if you didn’t fund it and the spendthrift clause is enforceable under Colorado law. Section 541(c)(2) honors restrictions enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law.

    Does reporting a trust’s income on my personal return make it self-settled?

    Not by itself, since many irrevocable trusts are grantor trusts by design. In Kittrell the reporting mattered because it came with personal use of trust assets and the husband holding himself out as owner.

    What can the trustee recover if a transfer to a trust is avoided?

    Under § 550(a), the trustee recovers the property or, if the court orders, its value from the initial transferee, usually the trust. The Kittrell court measured value at the petition date, not the 2014 transfer date, to restore the estate.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm represents debtors, and the relatives and trusts sued with them, when a Chapter 7 trustee attacks a family trust, and it maps reach-back exposure before a Colorado business owner files. Phillip Zagotti, a JD and CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado, and he reads the trust instrument and the tax returns side by side. Related services include Chapter 7 bankruptcy, clawback defense, SBA loan and business debt, and trust and estate tax planning. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    If a trustee has sent a demand letter about a trust you funded, or you are thinking about filing with a trust funded in the last ten years, have the timeline reviewed first. To start, contact North Star Law Firm.