Author: Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA

  • Colorado Year-End 2026: $15 Million Exemption, Charitable Floor, and State Deductions

    Colorado Year-End 2026: $15 Million Exemption, Charitable Floor, and State Deductions

    Harriet and her husband have run cattle outside Glenwood Springs for thirty years. The ranch cost about $600,000 and would bring perhaps $4 million now; with savings and the house in town, their estate is roughly $9.2 million. A neighbor says the new federal law means “give the ranch to the kids now.” Their church expects a December check, and two grandchildren have Colorado 529 accounts.

    Little of their December 31, 2026 to-do list turns on the estate tax. The new charitable rules matter more, along with Colorado’s own subtractions and basis.

    Does Colorado have an estate tax in 2026, and what is the federal exemption?

    Not in any practical sense. C.R.S. § 39-23.5-103(1) imposes a tax “in the amount of the federal credit,” and § 39-23.5-102(6) defines that credit as the maximum state death tax credit under 26 U.S.C. § 2011, which Congress has since repealed. The tax computes to zero; Legislative Council Staff confirms no Colorado filing is required for deaths after December 31, 2004. Colorado has no inheritance or gift tax.

    The One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA), Pub. L. 119-21, § 70106, amended 26 U.S.C. § 2010(c)(3) to set the federal basic exclusion at $15,000,000 for deaths and gifts after 2025, indexed after 2026, with no sunset. Rev. Proc. 2025-32, § 3.14, confirms that figure for 2026 and an equal generation-skipping exemption under § 2631(c). As of October 23, 2026, the IRS had not published 2027 figures. With a portability election under § 2010(c)(4) and (5), a couple can shelter $30 million; see the post on Estate of Rowland.

    Families with New York ties should not assume this answer travels: New York taxes estates above $7,350,000 in 2026 and drops the credit entirely past 105 percent of that figure (N.Y. Tax Law § 952(c)(1)).

    How does the 2026 charitable deduction floor work for Colorado itemizers?

    Starting in 2026, 26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(1)(I), added by OBBBA § 70425, allows an itemizer’s gifts only to the extent they exceed 0.5 percent of the contribution base, generally adjusted gross income. Under § 170(d)(1)(C), the trimmed amount carries forward only from a year in which the donor also exceeded a percentage-of-income ceiling, such as the 60 percent limit on cash gifts to public charities. Most donors simply lose it.

    A retired couple in Colorado Springs with large stock gains should still usually give shares: long-term stock given to a public charity is generally deductible at fair market value (§ 170(e)(1)), subject to a 30 percent ceiling (§ 170(b)(1)(C)), and the gain is never taxed.

    The OBBBA also rewrote 26 U.S.C. § 68, cutting itemized deductions by 2/37 of the lesser of the deductions or taxable income above the start of the 37 percent bracket, which for 2026 is $768,700 on a joint return (Rev. Proc. 2025-32, § 4.01). A deduction that saved 37 cents now saves about 35.

    Under § 170(p), as amended by OBBBA § 70424, non-itemizers can deduct up to $1,000, or $2,000 jointly, of cash given directly to public charities on top of the standard deduction ($32,200 jointly for 2026). Gifts to donor-advised funds and supporting organizations do not count.

    Should a Colorado family bunch 2026 gifts into a donor-advised fund?

    Bunching stacks two years of giving into one itemized year, so the 0.5 percent toll is paid once. A donor-advised fund gives the 2026 deduction while grants go out later.

    Illustrative example (hypothetical facts). Harriet and her husband, both 63, expect 2026 adjusted gross income of $260,000 and $18,000 of state income and property taxes. If they give their usual $38,000 in cash, the floor is $1,300, so $36,700 is deductible and itemized deductions total $54,700. Taxable income of $205,300 sits in the 22 percent bracket, which runs to $211,400 for 2026. The floor costs about $286 federally and $57 in Colorado, and since they are far below their $156,000 cash ceiling, the $1,300 is gone.

    Suppose instead they put $76,000 into a donor-advised fund before December 31, 2026. Their 2026 itemized deductions become $92,700 ($74,700 of charity after the same floor, plus taxes). For 2027, whose standard deduction is not yet published, I use 2026’s $32,200. Over two years they deduct $124,900 instead of $109,400. With similar income, the extra $15,500 is worth about $3,400 federally and $680 in Colorado. In 2027, direct checks to the church can still earn the § 170(p) deduction of up to $2,000. The fund’s grants are not new contributions by them.

    Year-End Gift or Charitable Planning in Colorado? Contact Us Now

    How do Colorado’s charitable contribution subtraction and high-income addback work in 2026?

    Colorado taxes federal taxable income at 4.40 percent under C.R.S. § 39-22-104(1.7)(c); the September 2026 Legislative Council Staff forecast reports no TABOR refunds for tax year 2026, so the temporary rate cut in § 39-22-627 does not apply. A federal deduction is therefore usually worth another 4.40 percent.

    Two state rules change that. C.R.S. § 39-22-104(4)(m) gives standard-deduction filers a subtraction for the charitable deduction they could have claimed, above $500. Department of Revenue guidance (June 2024) allowed it alongside the temporary 2020 and 2021 federal non-itemizer deduction, but nothing addresses 2026, when the borrowed § 170 deduction has its own floor; I treat that as unsettled.

    The bigger issue is C.R.S. § 39-22-104(3)(p.7), enacted by House Bill 25-1274 and approved by voters as Proposition MM in November 2025. Starting in 2026, a taxpayer with federal adjusted gross income of $300,000 or more adds back any itemized or standard deduction above $1,000 (single) or $2,000 (joint); the older § 39-22-104(3)(p) cap ($60,000 jointly at $400,000 of AGI) is now the milder rule. Above $300,000, a December gift saves federal tax and almost nothing in Colorado. Harriet’s $260,000 is under that line, but a ranch-parcel sale or large IRA withdrawal in the bunching year could push her over.

    How much can Colorado grandparents give in 2026, and what does the Colorado 529 deduction add?

    Under 26 U.S.C. § 2503(b) and Rev. Proc. 2025-32, § 4.42(1), each person may give $19,000 to any number of people in 2026 without using exemption, so Harriet and her husband can move $38,000 to each grandchild. A 529 contribution counts, and § 529(c)(2)(B) lets a donor elect to spread a larger one over five years.

    Colorado lets you subtract CollegeInvest and other qualifying Colorado 529 contributions up to an indexed per-beneficiary cap (C.R.S. § 39-22-104(4)(i)(II)). CollegeInvest lists the 2026 cap as $39,200 per beneficiary on a joint return. If the couple puts $38,000 into each grandchild’s account by December 31, the $76,000 subtraction saves about $3,344 of Colorado tax, subject to recapture on a nonqualified withdrawal (§ 39-22-104(4)(i)(III)).

    Should we give the ranch or low-basis stock to our children before the year ends?

    Below $15 million, usually not. A gift carries the donor’s basis under 26 U.S.C. § 1015(a); an inheritance takes date-of-death value under § 1014(a)(1). Deeded over this December, the ranch carries Harriet’s $600,000 basis and $3.4 million of built-in gain, and she reports a $4 million gift. Inherited, that gain disappears. A $9.2 million estate owes no federal or Colorado estate tax for the gift to save.

    Title matters at the first death. Colorado is not a community property state (C.R.S. § 14-10-113 divides marital property equitably), so the § 1014(b)(6) step-up for a survivor’s community half is unavailable. If the spouses hold the ranch in joint tenancy with right of survivorship, 26 U.S.C. § 2040(b) includes half in the first estate, and only that half gets a new basis under § 1014(b)(9). The survivor’s basis would be about $2.3 million: $2 million inherited plus the survivor’s own $300,000.

    Lifetime gifts still pay for a Front Range business owner well above $15 million ($30 million for a couple using portability), especially gifts of assets likely to outgrow the indexing. A non-grantor trust administered here is a Colorado resident trust under C.R.S. § 39-22-103(10), taxed at 4.40 percent on federal taxable income (§ 39-22-401(1)), computed after the distribution deduction in 26 U.S.C. § 661. Federally, income the trust keeps above $16,000 is taxed at 37 percent in 2026.

    Item 2025 rule 2026 rule (OBBBA) Colorado treatment
    Basic exclusion amount $13,990,000 per person $15,000,000 per person, indexed after 2026 No Colorado estate tax or return
    Annual exclusion $19,000 per donee $19,000 per donee No Colorado gift tax
    Non-itemizer charitable deduction None Up to $1,000 ($2,000 joint), cash to public charities only Subtraction above $500 for non-itemizers; 2026 interaction unsettled
    Itemizer charitable floor None 0.5 percent of contribution base, usually lost Follows federal taxable income
    Top-bracket charitable benefit cap None (old § 68 suspended) 2/37 cut above the 37 percent bracket AGI of $300,000 or more: deductions over $1,000/$2,000 added back
    State estate or inheritance tax No federal credit since 2005 Unchanged None
    529 contributions Annual exclusion gift; five-year election Same Subtraction up to $38,100 (2025) and $39,200 (2026) per beneficiary, joint

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Does Colorado have an estate tax or inheritance tax in 2026?

    No. Colorado’s estate tax equals a federal credit that no longer exists, so no Colorado return is required for deaths after 2004. There is no inheritance or gift tax.

    What is the charitable deduction floor for 2026?

    Itemizers deduct charitable gifts only to the extent they exceed 0.5 percent of their contribution base, generally adjusted gross income. Unless you also exceed a percentage-of-income ceiling, the disallowed amount does not carry forward.

    Can I claim the new $1,000 charitable deduction for a gift to a donor-advised fund?

    No. The non-itemizer deduction covers cash given directly to public charities and excludes donor-advised funds and supporting organizations.

    What is the annual exclusion gift amount for 2026?

    It is $19,000 per recipient from each donor. A married couple can give $38,000 to each grandchild, 529 contributions included.

    Should I give my Colorado ranch to my children to avoid estate tax?

    Below the $15 million federal exclusion, a lifetime gift usually saves no estate tax and costs your children the basis step-up at death. Run the numbers with your actual values and title first.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm advises Colorado families on trust and estate tax planning, year-end Colorado tax planning under federal tax law, and the Colorado state tax adjustments that follow a federal return. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    Annual exclusion gifts and a bunched charitable gift must be made by December 31, 2026. To have your numbers run first, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Colorado LLLP and LLC Owners: Self-Employment Tax After Soroban and K Alain

    Colorado LLLP and LLC Owners: Self-Employment Tax After Soroban and K Alain

    Caleb and one other partner run a registered investment adviser in Boulder. The firm is a Colorado limited liability limited partnership; a third partner put in capital and never comes to the office. For years the CPA has reported zero self-employment earnings on every K-1. The 2025 return went in on extension on October 15, 2026, a month after a federal appeals court ruled against a New York investment manager that had done the same thing.

    Is the CPA still right? For the two working partners, probably not. For the capital partner, mostly yes. Here is how I would work through it in Colorado.

    Do limited partners in a Colorado LLLP or LLC pay self-employment tax?

    Self-employment tax reaches a partner’s share of partnership business income (26 U.S.C. § 1402(a)). Section 1402(a)(13) excludes “the distributive share of any item of income or loss of a limited partner, as such,” but not guaranteed payments for services. Everything turns on what “limited partner, as such” means.

    The rates under 26 U.S.C. § 1401 are 12.4 percent for Social Security, up to a wage base the Social Security Administration sets at $184,500 for 2026, and 2.9 percent for Medicare with no cap. Another 0.9 percent applies above $200,000 for a single filer or $250,000 jointly (§ 1401(b)(2)). Half the tax, minus that 0.9 percent, is deductible under 26 U.S.C. § 164(f).

    Why does the IRS test Colorado LLC members differently?

    Because a Colorado LLC has no limited partners. Every member is shielded from company debts (C.R.S. § 7-80-705), and in a member-managed LLC each member can bind the company (C.R.S. § 7-80-405(2)). Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(h), 62 Fed. Reg. 1702 (Jan. 13, 1997), would treat an owner as a limited partner unless the owner has personal liability, has authority to contract for the entity, or works more than 500 hours a year. It would deny the exclusion outright to service partners in health, law, engineering, architecture, accounting, actuarial and consulting firms, which reaches a Denver Tech Center engineering firm or a dental group.

    Congress then barred final rules before July 1, 1998 (Pub. L. 105-34, § 935, 111 Stat. 788, 882 (1997)), and Treasury never finalized them. In Renkemeyer, Campbell & Weaver, LLP v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 137 (2011), the Tax Court taxed three Kansas law partners who had paid $110 each for their interests, since their income came from legal work, not investment.

    A Colorado limited partnership becomes an LLLP by filing a statement of registration under C.R.S. § 7-64-1002, and C.R.S. § 7-62-303(2) lets a limited partner even work as an employee without “participating in control.” That settles liability, not federal tax. S corporations sit outside all this: owners pay payroll tax on reasonable wages, and the IRS can recharacterize distributions as wages. Our Colorado entity-choice post runs the comparison.

    What did Soroban and K Alain decide about the limited partner exception?

    In Soroban Capital Partners LP v. Commissioner, 161 T.C. 310 (2023), the Tax Court held that the exception “does not apply to a partner who is limited in name only.” Its follow-up, T.C. Memo. 2025-52, found principals who worked 2,300 to 2,500 hours a year, sat on the management committees and put in little capital were not limited partners. The court used the same factors in Denham Capital Management LP v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2024-114, involving an adviser to energy funds, now on appeal in the First Circuit.

    The Fifth Circuit first went the other way. Sirius Solutions, a Houston consulting LLLP, took stipulated Tax Court decisions on February 20, 2024, appealed, and won a rule that any limited partnership partner with limited liability qualifies. Sirius Solutions, L.L.L.P. v. Commissioner, 165 F.4th 374 (5th Cir. 2026). The panel withdrew that opinion on rehearing. In K Alain, L.L.L.P. v. Commissioner, No. 24-60240 (5th Cir. Aug. 12, 2026), the renamed partnership’s case, it held that the term means “a partner who plays no significant role in managing or running a business,” called the Tax Court’s rule too strict, and remanded. Reports say K Alain sought full-court rehearing on September 28; I found no ruling as of October 23.

    The Second Circuit affirmed on September 17. Soroban Capital Partners LP v. Commissioner, Nos. 25-2079, 25-2250 (2d Cir. 2026). A limited partner is “one who has limited liability and who does not run, manage, or otherwise exert control.” It held the issue a partnership item under the old TEFRA audit rules and saw little daylight between its test and the Fifth Circuit’s.

    Which rule applies in Colorado if the Tenth Circuit has not ruled?

    I found no Tenth Circuit or District of Colorado decision on § 1402(a)(13), and no appeal from Renkemeyer, a Kansas case. So Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), aff’d, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971), controls. Golsen, itself an Oklahoma case, followed a Tenth Circuit decision squarely in point; the Tax Court defers only to the circuit where the appeal lies. For a Colorado individual that is the Tenth Circuit (26 U.S.C. § 7482(b)(1)(A)); for a partnership-level case, the circuit of the partnership’s principal place of business (§ 7482(b)(1)(E)).

    So a Colorado case in Tax Court gets the Tax Court’s own Soroban test and Denham factors; the Second and Fifth Circuit opinions are only persuasive. A refund suit in Colorado federal district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) would read the statute fresh, and either forum’s appeal reaches a court with a clean slate.

    How much self-employment tax is at stake for a Boulder LLLP partner?

    Illustrative example (hypothetical figures). Each Boulder partner’s 2026 distributive share is $240,000, and Caleb is single with no wages. As self-employment income, his net earnings are $221,640 (92.35 percent, under § 1402(a)(12)). Social Security tax on the first $184,500 is $22,878.00. Medicare at 2.9 percent is $6,427.56, and the extra 0.9 percent on $21,640 adds $194.76. Total: $29,500.32, with a $14,652.78 deduction under § 164(f). For the two working partners, about $59,000 a year rides on the label.

    Under any of the three tests, Caleb and his co-manager look like Soroban‘s principals. The capital partner looks like the investor Congress had in mind, so her exclusion likely survives. Passive income, though, often meets the 3.8 percent net investment income tax instead (26 U.S.C. § 1411(c)(2)) once modified AGI passes $200,000 single or $250,000 joint, which here means up to $9,120. Section 1411(c)(6) prevents taxing the same item both ways. The IRS target is a working partner whose income escapes both. A changed position also shifts the § 199A math, because the § 164(f) deduction reduces qualified business income (Treas. Reg. § 1.199A-3(b)(1)(vi)).

    What happens in a partnership self-employment tax audit, and should I amend my 2025 return?

    Partnership audits for 2018 onward generally use the centralized regime of 26 U.S.C. § 6221(a), with any imputed underpayment paid by the partnership (§ 6225(a)). But Treas. Reg. § 301.6241-6(a)(1) confines that regime to chapter 1 income tax; self-employment tax is chapter 2, so I would expect the bill to land on the partners. Each partner’s assessment period generally runs three years from filing (26 U.S.C. § 6501(a)), so a 2025 return filed October 15, 2026 stays open until October 15, 2029.

    No statute requires an amended return, which the Supreme Court called “a creature of administrative origin and grace.” Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464 U.S. 386 (1984). Waiting still costs interest, plus a possible 20 percent penalty under 26 U.S.C. § 6662(a) unless reasonable cause and good faith are shown (§ 6664(c)(1)). I start with facts, not labels: hours, titles, signing authority and capital at risk. A partner who fails every test gains little by waiting. A partner with a real investor profile can defend the return as filed.

    The fourth 2026 estimated payment is due January 15, 2027 (26 U.S.C. § 6654(c)(2)) and must cover self-employment tax (§ 6654(f)(2)). Partners whose 2025 AGI topped $150,000 can rely on paying 110 percent of 2025 tax (§ 6654(d)(1)(C)).

    Partner profile Role facts Tax Court test (Soroban) Fifth Circuit test (K Alain) Practical note
    Passive capital partner in an LLLP Capital only; no work or management Likely excluded Likely excluded Watch the 3.8% investment income tax
    Managing partner of an LLLP Title, full-time work, signs contracts Likely taxed Likely taxed The label does not control
    LLC member-manager in a service business Serves clients, over 500 hours, binds the LLC Taxed Taxed Fails the 1997 proposed tests too
    LLC member who only contributed capital Manager-managed LLC; no agency or services Likely excluded Likely excluded Document the passive role yearly
    General partner of a limited partnership Personal liability; runs the business Taxed Taxed Never qualifies

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Is a Colorado LLLP partner’s K-1 income taxed as self-employment income?

    It depends on what the partner does, not the title in the agreement. A partner who manages or runs the business is likely taxed under every current test; a true capital investor likely is not.

    Has the Tenth Circuit decided the limited partner exception?

    Not that I could find. Under Golsen, a Colorado case in Tax Court gets the Tax Court’s own Soroban test, and an appeal would go to a circuit with no precedent on the point.

    Are guaranteed payments ever excluded from self-employment tax?

    No. Section 1402(a)(13) keeps guaranteed payments for services in self-employment income, even for a true limited partner.

    Does the 1997 proposed regulation’s 500-hour test still matter?

    It was never finalized and binds no one. Hours still matter, because the Tax Court weighs time devoted to the business.

    When is my last 2026 estimated tax payment due?

    January 15, 2027. Self-employment tax counts toward the required payment, so a partner rethinking the position should revisit that installment now.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm advises Colorado partners and LLC members on entity structure and self-employment tax, defends partnership and partner positions in IRS audits, and handles Tax Court litigation when a dispute does not settle. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    A partner’s role can change from one year to the next, and so can the answer. If your K-1 shows zero self-employment earnings but you help run the business, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Colorado Divorce Taxes: Maintenance After the TCJA, Property Division, and Joint Tax Debt

    Colorado Divorce Taxes: Maintenance After the TCJA, Property Division, and Joint Tax Debt

    Renata’s permanent orders hearing in Castle Rock is in December. The proposal gives her guideline maintenance and the brokerage account, gives him his 401(k), and has him promise to pay what they owe on their 2023 joint return. It looks even. After tax it is not, and that promise may not protect her.

    I do a lot of divorce forensic work, and Colorado’s statutes assume you know the federal answers.

    Does the IRS have to follow a Colorado decree that assigns our joint tax debt to my spouse?

    No. A joint return makes each spouse liable for the whole tax under 26 U.S.C. § 6013(d)(3), and IRS Publication 971 warns that the IRS can still collect from you even if the decree makes your ex solely responsible. Your later refunds can be applied to the joint balance under § 6402(a).

    Relief lives in 26 U.S.C. § 6015. Subsection (b) covers an understatement from your spouse’s erroneous items you had no reason to know about. Subsection (c) allocates a deficiency as if you had filed separately, but only if you are divorced or legally separated, or lived apart for the 12 months before electing. Both are due within two years after the IRS begins collection activities against you (§ 6015(b)(1)(E), (c)(3)(B)); Publication 971 says a refund offset can start that clock.

    A balance reported but never paid is reachable only by equitable relief under § 6015(f), which may be requested until the 10-year collection period in § 6502(a)(1) runs, the timing Rev. Proc. 2013-34 also uses. Its § 4.03(2)(d) counts a decree putting the debt solely on your ex in favor of relief, unless you knew your ex would not pay.

    The Tax Court reviews a denial de novo under § 6015(e)(7); Colorado appeals go to the Tenth Circuit (§ 7482(b)(1)(F)), where I found no published opinion applying that standard. Form 8379 does not help: its instructions limit it to your share of a joint refund taken for your spouse’s own debt, and a joint-year balance is yours too.

    Is spousal maintenance taxable in Colorado after the 2017 tax law?

    Not under a 2026 decree. Pub. L. 115-97, § 11051, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, repealed former 26 U.S.C. §§ 71 and 215 for divorce or separation instruments executed after December 31, 2018. The payer deducts nothing and the recipient reports nothing. An older order keeps the old treatment unless a post-2018 modification expressly adopts the new rule (§ 11051(c)(2)).

    Colorado taxes federal taxable income under C.R.S. § 39-22-104, and I found no modification for maintenance. The statutory rate is 4.40 percent, subject to temporary TABOR cuts; confirm the final 2026 rate.

    How does Colorado’s maintenance guideline adjust for the lost alimony deduction?

    If the marriage lasted at least three years and combined annual adjusted gross income is $240,000 or less, C.R.S. § 14-10-114(3)(b) starts with 40 percent of combined monthly adjusted gross income, minus the lower earner’s monthly income. That formula assumes deductible alimony. For a nondeductible order the statute takes 80 percent of the result when combined monthly income is $10,000 or less, and 75 percent above $10,000 up to $20,000.

    So the lost deduction is already priced in; a payer seeking a further cut because maintenance “isn’t deductible anymore” is counting it twice. The court still makes a deductibility finding under (3)(a)(I)(E) and may adjust “to equitably allocate the tax burden” under (3)(c)(XII). Under (5)(c), the federal change alone does not justify modifying a pre-TCJA order.

    Note that “adjusted gross income” in § 14-10-114(8) is not the AGI line on Form 1040. Subsection (8)(c)(III)(B) disallows the accelerated component of depreciation, so a business owner’s bonus-depreciation loss can badly understate income for maintenance; I rebuild it from the books.

    Divorcing With Tax Debt or a Business in Colorado? Contact Us Now

    Is dividing property in a Colorado divorce taxable, and whose tax basis carries over?

    Colorado is not a community property state. Under C.R.S. § 14-10-113(1), the court sets apart separate property and divides marital property “in such proportions as the court deems just.” Subsection (4) makes a premarital asset’s growth during the marriage marital.

    That framework once drove the federal answer: in Imel v. United States, 523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1975), the Tenth Circuit treated a 1965 Colorado transfer of appreciated stock as a nontaxable division between co-owners, because the Colorado Supreme Court had found the wife held “a species of common ownership” once the case was filed. Since 1984, 26 U.S.C. § 1041 treats every state alike: no gain or loss on a transfer incident to divorce, and the transferor’s basis carries over (§ 1041(b)). Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-1T, Q&A-7, covers transfers under the decree within six years; § 1041(d) excludes nonresident alien spouses.

    Carryover basis is why equal dollars are not equal value. The court weighs “the economic circumstances of each spouse” under § 14-10-113(1)(c), and whether that reaches tax the decree does not trigger is a question for Colorado counsel. A negotiated settlement can price it; I put it on the balance sheet.

    For the house, § 121(d)(3)(B) credits an owner with use while a former spouse is granted use under the divorce instrument, so the spouse who moves out can keep the $250,000 exclusion alive.

    Should I take the 401(k) by QDRO, an IRA, or the brokerage account?

    An IRA moves tax-free under § 408(d)(6) and becomes the recipient’s own. Withdrawals before 59½ generally owe the 10 percent additional tax in § 72(t), because § 72(t)(3)(A) denies IRAs the domestic relations exception.

    A 401(k) split by a qualified domestic relations order under § 414(p) is different. Section 72(t)(2)(C) exempts distributions to the alternate payee, who is taxed as the distributee under § 402(e)(1); the plan withholds 20 percent under § 3405(c) unless the payee elects a direct rollover. Once the money lands in an IRA, the exception is gone.

    What filing status and child tax benefits apply in the year of a Colorado divorce?

    Marital status is fixed on December 31 under § 7703(a). A December 2026 decree rules out a joint 2026 return; a January decree leaves the couple married for 2026, though § 7703(b) can treat a separately filing parent who keeps up the child’s home and lived apart the last six months as unmarried. Head of household (§ 2(b)) follows where the child lives.

    Child support payments “aren’t deductible by the payer and aren’t taxable to the payee,” says IRS Publication 504; Colorado sets the amount under C.R.S. § 14-10-115. The parent with more overnights claims the child unless that parent signs a release under § 152(e)(2), which must be unconditional and does not carry head of household status.

    What do the numbers look like for a Castle Rock divorce in 2026?

    Illustrative, as of October 2026, with assumed rates. Renata earns $3,000 a month and her husband $11,000, for $14,000 combined. Forty percent of $14,000 is $5,600; minus her $3,000 leaves $2,600; at 75 percent the guideline is $1,950 a month. For their 144-month marriage, the duration table in the Colorado Judicial Branch’s form FCF 425 gives 71 months. Under the old rules, at an assumed 28.4 percent combined rate, $2,600 would have cost him about $1,862 after tax; at 16.4 percent she would have kept about $2,174. Now both figures are $1,950.

    Assume she is 46. The $300,000 brokerage account holds $110,000 of gain; at an assumed 19.4 percent its built-in tax is $21,340. The $300,000 401(k) is all pre-tax; at 26.4 percent it carries $79,200, a $57,860 gap before credit for deferral. If she needs $40,000 at closing, a $50,000 QDRO distribution nets $40,000 after withholding and owes no 10 percent additional tax; through an IRA first, that tax adds $5,000. Assume the $2,900 from 2023 was reported but unpaid: only § 6015(f) fits, and paying it from marital funds before the decree is the cleanest fix I know.

    Item Federal treatment (2026) Colorado treatment (2026) What the decree can and cannot do
    Maintenance, 2026 instrument Not deductible; not income Follows federal Can apply the 80 or 75 percent guideline; cannot make it deductible
    Child support Not deductible; not income Follows federal Can order a Form 8332 release; cannot substitute for it
    Property transfer under § 1041 No gain or loss; carryover basis Follows federal Can price embedded tax; cannot change basis
    IRA transfer Tax-free; 10 percent on withdrawals before 59½ Follows federal Can order the transfer; cannot waive the 10 percent
    401(k) by QDRO No 10 percent to alternate payee; 20 percent withheld Follows federal Can issue the order; the plan decides qualification
    Sale of marital home § 121 exclusion; § 121(d)(3)(B) use credit Follows federal Can grant one spouse use of the home
    Prior-year joint tax balance Joint and several; § 6015 relief Not covered here Can allocate it; cannot bind the IRS

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Is spousal maintenance taxable in Colorado in 2026?

    Not under a decree or agreement signed after 2018. The payer cannot deduct it and the recipient does not report it, on either return.

    Why is the Colorado maintenance guideline lower than the 40 percent formula?

    The formula was written for deductible alimony. Nondeductible orders get 80 percent of the result at combined monthly income of $10,000 or less, and 75 percent up to $20,000.

    Can the IRS collect a joint tax debt from me if my decree assigns it to my ex?

    Yes. Joint return liability is joint and several, and a state decree does not bind the IRS. You can seek relief under § 6015 or enforce the decree against your ex.

    How long do I have to request innocent spouse relief?

    Innocent spouse and separation of liability elections are due within two years after IRS collection against you begins. Equitable relief on an unpaid balance can be requested until the collection period expires.

    Is it better to take an IRA or a 401(k) in a Colorado divorce?

    A QDRO distribution from a 401(k) avoids the 10 percent additional tax before 59½; an IRA withdrawal does not. Both are ordinary income.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm helps Colorado spouses and family lawyers with innocent spouse relief, the tax analysis behind a property division, and retirement account transfers. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    Embedded tax is easiest to price before anyone signs. If a joint tax balance or retirement account is in your Colorado divorce, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Dyed Diesel Tax Relief in Colorado: What the IRS Waived and What Truckers Still Owe

    Dyed Diesel Tax Relief in Colorado: What the IRS Waived and What Truckers Still Owe

    Tobias farms 900 acres of wheat and sugar beets outside Fort Morgan and runs four grain trucks along I-76. In mid-October, with diesel prices climbing, he asked his bookkeeper about filling the trucks from the red-dyed tank behind the shop. She had seen a headline that Washington lifted the dyed diesel rules, but nothing on what it meant for the Form 720 she files, or for Colorado.

    As of October 23, 2026, the IRS has dropped the penalty and most of the paperwork, but not the tax. Colorado has told its troopers to stand down but said nothing about the state fuel tax.

    What did the IRS waive for dyed diesel used on the highway in 2026?

    IR-2026-122 (October 14, 2026) says the IRS will not impose a penalty when dyed diesel is sold for use or used on highways nationwide from October 1 through December 31, 2026. Federal inspections of on-road dyed fuel are suspended, and sellers need not document end use. Deposit and recordkeeping penalties are covered too.

    The penalty switched off is 26 U.S.C. § 6715: the greater of $1,000 or $10 per gallon for each act, with a higher floor for repeat offenders under § 6715(b)(2). It applies when a seller or user knew or had reason to know the fuel was dyed or bound for a taxable use. “Willfully” appears only in the tampering clause and in § 6715(d), which makes an officer or employee who willfully took part jointly liable.

    Next, IR-2026-125 (October 21, 2026) said the IRS will not challenge a failure to file Form 720 solely to report § 4041(a) liability from taxable uses of dyed diesel between October 1, 2026 and January 1, 2027, or to keep records of it, and will not require later filing. Other Form 720 liabilities must still be reported.

    Is the federal diesel excise tax deferred or forgiven under Executive Order 14435?

    Neither, yet. Executive Order 14435, signed October 5, 2026 (91 Fed. Reg. 64747), gave the Treasury Secretary five days to decide if 26 U.S.C. § 7508A allows relief, including whether a qualifying event occurred. If so, Treasury is to defer payment of the taxes imposed by § 4041(a)(1)(A) and § 4041(b)(1)(B) incurred October 5 through December 31, 2026, without interest or penalties. Section 4 only tells Treasury to explore eliminating the deferred amounts. The order’s window opens October 5; the IRS’s opens October 1.

    Most diesel is taxed at the terminal rack at 24.3 cents a gallon under § 4081(a)(2)(A)(iii), plus 0.1 cent under § 4081(a)(2)(B), and Treas. Reg. § 48.4081-2 puts it on the position holder. The order leaves it alone. Dyed fuel escapes the rack tax under § 4082(a). Put in a highway vehicle, § 4041(a)(1)(A) imposes a back-up tax at the regular rate, owed by the retail seller or, for farm-tank fuel, the vehicle operator.

    As of October 23, I found no § 7508A notice in the Internal Revenue Bulletin and no revised Form 720 instructions. Section 7508A lets Treasury disregard up to one year for taxpayers affected by a federally declared disaster, a significant fire, or a terroristic or military action under § 692(c)(2). It postpones; it cannot forgive. The order’s nod to the Secretary of War, and Colorado’s own order blaming U.S. strikes on Iran that began February 28, 2026, point to the military-action prong; whether a price shock makes a Fort Morgan farmer “affected,” Treasury has not said.

    Got a Dyed Diesel or Form 720 Penalty Notice? Contact Us Now

    Does Colorado allow dyed diesel on state highways this fall?

    C.R.S. § 42-4-1414(1) still bars driving on a Colorado highway using dyed diesel, a class B traffic infraction. What changed is enforcement. Executive Order D 2026 020 (October 9, 2026) tells the Department of Public Safety not to enforce the ban through December 31, 2026, and to skip inspections or citations based “solely upon the presence or use of dyed diesel fuel.”

    The order never mentions the Department of Revenue or the special fuel tax, which is 20.5 cents a gallon under C.R.S. § 39-27-102(1)(a)(II)(B), plus a 6-cent road usage fee for fiscal year 2026-27 under C.R.S. § 43-4-217(4)(b)(I)(E). Dyed fuel is exempt, but C.R.S. § 39-27-102.5(1.5) allows taxable use only as federal law permits, “with such fuel being subject to the excise tax.” Section 42-4-1414(3) also exposes a violator to a fuel tax audit. I found no Department of Revenue announcement of tax relief.

    So a trucker running dyed fuel on I-76 this quarter has federal penalty relief and a State Patrol stand-down, and may still owe Colorado fuel tax on those gallons. IFTA returns for interstate carriers (C.R.S. § 39-27-301(5)) still run; the Department of Revenue lists the third quarter as due October 31, a Saturday, so Monday, November 2, 2026.

    What changes for Form 720 deposits and farm fuel refund claims?

    Treas. Reg. § 40.6302(c)-1 requires semimonthly deposits covering 95 percent of each period’s net liability (or a look-back safe harbor), due by the 14th day of the next period, and none for a quarter at or under $2,500. Late deposits cost 2 to 15 percent under § 6656. The relief covers only the dyed diesel highway tax; other deposits continue.

    Under § 6427(l), the buyer of taxed clear diesel used in farming (§ 4041(f)) or in off-road equipment gets the tax back, usually on Form 4136 at $.243 a gallon, or on Form 8849 Schedule 1 once $750 is owed for a quarter (§ 6427(i)(2)). Dyed gallons earn nothing because no tax was paid, and IR-2026-125 leaves refund recordkeeping in place.

    What does the relief mean for a Fort Morgan farm with grain trucks?

    An illustration, with hypothetical numbers. From October 1 to December 31, 2026, Tobias puts 1,800 gallons of farm-tank dyed diesel into trucks that never leave Colorado. Before the relief, a roadside sample finding 150 dyed gallons could have meant a $1,500 penalty. Now there is none, but the § 4041(a)(1)(A)(ii) tax at 24.3 cents is still $437.40, unreported under IR-2026-125 and pending deferral guidance. Under $2,500 for the quarter, he never had deposits.

    Troopers have been told not to cite him, yet on my reading of § 39-27-102.5(1.5) he owes $369 of special fuel tax, plus $108 if the road usage fee applies. Also, 2,500 gallons of clear diesel burned in his combine during July harvest support a $607.50 Form 4136 credit for 2026, and § 39-27-102.5(2)(a) lets him seek the state tax back. I would run the truck tanks low by late December.

    If deferred diesel tax is never forgiven, how does the IRS collect it?

    Like any excise debt: assessment, notice and demand within 60 days under § 6303(a), then a lien under § 6321. But the three-year assessment period in § 6501(a) runs from a filed return, and with no return, § 6501(c)(3) leaves it open. Because IR-2026-125 excuses the return, I tell clients to keep a gallon log anyway.

    The trust fund penalty in § 6672 reaches a person “required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any tax.” Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238 (1978), limits it to “third-party taxes” collected from others. Because the rack tax falls on the position holder and the § 4041 tax on the seller or user, I read § 6672 as not reaching owners for them. I found no Tenth Circuit case applying § 6672 to fuel excise tax; § 6715(d) is the exposure to watch.

    In bankruptcy, a pre-petition excise tax is a priority claim under 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(E) if its return was last due within three years before filing, or, where no return is required, if the transaction falls within those three years. Which branch fits an excused Form 720 is untested. An individual cannot discharge it under § 523(a)(1)(A), and Chapter 12 and 13 plans must pay it in full (§§ 1222(a)(2), 1322(a)(2)). See also selling farmland in a Colorado Chapter 12 case.

    Item Federal rule before the order Federal rule Oct. 1 to Dec. 31, 2026 Colorado rule
    Dyed diesel on the highway (penalty) § 6715: greater of $1,000 or $10 per gallon, per act Not imposed; no federal inspections Class B infraction; not enforced through Dec. 31
    Dyed diesel on the highway (tax) § 4041 back-up tax at 24.3 cents Still imposed; reporting excused; deferral pending 20.5-cent special fuel tax appears to apply
    Semimonthly Form 720 deposits 95 percent rule or look-back; § 6656 penalty No penalty for dyed diesel tax only Not applicable
    Recordkeeping Required Excused for dyed diesel highway liability Fuel tax audit possible
    Off-highway refund claims § 6427(l); Form 4136 or 8849 Unchanged; records still required State refund for clear farm fuel
    State fuel tax and IFTA Not federal Not federal Q3 IFTA due Nov. 2, 2026

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Did the IRS forgive the federal tax on dyed diesel used on the road?

    No. As of October 23, 2026, the IRS has waived only penalties and reporting for October 1 through December 31, 2026. Payment awaits promised Section 7508A guidance, which can postpone but not erase the tax.

    Can I get a dyed diesel penalty for fuel in my truck this fall?

    Not a federal one through December 31, 2026, and Colorado troopers have been told not to enforce the state ban until then. Dye left in the tank on January 1, 2027 is a separate risk the IRS is still studying.

    Does the relief lower the diesel tax built into the pump price?

    No. The 24.4-cent federal rack tax on clear diesel is unchanged. The order covers only the Section 4041 taxes.

    Do I still owe Colorado fuel tax on dyed diesel used on the highway?

    Probably. The Governor’s order is silent on the special fuel tax, and Colorado law taxes dyed fuel used for a taxable purpose.

    Can I still claim a refund for clear diesel used on my farm?

    Yes. The Section 6427(l) refund through Form 4136 or Form 8849 is unchanged. Keep your purchase records; the relief does not excuse them.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm helps Colorado farmers and truckers with penalty abatement for Form 720 and dyed fuel penalties, installment agreements for excise balances, and Colorado state tax questions. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    These rules may shift again before the fourth-quarter Form 720 is due; if you have a dyed diesel notice or a fuel tax balance you cannot pay, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Your Customer Filed Chapter 11 in Colorado: 503(b)(9), Reclamation and Critical Vendors

    Your Customer Filed Chapter 11 in Colorado: 503(b)(9), Reclamation and Critical Vendors

    Ingrid runs a precision machine shop in Loveland that makes hydraulic valve bodies for a Front Range equipment maker. On Thursday, October 1, 2026, the maker filed a Subchapter V case in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. It owes her $146,000 on four invoices, and by afternoon its buyer was asking whether the next order could ship on net-30, adding that she might be a “critical vendor.” (Ingrid and her numbers are illustrative.)

    Each invoice now has a different value, and some deadlines run in days. Here is how I sort a supplier’s rights, in the order the clock runs.

    My customer filed Chapter 11 in Colorado. What can I do the day after?

    11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6) stays “any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case.” No more past-due calls, and no holding a new order hostage to the old balance.

    The stay does not make you a lender. Unless a contract obligates you to sell on credit, you can demand cash in advance on new orders. Anything you deliver after the filing on terms is an administrative expense under § 503(b)(1)(A), payable in the ordinary course under § 363(c)(1).

    A written supply agreement is usually an executory contract the debtor may assume or reject under § 365(a), and § 365(e)(1) bars ending it under a clause triggered by the filing. If the debtor assumes it, § 365(b)(1) requires a cure of your defaults. Read yours before refusing an order.

    Is my unpaid invoice a section 503(b)(9) claim?

    Part of it may be. Section 503(b)(9) gives administrative priority to “the value of any goods received by the debtor within 20 days before the date of commencement of a case,” if sold in the ordinary course of the debtor’s business. That ranks second under § 507(a)(2), ahead of all general unsecured creditors.

    The statute says goods. A Western Slope trucking company sells a service, and in In re Goody’s Family Clothing, Inc., 401 B.R. 131 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009), a vendor that inspected and ticketed apparel got no priority. And “received” means physical possession: in In re World Imports, Ltd., 862 F.3d 338 (3d Cir. 2017), furniture shipped from China more than 20 days before the filing but delivered inside the window qualified. The court used the UCC definition, which Colorado enacted in C.R.S. § 4-2-103(1)(c). I found no Tenth Circuit or BAP decision on point; a Colorado judge would likely start from the same text. Keep your delivery receipts.

    Priority is not prompt payment. Chapter 11 normally requires cash on the effective date under § 1129(a)(9)(A), but § 1191(e) lets a nonconsensual Subchapter V plan pay administrative claims over its term. Official Form 410 is not for administrative expenses, so request 503(b)(9) payment separately under § 503(a).

    Can I still reclaim the goods under section 546(c)?

    Under C.R.S. § 4-2-702(2), a seller that discovers the buyer received goods on credit while insolvent may reclaim them on demand within ten days after receipt. Section 546(c)(1) carries that right into bankruptcy for goods received while insolvent within 45 days before the filing, if the written demand comes within 45 days after receipt or, when that period ends after the filing, within 20 days after the case began. I calendar the earlier date.

    The right is “subject to the prior rights of a holder of a security interest in such goods or the proceeds thereof.” Most operating companies owe a bank with a blanket inventory lien, so reclamation rarely recovers much. Send the demand anyway. If you miss it, § 546(c)(2) preserves the 503(b)(9) claim.

    Customer Filed Bankruptcy and Owes You? Contact Us Now

    What does a critical vendor letter in a Colorado bankruptcy actually mean?

    The debtor wants to pay some old invoices now, ahead of other creditors, if you keep supplying. The Code never says so; debtors cite § 363(b)(1) and § 105(a) and call it the doctrine of necessity.

    In In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2004), Judge Easterbrook called that doctrine “just a fancy name for a power to depart from the Code” and required the debtor to “prove, and not just allege,” that vendors would quit without payment and that the other creditors would still benefit. Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. 451 (2017), noted that courts approve such orders when the payments “enable a successful reorganization and make even the disfavored creditors better off.”

    I found no published Tenth Circuit, BAP, or District of Colorado opinion on a critical vendor motion. In Colorado they arrive as first-day motions under L.B.R. 2081-1 (expedited consideration in the first 21 days). Expect a trade agreement requiring customary terms for the whole case, with a clawback if you stop. Small Subchapter V debtors seldom ask, since every dollar comes out of the unsecured pool. A larger Front Range manufacturer relying on a single-source part might.

    When is the proof of claim bar date in a Colorado Subchapter V case?

    Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3002(c)‘s 70-day rule covers voluntary Chapter 7 cases and Chapter 12 and 13 cases, not Chapter 11. Under Rule 3003(c)(3), “the court must set the time,” and Colorado’s bankruptcy court says on its Subchapter V page that a 70-day deadline “will be established in the Notice of Meeting of Creditors issued in each case.” In larger Chapter 11 cases, a bar date order under L.B.R. 3003-1 may also set an administrative claim deadline.

    A scheduled claim is deemed filed under § 1111(a) unless listed as disputed, contingent, or unliquidated. Check the schedules and claims register on PACER (big cases use a claims agent under 28 U.S.C. § 156(c)). If your claim is wrong or flagged, file through the court’s ePOC page.

    There is no standard payout. A plan confirmed over objection must devote projected disposable income for three years, or up to five, under § 1191(c)(2), and § 1129(a)(7) guarantees at least Chapter 7 value, which can be little.

    How would a $146,000 receivable split if a Loveland supplier’s customer filed?

    Using Ingrid’s illustrative numbers and an October 1, 2026 petition, the 20-day window covers receipts from September 11 through September 30, the 45-day window starts August 17, and the 90-day preference period starts July 3.

    Invoice one ($38,000, delivered July 28) is general unsecured. Invoice two ($41,000, delivered August 26) is outside 20 days; its reclamation demand was due October 21 and likely loses to the bank’s lien. Invoice three ($15,000) shipped by common carrier September 9 and arrived September 14, so under World Imports it qualifies. Invoice four ($52,000, received September 16) does too. That is $67,000 of 503(b)(9) priority and $79,000 unsecured, with a proof of claim due December 10, 2026 if the notice counts 70 days from the petition.

    Can the debtor take back payments I received before the bankruptcy?

    Possibly, often a year later. Section 547(b) reaches payments on old debt made within 90 days before the filing, while the debtor was insolvent (presumed under § 547(f)), that paid you more than Chapter 7 would. Under § 546(a), suit generally must be filed within two years after the order for relief.

    Do not assume the money is gone. The plaintiff must act on “reasonable due diligence,” weighing your “known or reasonably knowable affirmative defenses,” though § 547(g) makes you prove them. Ordinary course payments are protected by § 547(c)(2). Later shipments on credit count as new value under § 547(c)(4): if Ingrid was paid $30,000 on August 3 for a June invoice, her unpaid August 26 shipment exceeds it. In business cases filed on or after April 1, 2025, § 547(c)(9) bars recovering transfers totaling under $8,575, and 28 U.S.C. § 1409(b) sends suits against a non-insider on a non-consumer debt under $31,425 to your home district.

    Never ignore a summons from an out-of-state case (see default judgments against Colorado vendors).

    Claim bucket Statute What qualifies When it is paid Deadline to assert
    Twenty-day goods § 503(b)(9) Goods physically received within 20 days before filing Effective date, or over a Subchapter V cramdown plan Deadline set by order or plan
    Reclamation § 546(c) Goods received while insolvent within 45 days before filing Return of goods, behind prior liens Written demand within 45 days of receipt or 20 days after filing
    Critical vendor payment §§ 363(b)(1), 105(a) Suppliers the debtor proves it cannot replace Early, per the order Debtor moves, often within 21 days
    Postpetition deliveries § 503(b)(1)(A) Goods or services provided after filing Ordinary course Any administrative claim deadline
    General unsecured claim §§ 1111(a), 1191(c)(2) Everything else Pro rata, often over three to five years 70 days in D. Colo. Subchapter V; court-set otherwise

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Can I stop shipping to a customer that filed Chapter 11 in Colorado?

    Unless a contract requires credit terms, you can ask for cash in advance. A supply agreement generally cannot be ended because of the filing, so check yours first.

    Do services qualify for a section 503(b)(9) claim?

    No. The statute covers goods, and courts have denied priority to service vendors. Prepetition freight, labor and repair charges are usually general unsecured claims.

    Do I still need a proof of claim if my debt is on the debtor’s schedules?

    In a Chapter 11 or Subchapter V case, a scheduled claim is deemed filed unless listed as disputed, contingent, or unliquidated. If it is wrong or flagged, file by the noticed deadline.

    Is a critical vendor payment the same as being paid in full?

    Not necessarily. The order may pay only part of the balance, and if you stop supplying on customary terms the debtor can usually claw the payment back.

    What should I do if I get a preference demand letter?

    Pull a year of invoices and payments and compare payment timing inside and outside the 90 days. Ordinary course and new value defenses often shrink the demand.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm represents Colorado suppliers in their customers’ Chapter 11 and Subchapter V cases, from 503(b)(9) requests and proofs of claim through preference and clawback defense. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    The reclamation window can close within three weeks of the filing. If a customer has filed and still owes you, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Will Bankruptcy Cost Me My Colorado License? Section 525(a) After In re Lacher

    Will Bankruptcy Cost Me My Colorado License? Section 525(a) After In re Lacher

    Devin sells houses in Fort Collins. The small brokerage he opened with a partner failed, and the partner now holds an $85,000 judgment against him for Devin’s share of the lease and payroll. He is more worried about his broker’s license, and a complaint a former client filed with the Colorado Real Estate Commission last spring.

    Federal law has shielded licensees since 1978, but the shield is narrower than people expect, and a 2025 decision about a California lawyer shows where it stops.

    Can a Colorado agency deny or revoke my license because I filed bankruptcy?

    Not if bankruptcy is the only reason. 11 U.S.C. § 525(a) says a “governmental unit” (a State and its agencies, per § 101(27)) may not “deny, revoke, suspend, or refuse to renew a license, permit, charter, franchise, or other similar grant” to a debtor solely because of the filing. Insolvency is also off limits, as is the fact that the person “has not paid a debt that is dischargeable in the case.”

    “Solely” does the heavy lifting. In FCC v. NextWave Personal Communications Inc., 537 U.S. 293 (2003), the FCC canceled a Chapter 11 debtor’s licenses for missed payments, citing its regulatory purpose. “In our view, that factor is irrelevant,” the Court said; “the failure to pay a dischargeable debt must alone be the proximate cause” of the cancellation.

    Section 525(b) covers private employers, and only firing or discrimination “with respect to employment.” Section 525(c) covers student grants and loans.

    Can Colorado suspend my driver’s license over an accident judgment discharged in bankruptcy?

    In Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971), Arizona suspended the license of an uninsured driver over an accident judgment he had discharged; the Supreme Court struck the law under the Supremacy Clause. The Senate report on the 1978 Code (S. Rep. No. 95-989) says § 525 “codifies the result of Perez.”

    C.R.S. § 42-7-401(1) requires suspension when a driver fails “for a period of thirty days” to satisfy a qualifying accident judgment, but C.R.S. § 42-7-402(2) says a later “discharge in bankruptcy” relieves the debtor “from any of the requirements of this article.” A judgment for injury caused by intoxicated driving is excepted from discharge by 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9), so neither rule reaches it.

    What does section 525(a) not protect a Colorado licensee from?

    Misconduct. In Lacher v. State Bar of California (In re Lacher), 669 B.R. 548 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2025), a lawyer spent two decades fighting a fee award, violating court orders and commingling client trust funds along the way. The panel held the proximate cause was “Ms. Lacher’s own poor choices while attempting to avoid payment of a judgment, not the unpaid debt or her bankruptcy filing.”

    Debts that survive bankruptcy are also outside it. Recent priority taxes (§ 523(a)(1)(A)), domestic support (§ 523(a)(5)) and government fines (§ 523(a)(7)) are not discharged in Chapter 7, nor is a debt a creditor successfully excepts.

    So is credit. Ayes v. U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, 473 F.3d 104 (4th Cir. 2006), held a VA home loan guaranty is not an “other similar grant,” noting Congress protected only student loans in § 525(c).

    Worried Bankruptcy Will Touch Your Colorado License? Contact Us Now

    Do DORA licensing boards treat bankruptcy as a ground for discipline?

    Not in the statutes I reviewed. C.R.S. § 12-20-404 supplies a regulator’s remedies once a ground exists in the practice act for that profession. The grounds for brokers (§ 12-10-217(1)), mortgage loan originators (§ 12-10-713(1)), nurses (§ 12-255-120(1)) and dentists (§ 12-220-201(1)) never mention bankruptcy. Electricians and plumbers are disciplined through the same process (§ 12-115-122; § 12-155-113).

    Adjacent grounds are another matter. Brokers answer for commingling, “dishonest dealing,” and under § 12-10-217(1)(v) for fraud or conversion of trust funds “that results in the entry of a civil judgment for damages.” Insurance producers face “financial irresponsibility” under C.R.S. § 10-2-801(1)(i); originators must show “demonstrated financial responsibility” under 12 U.S.C. § 5104(b)(3). The Senate report permits weighing “future financial responsibility or ability,” which I read as how you handle money now, not the filing or a discharged balance.

    A board fine is usually a § 523(a)(7) debt that survives Chapter 7, and ignoring it can be discipline for violating a board order (§ 12-10-217(1)(m); § 12-255-120(1)(g)). A completed Chapter 13 differs: § 1328(a) excepts criminal fines but not § 523(a)(7) civil fines, and a discharged fine is protected by § 525(a) and the § 524(a)(2) injunction.

    If an application or renewal asks about bankruptcy, answer truthfully; § 525(a) bars acting on a truthful yes alone. A false no is its own ground: “material misstatement of fact in an application” for brokers (§ 12-10-217(1)(s)) and originators (§ 12-10-713(1)(r)), and “materially untrue information” for insurance producers (§ 10-2-801(1)(a)).

    How do Colorado liquor, marijuana, sales tax and child support licenses fare in bankruptcy?

    Liquor licensing turns on whether the applicant’s “character, record, and reputation” satisfy the licensing authorities (C.R.S. § 44-3-307(1)(a)). The filing cannot stand in for bad character.

    Marijuana licensees hit an earlier wall. In Arenas v. U.S. Trustee (In re Arenas), 535 B.R. 845 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2015), a Colorado medical marijuana licensee’s Chapter 7 was dismissed and conversion to Chapter 13 denied because no trustee could administer marijuana assets lawfully. A DEA rule effective April 28, 2026 (91 Fed. Reg. 22714) moved state-licensed medical marijuana to Schedule III; adult-use marijuana stays in Schedule I. Unpaid marijuana taxes also bar a license under C.R.S. § 44-10-307(1)(e).

    Child support and sales tax fall outside § 525(a). Support is nondischargeable; C.R.S. § 26-13-126 allows suspension for an obligor more than six months behind and paying under half the current amount, and § 362(b)(2)(D) keeps the stay from stopping it. Collected sales tax is held “in trust” under C.R.S. § 39-26-118(1)(a) (compare contractor trust fund debts). It is a priority tax under § 507(a)(8)(C), nondischargeable under § 523(a)(1)(A) and § 1328(a)(2), and the license can be revoked after a hearing (C.R.S. § 39-26-103(4)). Chapter 13 can still pay it in “deferred cash payments” under § 1322(a)(2).

    What can I do if a Colorado agency targets my license after bankruptcy?

    I found no published Tenth Circuit or Tenth Circuit BAP decision applying § 525(a) to a license. The closest local case is Ellis v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security (In re Ellis), 493 B.R. 818 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2013), where a Chapter 13 debtor was found unsuitable for an armed-guard job on a Denver federal contract over about $47,837 in debts. Applying NextWave, Judge Brooks held the debts were not the sole cause because the debtor had not supplied requested bankruptcy papers, but rejected the agency’s immunity defense.

    Relief comes from the bankruptcy court, and § 106(a) abrogates sovereign immunity for §§ 524 and 525. Contempt for violating the discharge order requires “no fair ground of doubt” that the order barred the conduct (Taggart v. Lorenzen, 587 U.S. 554 (2019)). Agencies may cite Younger abstention and Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982); Lacher held that neither Younger nor the Eleventh Amendment blocks enforcing the discharge or § 525(a).

    How would section 525(a) apply to a Fort Collins real estate broker?

    Illustrative example (hypothetical facts). Devin files Chapter 7 on November 2, 2026, and his creditors’ meeting is first set for December 7. Under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007(c), his former partner has until February 5, 2027 to sue over dischargeability. No complaint is filed, so the $85,000 contract judgment is discharged.

    The Commission cannot refuse renewal, or condition it on paying the partner, because Devin filed or because that debt is unpaid. If the client complaint alleges he kept a buyer’s $6,000 earnest money in the brokerage operating account, that is commingling under § 12-10-217(1)(i), and it proceeds as if he had never filed. A resulting fine (up to $2,500 per offense) is a government debt outside § 525(a). Had the partner’s judgment rested on fraud, § 12-10-217(1)(v) would give the Commission a ground no discharge removes.

    Colorado license Who issues it Action for the filing or an unpaid dischargeable debt? What the agency can still act on
    Driver’s license (accident judgment) Department of Revenue No: § 42-7-402(2), Perez Nondischargeable judgments
    DORA professional licenses Title 12 boards and commissions No: § 525(a), NextWave Fraud, commingling, false applications
    Liquor license State and local authorities No Character and record apart from the filing
    Marijuana business license State and local authorities Mostly academic after Arenas Unpaid marijuana taxes
    Child-support suspension Licensing agency, on support agency notice § 525(a) inapplicable Arrears over six months
    Sales tax license Department of Revenue § 525(a) inapplicable Revocation after a hearing

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Can a Colorado licensing board ask whether I filed bankruptcy?

    Nothing in section 525(a) prevents the question. It stops the agency from acting solely because of the filing or an unpaid dischargeable debt. A false answer is a separate ground for discipline.

    Does filing bankruptcy stop a DORA disciplinary case?

    No. Section 362(b)(4) exempts regulatory proceedings by a governmental unit from the automatic stay, so the case proceeds on the conduct alleged.

    Will Chapter 7 discharge a fine my licensing board imposed?

    Usually not, because section 523(a)(7) excepts government fines that are not compensation for actual loss. A completed Chapter 13 can discharge civil fines provided for by the plan.

    Can Colorado suspend my driver’s license for an accident judgment I discharged?

    C.R.S. 42-7-402(2) says a discharge relieves the judgment debtor of the article’s requirements, matching Perez v. Campbell. Judgments excepted from discharge, such as intoxicated-driving injuries, are different.

    Can a Colorado marijuana business file bankruptcy?

    Generally not under In re Arenas, because a trustee cannot lawfully administer marijuana assets. Whether the 2026 Schedule III rule for medical marijuana changes that is still open.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm represents Colorado individuals and business owners in Chapter 7 bankruptcy and Chapter 13 plans, including cases where a license or tax debt of uncertain dischargeability shapes the strategy. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    Separating the bankruptcy question from the conduct question is easiest before you file. If your license pays the bills and the debt is closing in, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Can a Colorado Subchapter V Company Still Owe a Fraud Debt After 2 Monkey Trading?

    Can a Colorado Subchapter V Company Still Owe a Fraud Debt After 2 Monkey Trading?

    Marisol owns an oilfield-services LLC in Grand Junction. After work slowed and a merchant cash advance covered payroll, the company owes about $1.9 million. The funder’s lawyer says the funding application overstated receivables, so its balance “will survive any bankruptcy.” Her question for me is narrow: if the company files under Subchapter V, does that one debt go away?

    It depends on whether the plan is confirmed with creditor votes or over their objection. Three federal courts of appeals have ruled on the second situation, and so has a Colorado bankruptcy judge.

    Does a Colorado LLC’s Subchapter V discharge cover a debt the creditor calls fraud?

    Subchapter V, the small business track inside Chapter 11, has two discharge rules. If each impaired class accepts, the court confirms under 11 U.S.C. § 1191(a). A class accepts when creditors holding two-thirds of the dollars and more than half of the claims that vote say yes (§ 1126(c)). The discharge then comes at confirmation from § 1141(d)(1), and § 1141(d)(2) applies the § 523 exceptions only to “a debtor who is an individual.”

    SBA borrowers should know the one carve-out. Section 1141(d)(6)(A) leaves a corporation, which under § 101(9)(A) includes an LLC, liable for a § 523(a)(2)(A) or (2)(B) fraud debt “owed to a domestic governmental unit,” or owed because of a False Claims Act suit. A private funder’s claim is not on that list.

    If a class votes no, the debtor can still ask for confirmation under § 1191(b), a cramdown, if the plan is fair and equitable. Section 1181(c) then turns off § 1141(d), and the discharge comes from § 1192 after plan payments. Section 1192(2) excepts “any debt … of the kind specified in section 523(a),” but § 523(a) says a § 1192 discharge “does not discharge an individual debtor” from those debts. Whether an LLC is caught is the whole fight, and it only arises in a cramdown.

    What have the federal appeals courts said about section 523(a) and corporate debtors?

    Three circuits say the exceptions reach companies. In Cantwell-Cleary Co. v. Cleary Packaging, LLC, 36 F.4th 509 (4th Cir. 2022), an LLC owing a $4.7 million tortious interference judgment proposed to pay under 3 percent of it. The court read § 1192(2) as pointing to a kind of debt, not a kind of debtor, while conceding the statutory fit is “clumsy.”

    Avion Funding, L.L.C. v. GFS Industries, L.L.C. (In re GFS Industries, L.L.C.), 99 F.4th 223 (5th Cir. 2024) is the cash advance case. Avion paid $190,000 for $299,800 of receivables after GFS said it did not anticipate a Chapter 11 filing; GFS filed two weeks later, and Avion’s § 523(a)(2)(B) claim was allowed to proceed.

    In BenShot, LLC v. 2 Monkey Trading, LLC (In re 2 Monkey Trading, LLC), 142 F.4th 1323 (11th Cir. 2025), decided July 9, 2025, a jury had found the debtors acted maliciously in a false advertising case. The majority joined the other two circuits. Judge Luck dissented, noting that most bankruptcy courts had read § 523(a) as limited to individuals.

    Those courts include In re Satellite Restaurants Inc. Crabcake Factory USA, 626 B.R. 871 (Bankr. D. Md. 2021) and the Ninth Circuit’s appellate panel in In re Off-Spec Solutions, LLC, 651 B.R. 862 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2023), which called its own result “vexing.” As of October 23, 2026, the Supreme Court’s docket shows no certiorari petition in any of the three.

    Creditor Says Your Company’s Debt Survives Subchapter V? Contact Us Now

    Has the Tenth Circuit or a Colorado bankruptcy court decided this?

    The Tenth Circuit has not, and I found no Tenth Circuit BAP decision. But in 2021, in the Revelant Holdings case, Chief Judge Romero held that § 1192(2) reaches only individuals and denied creditors’ stipulated request for more time to sue as moot. Judge Sweeney reversed in Synergetic Oil Tools, Inc. v. Revelant Holdings LLC, No. 1:21-cv-02213-CNS (D. Colo. Mar. 28, 2023), finding the Fourth Circuit persuasive.

    Then, in Marmic Fire & Safety Co. v. ETG Fire, LLC (In re ETG Fire, LLC), 670 B.R. 884 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2025), Judge McNamara refused to dismiss a competitor’s § 523(a)(6) trade secret complaint. He found Cleary and GFS “far more compelling and persuasive” than Off-Spec, and held that a company’s intent can be shown through managers and employees acting for it.

    None of this binds the next Colorado judge or the Tenth Circuit, and the “individual debtor” text gives a debtor a serious appellate argument. Still, with three circuits, a Colorado district judge and the latest published Colorado bankruptcy opinion aligned, I tell owners to assume a cramdown leaves fraud-type debts open to challenge.

    What does a creditor have to file to keep a fraud debt alive in a Colorado Subchapter V case?

    Under § 523(c)(1), the debtor “shall be discharged” from a (2), (4) or (6) debt unless the creditor asks and the court rules. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007(c), restyled effective December 1, 2024, requires the complaint “within 60 days after the first date set for the §341(a) meeting of creditors.” Extensions require cause and a motion “filed before the time expires,” and Rule 9006(b)(3) allows nothing beyond that. A funder that sleeps past it generally loses the issue, and as Revelant shows, the date usually passes before anyone knows whether the plan will be consensual.

    The creditor must then prove its claim by a preponderance of the evidence, Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991). Against a company, the usual theories are (2)(B), a materially false written statement about financial condition that the creditor reasonably relied on and that was made to deceive, and (6), willful and malicious injury. A receivables figure likely qualifies, because a statement about a single asset can concern financial condition, Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling, 584 U.S. 709 (2018). An oral version falls outside (2)(A) and fails (2)(B)’s writing requirement.

    Does my company’s Subchapter V discharge protect me on a personal guaranty?

    No. Under § 524(e), discharging the company’s debt “does not affect the liability of any other entity” on it. Cash advance agreements routinely include an owner guaranty.

    If the owner files her own case, § 523(a)(2) applies to her directly in every chapter. A written statement about her LLC’s receivables is one “respecting … an insider’s financial condition,” since a company she controls is her insider under § 101(31)(A)(iv). That is how funders usually plead against owners: (2)(B), built on the application she signed. For EIDL collection and fraud referrals, see the earlier post on the SBA demand letter and Treasury offset.

    How would this play out for a Grand Junction oilfield-services company in 2026?

    Eligibility first. A case filed October 25, 2026 faces the $3,424,000 limit in § 101(51D), in effect since April 1, 2025 (90 Fed. Reg. 8941). H.R. 7730 would raise it to $7,500,000 for cases commenced on or after enactment; it passed the House September 16 and the Senate September 28, 2026, but as of October 23 the official record showed no signature.

    Illustrative example (hypothetical facts). Marisol’s LLC owes a bank $620,000 on equipment, the SBA $430,000 on an EIDL loan, the funder a claimed $265,000, and trade creditors $555,000, about $1.87 million. It files November 2, 2026. The first date set for the creditors’ meeting is December 3, so the funder’s complaint is due February 1, 2027.

    Say the funder sues on time under (2)(B). It holds about 32 percent of the unsecured dollars, so trade creditors can carry that class over its no vote. If every impaired class accepts, the plan is confirmed under § 1191(a) and the funder’s unpaid balance is discharged at confirmation. If the SBA’s class rejects instead, the plan becomes a cramdown, and a funder that proves deliberate overstatement keeps its debt past the § 1192 discharge. The other unsecured debt is still discharged after plan payments, and Marisol still owes whatever she guaranteed.

    So Subchapter V usually remains the better route. Section 523(a) reaches only the debts a creditor proves, not the whole discharge, and the vote count often deserves more attention than the fraud letter.

    Question Consensual plan, company (§ 1191(a)) Cramdown plan, company (§ 1191(b)) Cramdown plan, individual owner (§ 1191(b))
    Discharge section § 1141(d)(1), at confirmation § 1192, after plan payments § 1192, after plan payments
    Does § 523(a) apply? Only the narrow § 1141(d)(6) exceptions Split; recent rulings say yes Yes, by its own terms
    Who has ruled Statute Three circuits and ETG Fire vs. Off-Spec; no Tenth Circuit ruling No dispute
    What the creditor files Government proves a § 1141(d)(6) debt Complaint within 60 days after first date set for § 341 meeting Same deadline
    What the owner still owes Any guaranty Any guaranty Her own surviving § 523(a) debts

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Can a cash advance funder block my Colorado LLC’s Subchapter V discharge?

    No, only its own debt is at stake. Even under the circuit view, it must file a timely complaint and prove fraud or willful and malicious injury.

    Does section 523(a) apply if my Subchapter V plan is consensual?

    For a company, generally not. The discharge comes from section 1141(d), which reaches only the narrow government fraud, False Claims Act and fraudulent tax debts in section 1141(d)(6).

    When must a creditor file a nondischargeability complaint in Subchapter V?

    Within 60 days after the first date set for the meeting of creditors, under Rule 4007(c). The court can extend that only on a motion filed before the deadline runs.

    Has the Tenth Circuit decided whether a corporate Subchapter V debtor is subject to section 523(a)?

    Not as of October 23, 2026. A Colorado district judge and a Colorado bankruptcy judge have followed the Fourth Circuit.

    What is the Subchapter V debt limit for a Colorado case filed in late October 2026?

    It is $3,424,000 unless H.R. 7730 becomes law first. If it does, cases filed on or after enactment get $7,500,000.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm represents Colorado businesses and owners in Subchapter V reorganizations, Chapter 11 cases, and SBA loan and business debt problems, including discharge disputes. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    The vote count and the complaint deadline both take shape early in a case. If a creditor says its debt will survive your company’s bankruptcy, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • SEC Asset Freeze in Colorado: Bankruptcy, Receivership and Tax After Reven Holdings

    SEC Asset Freeze in Colorado: Bankruptcy, Receivership and Tax After Reven Holdings

    Three founders of a Castle Rock software company learn on a Monday that the SEC sued them under seal last week and a federal judge has frozen the company’s accounts and their own. Payroll runs Friday. By lunch someone asks whether bankruptcy would unlock the money.

    On October 14, 2026, the Tenth Circuit affirmed this kind of freeze against a Colorado biotech company and its principals in SEC v. Reven Holdings, Inc., Nos. 24-1235 and 24-1309. The opinion is silent on bankruptcy, receivers, and taxes, the questions owners ask first.

    What does an SEC asset freeze do to a Colorado company and its owners?

    A freeze bars the company and named individuals from moving money or property without permission. In Reven a temporary restraining order and freeze entered January 3, 2023, before the defendants were heard, became a preliminary injunction on March 29, 2024.

    The order allowed “necessary and reasonable living expenses” and, from March 2023, payments to attorneys keeping the company’s patents alive. In July 2024 the court let third parties pay company bills and let the principals spend new outside income, or court-approved borrowing, on patent upkeep and legal fees. Some release motions were granted the day they were filed.

    There was no hearing because both sides asked to vacate it and the defense never asked to reset it, and Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b) lets a court rule on the papers. Want a hearing? Move for one.

    What standard did SEC v. Reven Holdings apply in the Tenth Circuit?

    The four factors of Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008), because Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney, 602 U.S. 339 (2024), requires them unless Congress clearly says otherwise, and the securities statutes do not. SEC v. Pros International, Inc., 994 F.2d 767 (10th Cir. 1993), a permanent-injunction case, adds no element. The SEC got no presumption of irreparable harm; the court found it in likely repeat violations and the risk to funds for “any disgorgement or other future judgment.” Barring future violations altered the status quo, so the SEC needed a “strong showing” on the merits and balance of harms.

    The court never sized the freeze to a disgorgement estimate. It did not cite Liu v. SEC, 591 U.S. 71 (2020), which limits disgorgement to net profits awarded for victims, or the 2021 disgorgement amendments to 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d). It accepted that all of the defendants’ assets might be at stake. A narrower, numbers-based request remains untested.

    Why did the bank records decide the compensation question?

    Offering memoranda put the principals’ pay at $1.62 million in 2019, $1.98 million (later stated as $1.8 million) in 2020, and $2.16 million in 2021. The SEC’s accountant worked from the company’s Wells Fargo records and found $5.35 million, $3.36 million, and $6.65 million. By my arithmetic, $15.36 million was paid against roughly $5.6 million to $5.8 million disclosed.

    The method is ordinary forensic accounting. I pull every outflow from the operating accounts, identify each payee, and sort insider transfers by person and year, whatever the memo line says, and set that schedule beside what investors were told. Reven pointed to employment agreements allowing more pay, but those said what could be paid, while the memoranda claimed to report what was paid. Bank statements win because a third party produced them as the money moved, which is why a bankruptcy trustee or IRS examiner starts there too.

    Facing an SEC Asset Freeze? Contact Us Now

    Can a frozen Colorado company file Chapter 11, Subchapter V, or Chapter 7?

    Yes. An asset freeze and bankruptcy can run at once, though a retainer from frozen funds needs a carve-out. Filing will not stop the SEC. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) exempts a governmental unit’s exercise of “police and regulatory power,” including enforcement of “a judgment other than a money judgment.” Eddleman v. U.S. Department of Labor, 923 F.2d 782 (10th Cir. 1991), asks whether the action serves public policy or the government’s pecuniary interest. The SEC may litigate to judgment, but SEC v. Brennan, 230 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2000), held that ordering assets repatriated toward a disgorgement judgment violated the stay.

    The SEC may be heard on any Chapter 11 issue, § 1109(a). Fraud is cause for a trustee under § 1104(a)(1); Subchapter V drops § 1104, § 1181(a), but § 1185(a) removes the debtor in possession for the same cause. Filing mid-lawsuit also draws bad-faith challenges.

    Subchapter V eligibility, under § 1182(1) and § 101(51D), caps noncontingent, liquidated debts at $3,424,000. As I read it, an SEC claim no court has reduced to a number is unliquidated and does not count. H.R. 7730 would raise the cap to $7,500,000 for later cases; it passed the House September 16 and the Senate September 28, 2026, but was unsigned as of October 16.

    Illustrative example (hypothetical facts): the Castle Rock TRO is entered Monday, October 5, 2026. Friday’s payroll is $46,000, and $9,800 withheld last pay period is undeposited. Tuesday’s carve-out motion carries a two-week budget, tax deposit first, because unpaid withholding can become the founders’ personal debt under 26 U.S.C. § 6672. The company owes $2.1 million to its bank, landlord, and vendors and expects a $6 million disgorgement demand, so Subchapter V is available. If the carve-out keeps payroll moving and nobody seeks a receiver, I would usually hold the petition until it solves a problem the freeze does not.

    Receivership vs bankruptcy in Colorado: what changes for investors?

    Reven had no receiver; the court refused even a liquidation agent. A receiver is a “custodian” under § 101(11). Once a petition is filed, § 543 limits it to preserving property and requires turnover, unless the court excuses compliance under § 543(d)(1) because creditors are better served. The court may instead dismiss or suspend the case under § 305(a). I found no Tenth Circuit or BAP decision applying either to an SEC receiver.

    A federal receiver controls property in each district where it files its papers within ten days, 28 U.S.C. § 754, and must obey valid state law, 28 U.S.C. § 959(b). It distributes under a plan the district court approves with “broad powers and wide discretion,” SEC v. Vescor Capital Corp., 599 F.3d 1189 (10th Cir. 2010). Bankruptcy follows § 507 and § 726, and § 510(b) drops a shareholder’s fraud claim to the level of the stock.

    C.R.S. § 11-51-602 of the Colorado Securities Act lets the Securities Commissioner sue in Denver District Court without proving irreparable injury or posting bond, and seek restitution or disgorgement. In 2022 the Division of Securities announced a freeze and a receiver in a $26 million fraud case.

    Can SEC disgorgement be discharged in bankruptcy?

    For an individual, generally not. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19) covers securities-law debts from a judgment, settlement, or order for a “disgorgement payment,” entered “before, on, or after” the petition date. A company gets no Chapter 7 discharge, § 727(a)(1). A reorganizing corporation is discharged except under § 1141(d)(6), and I found no Tenth Circuit ruling on whether that reaches an SEC fraud claim.

    Under a nonconsensual Subchapter V plan, § 1192 excepts debts “of the kind specified in section 523(a),” and the Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits apply that to companies, most recently in BenShot, LLC v. 2 Monkey Trading, LLC, No. 23-12342 (11th Cir. July 9, 2025). In re Off-Spec Solutions, LLC, 651 B.R. 862 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2023), disagreed. Colorado’s bankruptcy court sided with the circuits in In re ETG Fire, LLC, Adv. No. 24-1225 (Bankr. D. Colo. Mar. 17, 2025). The Tenth Circuit has not ruled.

    How does the IRS treat frozen accounts and SEC payments?

    A freeze moves nothing; the company keeps filing and reporting its own income. A receiver holding “all or substantially all” of a corporation’s property files instead, 26 U.S.C. § 6012(b)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-3(b)(4). A segregated, court-supervised fund for claims from a violation of law can be a qualified settlement fund, Treas. Reg. § 1.468B-1(c).

    Under 26 U.S.C. § 162(f), amounts paid to a government over a violation of law on or after December 22, 2017, are nondeductible unless the order identifies them as restitution and the taxpayer proves it. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-21(e)(4)(i)(B) lets disgorgement qualify when paid to harmed investors or a fund for them, not when it exceeds net profits or goes to the government’s general account. Agencies report on Form 1098-F under 26 U.S.C. § 6050X at $50,000 or more, Treas. Reg. § 1.6050X-1(f)(6).

    Setting Who controls assets How investors are paid Who files the corporate return
    SEC asset freeze Owners, through carve-outs Nothing until judgment or settlement The company
    Federal receivership Receiver (28 U.S.C. § 754) District court-approved plan Receiver, if it holds substantially all
    Chapter 11 or Subchapter V Debtor, unless removed (§ 1104, § 1185) Plan under Code priorities; § 510(b) Company, or trustee if appointed
    Chapter 7 Trustee § 726 order; § 510(b) Trustee

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Can I pay my lawyer while the SEC has my assets frozen?

    Only as the order allows. In Reven the court let the principals use new outside income and court-approved borrowing for legal fees. Ask with a specific budget.

    Does filing bankruptcy stop an SEC lawsuit in Colorado?

    No. Section 362(b)(4) lets the SEC keep litigating to judgment. Collecting a money judgment is stayed.

    Does the SEC’s claim count against the Subchapter V debt limit?

    The limit counts only noncontingent, liquidated debts, so a disputed claim not yet reduced to judgment should not count. A prepetition disgorgement judgment would.

    Is SEC disgorgement tax deductible?

    Generally not, under § 162(f). It can qualify as restitution if the order identifies it that way and it goes to harmed investors.

    Did the Tenth Circuit tie the freeze to investor losses?

    No. It computed no cap and did not discuss Liu or the 2021 amendments.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm represents Colorado businesses and their owners in Chapter 11, Subchapter V, and Chapter 7 cases and in the IRS disputes that follow a business collapse. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    Settlement wording is tax wording, so shape it before anyone signs. If an SEC complaint or freeze has reached your company, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Lending to Your Child in Colorado: AFR Family Loans, Galli, and the Note at Death

    Lending to Your Child in Colorado: AFR Family Loans, Galli, and the Note at Death

    A retired engineer in Boulder has two things on her kitchen table: a statement for the brokerage account she inherited, and a listing for a house in Louisville. Her daughter and son-in-law found the place, and she would rather lend them $900,000 than see them take a jumbo mortgage. Her question to me is how to write it down so the IRS sees a loan and not a $900,000 gift.

    The answer is a real promissory note charging the applicable federal rate, paid the way it reads.

    Listen to this post

    North Star Tax and Legal Briefing: Colorado Family Loans at the AFR: Gift and Estate Tax

    A Boulder parent lends her daughter $900,000 for a house. We cover the applicable federal rate, what the Galli order did and did not decide, the Maxwell forgiveness trap, and the insider preference risk if the child files bankruptcy.

    Download the MP3 · Episode page on Podbean

    Show / hide the episode transcript

    A retired engineer in Boulder wants to lend her daughter and son-in-law nine hundred thousand dollars toward a house in Louisville, Colorado, rather than watch them sign a jumbo mortgage. Her worry is simple. If she writes the check, does the I R S see a loan, or a nine hundred thousand dollar gift? The difference matters. A gift that size eats into her lifetime exclusion and requires a gift tax return. Get the paperwork wrong, forgive the interest the wrong way, or let the note sit unpaid, and the loan quietly turns into the very gift she was trying to avoid. A recent Tax Court case shows exactly how to get it right.

    Here is the rule. Back in nineteen eighty-four the Supreme Court held that an interest-free loan to a family member is a taxable gift, because the free use of money has value. Congress answered that same year with a statute on below-market loans. For a term loan, the gift equals the amount lent minus the present value of the required payments, discounted at a rate the government publishes every month, the applicable federal rate. Charge at least that rate and the gap is zero. No gift. The rate depends on the length of the loan. For October two thousand twenty-six, the annual rates are four point two five percent for three years or less, four point six one percent for over three and up to nine years, and five point two two percent beyond nine. A term loan locks in the rate for the month it is made. And that rate is enough even when no bank would match it. The Tax Court held years ago that Congress replaced market valuation with this discounting formula.

    Which brings us to the Galli case. In February two thousand thirteen, Barbara Galli lent her son two point three million dollars on an unsecured note at one point zero one percent, that month’s mid-term rate, with interest due yearly and principal due within nine years. He paid the interest every year until she died in March two thousand sixteen. Her estate reported the note at one million six hundred twenty-four thousand dollars, well under face. The I R S said the whole thing had been a partial gift back in two thousand thirteen, to the tune of eight hundred sixty-nine thousand dollars. In a March two thousand twenty-five order, the judge sided with the estate. The son produced the transfer record, the signed note, his interest payments, and his mother’s returns reporting that interest. Under the statute, the transaction was not a gift at all. Now the part that cuts the other way. Some commentators read Galli as blessing a date-of-death discount on the note. It did not. The order said the estate value was not before the court, and that case later closed on a private stipulated decision. It is an order, not a published opinion. A Colorado executor claiming a discount because rates went up should expect a fight, and an appraisal bill.

    For most Colorado families, the estate side is modest. The federal exclusion is fifteen million dollars for two thousand twenty-six, and Colorado has no gift tax, no inheritance tax, and an estate tax tied to a federal credit that no longer exists. What Colorado does take is income tax on the parent’s interest, at a flat four point four zero percent. The real danger is forgiveness on a schedule. In the Maxwell case, a mother forgave twenty thousand dollars of her son’s note every year, no principal was ever paid, and the Tax Court held the note worthless because nobody ever intended payment. Then there is bankruptcy. If the child files, the parent is an insider, so payments made in the year before the filing can be clawed back as preferences, against ninety days for ordinary creditors. If the parent files, forgiveness by an insolvent parent can be unwound.

    So, three things this week. First, write a real note. A fixed rate at or above the applicable federal rate for the month you fund it, a maturity date, and signatures, drafted the way a bank would draft it. Second, record a deed of trust on the house. Security is optional for gift tax, but without it the kids cannot deduct the interest as home mortgage interest. Third, make the payments real. From the child’s own account, on time, and reported on the parent’s return every year, even when part of the interest is forgiven within the annual exclusion. That’s what we do at North Star Law Firm. The initial consultation is free, and the full written analysis with citations is at c o dash legal dot net.

    Is a loan to my child a gift if I charge the applicable federal rate?

    Not under the statute. Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330 (1984), held that interest-free demand loans to family members were taxable gifts of the reasonable value of the use of the money. Congress responded that year with 26 U.S.C. § 7872. For a term loan, the gift equals the amount loaned minus the present value of the required payments, discounted using the applicable federal rate, or AFR (§ 7872(b)(1), (d)(2), (e)(1)(B)). Charge at least the AFR and that difference is zero.

    AFRs are set monthly under 26 U.S.C. § 1274(d): short-term for three years or less, mid-term for over three and not over nine, long-term beyond nine. For October 2026, Rev. Rul. 2026-19 puts the annual rates at 4.25, 4.61 and 5.22 percent. A term loan uses the rate in effect the day it is made (§ 7872(f)(2)(A)), so a November closing needs November’s ruling, not yet posted as I write.

    Is the AFR enough when no bank would match it? Frazee v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 554 (1992), says yes: in § 7872, “Congress displaced the traditional fair market methodology of valuation of below-market loans by substituting a discounting methodology.” Neither the $10,000 de minimis rule in § 7872(c)(2) nor the § 7872(d)(1) income cap, which stops applying once loans exceed $100,000, helps with a house-sized loan.

    What did the Tax Court actually decide in Galli?

    Barbara Galli lent her son $2.3 million in February 2013 on an unsecured note at 1.01 percent, that month’s mid-term AFR, with yearly interest and principal due within nine years. He paid interest each year until she died in March 2016. The estate reported the note at $1,624,000; the IRS asserted an $869,000 gift in 2013.

    In a March 5, 2025 order in Estate of Galli v. Commissioner, Docket Nos. 7003-20 and 7005-20, Judge Mark V. Holmes granted the estate’s motions. The IRS offered no facts showing more than a partial gift; the son produced the transfer record, the signed note, his interest payments, and his mother’s returns reporting that interest. Under § 7872 and Frazee, “this transaction was not a gift at all.” The gift-tax docket closed April 3, 2025, with a stipulated decision of no deficiency.

    On the estate value, the order says: “There is a dispute about its reported value, but that’s not the subject of this motion.” Some commentary reads Galli as approving a date-of-death discount. It did not rule on one. The estate-tax docket ended March 25, 2026, with a stipulated decision of no deficiency and no overpayment, stated as a net amount, on terms that are not public. It is an order, not a published opinion.

    How is a promissory note valued for estate tax when interest rates have gone up?

    The note is in the lender’s gross estate under 26 U.S.C. § 2033. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-4 presumes its value is unpaid principal plus accrued interest “unless the executor establishes that the value is lower,” names the interest rate and maturity date as reasons, and demands “satisfactory evidence,” in practice an appraisal.

    A 1.01 percent note is worth less than face once rates rise. The IRS notices led with consistency: discount the note at death and the 2013 transfer must have been a partial gift. Their alternative discounted at the AFR alone and added $544,000 to the gross estate, about $2,168,000 by my arithmetic. Even the government’s fallback sat below the $2.3 million face.

    I found no Tenth Circuit decision on either point and no published Tax Court opinion resolving the consistency theory, so a Colorado executor claiming a discount should expect a fight. For most families the stakes are modest. The basic exclusion amount is $15,000,000 for 2026 under 26 U.S.C. § 2010(c)(3), indexed after 2026. Colorado adds nothing: C.R.S. § 39-23.5-103 taxes an estate only “in the amount of the federal credit” for state death taxes, and Congress phased that credit, former 26 U.S.C. § 2011, down to zero for deaths after 2004 and repealed the section in 2014. Surviving spouses should also read our post on portability and Form 706.

    How should Colorado parents document an intrafamily loan at the AFR?

    Copy the Galli record: a signed note with a fixed rate and maturity, a traceable transfer, and payments on time from the child’s own account, reported on the parent’s return. A promissory note is a contract under Colorado law, so draft it as a bank would.

    Security is optional for gift tax but not for the borrowers’ income tax. Interest is qualified residence interest only on debt “secured by such residence” under 26 U.S.C. § 163(h)(3), with acquisition debt capped at $750,000. A recorded deed of trust on the Louisville house can make most of the interest deductible.

    Colorado is not a community property state, so a loan from one spouse’s separate account is that spouse’s note and lands in that spouse’s estate. Colorado taxes the interest at the flat 4.40 percent rate in C.R.S. § 39-22-104(1.7)(c); the Legislative Council’s September 2026 forecast reports no TABOR refund obligation for fiscal 2025-26, so no temporary cut applies for 2026.

    What sinks these loans is forgiveness on a schedule. In Estate of Maxwell v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 594 (1992), a mother forgave $20,000 of her son’s mortgage note yearly, no principal was ever paid, and the court held the note worthless because nobody intended payment.

    What does a $900,000 family loan for a Louisville home look like in numbers?

    Illustrative example (hypothetical facts; rates as of October 16, 2026): in November 2026 the Boulder mother lends $900,000 from her separate account to her daughter and son-in-law as co-borrowers, on a nine-year, interest-only note with a November 2035 balloon, secured by the house. Nine years is mid-term. Using October’s 4.61 percent in place of November’s unpublished rate, interest runs $41,490 a year and the gift at signing is zero.

    Say she forgives $38,000 of each year’s interest and the couple pays $3,490. That is $19,000 to each co-borrower, the 2026 annual exclusion under 26 U.S.C. § 2503(b) and Rev. Proc. 2025-32, so 26 U.S.C. § 6019 requires no gift tax return. I would still have her report all $41,490 (about $1,826 of Colorado tax), since a planned forgiveness lets the IRS treat the interest as never payable and impute it under § 7872(a). Now she dies in November 2031 with four payments left and comparable rates at 7 percent; at that rate the remaining payments are worth about $827,000, roughly $73,000 under face. Claiming it takes an appraisal, and below $15,000,000 it changes no federal tax.

    What happens to a family loan in a Colorado bankruptcy?

    If the parent files, the note is estate property under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1), and forgiveness by an insolvent parent within two years can be avoided under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B). Through 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) the trustee can also use the four-year reach of C.R.S. § 38-8-105 and C.R.S. § 38-8-110. If the child files, the parent is a relative and so an insider under 11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(A)(i), and payments within one year before the petition face preference recovery under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B), against 90 days for other creditors. See also our post on Kittrell and children’s trusts.

    How the parent helpsGift at signingParent’s income taxValue in parent’s estateBankruptcy exposure
    Outright giftTaxable above the annual exclusion, using lifetime exclusionNoneOut of the estateAvoidable if the parent was insolvent
    Interest-free term loanPresent-value gap under § 7872(b)(1)Imputed interest under § 7872Face presumedNote is an estate asset; insider payments reachable for one year
    AFR loan, paid as writtenNoneInterest taxed federally and at 4.40% in ColoradoFace presumed; discount needs an appraisalSame as above
    AFR loan with scheduled forgivenessEach forgiven amount is a giftReport the full interestNote may be attacked as no real debtForgiveness can be an avoidable transfer

    Frequently Asked Questions

    What interest rate do I have to charge on a loan to my child in Colorado?

    At least the AFR for the note’s term in the month the loan is made. For October 2026, Rev. Rul. 2026-19 sets 4.25 percent short-term, 4.61 percent mid-term and 5.22 percent long-term.

    Did Galli decide that a family note can be discounted in the lender’s estate?

    No. The order said the reported estate value was not before the court, and the estate-tax case closed by stipulated decision on March 25, 2026.

    Does Colorado have a gift or estate tax on family loans?

    No. Colorado’s estate tax depends on a federal credit that no longer exists, and Colorado has no gift or inheritance tax. It does tax the parent’s interest at 4.40 percent for 2026.

    Can I forgive the interest each year as a gift?

    Forgiveness within the $19,000 per-person exclusion for 2026 is not a taxable gift. A fixed yearly pattern invites the argument from Maxwell that the note was never meant to be paid.

    What happens to the note if my child files bankruptcy?

    The parent is an insider, so payments within one year before filing can be recovered as preferences. Other creditors face a 90-day window.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm advises Colorado families on trust and estate tax planning and real estate tax strategy, handles gift and estate tax disputes in Tax Court litigation, and defends preference and clawback claims. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    If you are lending a child money for a house, or an estate you manage holds a family note, contact North Star Law Firm.

  • Colorado Nonprofit Insider Payments: Section 4958 Excess Benefit Taxes After Jagannath

    Colorado Nonprofit Insider Payments: Section 4958 Excess Benefit Taxes After Jagannath

    A new board member of a Lakewood youth soccer club is reconciling old bank statements. One line stops her: a $120,000 wire in December 2024 to an event company the board president owns, with no contract or board minute behind it and nothing showing what it bought. Her question is the one I hear most: is this the club’s problem or the president’s?

    Federally, mostly his. Section 4958 of the Internal Revenue Code taxes the insider, and the Tax Court’s September 24, 2026 decision in Jagannath v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2026-92, shows 25 percent becoming 225 percent when nobody corrects. The board has work too, some under Colorado law.

    What is an excess benefit transaction for a Colorado nonprofit?

    It is a deal in which a 501(c)(3) public charity gives an economic benefit to a “disqualified person” and gets less value back. 26 U.S.C. § 4958(c)(1)(A), (e). A disqualified person is anyone in a position to exercise substantial influence over the organization at any time in the prior five years (§ 4958(f)(1)(A)), which by rule includes voting directors, the president and the treasurer (Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(c)). Their family members count, and so does any entity they own more than 35 percent of (§ 4958(f)(3), (f)(4)).

    A real loan on fair terms is not automatically an excess benefit for a public charity. Jagannath was not close: a Tennessee charity’s president signed a $590,000 interest-free note as both lender and borrower for his own LLC, 11 days after the cash left, and the court rejected his story that a later $600,000 wire repaid it. Colorado goes further than the Code. C.R.S. § 7-128-501(2) bars a Colorado nonprofit corporation from lending to its directors or officers, and any who assent to or participate in such a loan are liable for it until repaid.

    How much does the section 4958 excise tax cost the insider personally?

    The first-tier tax is 25 percent of the excess benefit, owed by the disqualified person (§ 4958(a)(1)). An officer or director who knowingly participates owes 10 percent unless the participation was not willful and was due to reasonable cause, capped at $20,000 per transaction (§ 4958(a)(2), (d)(2)). Leave the benefit uncorrected through the “taxable period” and a 200 percent tax follows (§ 4958(b)).

    In Jagannath that meant $147,500 plus $1,180,000, or $1,327,500 on $590,000. The court also sustained additions under 26 U.S.C. § 6651(a)(1) and (a)(2); he never filed or paid, and he never argued reasonable cause.

    The insider files his own Form 4720 (Treas. Reg. § 53.6011-1(b)), due the 15th day of the fifth month after his tax year, usually May 15 (Treas. Reg. § 53.6071-1(f)(1)). Under the Form 4720 instructions, the charity may not pay his tax.

    When can an insider still avoid the 200 percent tax?

    The taxable period ends when the IRS mails a notice of deficiency for the 25 percent tax or assesses it (§ 4958(f)(5)); correcting before then prevents the 200 percent tax. Under Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-7, the insider repays the excess plus interest, compounded annually at no less than the applicable federal rate (AFR) for the transaction month, in cash or its equivalent, “excluding payment by a promissory note.”

    Even the mailing date is not quite the end. 26 U.S.C. § 4961(a) abates the second-tier tax if correction comes within the “correction period,” which § 4963(e) ends 90 days after the notice for that tax, extended while a Tax Court case bars assessment (see Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-1(c)(2)(iii)). The Jagannath opinion never mentions § 4961; on October 16, 2026 the docket showed Rule 155 computations due December 27 and no decision entered.

    The 25 percent tax is stickier. Section 4962 abates it only if the transaction was due to reasonable cause rather than willful neglect and was corrected in time; § 4962(b) covers subchapter D of chapter 42, where § 4958 sits. A president who paid his own company without a vote has a weak reasonable-cause case.

    Insider Payment on Your Nonprofit’s Books? Contact Us Now

    How does a Colorado board use the rebuttable presumption of reasonableness?

    Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6 presumes pay reasonable, and a property transfer at fair market value, when board members with no conflict approve it in advance, relying on comparability data and documenting their basis at the time. For an event contract, I want competing vendor quotes in the file, and minutes written before the later of the next meeting or 60 days after the vote.

    Colorado runs a parallel test. A contract with an entity in which a director has a financial interest is a “conflicting interest transaction” (§ 7-128-501(1)), and it is not voidable solely for that reason if disinterested directors approve or ratify it in good faith after disclosure, if members do, or if it is fair (§ 7-128-501(3)). Colorado accepts after-the-fact ratification; the federal presumption needs advance approval, so a 2026 vote cannot create it for 2024. Applying these rules and the director duties in C.R.S. § 7-128-401 is work for a Colorado nonprofit tax attorney or other Colorado-licensed counsel.

    Under Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(c), services count as consideration only if the charity showed at payment that it meant compensation, usually by a W-2, 1099, Form 990 report or written contract. Otherwise they are ignored, an “automatic” excess benefit in practitioners’ shorthand.

    What could the IRS assess against a Lakewood board president?

    Illustrative example (hypothetical facts): on December 2, 2024, the club wires $120,000 to the president’s single-member LLC for two tournaments. Nobody signed a contract or called a vote, and the club issued no Form 1099. If all of it is excess benefit under § 53.4958-4(c), his first-tier tax is $30,000. If the work counts and a comparable vendor would have charged $50,000, the excess is $70,000 and the tax $17,500. A treasurer who knowingly approved the wire faces $12,000 of manager tax.

    His 2024 Form 4720 was due May 15, 2025, so § 6651 additions are accruing. Correcting on December 2, 2026, two years later, uses the short-term rate under 26 U.S.C. § 1274(d)(1)(A), 4.30 percent compounded annually for December 2024 (Rev. Rul. 2024-26). At that floor he repays $130,541.88, including $10,541.88 of interest. If a notice of deficiency comes first, $240,000 more is at stake until correction within the § 4961 period, or $270,000 in all.

    How long does the IRS have, and which court hears a Colorado section 4958 case?

    The clock runs from the charity’s return. 26 U.S.C. § 6501(l)(1) points to the organization’s return for the transaction year, and Treas. Reg. § 301.6501(e)-1(c)(3)(ii) allows three years if that return adequately discloses the transaction, six if not. The Schedule L instructions put payments over $100,000 to an interested person in Part IV and every excess benefit transaction in Part I. Jagannath‘s charity left Schedule L off, and the court used those returns against him.

    The IRS asserts these chapter 42 taxes by notice of deficiency (26 U.S.C. § 6212(a)), and the insider has 90 days to petition the Tax Court before assessment (§ 6213(a)). Colorado residents appeal to the Tenth Circuit (§ 7482(b)(1)(A)), whose only § 4958 ruling I found is Farr v. Commissioner, 738 F. App’x 969 (10th Cir. 2018). That unpublished order affirmed both tiers against a Kansas taxpayer who had used charity funds for personal expenses. With no published Tenth Circuit law, the Tax Court applies its own precedent under Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970).

    Can intermediate sanctions and 501(c)(3) revocation both hit a Colorado nonprofit?

    Yes. Congress added § 4958 in 1996 (Pub. L. 104-168, § 1311) because, as Jagannath recounts, revocation had been the IRS’s only remedy and it fell on the charity rather than the insider. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(f)(2) keeps revocation available, weighing size, repetition, safeguards and correction, and correction after IRS discovery “by itself, is never a sufficient basis” to keep exemption. Last week’s post covers 501(c)(3) revocation in Colorado.

    The Colorado Secretary of State’s charity registration can require the Form 990 with every schedule except donor lists (C.R.S. § 6-16-104(2)(f)). A Charitable Solicitations Act violation is also a Consumer Protection Act violation (§ 6-16-111(5)), which the Attorney General can enforce (§ 6-1-103), and C.R.S. § 7-134-301 allows dissolution suits over abuse of authority or misapplied assets.

    Layer Who owes it Example ($120,000) Way out
    First-tier tax, 25% President $30,000 § 4962: reasonable cause plus correction
    Manager tax, 10% Knowing managers $12,000 (cap $20,000) No knowing participation
    Second-tier tax, 200% President $240,000 Timely correction (§ 4961)
    Correction payment President, to the club $130,541.88 (Dec. 2, 2026) Cash; AFR or higher
    § 6651 additions President Up to 25% each Timely Form 4720; reasonable cause

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Is a nonprofit loan to a director legal in Colorado?

    Not for a Colorado nonprofit corporation. C.R.S. § 7-128-501(2) bars loans to directors and officers and makes those who assent to one liable until it is repaid. Federal excess benefit treatment is a separate question.

    Can the nonprofit pay the president’s section 4958 tax?

    No. The Form 4720 instructions forbid it. A reimbursement is itself an excess benefit unless it was part of reasonable compensation.

    Does signing a promissory note correct an excess benefit?

    No. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-7(b)(1) requires cash or cash equivalents and excludes notes. Returning the property itself requires the organization’s agreement.

    Who files Form 4720, and when?

    The disqualified person and each liable manager file separately, by the 15th day of the fifth month after their tax year. The organization reports the transaction on Schedule I of its own Form 4720.

    Can the 200 percent tax be removed after a notice of deficiency?

    Yes, by correction within the § 4961 correction period: 90 days after the notice for that tax, extended while a Tax Court case bars assessment. Waiting is risky, since interest keeps growing.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm represents Colorado nonprofit insiders and organizations in IRS examinations of excess benefit transactions, penalty and excise tax abatement, and Tax Court litigation of section 4958 deficiencies. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    Fixing an insider payment gets costlier once the IRS mails a notice of deficiency. If your board has found a payment it cannot explain, contact North Star Law Firm.