Author: Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA

  • DOJ v. McNutt and Colorado Home Distilling: What Changes for Hobbyists and Distillers

    DOJ v. McNutt and Colorado Home Distilling: What Changes for Hobbyists and Distillers

    Marcus has pressed apples and fermented hard cider in his Salida garage for years. He read that a federal appeals court struck down the home distilling ban, and now he wants to run a few gallons through a small pot still and age it as apple brandy. A friend who owns a licensed craft distillery in town asks the other half: if the ban falls, does her federal permit or quarterly excise tax change?

    For Marcus, nothing he read makes a garage still lawful in Colorado. For his friend, nothing turns on the case. The reasons matter, because Department of Justice v. McNutt, now at the Supreme Court, turns on a question about the taxing power that reaches well past whiskey.

    Is home distilling legal in Colorado after the Fifth Circuit’s McNutt ruling?

    No. Under 26 U.S.C. § 5178(a)(1)(B), no distilled spirits plant may be located “in any dwelling house, in any shed, yard, or inclosure connected with any dwelling house.” The Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB) regulation at 27 C.F.R. § 19.51 is blunter: “A person may not produce distilled spirits at home for personal use.”

    The ruling protects people, not a region. The government’s cert petition describes the injunction entered in Hobby Distillers Ass’n v. Alcohol & Tobacco Tax & Trade Bureau, 740 F. Supp. 3d 509 (N.D. Tex. 2024), as running “against McNutt, the association, and the association’s members.” Colorado sits in the Tenth Circuit, which has not ruled on the ban. Unless Marcus is a plaintiff or a Hobby Distillers Association member, the ban still binds him, and membership would not fix his state law problem.

    What did the Fifth and Sixth Circuits hold, and what is the Supreme Court deciding in DOJ v. McNutt?

    In McNutt v. U.S. Department of Justice, 173 F.4th 204 (5th Cir. 2026), decided April 10, 2026, the panel held that the ban collects nothing, so it falls outside the taxing power, and is not “necessary and proper” either. It leaned on NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 574 (2012), which limits the taxing power to “requiring an individual to pay money into the Federal Treasury, no more.” It refused to read United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126 (2010) as a rational basis test, and warned that the government’s logic had no stopping point.

    Eleven days later, Ream v. U.S. Department of the Treasury, 174 F.4th 480 (6th Cir. 2026) agreed the taxing power alone could not carry the ban but upheld it as necessary and proper. Judge Kethledge pointed to the “stupendous frauds” Congress documented in 1867 and to how much harder a house is to inspect, concluding that “empirically, alcohol is sui generis, or very close to it.”

    The docket in No. 26-204 shows certiorari granted October 19, 2026, on whether the location ban “is necessary and proper for carrying into execution Congress’s enumerated power to lay and collect taxes.” As of November 6, 2026, no argument date is listed. Ream’s petition, No. 26-93, remains pending. Ohio and 14 other states filed an amicus brief there; Colorado did not join.

    What federal penalties does a Colorado home distiller face under 26 U.S.C. 5601?

    Several; McNutt challenged one. Section 5601(a) makes each of these a felony carrying up to $10,000 and five years per offense: possessing an unregistered still (paragraph (1)), distilling in a dwelling or connected shed or yard (paragraph (6)), making a wash fit for distillation off a qualified plant (paragraph (7)), and producing spirits without being “a distiller authorized by law” (paragraph (8)). Sections 5602 (fraud) and 5604 (closures and marks) add more.

    Forfeiture is the harsher piece. Under § 5615, an unregistered still is forfeited with nearby personal property, and someone distilling without bond can lose his interest “in the lot or tract of land on which the distillery is situated.” The tax attaches “as soon as this substance is in existence” under § 5001(b), and § 5006(c)(2) makes it “due and payable immediately upon production” for spirits made outside a qualified plant. Marcus would owe $13.50 per proof gallon on brandy he never sold.

    What would a Supreme Court win for McNutt change for a Colorado hobbyist?

    Less than headlines suggest. A win removes the location ban and paragraph (6). Registration under § 5171, still registration under § 5179, the permit requirement and the tax all stay. The Fifth Circuit said a home distiller would then stand “on the same level as current licensees,” paperwork included.

    For beer and wine, Pub. L. 95-458 (1978) shaped today’s household exemptions in § 5042(a)(2) and § 5053(e): 200 gallons a calendar year with two or more adults, 100 with one. Congress never wrote a spirits counterpart, and no court can.

    Colorado law runs separately. A manufacturer’s license under C.R.S. § 44-3-402 goes to persons “distilling, rectifying, or brewing within this state,” and the home exception in C.R.S. § 44-3-106(2) reaches only malt and vinous liquors made in conformity with federal law. I found no Colorado exception for home spirits; Colorado licensed counsel should confirm for any specific plan.

    So Marcus can keep making cider, which federal law treats as wine (§ 5041(g)), within the household limit. A lawful still means a fuel alcohol plant under § 5181, with the product used only as fuel. Beverage brandy would still need federal qualification and a Colorado license after a McNutt win in 2027.

    What does a licensed Colorado craft distillery owe in federal excise tax and Colorado distillery tax?

    TTB’s list of permittees showed 178 Colorado distilled spirits plant permits as of November 2, 2026, tenth among the states, each registered on TTB F 5110.41 (27 C.F.R. § 19.73). Section 5001(c) cuts the $13.50 rate to $2.70 on the first 100,000 proof gallons a plant distills or processes and removes each calendar year, and $13.34 on the next 22,130,000. Those rates became permanent in December 2020 (Pub. L. 116-260, div. EE), and related companies share one allotment under § 5001(c)(2).

    Illustrative example: Marcus’s friend removes 4,000 proof gallons of her own spirits in 2027. At $2.70 she owes $10,800; at the full rate it would be $54,000. Because she expects no more than $50,000 for 2027 and owed no more than that in 2026, § 5061(d)(4) and 27 C.F.R. § 19.235(c) let her file TTB F 5000.24 quarterly, and § 5551(d) excuses a bond. Under § 19.236(b), her first quarter return and payment are due April 14, 2027. At the full rate she would cross $50,000 and lose both benefits.

    Colorado’s excise is 60.26 cents per liter under C.R.S. § 44-3-503, per the Legislative Council’s March 2026 issue brief. At 80 proof, 4,000 proof gallons is 5,000 gallons (about 18,927 liters), roughly $11,405 if all of it sells in Colorado. For income tax, the excise is a cost of goods, and § 263A capitalization applies unless she meets the § 448(c) gross receipts test. Late TTB returns draw § 6651 additions, with the usual reasonable cause defense. On entity choice, see our 2026 LLC, S corporation and C corporation comparison.

    Why should Colorado taxpayers who never distill care about the taxing power question?

    Much of the Code is not tax but machinery for collecting it. The government’s petition says the ban works by “channeling taxable conduct into locations where tax evasion is more difficult.” The respondents’ brief calls that “a federal police power in all but name.” Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937) held that a tax does not stop being a tax because it regulates. McNutt asks how far a rule that collects nothing may go in collection’s name.

    My read: if the Court adopts the Fifth Circuit’s view, expect challenges to other criminal rules justified as collection aids; Ohio’s brief says a Texas federal court has already carried McNutt into firearm rules. If it follows the Sixth Circuit, the fallout stays narrow. Recordkeeping tied to a taxed item looks safe either way; the Fifth Circuit itself distinguished rules aimed at “the very articles” taxed. For another federal excise regime, see dyed diesel relief for Colorado truckers and farmers.

    Activity in Colorado Federal permit and tax Colorado license After a hypothetical McNutt win
    Home beer, wine or cider for personal use No permit; tax exempt up to 100 or 200 gallons a year None within the § 44-3-106(2) exception No change
    Home fuel alcohol § 5181 fuel plant permit; product used only as fuel Confirm with Colorado counsel Little practical change
    Home beverage distilling Barred by § 5178(a)(1)(B); tax due on production Manufacturer’s license required; no home exception found Location ban gone; registration, permit, tax and state license remain
    Licensed craft distillery Registration and permit; $2.70 or $13.50 per proof gallon Manufacturer’s license; 60.26 cents per liter No change

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Can I legally distill spirits at home in Colorado right now?

    No. The federal location ban still applies to anyone outside the McNutt injunction, which covers the plaintiffs and Hobby Distillers Association members. Colorado’s home production exception covers beer and wine, not spirits.

    Does the Fifth Circuit decision apply in Colorado?

    Not as precedent. The Tenth Circuit has not ruled, and the Sixth Circuit went the other way. The Supreme Court will decide, probably before its 2027 summer recess.

    If McNutt wins, can I sell spirits I make at home?

    No. Selling still requires federal registration and a permit, the excise tax, and a Colorado manufacturer’s license. The case concerns only where a still may sit.

    Do I owe federal excise tax on spirits I make just for myself?

    Yes. The tax attaches when the spirits exist and is due immediately when made outside a qualified plant. Spirits have no personal use exemption.

    Does a small Colorado distillery need a bond?

    Not if it expects no more than $50,000 in federal excise tax for the year and owed no more than $50,000 the year before. Those taxpayers file quarterly and, under section 5551(d), are treated as bonded.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm advises Colorado distillers and other producers on federal excise and income tax questions, entity selection, and penalty abatement when a return or payment slips. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    To have your distillery’s excise filing, bond status and reduced rate allotment reviewed before the 2027 returns, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Colorado PPP and EIDL Borrowers: How DOJ’s New Directive Turns a Loan File Into a Tax Case

    Colorado PPP and EIDL Borrowers: How DOJ’s New Directive Turns a Loan File Into a Tax Case

    Gideon runs a trucking and ag hauling S corporation in Greeley with about nine drivers. The company took PPP loans of $187,000 in 2020 and $150,000 in 2021, both forgiven, plus a $200,000 SBA COVID EIDL that is now 14 months behind. A dispatcher he fired in 2024 keeps posting “fraud” about the company online. Meanwhile his bookkeeper has spotted a real problem: the payroll on the PPP applications is higher than the Forms W-3 the company filed, and the 2020 and 2021 Forms 941 and 1120-S were all late.

    Most coverage this fall has been about the Justice Department paying tipsters. For a borrower like Gideon, the bigger change is a memo telling fraud prosecutors to look for a tax case every time. That is where I would start.

    Why would a PPP loan fraud investigation in Colorado turn into an IRS criminal case?

    The Justice Department created its National Fraud Enforcement Division by an Acting Attorney General memo dated April 7, 2026. In October the division opened a tip rewards pilot that, according to its published FAQs, pays $10,000 to $30,000 once charges are unsealed, and SBA program fraud is covered.

    The more important document is Directive 26-13, “A Comprehensive Approach in the Fight Against Fraud” (Oct. 7, 2026). It tells prosecutors to assess “in every case” whether “a violation of the internal revenue laws has occurred,” and to invite IRS Criminal Investigation to evaluate the tax side when tax charges would advance the case or asset recovery. It also targets unpaid tax on “fraudulently obtained or unreported income.” The memo never mentions PPP or EIDL. It does not need to.

    Colorado already has the machinery. The U.S. Attorney’s Office here was picked on July 11, 2023 to lead one of five national COVID-19 Fraud Strike Force teams, and the IRS-CI Denver Field Office investigates local PPP cases. In United States v. Nieto, No. 22-cr-00262-WJM (D. Colo.), a Morrison contractor got 46 months in June 2025; the IRS release says he fabricated Forms 941 that did not match the returns he had actually filed. That mismatch is what a tax agent hunts for.

    Which tax charges can a PPP or EIDL file pull in with IRS Criminal Investigation?

    On the loan side the usual charges are 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (false statements to the SBA or an FDIC insured lender), wire fraud and conspiracy under § 1343 and § 1349, § 1001, theft of government money under § 641, and money laundering under § 1957 for transactions over $10,000. Nieto and a Colorado Springs borrower sentenced in January 2025 were both convicted of wire fraud and laundering.

    Directive 26-13 adds the tax column. A Form 941 or 1120-S the owner knew was false supports a count under 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1), and a bookkeeper who helped faces § 7206(2). Withheld payroll tax never paid over fits § 7202; years with no return fit § 7203; a pattern of hiding income becomes evasion under § 7201.

    The facts that create this exposure are familiar. Application payroll above the 941s means either an inflated application or wages paid off the books. EIDL money spent on the owner’s mortgage was income to someone and often never reported. Forgiven PPP is tax exempt under 15 U.S.C. § 636m(i), as amended by section 276 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, with the deductions preserved, but if prosecutors treat the excess as money obtained by fraud rather than a loan, nobody should assume that treatment survives.

    Worried About Your PPP or EIDL File? Contact Us Now

    What is the statute of limitations for PPP fraud, and when does the tax side close?

    Ten years on the loan. The PPP and Bank Fraud Enforcement Harmonization Act of 2022 put that deadline in 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(36)(W) and (a)(37)(P), and the COVID-19 EIDL Fraud Statute of Limitations Act of 2022 did the same in § 636(b)(16) and § 9009(e)(9), for criminal and civil cases alike.

    Most criminal tax charges get six years under 26 U.S.C. § 6531. Civil assessment usually ends three years after filing under § 6501(a), but a fraudulent return can be assessed “at any time” under § 6501(c)(1), with a 75 percent penalty under § 6663.

    On one calendar: if Gideon signed his first application in April 2020, it can be charged until April 2030. If his late 2020 Form 1120-S was filed in December 2021, a § 7206(1) count on it expires in December 2027. The criminal tax window can close years before the loan window, while civil fraud on that same year never closes. The post on Colorado limitations periods after Murrin covers how fraud keeps old years open.

    How does an EIDL fraud whistleblower read my file against public data?

    The FAQs say original information can come from “independent analysis of public or private data.” For PPP, much of it is public. The SBA’s PPP FOIA dataset shows borrower name, lender, amounts approved and forgiven, and jobs reported, and ProPublica publishes a searchable copy. A former employee can lay those numbers beside Secretary of State records, job postings and what he saw in the yard. Just assume your file will be read against public numbers by someone who wants it to look bad.

    What does a payroll gap mean for a Greeley trucking company’s PPP file?

    An illustrative version of Gideon’s numbers: first and second draw loans were capped at 2.5 times average monthly payroll under 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(36)(E) and (a)(37)(C). To support $187,000 and $150,000, his applications claimed about $74,800 and $60,000 a month. Assume his Forms 941 show about $45,000 a month in 2019 and 2020 ($540,000 for 2020). On those filings each loan tops out near $112,500, leaving roughly $112,000 of the $337,000 unexplained. In United States v. Joseph, 108 F.4th 1273 (10th Cir. 2024), a Colorado Springs PPP case, the Tenth Circuit upheld counting an earlier failed application as intended loss, so a sentencing loss figure can exceed what was received.

    A counsel led review rebuilds payroll from bank records, 941s and W-2s first. The innocent explanation I see most is owner pay that never ran through payroll. That helps less than people hope, because payroll costs under § 636(a)(36)(A)(viii) mean compensation to employees, and S corporation draws are not wages. If he worked full time on no salary, the IRS may recast part of the draws as wages, and the trust fund recovery penalty under § 6672 can reach him personally.

    The EIDL comes after that. A hardship plan or offer requires sworn financial statements, so it waits for the exposure review. Any compromised balance is also debt cancellation income under 26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(11) unless a § 108(a) exclusion, such as bankruptcy or insolvency, applies.

    Should I amend returns or ask the SBA for relief before a lawyer reviews the file?

    No. Under IRM 25.1.2.2, an examiner who sees badges of fraud brings in a fraud enforcement advisor, develops “affirmative acts” of fraud, suspends the exam once they are found, and refers the case to Criminal Investigation when criminal criteria are met. After CI opens a case, IRM 9.5.1.2.1 has the agent ask civil functions to suspend their work. An amended return filed midstream is a signed admission.

    The tax practitioner privilege in 26 U.S.C. § 7525 applies only in noncriminal matters, so what you tell your CPA is unprotected if the case turns criminal. The fix is for the lawyer to hire the accountant, as in United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961). Kovel is a Second Circuit case, and I did not locate a Tenth Circuit opinion deciding the point, so the engagement terms matter. The Fifth Amendment protects what you say; a first call from an agent is not the time to explain.

    My order is criminal exposure, then civil tax compliance, then SBA or Treasury resolution or bankruptcy. For collection, see SBA demand letters, Treasury offset and bankruptcy in Colorado.

    Colorado borrower profile Likely civil tax issue Potential criminal exposure First step
    Clean loan file, late 941s and 1120-S Late filing and payment penalties Low; § 7203 only if willful Confirm filings support the applications, then catch up
    Application payroll above the 941s Unreported wages, employment tax, § 6672 § 1014, § 1343, § 7206(1) Payroll reconstruction through counsel
    EIDL spent on personal bills Unreported distributions or wages § 641, § 1957, false returns Trace the EIDL before any hardship request
    Forgiven PPP, no real operations Whether § 636m(i) applies; civil fraud penalty Highest: loan, laundering and tax counts Criminal defense counsel before any contact

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Does the DOJ WHIP whistleblower program cover PPP and EIDL fraud?

    Yes. The FAQs list fraud on Small Business Administration programs as covered. Rewards of $10,000 to $30,000 are paid after charges are unsealed, not after conviction.

    Can IRS Criminal Investigation open a case over a PPP loan?

    Yes. IRS-CI investigates tax crimes and money laundering and has worked Colorado PPP cases. Directive 26-13 now has fraud prosecutors ask about tax charges in every case.

    How long can the government charge PPP fraud?

    Ten years from the offense under the 2022 amendments to 15 U.S.C. § 636. An application signed in 2021 can be charged into 2031.

    Is a forgiven PPP loan taxable income?

    Legitimately forgiven PPP is excluded from gross income by 15 U.S.C. § 636m(i), and the related deductions stay. A loan forgiven on false certifications is an unsettled question.

    Should I file amended returns to fix the payroll numbers?

    Not before a lawyer reviews your exposure. An amended return is sworn, and if a fraud referral is underway it becomes evidence.

    Is my CPA’s advice on the PPP file privileged?

    Not in a criminal case. Section 7525 stops at noncriminal matters, so when criminal exposure is possible the CPA should be retained through counsel.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm reviews PPP and EIDL files for Colorado business owners, handles IRS audit defense and unfiled and late tax returns, and works on SBA loans and business debt once the tax picture is clear. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    If your PPP applications and payroll filings do not agree, have the file reviewed before anyone signs a new form. To start, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Colorado Chapter 11 Landlords: Using Rents as Cash Collateral and the Equity Cushion

    Colorado Chapter 11 Landlords: Using Rents as Cash Collateral and the Equity Cushion

    Lorena owns two older apartment buildings in Pueblo through an LLC she owns alone: 46 units, one deed of trust to a regional bank, and an assignment of rents in the loan papers. The balloon came due in 2026, the bank would not extend, and the LLC filed Chapter 11 in Denver to buy time for a refinance. Rents run about $52,000 a month, and the gas bill, the manager’s payroll and the insurance premium are due before the bank calls back.

    The bank’s first letter says every dollar of rent is its cash collateral. That is partly right, but a court can still let the LLC spend rents, and the answer turns mostly on what the LLC can prove in the first two weeks.

    Can a Colorado landlord use rents in a Chapter 11 when the lender has an assignment of rents?

    Only with consent from the bank or a court order. 11 U.S.C. § 363(a) puts encumbered “rents” inside the definition of cash collateral, § 363(c)(2) bars using them without consent or an order entered “after notice and a hearing,” and § 363(c)(4) requires the debtor to “segregate and account for” them meanwhile. Spending them anyway can be cause to convert or dismiss under § 1112(b)(4)(D).

    Rents collected after the filing stay subject to the bank’s lien because of § 552(b)(2), added in 1994, which reaches them “to the extent provided in such security agreement” and “notwithstanding section 546(b).” Before that, Colorado courts asked whether the lender had perfected its rents interest under state law. Colorado is a lien theory state (C.R.S. § 38-35-117), and in Consolidated Capital Income Trust v. Colter, Inc., 47 B.R. 1008 (D. Colo. 1985), Judge Matsch called a mortgagee’s interest in apartment rents “an inchoate or passive lien.” In re RV Centennial Partnership, 202 B.R. 774 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1996) treated a receiver’s appointment, now governed by C.R.S. § 38-38-601, as the step that perfected it.

    Now the loan documents carry most of the weight, read under Colorado law. As far as I can find, Colorado has not enacted the Uniform Assignment of Rents Act, and the Tenth Circuit has not construed § 552(b)(2). The court may trim the lien “based on the equities of the case,” but a debtor should not plan around that.

    What does a cash collateral motion in the Denver bankruptcy court have to show?

    Interim use is requested under L.B.R. 2081-1, for expedited motions in the first 21 days after the order for relief. The motion needs affidavits from someone with personal knowledge and must reach the U.S. Trustee within four hours after filing. Chambers tries to set a hearing within three days, and only an interim order issues.

    L.B.R. 4001-2 requires a “line item budget for both the interim and final order periods.” Under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4001(b)(2), the final hearing starts “no earlier than 14 days after” service, and until then the court allows only what is “necessary to avoid immediate and irreparable harm.” Section 363(p)(1) puts the burden of proving adequate protection on the debtor.

    Lender Cutting Off Your Rents? Contact Us Now

    Why did the Broadway Realty debtors lose, and should a Colorado landlord worry?

    In In re Broadway Realty I Co., LLC, No. 25-11050 (DSJ) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2025), 82 related New York apartment owners, each with its own Flagstar loan, asked to keep spending rents. Judge Jones denied the motion without prejudice. Some cushions were under 18 percent on the debtors’ own appraisals, the budget was consolidated though a property level version existed, and nobody could break down the professional fees.

    Read it as a list of missing exhibits. The judge refused to wait for proof of harm, calling adequate protection “an explicitly prospective enterprise.” The cases ended in a liquidating plan confirmed in January 2026. A Colorado case with one lender and two buildings can close those gaps by building the numbers property by property.

    How big an equity cushion does a Colorado bankruptcy judge need to see?

    There is no Tenth Circuit percentage. In re O’Connor, 808 F.2d 1393 (10th Cir. 1987) treats adequate protection as a question of fact, decided “flexibly on the proverbial ‘case-by-case’ basis,” and reinstated an order letting debtors spend cash collateral backed by replacement liens. In In re Gallegos Research Group, Corp., 193 B.R. 577 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1995), Judge Krieger wrote that sufficiency “must be determined by the facts in each case,” and a small cushion or a long case can fall short.

    The closest apartment case is In re Bluejay Properties, LLC, BAP No. KS-12-105 (10th Cir. BAP Mar. 12, 2014) (unpublished). A Kansas complex worth about $17 million secured a claim of slightly less than $14 million, and the panel held that “adequate protection” does not require “identical protection,” letting the debtor pay legal fees from rents. It persuades but does not bind. The familiar 15 and 20 percent figures come from cases the Broadway Realty opinion surveyed, not from any Colorado rule.

    The CHFA Colorado Statewide Apartment Survey for the second quarter of 2026 puts Pueblo metro vacancy at 2.6 percent and average rent at $1,190, against 5.5 percent statewide, after vacancy rose across Colorado from late 2022 through 2025. That helps a Pueblo debtor.

    What should the budget show, and can rents pay the lawyers?

    As a forensic accountant, I want a rent roll for each building, a trailing twelve month operating statement, an escrow tied to actual bills, and a line for the U.S. Trustee’s quarterly fee under 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(6), which through 2030 is the greater of 0.4 percent of disbursements or $250 for quarters under $1 million. Professional fees go on a separate line, paid from other money unless the bank agrees.

    Section 506(c) rarely rescues that line. It reaches reasonable, necessary costs of preserving the property only “to the extent of any benefit” to the lender, and lawyers hired to fight the lender do not benefit it. Property taxes qualify. Default interest and fees also shrink the cushion; see default interest and lender fees under section 506(b).

    How would this play out for Lorena’s Pueblo apartment buildings?

    This example is illustrative. Say the LLC filed Tuesday, November 3, 2026, the buildings appraise together at $4.9 million, and the bank is owed $4.1 million. The cushion is $800,000, about 16.3 percent of value, and $90,000 of asserted default interest and fees would cut it to about 14.5 percent. Alone, that proves little. Had the appraisal come in below the debt, United Savings Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U.S. 365 (1988) would give the bank protection against decline only, nothing for delay.

    Rents of $52,000, less $31,000 of operating costs including payroll and a $6,500 escrow, leave $14,500. At an assumed 4 percent nondefault contract rate, interest on $4.1 million is about $13,667 a month. A realistic offer under § 361 is that monthly interest, replacement liens on postpetition rents, and weekly reports. About $833 a month remains, before a quarterly trustee fee near $614.

    The 46 units clear the “fewer than 4 residential units” carve out in § 101(51B), so the question is whether two buildings are “a single property or project.” If so, § 362(d)(3) requires a plan with “a reasonable possibility of being confirmed” or monthly interest at the “nondefault contract rate” within 90 days after the order for relief (February 1, 2027 here), or 30 days after a later SARE finding. Otherwise the stay lifts and the bank forecloses through the public trustee, as discussed in Colorado foreclosure after Obduskey.

    Subchapter V is probably closed. The definition in § 101(51D) excludes “a person whose primary activity is the business of owning single asset real estate,” and the $3,424,000 debt limit in effect since April 1, 2025 (Federal Register notice of Feb. 4, 2025) is below the LLC’s debt. As of November 6, 2026, H.R. 7730, which would raise the limit to $7.5 million, had passed both chambers with no signature recorded, and it keeps the single asset exclusion.

    Here is how the usual packages compare.

    Protection offered What the debtor must prove Typical interim result (general observation) Risk to debtor and usual lender response
    Equity cushion only Current appraisal and stable value Approved if wide; often denied when thin Lender’s appraiser attacks the cap rate
    Cushion plus monthly interest Cushion and net rent to pay contract interest Often approved when net rent covers it Little cash left; lender disputes the rate
    Replacement liens and reporting Rents and occupancy will hold Weeks at a time, tied to the budget A shortfall reopens the fight
    Consent with agreed budget Terms that clear L.B.R. 4001-2 Usually entered quickly Lender seeks a § 506(c) waiver

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Are apartment rents cash collateral in a Colorado Chapter 11?

    Yes, if the deed of trust or a separate assignment gives the lender a security interest in rents. Section 552(b)(2) carries that interest into rents collected after filing.

    Does my lender need a receiver before I file to claim the rents?

    Generally not, after the 1994 amendment. Older Colorado cases turned on receivers and notice, but the security agreement now carries most of the weight, read under Colorado law.

    How fast can the Denver bankruptcy court approve use of rents?

    Chambers tries to hear an expedited motion within three days under L.B.R. 2081-1. That yields only an interim order; a final hearing waits at least 14 days after service.

    Is a 20 percent equity cushion required in Colorado?

    No Colorado or Tenth Circuit rule sets a number. Judges weigh the cushion with value trends, cash flow and the other protection offered.

    Does the 90 day single asset deadline apply to my building?

    Only if the property is single asset real estate, which excludes residential property with fewer than four units. Then the debtor needs a confirmable plan or monthly interest payments by day 90.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm represents Colorado property owners in Chapter 11 reorganizations, including cash collateral fights, and advises on Subchapter V eligibility and the tax side of a refinance or sale. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    A rents motion is won on proof. If your lender is trying to cut off the rents your buildings run on, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Walk-Away Money in Colorado: Forfeited Deposits, Break Fees and Section 1234A After AbbVie

    Walk-Away Money in Colorado: Forfeited Deposits, Break Fees and Section 1234A After AbbVie

    Lucas runs a ranch-supply and feed business in Montrose. In April 2026 the buyer of his 40-acre commercial parcel at the edge of town, where he stores hay and parks trucks, walked away before closing, and Lucas kept the $150,000 earnest money. In July his lender pulled financing for his purchase of a competing feed store in Delta, and he paid that owner $60,000 to terminate their letter of intent. His bookkeeper wants to net the two.

    Short answer: the $150,000 is very likely ordinary income. The $60,000 is an ordinary deduction or a capital loss depending on what he signed, and as a capital loss only $3,000 of it offsets the deposit in 2026.

    Is forfeited earnest money ordinary income or capital gain for a Colorado seller?

    It turns on what the property is in the seller’s hands. 26 U.S.C. § 1234A says a gain or loss on the “cancellation, lapse, expiration, or other termination” of a right or obligation “with respect to property which is (or on acquisition would be) a capital asset in the hands of the taxpayer” is taxed as if a capital asset had been sold. A 1997 amendment, Pub. L. 105-34, § 1003, extended it from personal property to all property, including real estate.

    But § 1221(a)(2) says depreciable property and “real property used in his trade or business” are not capital assets. Held over a year, they are § 1231 property, which gets capital gain rates on a net sale gain but is not a capital asset. In CRI-Leslie, LLC v. Commissioner, 147 T.C. 217 (2016), aff’d, 882 F.3d 1026 (11th Cir. 2018), a Tampa hotel owner kept a $9.7 million deposit after its buyer defaulted. The hotel was § 1231 property, so § 1234A did not apply and the deposit was ordinary income. The Eleventh Circuit called the result odd but not absurd.

    Investment land is the opposite case: it is a capital asset, so a kept deposit is § 1234A capital gain. I found no Tenth Circuit decision on § 1234A or forfeited deposits. A Colorado individual’s Tax Court case goes to the Tenth Circuit under § 7482(b)(1)(A), and I expect the Tax Court to follow its own CRI-Leslie opinion.

    Does the liquidated damages box in a Colorado real estate contract change the tax result?

    Many Colorado commercial sales use the Real Estate Commission’s Contract to Buy and Sell Real Estate (Commercial), adopted August 5, 2025 and mandatory on and after January 1, 2026. Under § 20.1.2, which applies unless the § 20.1.1 box is checked, a seller facing a buyer’s default may cancel and keep the earnest money as liquidated damages, “SELLER’S ONLY REMEDY.” Checking the § 20.1.1 “Specific Performance” box instead lets the seller keep the deposit and seek more damages, or enforce the contract.

    Which box to check is a contract question for the parties and their Colorado counsel. For tax purposes, it mostly decides whether a sale happens. If the seller compels the sale, the earnest money is part of the price on a § 1231 sale. If the seller cancels and keeps the deposit under either box, nothing is sold, and the CRI-Leslie analysis governs.

    What did AbbVie v. Commissioner decide, and does it still stand in 2026?

    In AbbVie Inc. & Subsidiaries v. Commissioner, 164 T.C. No. 10 (June 17, 2025), AbbVie deducted a roughly $1.635 billion fee paid to Shire after its board withdrew support for their combination, and the IRS called it a § 1234A capital loss. Judge Toro read the statute as reaching only contracts under which property would actually change hands, and not promises to do work that merely relates to property. AbbVie’s co-operation agreement was mainly services, like seeking regulatory approval and recommending the deal. Neither company owned the shares, so AbbVie could never compel a purchase of Shire stock, and the withdrawn recommendation, not a failed transfer, triggered the fee.

    The court did not decide whether the fee qualified under § 162 or § 165, and it agreed § 1234A can reach conditional deals between parties with “complete authority” to buy and sell. The Tax Court docket (No. 2597-23) shows an IRS notice of appeal filed September 11, 2025, and a February 9, 2026 Seventh Circuit mandate dismissing it under Rule 42(b), the voluntary dismissal rule. As of October 30, 2026, the IRS action on decision list shows nothing on AbbVie. No court of appeals has reviewed it.

    Kept or Paid a Forfeited Deposit This Year? Contact Us Now

    Is a break fee under a small-business letter of intent a capital loss or a tax deduction?

    Many letters of intent make the price terms nonbinding but the fee clause binding. If Lucas never had an enforceable right to buy the Delta store, he looks like AbbVie, and § 1234A should not apply.

    A signed asset purchase agreement is different. The Delta owner owned the assets and could commit to sell them, so that contract is a right to acquire property, and AbbVie does not help. The statute still asks whether the property would be a capital asset in the buyer’s hands. Feed inventory is excluded by § 1221(a)(1); trucks, shelving and the building would be business property under § 1221(a)(2); and purchased goodwill is a § 197 intangible that § 197(f)(7) treats as depreciable. The rule that hurts sellers in CRI-Leslie may help a buyer of operating assets, making an ordinary loss under § 165(c)(1) the stronger position.

    The capital loss risk is real when the deal was for LLC interests or stock, or included land he would have held as an investment. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp. v. Commissioner, 779 F.3d 311 (5th Cir. 2015) read § 1234A as covering contractual rights to buy or sell capital assets, which a terminated stock purchase agreement fits. No court has applied this to a small asset deal.

    Deal costs follow Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-5. Costs to facilitate buying a business are capitalized, but investigatory costs before the letter of intent generally are not, unless “inherently facilitative,” like an appraisal (§ 1.263(a)-5(e)). Its examples let capitalized costs of an abandoned deal be deducted under § 165.

    How does Colorado’s flat income tax treat walk-away money?

    Colorado has no separate capital gains rate. C.R.S. § 39-22-104(1.7)(c) taxes federal taxable income at 4.40 percent, subject to TABOR-triggered reductions under § 39-22-627. Legislative Council staff’s September 2026 forecast reports no TABOR refund obligation for fiscal year 2025-26, so the 2026 rate is 4.40 percent. C corporations pay 4.40 percent under C.R.S. § 39-22-301(1)(d)(I)(K).

    So the character fight is federal: a capital loss trapped by § 1211 cuts Colorado tax only in the year it is deducted federally. The capital gain subtraction in C.R.S. § 39-22-518 will not help: since 2022 it is limited to Schedule F filers selling Colorado agricultural land acquired between May 9, 1994 and June 4, 2009 and held five years, capped at $100,000. A kept deposit is not gain from selling land anyway.

    What does the character mismatch cost a Montrose owner in 2026?

    Illustrative example (hypothetical; 32 percent federal marginal rate assumed, ignoring self-employment tax and § 199A). Lucas is a sole proprietor, and the parcel, titled to him and used in the business for years, is § 1231 property, so the $150,000 is ordinary income.

    If the fee is an ordinary deduction, taxable income rises $90,000: $28,800 federal and $3,960 Colorado. If it is a § 1234A capital loss and he has no 2026 capital gains, § 1211(b) allows $3,000, taxable income rises $147,000, and he owes $47,040 federal and $6,468 Colorado, $20,748 more. The other $57,000 carries forward under § 1212(b), short-term if he held the contract right under a year, usable against future gains plus $3,000 a year: 19 more years if he has none.

    The twist: had the parcel been investment land, the deposit would be § 1234A capital gain and the $60,000 loss would offset it dollar for dollar. A C corporation is boxed in further: § 1211(a) allows capital losses only against capital gains, carried back three years and forward five under § 1212(a). See LLC vs. S corporation vs. C corporation in Colorado.

    Payment Governing authority Character and where reported Colorado effect
    Seller keeps deposit on business real estate §§ 1221(a)(2), 1231, 1234A; CRI-Leslie Ordinary income; IRS instructions name no specific line Taxed at 4.40 percent
    Seller keeps deposit on investment land or a residence § 1234A Capital gain; Form 8949 and Schedule D 4.40 percent; § 39-22-518 does not apply
    Buyer forfeits deposit on property that would be a capital asset §§ 1234A, 1211, 1212 Capital loss; $3,000 a year against ordinary income Saves tax only when deducted federally
    Buyer ends a binding deal for operating assets §§ 1221(a)(1), (a)(2), 197(f)(7), 165(c)(1) Likely ordinary loss; untested Full 4.40 percent benefit if ordinary
    Buyer pays a break fee under a services-type agreement AbbVie; §§ 162, 165 Ordinary deduction Full 4.40 percent benefit

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Is forfeited earnest money ordinary income for a Colorado seller?

    If the property was used in the seller’s business, yes, under CRI-Leslie. If it was investment land or a residence, § 1234A makes it capital gain.

    Can I deduct a fee I paid to back out of buying a business?

    Often, as an ordinary loss, especially under a nonbinding letter of intent or for operating assets. If you were bound to buy stock or LLC interests, § 1234A may make it a capital loss.

    Did the IRS appeal the AbbVie break fee decision?

    It appealed to the Seventh Circuit in September 2025, and the appeal was voluntarily dismissed, with the mandate issued February 9, 2026. No action on decision had issued as of October 30, 2026.

    Does choosing liquidated damages in the Colorado contract make the deposit capital gain?

    No. A kept deposit on business real estate is ordinary income under CRI-Leslie whichever box is used.

    What is Colorado’s income tax rate for 2026?

    4.40 percent of federal taxable income. No TABOR refund obligation arose for fiscal year 2025-26, so no temporary reduction applies.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm advises Colorado owners on real estate tax strategy, business sale tax structuring, and IRS audit defense Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    If you kept or paid walk-away money on a property or business deal this year and want the documents read before your 2026 return is filed, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Bankruptcy Mediation in Colorado: L.B.R. 9019-2, the Subchapter V Trustee and Rule 9019

    Bankruptcy Mediation in Colorado: L.B.R. 9019-2, the Subchapter V Trustee and Rule 9019

    Margo owns a restaurant group in Steamboat Springs: a flagship dining room downtown and a smaller café nearby. After two thin winters her company filed Subchapter V in Denver owing about $2.6 million, including a $500,000 SBA EIDL. The flagship’s landlord filed a $410,000 claim for back rent and rejection damages and says it will vote against any plan.

    Margo asks whether a mediator can get the landlord to a number before confirmation, who pays for one, and what the Subchapter V trustee should be doing meanwhile. In Colorado the answers start with a short local rule.

    How does bankruptcy mediation work in Colorado under L.B.R. 9019-2?

    Under L.B.R. 9019-2, part of the Local Bankruptcy Rules as amended effective December 1, 2021, the court “may refer a matter to mediation sua sponte, upon written stipulation, or upon motion by a party or the United States Trustee.” Participation is voluntary “[u]nless otherwise ordered,” so a judge can require it. Afterward the mediator reports only the dates, who attended, and whether the matter resolved.

    What the rule leaves out matters more. It has no mediator roster, nothing on fees and no confidentiality clause, and the court’s general orders, checked October 30, 2026, add no mediation or loss-mitigation program. So the parties pick a private mediator and submit a stipulated motion with a referral order that fills those gaps.

    Fed. R. Evid. 408 only limits using settlement talk as evidence of a claim’s amount. Colorado’s Dispute Resolution Act protects mediation communications (C.R.S. § 13-22-307), but Fed. R. Evid. 501 applies federal common law to privilege on federal questions like claim allowance, and the district court’s ADR clause, D.C.COLO.LCivR 16.6(e), covers only communications to a magistrate judge. Put confidentiality in the referral order and a signed mediation agreement.

    What is the Subchapter V trustee supposed to do to help settle my case?

    Under 11 U.S.C. § 1183(b)(7), the trustee shall “facilitate the development of a consensual plan of reorganization,” and the U.S. Trustee Program’s Subchapter V trustee handbook tells trustees to start plan talks “[a]s soon as possible.” The trustee is the first call. The status conference comes within 60 days after the order for relief, and at least 14 days before it the debtor reports its efforts “to attain a consensual plan of reorganization” (§ 1188(a), (c)). That report is where Margo should say the landlord dispute needs a neutral.

    The trustee is not free, though; fees are allowed under § 330(a) and paid by the estate. Nor is the trustee a confidential neutral. Section 1183(b)(3) has the trustee heard on valuation and confirmation, and § 1183(b)(2) lets the court order an investigation. A mediator who reports only “settled” or “not settled” can hear what Margo would never tell the trustee.

    How much can a landlord claim after a rejected restaurant lease, and can mediation settle it?

    Rejection counts as a breach just before the petition (§ 365(g)(1)), and § 502(b)(6) caps the landlord at rent for “the greater of one year, or 15 percent, not to exceed three years, of the remaining term,” plus rent unpaid at filing.

    Illustrative example (hypothetical numbers). The flagship lease has 76 months left at $9,800 a month. Fifteen percent of 76 months is 11.4 months, under a year, so one year controls: $117,600. Add four months of unpaid prepetition rent, $39,200, and the cap is $156,800, not $410,000.

    A bank holds $700,000 with a first lien on assets worth $760,000, so the SBA’s EIDL is $60,000 secured and $440,000 unsecured under § 506(a). With $990,000 of trade debt and the capped landlord, the unsecured class totals $1,586,800. A plan paying it $210,000 over three years returns about 13.2 cents.

    The vote is the landlord’s leverage. A class accepts with two-thirds in amount and more than half in number of those voting (§ 1126(c)), and many trade creditors never vote. If creditors holding $260,000 vote yes, the SBA abstains, and the landlord votes no on its filed claim (deemed allowed until Margo objects, § 502(a)), the class rejects; even at $156,800, yes reaches only 62 percent. That forces a cramdown under § 1191(b), where the trustee usually disburses payments (§ 1194(b)) and the discharge waits for completed payments under § 1192. See the post on whether a Colorado Subchapter V company can still owe a fraud debt.

    Now mediate it. The landlord takes an allowed claim of $130,000, Margo assumes the café lease the same landlord owns and cures $18,000 of arrears over six months (§ 365(b)(1)(A)), and the landlord votes yes. The class accepts, and if the SBA’s secured class accepts or is unimpaired, the plan goes under § 1191(a): discharge at confirmation, and the trustee’s service ends at substantial consummation (§ 1183(c)(1)). Negotiate both leases together: § 365(d)(4) allows 120 days after the order for relief to assume the café lease, one 90-day extension, and more only with the landlord’s written consent.

    Who pays for a bankruptcy mediator in a Denver Subchapter V case?

    L.B.R. 9019-2 is silent, so the referral order or mediation agreement sets the fee; an even split is common. The estate’s half needs court authority: employment under § 327(a) with fees allowed under § 330, or express authority in a noticed referral order, with the fee paid as an administrative expense under § 503(b). I want the rate, a cap and the split in the order before the session is booked.

    A contested confirmation costs more: a claim objection, feasibility and valuation evidence, and trustee time throughout. And mind the trap: referral “does not operate to stay, postpone, or extend any deadlines,” and the 90-day plan deadline in § 1189(b) stretches only for circumstances for which the debtor “should not justly be held accountable.”

    How is a mediated settlement approved under Rule 9019 in Colorado?

    A handshake binds no one until the court approves it. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019(a), restyled effective December 1, 2024, allows approval “[o]n the trustee’s motion and after notice and a hearing,” and a Subchapter V debtor in possession holds the trustee’s powers (§ 1184). Rule 2002(a)(3) requires 21 days’ notice to creditors. Colorado has no L.B.R. 9019-1; the notice follows L.B.R. 9013-1 and must state a specific objection date.

    In Reiss v. Hagmann, 881 F.2d 890 (10th Cir. 1989), the Tenth Circuit reversed approval of a settlement the sole creditor opposed, holding that approval “must be an informed one based upon an objective evaluation of developed facts.” In re Kopexa Realty Venture Co., 213 B.R. 1020 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1997) lists the factors: “the probable success of the underlying litigation on the merits, the possible difficulty in collection of a judgment, the complexity and expense of the litigation, and the interests of creditors in deference to their reasonable views,” and vacated an approval resting on the trustee’s business judgment without findings. Both trace to Protective Committee v. Anderson (TMT Trailer Ferry), 390 U.S. 414 (1968), which demands facts, not allegations.

    So Margo’s motion needs a declaration with the § 502(b)(6) math. A deal written into the plan is instead tested at confirmation on 28 days’ notice under Rule 2002(b)(2). If it releases Margo’s guaranty, see Colorado plan releases after Purdue.

    Which disputes in a Colorado Chapter 11 small business case are worth mediating?

    Mediation pays where the dollars are uncertain and both sides spend to fight: valuation, disputes among LLC members, and preference suits, which the federal ADR statute covers as “adversary proceedings in bankruptcy” (28 U.S.C. § 651(b)). The SBA is harder. An agency may compromise a claim of up to $100,000, excluding interest, or a higher amount the Attorney General sets (31 U.S.C. § 3711(a)(2)), so on a larger EIDL balance the person at the table usually cannot say yes that day. Skip mediation for a pure legal question a judge can decide on briefs, a creditor with no economic stake, or a debtor that cannot fund any deal.

    Dispute Natural facilitator How the deal is approved, and when Cost sensitivity
    Landlord rejection claim Trustee, then a mediator Rule 9019 motion, 21 days’ notice; before ballots High: the cap limits the dollars
    Creditor fraud objection Mediator in the adversary Stipulated dismissal or judgment; before the vote Moderate: matters mainly in cramdown
    Preference adversary Mediator Rule 9019 motion; often after confirmation High: defense costs rival the transfer
    Lender adequate protection Judge at the § 1188 conference, or trustee Rule 4001(d) stipulation, 14-day objection period; first 60 days Moderate: payments drive feasibility
    Unsecured class vote Trustee (§ 1183(b)(7)) Ballots under § 1126(c); confirmation under § 1191(a) or (b) Low cash, high stakes: sets discharge timing

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Can the Colorado bankruptcy court make me go to mediation?

    Yes. Under L.B.R. 9019-2(a) the court can refer a matter on its own, on a stipulation, or on a motion by a party or the U.S. Trustee, and participation is voluntary only until the court orders otherwise.

    Does mediation pause my Subchapter V deadlines?

    No. A referral extends nothing unless the court orders it, so the 90-day plan deadline and the 120-day deadline to assume or reject a commercial lease keep running.

    Is talking to the Subchapter V trustee the same as mediating?

    No. The trustee must help build a consensual plan but is also heard at confirmation and can be ordered to investigate, so those conversations are not confidential.

    Is there mediation if my bankruptcy case is appealed?

    At the Tenth Circuit, the Circuit Mediation Office may hold confidential conferences in any pending matter under 10th Cir. R. 33.1. The BAP’s local rules, effective January 1, 2026, have no mediation procedure.

    Can a business with $2.6 million of debt use Subchapter V in Colorado?

    Yes, under the $3,424,000 limit in effect since April 1, 2025. H.R. 7730 would raise it to $7,500,000; as of October 30, 2026 it had passed both chambers, with no signature recorded.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm represents Colorado business owners in Subchapter V reorganizations and Chapter 11 cases, including landlord claim disputes, plan negotiations and SBA loan and business debt problems. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    If one creditor’s vote stands between your company and a consensual plan, raise mediation before the status conference report is due, and contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Your Colorado Customer Paid You, Then Filed Bankruptcy: Preference Clawbacks and Defenses

    Your Colorado Customer Paid You, Then Filed Bankruptcy: Preference Clawbacks and Defenses

    Hollis owns an electrical-supply distributor in Longmont. A Fort Lupton contractor that owed him about $71,000 sent three wires over seven weeks totaling $38,000, then filed Chapter 7 in Denver. Eleven months later the trustee’s lawyer sent a preference demand letter: return the $38,000, or pay $28,000 within 30 days.

    Nobody accuses Hollis of wrongdoing. Bankruptcy still reaches payments made just before a filing, but the creditor has defenses, and the Tenth Circuit has said a good deal about them.

    Can a Colorado bankruptcy trustee take back a payment your customer made before filing?

    Yes. Under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b), a trustee can avoid a payment to a creditor on an antecedent debt, made while the debtor was insolvent and within 90 days before the petition, that let the creditor collect more than a Chapter 7 liquidation would pay. For an insider, such as an officer of a corporate debtor under § 101(31), the reach-back is one year. Section 550(a)(1) then lets the trustee recover the money.

    The trustee carries those elements under § 547(g), helped by the § 547(f) presumption of insolvency during the 90 days; the creditor carries the § 547(c) defenses. Since February 19, 2020, § 547(b) has also required “reasonable due diligence in the circumstances of the case” that takes into account a party’s “known or reasonably knowable affirmative defenses.” In Rebein v. NutriQuest, LLC (In re Sandy Road Farms, LLC), Adv. No. 25-7001 (Bankr. D. Kan. Oct. 22, 2025), a Kansas bankruptcy court treated that diligence as a condition precedent that a general allegation satisfies. I found no Colorado ruling.

    Why can a trustee reach payments Colorado law would leave alone?

    The old rule is that a struggling debtor picks whom to pay. In Clarke v. White, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 178 (1838), often cited as Clark v. White, the Supreme Court upheld a failed Washington, D.C. merchant’s separate settlements with creditors: “The debtor may prefer one creditor, pay him fully, and exhaust his whole property.” Commentators link that race-to-the-courthouse rule with the Contracts Clause, though the opinion never mentions the Clause. Congress’s bankruptcy power overrides it.

    Colorado law largely keeps it. Under the Colorado Voidable Transactions Act, renamed by S.B. 25-133 (Colo. Sess. Laws 2025, ch. 57), satisfying an antecedent debt is value under C.R.S. § 38-8-104(1), and the § 38-8-105(2) badges of intent rarely fit a supplier paid normally. The state preference rule, C.R.S. § 38-8-106(2), reaches only insiders with reasonable cause to believe the debtor was insolvent, and S.B. 25-133 stretched its deadline in § 38-8-110(1)(c) from one year to “not later than four years after the transfer was made” for claims filed on or after August 6, 2025. A trustee can generally use that claim through § 544(b)(1). Section 547, by contrast, reaches Hollis with no fraud at all.

    Trustee Demanding You Return a Payment? Contact Us Now

    How does the Tenth Circuit apply the ordinary course of business defense?

    Section 547(c)(2) protects payment of an ordinary-course debt if the payment was “(A) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee; or (B) made according to ordinary business terms.” Since 2005, either prong suffices. For (A), Payne v. Clarendon National Insurance Co. (In re Sunset Sales, Inc.), 220 B.R. 1005 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1998), aff’d, 195 F.3d 568 (10th Cir. 1999), weighs how long the parties dealt, changes in the amount or form of payment, unusual collection activity, and the circumstances. Late payments are typically not ordinary unless lateness was the normal pattern between the parties.

    Prong (B) looks at the industry when debtors are healthy. In Clark v. Balcor Real Estate Finance, Inc. (In re Meridith Hoffman Partners), 12 F.3d 1549 (10th Cir. 1993), a lender’s post-default rent escrow failed because lenders used it “only in extraordinary circumstances, when debtors are in trouble.” Jubber v. SMC Electrical Products, Inc. (In re C.W. Mining Co.), 798 F.3d 983 (10th Cir. 2015) held that even a first-time deal can qualify, and that payment “shortly before or at the due date” generally does, as a $200,000 wire sent two days early did.

    In Weinman v. Dragul (In re Cornerstar Wine & Liquor, LLC), No. 19-12135 EEB (Bankr. D. Colo. Mar. 10, 2023), Judge Brown protected three identical $500 repayments but not a $25,000 one, noting a two-year baseline is common “But that is not an absolute requirement.” No opinion sets a formula, so I build two years of invoice-to-payment days, with the average and the range, and compare each payment in the 90 days. Inside the range is defensible under (A). Outside it, or after a credit hold, you need (B) and trade evidence.

    Do new value, a contemporaneous exchange or the small-preference floor protect a payment?

    Under § 547(c)(4), a creditor that ships unsecured goods after being paid keeps the payment to that extent, unless the debtor paid for those goods with an otherwise unavoidable transfer. Only shipments after a wire offset it. Circuits split on whether new value must stay unpaid; finding no Tenth Circuit ruling, I count only shipments still open at filing. The contemporaneous exchange defense in § 547(c)(1) covers an intended exchange that was “in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange.” In Lowrey v. U.P.G., Inc. (In re Robinson Bros. Drilling, Inc.), 877 F.2d 32 (10th Cir. 1989), a $40,000 payment bought lien releases worth $7,884.97, and only that amount was protected; new value must be proved “with specificity,” and a promise of future business is not new value.

    Section 547(c)(9) bars avoidance in a case filed by a debtor whose debts are not primarily consumer debts when the transfer’s aggregate value is under $8,575, the figure for cases filed on or after April 1, 2025 (90 Fed. Reg. 8941).

    How would the numbers work for a Longmont supplier?

    An illustration with hypothetical facts. The contractor filed on November 6, 2025, so the 90-day window opened August 8. For two years it had paid Hollis 38 to 55 days after invoice. On September 18 (day 49) it wired $11,000 on invoices 48 days old. On October 6 (day 31) it wired $15,000 on invoices 62 days old, after collection calls. On October 28 (day 9) it wired $12,000 on invoices 71 days old, a week after Hollis imposed a credit hold. Between the second and third wires he shipped $9,000 on October 10 and $6,500 on October 20, still unpaid at filing.

    The September wire fits the history under § 547(c)(2)(A). The October 6 wire misses the range, but $15,500 of later shipments covers all $15,000 under § 547(c)(4). The October 28 wire followed a hold and no shipments came after it, so unless trade evidence shows 70-day pay is normal for Front Range electrical suppliers, $12,000 is exposed. Every wire exceeds $8,575. That $12,000 is well under the $28,000 offer, and whatever Hollis repays becomes an unsecured claim under § 502(h) on top of the $48,500 still owed. None of this predicts a result.

    What should a Colorado creditor do after receiving a preference demand letter?

    Do not pay on the letter, and do not ignore it. Under § 546(a), the trustee must sue within two years after the order for relief (longer if the first trustee is appointed late in that period) and before the case closes. A voluntary filing is the order for relief (§ 301(b)), so Hollis’s two years run from November 6, 2025. Section 502(d) lets the trustee block your own claim until an avoidable transfer is returned.

    Pull two years of invoices and payment dates, delivery records and emails about holds. Answer in writing, and ask what diligence the trustee did on your defenses. If the case is in another state, 28 U.S.C. § 1409(b) requires a trustee recovering a non-consumer debt under $31,425 from a non-insider (cases filed on or after April 1, 2025) to sue where the defendant resides. If a complaint arrives, see our posts on default judgments in out-of-state bankruptcy adversaries and defending a fraudulent transfer complaint.

    Defense Creditor must show Evidence to pull Tenth Circuit or D. Colo. treatment
    Contemporaneous exchange, § 547(c)(1) Intended, actual near-simultaneous exchange COD terms, lien releases, dates Robinson Bros. Drilling: protected only to the lien value proved
    Ordinary course, § 547(c)(2) Payment ordinary between the parties (A) or on industry terms (B) Two years of days-to-pay, collection notes, trade data Late and workout payments failed (Sunset Sales, Meridith Hoffman); routine ones held (C.W. Mining, Cornerstar)
    New value, § 547(c)(4) Unsecured goods or services given after the payment Shipments and open invoices dated after each wire No Tenth Circuit ruling found on “remains unpaid”
    Small-preference floor, § 547(c)(9) Business debtor; transfer under $8,575 (cases filed on or after April 1, 2025) Payment amounts, debtor’s schedules Applies by its terms

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Do I have to return a payment because the trustee’s lawyer demands it?

    No. A demand letter is not a judgment. The trustee must sue within the section 546(a) period and prove each element, and you can raise your defenses.

    How far back can a bankruptcy trustee claw back payments in Colorado?

    Ninety days for most creditors and one year for insiders under section 547(b)(4). For claims filed on or after August 6, 2025, Colorado’s insider-preference claim runs four years.

    Does it matter that my customer paid late?

    Often it decides the case. The Tenth Circuit BAP treats late payments as not ordinary unless lateness was your normal pattern with the debtor.

    What is the small preference threshold for a business bankruptcy in 2026?

    It is $8,575 for cases filed on or after April 1, 2025, when the debtor’s debts are not primarily consumer debts. A transfer below that aggregate value cannot be avoided as a preference.

    If my customer filed bankruptcy in another state, where can the trustee sue me?

    Under 28 U.S.C. section 1409(b), a trustee recovering a non-consumer debt under $31,425 from a non-insider must sue in your home district, the District of Colorado. Larger claims can go where the bankruptcy is pending under section 1409(a).

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm represents Colorado vendors, landlords, lenders and contractors in preference and clawback defense in Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 cases. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    Payment records are easiest to gather early. If a trustee wants a pre-bankruptcy payment back, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Catholic Charities v. Wisconsin and Colorado’s Religious Unemployment Tax Exemption

    Catholic Charities v. Wisconsin and Colorado’s Religious Unemployment Tax Exemption

    Tomás runs a faith-based nonprofit in Pueblo that serves as the social services arm of a regional church body. It has a food pantry, a job-training program, a thrift store and 22 employees, and it has paid Colorado unemployment insurance premiums for years. After reading about a Supreme Court case out of Wisconsin, his board chair asked whether the organization ever owed those premiums and, if it does, whether there is a cheaper way to carry the risk.

    Both questions turn on the Colorado unemployment tax religious exemption in C.R.S. § 8-70-140 and on how much Colorado case law survived the Wisconsin ruling.

    Does Catholic Charities v. Wisconsin change Colorado’s religious exemption from unemployment tax?

    It changes how the exemption may be applied, not its text. In Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v. Wisconsin Labor & Industry Review Commission, 605 U.S. 238 (2025), a unanimous Court held on June 5, 2025 that Wisconsin violated the First Amendment. The state had conceded that the Diocese of Superior controlled the charities, then denied the exemption because they did not proselytize and served people of every faith.

    That, the Court said, is a denominational preference resting on “inherently religious choices,” so strict scrutiny applied under Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982). Recasting the test as “distinctively religious activity” like worship did not help; that choice is theological too. The Court did not hold that every church-affiliated charity is exempt; it rejected one line Wisconsin drew. Justice Thomas added that the charities were an arm of the diocese however incorporated. Justice Jackson read the federal model language as asking what an organization does, not why, and called it “perfectly consistent” with the ruling for states to use that function test. On remand, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ordered the exemption granted on December 15, 2025.

    Why does a Colorado 501(c)(3) owe unemployment premiums when it owes no FUTA?

    Under 26 U.S.C. § 3306(c)(8), work for a 501(c)(3) is outside federal unemployment tax. But § 3309(a), enforced through the approval rules in § 3304(a)(6), makes each state cover those workers and offer nonprofits a reimbursement option. Every Colorado employer’s federal credit depends on that approval. Section 3309(b) then lets states exclude churches, church-controlled organizations run “primarily for religious purposes,” religious schools and ministers. Colorado copied that list into C.R.S. § 8-70-140(1), carving it out of C.R.S. § 8-70-118, which covers a 501(c)(3) with four or more workers in each of 20 weeks.

    Federal payroll taxes are untouched: the organization still withholds and pays FICA under § 3121, thrift store clerks included. Ministers have dual status: ministry pay is outside FICA under § 3121(b)(8)(A), and they owe self-employment tax computed under § 1402(a)(8) unless they hold a § 1402(e) exemption. Intact 501(c)(3) status matters too; see the earlier post on automatic revocation and the Section 7428 deadline. A companion post this week addresses board exposure for unpaid payroll taxes.

    What did Young Life, Samaritan Institute, Harbert and A Child’s Touch decide about C.R.S. 8-70-140?

    The first major case involved a Colorado Springs ministry. In Young Life v. Division of Employment & Training, 650 P.2d 515 (Colo. 1982), the Colorado Supreme Court agreed Young Life was not a “church” because it had no membership, no congregation and no official tie to any denomination. It relied on Gillette v. United States and the absence of invidious motive. A footnote left the church-controlled organization clause undecided.

    Samaritan Institute v. Prince-Walker, 883 P.2d 3 (Colo. 1994) then held that “the type of activity actually engaged in, rather than the motivation and impetus for the activity, is dispositive,” and noted the counseling network’s office did not “evangelize or proselytize.” Harbert v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 2012 COA 23, 272 P.3d 1190 applied that test to an Evergreen outreach founded by 21 churches. Its food bank, clothing help and resale shop were “not religious per se,” so the shop employee was covered.

    A Child’s Touch v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 2015 COA 182, 411 P.3d 990 accepted that a Christian child care center had religious purposes and denied the exemption anyway. It was not “principally supported” by churches when it cut a maintenance worker in September 2013; the center had to show it “could not exist” without that support, and earlier audits finding it exempt did not help once its church closed.

    Can CDLE still deny a church-affiliated charity the exemption because its work looks secular?

    No published Colorado appellate decision has answered that since June 2025. The one later ruling I found, Christ’s Body Ministries v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, No. 25CA0757 (Colo. App. Aug. 21, 2025) (unpublished), affirmed dismissal of a ministry’s appeal filed 24 days late. It had skipped the hearing on a former worker’s claim, believing its status settled since 2017. Appeals to the Panel must arrive within 20 calendar days under C.R.S. § 8-74-104(1).

    My read: Harbert and Samaritan are the most exposed. Asking whether a church-controlled charity’s services are themselves religious, and counting the absence of proselytizing against it, is close to what the Supreme Court struck. Young Life leaned on Gillette, which the Court called “inapposite” when lines follow theology, so a church definition built on membership and rites is harder to defend.

    The control and support prong is sturdier. Asking who appoints the board or whether the entity could survive without the church is structural, not theological. A Child’s Touch turned on it, and Young Life would likely still fail it. Justice Jackson’s function reading offers CDLE another path, but no majority has adopted it. The Tenth Circuit has no authority on § 8-70-140; these disputes move from a CDLE deputy to a hearing officer, the Panel and the Colorado Court of Appeals.

    Can a Colorado religious nonprofit choose coverage or become a reimbursable employer?

    Exemption is not a one-way door. Under C.R.S. § 8-76-107, an employer whose work is not “employment” may elect, with division approval, to be covered for at least two calendar years, so laid-off staff can draw benefits.

    A covered 501(c)(3) can also choose under C.R.S. § 8-76-110 to reimburse the fund for regular benefits and half of any extended benefits its former workers draw, instead of paying premiums. The switch takes written notice at least 30 days before the calendar year and locks in for that year and the next. CDLE bills quarterly, due in 30 days, and may require a bond or deposit within 15 days, generally between 0.1 and 3.6 percent of prior-year covered payroll. Reimbursing employers sit outside § 8-76-102.5, home of the solvency surcharge. Whether an organization that opts in under § 8-76-107 may also reimburse is something I would confirm with CDLE in writing.

    For past premiums, C.R.S. § 8-79-108 refunds amounts “paid erroneously,” without interest, but nothing paid before January 1 of the first of the five calendar years preceding the application. A November 2026 application reaches back to January 1, 2021. If CDLE refuses or sits on it for six months, the employer may sue in Denver District Court.

    What would premiums, reimbursement and exemption cost a 22-employee Pueblo nonprofit in 2026?

    Illustrative example (hypothetical facts, assumed rate). Payroll is $820,000: 18 full-time staff paid $750,000, each above the wage base, and four part-time thrift store clerks paid $70,000, each below it. The 2026 base is the first $30,600 per worker under C.R.S. § 8-70-103(6.5)(a)(VI), so chargeable wages are $550,800 plus $70,000, or $620,800. The 2027 base is indexed to average weekly earnings; I had not seen CDLE’s 2027 figure as of October 30, 2026.

    Combined 2026 rates for positive-rated employers were reported at 0.72 to 4.58 percent. At an assumed 2.0 percent, premiums are $12,416, layoffs or not.

    Under reimbursement, suppose two trainers are laid off when a grant ends, each drawing an assumed $560 a week for 20 weeks. CDLE bills $22,400, about $10,000 more than premiums. With no layoffs the bill is zero, so reimbursement rewards a stable payroll.

    Exempt, the cost is zero and so is the coverage: the trainers would have no state claim on these wages.

    Question Exempt religious organization (§ 8-70-140) Covered 501(c)(3) paying premiums Covered 501(c)(3) reimbursing (§ 8-76-110)
    Who decides CDLE, often in a former worker’s benefit claim, subject to appeal Default for a covered nonprofit The organization, by notice at least 30 days before the year
    What the organization pays Nothing Rate plus surcharges on chargeable wages ($12,416 in the example) Benefits drawn plus half of extended benefits ($22,400 in the layoff year); possible bond
    What laid-off employees receive No state benefits based on those wages Regular state benefits The same state benefits
    Risk if CDLE disagrees Back premiums with interest and penalties Low; if later found exempt, refunds reach back about five years Election can be terminated for a missed bond or late payment

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Does Catholic Charities v. Wisconsin apply in Colorado?

    Yes. The First Amendment ruling binds Colorado agencies and courts, and C.R.S. 8-70-140 uses the same federal language. No published Colorado decision has applied it yet.

    Is a church-run thrift store exempt from Colorado unemployment tax?

    In Harbert (2012), the Colorado Court of Appeals said no for a church-founded outreach’s resale store. That activity-based reasoning is now in doubt, so church control and support facts matter more.

    Can a Colorado nonprofit switch from premiums to reimbursement?

    A covered 501(c)(3) can, by written notice at least 30 days before the calendar year. The election is locked for that year and the next, and CDLE may require a bond or deposit.

    How far back can a Colorado nonprofit recover unemployment premiums it did not owe?

    To January 1 of the first of the five calendar years before the refund application, under C.R.S. 8-79-108. Refunds carry no interest.

    Does the unemployment exemption change FICA or federal withholding?

    No. A 501(c)(3) still withholds income tax and pays FICA, and ministers follow their own self-employment tax rules.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm helps Colorado nonprofits and their boards with tax law questions, Colorado state tax matters, IRS employment tax audits and penalty abatement. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    The reimbursement election and the refund lookback both run on calendar-year deadlines. If your Colorado ministry is sorting out its unemployment tax status, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Consigned Goods in a Colorado Shop or Gallery Bankruptcy: UCC 9-319, PMSI Notice, Art Law

    Consigned Goods in a Colorado Shop or Gallery Bankruptcy: UCC 9-319, PMSI Notice, Art Law

    Delia builds walnut tables and steel consoles in Salida. About $48,000 of her work, valued at what she expects to net after commissions, sits in two stores: $29,500 at a Denver design showroom and $18,500 at a Breckenridge gallery. In October the showroom’s owner filed Chapter 7 in Denver, and its bank says a blanket lien on “all inventory” covers her pieces. The gallery is open but paying late.

    She wants to drive over and load her furniture. She can’t without court permission, and whether she gets it back turns mostly on what she filed with the Colorado Secretary of State.

    Who owns consigned goods when a Colorado consignment shop or showroom files bankruptcy?

    As between Delia and the showroom, she does. Against its creditors, maybe not. Article 9 covers “a consignment” (C.R.S. § 4-9-109(a)(4)), defined in § 4-9-102(a)(20) as a delivery for sale to a merchant that deals in goods of that kind under its own name, is not an auctioneer, and is not generally known by its creditors to be substantially engaged in selling the goods of others.

    When a deal fits, § 4-9-103(d) turns the consignor’s ownership into a purchase-money security interest in inventory, and § 4-9-319(a) treats the consignee, while it holds the goods, as having her rights and title as far as its creditors are concerned.

    In bankruptcy, the trustee holds the rights of a hypothetical judicial lien creditor as of the petition date under 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1). Colorado’s “lien creditor” definition includes the trustee (§ 4-9-102(a)(52)), and § 4-9-317(a)(2) puts an unperfected interest behind one. The Ninth Circuit applied that chain to an unperfected fuel consignor, including receivables collected before filing, in IPC (USA), Inc. v. Ellis (In re Pettit Oil Co.), No. 17-60081 (9th Cir. Mar. 11, 2019). Perfection means a UCC-1 filed with the Secretary of State (§ 4-9-310(a); § 4-9-501(a)(2)).

    Is a consignment shop “generally known” to sell other people’s goods, and who has to prove it?

    This exclusion lets many Colorado consignors skip Article 9. If the shop’s creditors generally know it is substantially engaged in selling others’ goods, the deal is not an Article 9 consignment, and the UCC’s Permanent Editorial Board says in PEB Commentary No. 20 (Jan. 24, 2019) that non-UCC law then typically keeps the goods away from the consignee’s creditors.

    Proving it is hard. In In re Valley Media, Inc., 279 B.R. 105 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002), the court called it “ultimately the burden of the consignor” and required proof that a majority of the debtor’s creditors, counted by number rather than dollars, knew; industry-wide knowledge was not enough. In In re Morgansen’s Ltd., 302 B.R. 784 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2003), consignors to a Southampton shop stocked about 70 percent by consignment offered no proof about its creditors and lost; the district court agreed on that point in Goss v. Morgansen’s Ltd., No. 04-CV-0268 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005), remanding a separate issue. In the Sports Authority case, In re TSAWD Holdings, Inc., 601 B.R. 599 (Bankr. D. Del. 2019), 20 percent of inventory was the floor and 14 percent fell short.

    I found no Tenth Circuit, Tenth Circuit BAP or Colorado bankruptcy decision on this exclusion under revised Article 9. A Denver judge would likely start from Valley Media‘s burden and head count, asking about creditors generally, as the PEB urges. That helps a dedicated resale or Western-wear consignment store, not a showroom mixing its own stock with consigned lines. Two other exits: a ski jacket a hiker consigns was usually consumer goods before delivery, and a delivery under $1,000 falls outside the definition.

    What happens to consigned goods after the consignee files Chapter 7 in Colorado?

    The estate takes “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property” (11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)), and § 4-9-319 gives the debtor enough to pull consigned goods in until a court rules. Section 362(a)(3) stays “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate,” and § 542(a) requires whoever holds such property to turn it over to the trustee. See also why Colorado Chapter 7 cases stay open.

    The fight usually comes with a sale motion under § 363(b), often free and clear under § 363(f)(4) because the consignor’s interest is “in bona fide dispute.” She can seek adequate protection under § 363(e), but § 363(p)(2) puts the burden of proving her interest on her. To force the question, she can file an adversary proceeding to determine the “validity, priority, or extent” of her interest under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(b), or move for stay relief under § 362(d). On that motion, § 362(e)(1) ends the stay as to her 30 days after the request unless the court continues it after a hearing. Waiting for the trustee rarely helps.

    Your Consigned Inventory Is Stuck in a Bankruptcy? Contact Us Now

    Does Colorado’s art consignment law protect artists when a gallery goes bankrupt?

    Partly. Under C.R.S. § 6-15-102, a work of fine art an artist delivers to an art dealer for sale on commission is trust property, the dealer is her agent, sale proceeds are trust funds, and none of it is “subject to or subordinate to any claims, liens, or security interests of the consignee’s creditors.” Section 6-15-101 includes “a craft work in materials, including but not limited to clay, textile, fiber, wood, metal, plastic, or glass,” and an “art dealer” is anyone selling fine art other than an exclusive auctioneer. Waivers are void (§ 6-15-104(2)), and a violating dealer owes $50 plus actual damages and fees (§ 6-15-103).

    Only the creator is protected, nothing is filed, and bankruptcy is never mentioned. The override runs “Notwithstanding the provisions of the ‘Uniform Commercial Code – Sales,’” meaning Article 2 (see § 4-2-326(4)), and the statute dates from 1982, long before revised Article 9 moved consignments into § 4-9-319. New York’s version overrides “any provision of the uniform commercial code or any other law,” and Arizona’s applies “Notwithstanding title 47,” its whole UCC.

    An artist would argue that § 541(d) brings in only bare legal title, not an equitable interest held for her; a trustee would answer with § 4-9-319 and § 544(a). I found no Colorado decision on that conflict, so artists should still file a UCC-1.

    How would this play out for a Salida furniture maker caught in a showroom bankruptcy?

    Illustrative example (hypothetical facts). The showroom filed a voluntary Chapter 7 on October 13, 2026. Delia delivered her pieces there in four loads, each over $1,000, and never filed a UCC-1. The bank filed on “all inventory” in 2023 and claims $300,000.

    She has no perfected purchase-money argument. If Article 9 applies, the bank reaches her pieces through § 4-9-319(a), the trustee outranks her, and her $29,500 becomes an unsecured claim that may pay little. Section 503(b)(9) covers goods “sold to the debtor” within 20 days before filing, and she sold the showroom nothing (see our post on 503(b)(9) and reclamation). Under Rule 3002(c) her proof of claim is due within 70 days after the order for relief, here December 22, 2026. If she proves most of the showroom’s creditors knew it mainly sold outside makers’ lines, the pieces stay hers; the art statute might cover the consoles if the showroom is an “art dealer.”

    In Breckenridge, she files a UCC-1 on November 4, 2026 using “consignor” and “consignee” as § 4-9-505(a) allows, finds a 2024 lender filing on the gallery’s inventory, and sends that lender a signed notice. Because that lender filed first, § 4-9-324(b) and (c) give her priority on future deliveries only if the notice arrives within five years before the gallery takes possession and she is perfected by then. A notice sent to a lender’s former agent failed in TSAWD. The $18,500 already hanging stays behind the 2024 lender under § 4-9-322(a)(1), and if the gallery files within 90 days, by about February 2, 2027, its trustee may attack the late perfection as a preference under § 547(b) and (e), the problem the one late filer faced in Valley Media.

    Consignor’s position Against the inventory lender Against a Chapter 7 trustee Likely recovery
    Filed UCC-1 and sent signed notice before delivery (Article 9 applies) Primes an earlier-filed lender (§ 4-9-324(b)) Perfected interest survives § 544(a) Goods or their sale proceeds
    Filed UCC-1, no notice (Article 9 applies) Loses to a lender that filed first Wins if perfected before delivery or outside the preference window What is left after the senior lender
    Nothing filed, shop generally known to sell others’ goods (outside Article 9) Lien generally does not reach the goods Goods typically outside the estate; consignor bears the burden Goods back, if she proves the head count
    Nothing filed, shop not generally known (Article 9 applies) Lender reaches goods via § 4-9-319(a) Trustee prevails under § 544(a)(1) Unsecured claim, often paid little

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Can I pick up my consigned items from a Colorado store that filed bankruptcy?

    Not on your own. Section 362(a)(3) stays acts to obtain possession of estate property. You need the trustee’s agreement or a court order.

    Do I need a UCC-1 to protect consigned goods in Colorado?

    For an Article 9 consignment, yes, with the Colorado Secretary of State. To beat a lender that filed first on the store’s inventory, it must also receive your signed notice before delivery.

    Does Colorado’s art consignment statute keep my artwork out of a gallery’s bankruptcy?

    It makes the work trust property beyond the dealer’s creditors. But it overrides only the UCC’s sales article, and no Colorado court has reconciled it with section 4-9-319.

    Is a consignor’s claim a 503(b)(9) priority claim?

    Usually not. Section 503(b)(9) covers goods sold to the debtor, and a consignor never sells to the store.

    When is the proof of claim deadline in a Colorado Chapter 7?

    In a voluntary case, 70 days after the order for relief under Rule 3002(c). If a judgment later avoids your interest in the goods, Rule 3002(c)(3) allows a claim within 30 days after it becomes final.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm represents Colorado consignors and vendors in bankruptcy disputes, including sale objections in Chapter 7 cases and preference defense. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    If your goods sit in a Colorado store or gallery that just filed, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Colorado Nonprofit IRS Audit: When Volunteer Board Members Owe the Payroll Taxes

    Colorado Nonprofit IRS Audit: When Volunteer Board Members Owe the Payroll Taxes

    Owen is the volunteer treasurer of a youth-mentoring 501(c)(3) in Colorado Springs with 14 employees and a $1.4 million budget. He co-signs checks over $5,000 and sees the bank statements before each board meeting. In October an IRS exempt organizations examiner asked for the 2023 and 2024 Forms 990, board minutes and payroll records. Pulling them, Owen learned the executive director had skipped federal payroll tax deposits for two quarters of 2025 to make payroll.

    His question for me was whether he could personally owe the money. He can. Whether he will depends on what he knew, when, and what he signs from here on.

    Can a volunteer board member personally owe a Colorado nonprofit’s unpaid payroll taxes?

    Yes. Income tax and the employee’s share of Social Security and Medicare withheld from a paycheck are “a special fund in trust for the United States” under 26 U.S.C. § 7501(a). If they are not paid over, 26 U.S.C. § 6672(a) imposes a penalty equal to the unpaid amount on any person “required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over” the tax who “willfully fails” to do it. This is the trust fund recovery penalty, or TFRP.

    Section 6672(a) has no carve-out for charities. The IRS’s employment tax page for exempt organizations names “a member of a board of trustees of a tax-exempt organization” as a possible target. Colorado Springs hosts an unusual concentration of national ministries and youth organizations with large unpaid boards.

    How does an IRS exam of a Colorado nonprofit become a collection case against board members?

    The IRS says an exempt organization audit may cover employment tax returns and whether employment taxes were paid. The examiners’ manual is blunter: IRM 4.70.12.3.6.2.1 calls employment tax “an integral part of the examination of an exempt organization,” and tells the agent to consider § 6672. The TE/GE Program Letter for fiscal year 2027 again lists worker classification and “various employment tax related issues.”

    So an exam of 2023 and 2024 returns can surface a 2025 deposit gap. Under IRM 5.7.3.5.1, an examiner who sees a possible TFRP refers it to Collection on Form 6238, and a revenue officer investigates the individuals. Insider pay and other organization-level issues run separately; see Section 4958 excess benefit taxes for Colorado nonprofits.

    Nonprofit Got an IRS Exam Letter? Contact Us Now

    Does the Section 6672(e) volunteer exception protect a board treasurer who signs checks?

    Usually not. Section 6672(e) bars the penalty against an “unpaid, volunteer member” of an exempt organization’s board who serves “solely” in an honorary capacity, “does not participate in the day-to-day or financial operations,” and lacks “actual knowledge of the failure.” All three must hold, and the exception falls away if it would leave no one liable. IRS Policy Statement 5-14, at IRM 1.2.1.6.3, tracks the statute.

    A treasurer who co-signs checks is not honorary. In Jefferson v. United States, 546 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 2008), the unpaid board president of an Illinois day care co-signed checks, approved financial statements and could borrow; he was not serving “solely in an honorary capacity,” and his claimed lack of knowledge did not help. I have found no Tenth Circuit decision applying § 6672(e).

    Muck v. United States, 3 F.3d 1378 (10th Cir. 1993), a Thornton hotel case, held that “significant, though not necessarily exclusive, authority” counts “irrespective of whether that authority is actually exercised.” Denbo v. United States, 988 F.2d 1029 (10th Cir. 1993) held a director willful who relied on his co-owner’s assurances instead of investigating. Taylor v. IRS, 69 F.3d 411 (10th Cir. 1995) found a board member with no stock responsible because he had “effective power” to pay, and Bradshaw v. United States, 83 F.3d 1175 (10th Cir. 1996) rejected a lender-control excuse. The narrow opening is Finley v. United States, 123 F.3d 1342 (10th Cir. 1997) (en banc): reasonable cause can negate willfulness, but only when efforts to protect the trust funds were frustrated by circumstances beyond the person’s control.

    What deadlines does a nonprofit director face after a Letter 1153?

    The revenue officer will seek a Form 4180 interview with each potentially responsible person. If the officer recommends the penalty, Letter 1153 follows. Section 6672(b)(2) requires at least 60 days before notice and demand, and IRM 5.7.4.7 extends that to 75 days for a letter addressed outside the United States. A timely protest goes to the IRS Independent Office of Appeals.

    For Form 941 periods, § 6501(b)(2) treats an early return as filed April 15 of the next year, and § 6501(a) gives three years from then to assess. Under § 6672(b)(3), a Letter 1153 mailed in time keeps it open until the later of 90 days after mailing or 30 days after Appeals finishes. With no return filed, § 6501(c)(3) leaves it open.

    After assessment, § 6330(a) requires notice of a hearing right at least 30 days before levy, and the hearing must be requested within that 30-day period. Someone who already had the Letter 1153 protest opportunity generally cannot reargue liability there, under § 6330(c)(2)(B). The court route is a refund suit. Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960) normally requires full payment, but in Boynton v. United States, 566 F.2d 50 (9th Cir. 1977), involving a nonprofit’s staff, the court said a TFRP taxpayer “need only pay the divisible amount” tied to one employee’s withholding. You then file Form 843 and sue in district court or the Court of Federal Claims, the forums § 6672(c) names.

    How would this play out for a Colorado Springs youth nonprofit in 2026?

    Illustrative example (hypothetical facts). Owen’s organization paid about $444,000 of wages in the second and third quarters of 2025 and filed both Forms 941 without paying. The $96,000 owed splits into about $34,000 of employer Social Security and Medicare, $34,000 of employee share and $28,000 of withheld income tax. Under IRM 5.7.4.3 the TFRP equals the employee share plus withholding, roughly $62,000. Because both returns were filed before April 15, 2026, the IRS has until April 15, 2029 to assess.

    The revenue officer will interview the executive director, Owen, the board chair and the bookkeeper. A director who never sees bank records and learned of the gap from the exam letter fits § 6672(e), and the exception works because the executive director stays liable. Owen’s best argument is lack of knowledge, which goes to willfulness. His bigger risk is ahead of him: Muck requires a responsible person who learns of the delinquency to send unencumbered funds to the IRS before other creditors, so every vendor check he co-signs this November counts.

    If the organization can raise cash, paperwork matters. Policy Statement 5-14 applies an undesignated payment to the employer’s share first; a written designation to the trust fund portion shrinks what any individual can be charged. The same statement says that, absent statute concerns, assertion recommendations are normally withheld while a business installment agreement is current. An earlier post covers the contractor version of this trust fund problem.

    Do Colorado’s nonprofit liability shields or a bankruptcy filing protect a director?

    Not against the IRS. C.R.S. § 13-21-115.7 gives uncompensated 501(c)(3) directors civil immunity absent willful and wanton conduct, and C.R.S. § 7-128-402 lets the articles limit damages owed to the corporation or its members. None stops a federal § 6672 assessment. Colorado treats withheld state income tax as held in trust under C.R.S. § 39-22-604(7), and C.R.S. § 39-21-116.5 adds a 150 percent penalty on corporate officers who willfully fail to pay over taxes they must collect. Unemployment premiums are an employer cost, not withheld from wages (C.R.S. § 8-76-101), so they raise no trust fund issue.

    Bankruptcy helps less than people expect. The TFRP is a priority tax under 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(C), so § 523(a)(1)(A) keeps it alive after a director’s own Chapter 7 discharge. The organization’s Chapter 11 does not shield him, though United States v. Energy Resources Co., 495 U.S. 545 (1990) lets the court direct plan payments to trust fund taxes first when the plan’s success requires it.

    Person Responsible person and § 6672(e) What the Form 4180 interview probes Likely exposure
    Honorary volunteer director Usually not responsible; exception available if unpaid, outside finances and unaware Board role, access to bank records, when the gap became known Low
    Volunteer treasurer who co-signs checks Likely responsible under Muck and Taylor; exception rarely fits Signature authority, which bills got paid, knowledge of missed deposits High if willful
    Executive director Responsible; paid staff, so no exception Who chose wages over deposits Highest
    Outside bookkeeper Usually not, if paying bills as directed (IRM 5.7.3.4.1.2) Whether he or she picked which creditors got paid Low to moderate

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Can the IRS go after a Colorado nonprofit’s board members for unpaid payroll taxes?

    Yes, for the withheld trust fund portion, if a member was responsible and acted willfully. Unpaid volunteers serving in a purely honorary role without knowledge are protected by section 6672(e).

    Does a nonprofit’s IRS audit cover payroll taxes?

    It can. The IRS manual treats employment tax as an integral part of an exempt organization exam, and examiners check whether Forms 941 were filed and paid.

    How long do I have to appeal a proposed trust fund recovery penalty?

    Letter 1153 gives 60 days, or 75 days if addressed outside the United States. A timely protest goes to the IRS Independent Office of Appeals.

    Is a board treasurer who signs checks a responsible person?

    Often. Check-signing alone is not decisive under IRM 5.7.3.4.1.1, but the Tenth Circuit counts authority whether or not it is used.

    Can I discharge a trust fund recovery penalty in bankruptcy?

    Not in Chapter 7. It is a priority tax under section 507(a)(8)(C), and section 523(a)(1)(A) excepts it from discharge.

    Does Colorado’s volunteer immunity statute stop the IRS penalty?

    No. C.R.S. 13-21-115.7 addresses state civil liability and does not bar a federal tax assessment.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm represents Colorado nonprofit directors and organizations in IRS audit defense, trust fund penalty appeals and CDP hearings, and installment agreements for unpaid payroll taxes. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    What a board member says in the Form 4180 interview, and signs after the exam letter arrives, can decide the case. If your organization has an IRS exam letter and payroll deposits are behind, contact North Star Law Firm.


  • Lapsed UCC-1 in a Colorado Bankruptcy: Does the Lender Become Unsecured After In re Short?

    Lapsed UCC-1 in a Colorado Bankruptcy: Does the Lender Become Unsecured After In re Short?

    Priya runs an outdoor-gear rental and repair LLC in Durango. In February 2021 an equipment lender filed a UCC-1 with the Colorado Secretary of State covering all of the company’s equipment and inventory. After a bad season the LLC filed Chapter 7 in Denver in November 2025. The filing hit its five-year mark in February 2026 with no continuation statement, and the trustee is selling about $180,000 of rafts, bikes and shop tools. The lender says $140,000 of that is its money.

    Another creditor’s lawyer told Priya the lapse “wipes out” the lien. My answer is less exciting. In Colorado, a lapse that happens after the petition rarely turns a secured lender into an unsecured one. The estate’s better arguments usually sit elsewhere in the file.

    Does a lapsed UCC financing statement make a lender unsecured in a Colorado bankruptcy?

    Under C.R.S. § 4-9-515(a), a filed financing statement is effective for five years. Subsection (c) says that on lapse the interest “becomes unperfected, unless the security interest is perfected otherwise,” and is “deemed never to have been perfected as against a purchaser of the collateral for value.” Colorado’s version is the uniform text, apart from a cross-reference to a transition rule for pre-1996 filings. Nothing in it pauses the clock for a bankruptcy.

    That is deliberate. Former C.R.S. § 4-9-403(2) kept a filing alive “until termination of the insolvency proceedings,” and revised Article 9 dropped the rule. But losing perfection is not losing the lien. An unperfected interest still binds the debtor and only loses priority contests. The real question is whether anyone in the case holds the kind of claim that wins one.

    What did In re Short decide, and does it bind a Colorado bankruptcy judge?

    In Thomson v. Short (In re Short), Bankr. No. 19-29471, Adv. No. 22-02004 (Bankr. D. Utah May 9, 2025), a father’s UCC-1 against his son’s personal property lapsed in October 2020, about ten months into the son’s Chapter 7. Judge Kevin R. Anderson held that the interest was perfected on the petition date, “and that status controls.” He allowed $24,417.60 as secured; most of the $182,300 claim failed for unrelated reasons.

    Some summaries say Utah’s UCC contains a bankruptcy carve-out. The opinion does not rest on one. Utah Code § 70A-9a-515 is uniform text, like Colorado’s, and the court relied on Official Comment 4 to section 9-515: if the debtor files before lapse, the lapse rules “would be of no effect to the extent that federal bankruptcy law dictates a contrary result.” Because Colorado enacted the same section, the reasoning carries over.

    Utah shares the Tenth Circuit with Colorado, so Denver bankruptcy judges will see Short cited, but it binds no one here. As of October 30, 2026 I found no appeal and no District of Colorado decision citing it.

    Secured Creditor’s UCC Lapsed in Your Case? Contact Us Now

    Why can’t a Colorado Chapter 7 trustee use the section 544(a) strong-arm power against a post-petition lapse?

    11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) gives the trustee a judicial lien creditor’s rights “as of the commencement of the case.” C.R.S. § 4-9-102(a)(52)(C) agrees that a trustee is a lien creditor “from the date of the filing of the petition,” and under § 4-9-317(a)(2) a lien creditor wins only if it arrives before perfection. Priya’s lender was perfected on the petition date. The trustee arrived second.

    The “deemed never perfected” sentence protects only a purchaser for value, and C.R.S. § 4-1-201(b)(29) limits a purchase to a voluntary transaction. A judicial lien is not one. The official comment confirms the retroactive language “does not apply with respect to lien creditors.”

    A lapse before the petition comes out the other way: the lender was unperfected when the trustee became a lien creditor, and the trustee wins. A buyer at the trustee’s sale is a purchaser for value, but in my reading that changes little, because a sale under § 363(f) normally moves the lien to the proceeds.

    Has the Tenth Circuit decided what happens when a UCC-1 lapses during a bankruptcy?

    No. The nearest case is Clark v. Valley Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n (In re Reliance Equities, Inc.), 966 F.2d 1338 (10th Cir. 1992), where a lender’s brief automatic perfection under the Colorado UCC expired after the Chapter 7 petition. The court would not freeze its status at filing, citing the risk of secret liens. A UCC-1 anyone could find on the petition date raises no such risk, which is how Short distinguished it.

    In re Chaseley’s Foods, Inc., 726 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1983) kept an SBA lien superior to the trustee after a lapse four months post-petition, under an Indiana statute that, like Colorado’s today, was silent about bankruptcy. In re Bond Enterprises, Inc., 54 B.R. 366 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1985) did the same. In re Hilyard Drilling Co., 840 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1988) is a pre-petition lapse case; the filing ran out nine months before the petition. The contrary voice, In re 800 Bourbon Street, LLC, 541 B.R. 616 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2015), rejected the freeze for a Louisiana mortgage but still paid that creditor.

    I expect a Colorado bankruptcy judge to follow the majority. The lender also had a cheap fix. Since 1994, § 362(b)(3) has exempted from the stay acts “to maintain or continue the perfection of” an interest, working with § 546(b)(1)(B), and John Deere Co. v. Alamosa National Bank, 786 P.2d 505 (Colo. App. 1989) had already upheld a mid-case continuation.

    How does a Colorado trustee challenge the lender’s lien, and who has standing?

    A lender claiming secured status must attach evidence of perfection under Bankruptcy Rule 3001(d). The trustee objects under Rule 3007, served at least 30 days before the hearing and stated with the particularity D. Colo. L.B.R. 3007-1 requires. A fight over “the validity, priority, or extent of a lien” is listed in Rule 7001(b) (restyled December 1, 2024), so it needs an adversary proceeding. If the lien falls, § 506(a) makes the claim unsecured and § 506(d) voids the lien.

    Priya’s LLC will not bring that case. In Chapter 7 the avoidance powers belong to the trustee, one reason a Colorado Chapter 7 case can stay open longer than owners expect. An individual debtor can sometimes use § 522(f) or (h), but both depend on exemptions an LLC lacks. A Chapter 11 debtor in possession holds trustee powers under § 1107(a), and a Subchapter V debtor under § 1184. When ordering a Secretary of State search, ask for lapsed records; otherwise the report omits them (C.R.S. § 4-9-523(c)), and the office need keep them only one year after lapse (§ 4-9-522(a)).

    How would the numbers work for a Durango gear-rental LLC?

    Illustrative dates: UCC-1 filed February 10, 2021; petition November 14, 2025; lapse after February 10, 2026; trustee’s sale in March 2026 for $180,000. The continuation window under C.R.S. § 4-9-515(d) ran from August 10, 2025 to February 10, 2026, so the lender had three post-petition months to file a UCC-3 without asking the court. It did not. Under Short‘s reasoning it was still perfected on November 14, 2025, takes its $140,000, and leaves $40,000 for the estate.

    The estate’s real chances are at the front of the file. Attachment under C.R.S. § 4-9-203(b) needs value, rights in the collateral and a signed security agreement describing it, and § 4-9-108(c) rejects “all the debtor’s assets” as a description. A UCC-1 using a name other than the one on the LLC’s articles fails § 4-9-503(a)(1) unless a correct-name search using standard search logic still finds it (§ 4-9-506(c)). And a UCC-1 filed on an older loan within 90 days of the petition, or one year for an insider, counts as a transfer on the filing date under § 547(e)(2)(B), open to attack under § 547(b)(4). Priya’s 2021 filing is safe there.

    If Priya personally guaranteed the loan, a lender paid from the sale chases her for less, so an estate win can leave her guaranty larger.

    Scenario Lender against the trustee Estate’s best argument Likely Colorado result
    Perfected and continued before the petition Perfected Attachment, description or name defects Lender secured unless a defect appears
    Perfected at petition, lapsed during case, no continuation Perfected as of commencement Statute has no tolling clause; 800 Bourbon Lender likely stays secured
    Continuation filed during case Perfected Little; § 362(b)(3) permits it Lender secured
    Lapsed before the petition Unperfected § 544(a)(1); § 4-9-317(a)(2) Trustee wins
    UCC-1 filed within 90 days (one year for insider) on older debt Perfected by a late transfer Preference, § 547(b) and (e) Trustee often wins
    Wrong debtor name on the UCC-1 Unperfected if seriously misleading § 4-9-506(b) Turns on the correct-name search

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Does a UCC-1 that lapses during my Colorado bankruptcy make the lender unsecured?

    Usually not. Most courts that have ruled, including the Utah bankruptcy court in In re Short, measure perfection on the petition date. The Tenth Circuit has not decided the question.

    Can a lender file a UCC continuation statement after my company files bankruptcy?

    Yes. Section 362(b)(3) lets it file without stay relief, but only inside the six-month window before the five-year date. Once the filing has lapsed, a continuation is too late.

    Can my LLC object to the lender’s secured claim in Chapter 7?

    Generally the Chapter 7 trustee controls lien challenges for the estate. A Chapter 11 or Subchapter V debtor in possession holds a trustee’s powers and can bring the challenge itself.

    What if the lender’s UCC-1 lapsed before we filed?

    Then the lender was unperfected on the petition date. The trustee, as a lien creditor under section 544(a)(1), takes priority, and the lender is likely left with an unsecured claim.

    Does the Colorado Secretary of State search show lapsed filings?

    Only if the search request asks for them. The office must keep a lapsed record for at least a year, so order the search early.

    How North Star Law Firm Can Help

    North Star Law Firm represents Colorado business owners and creditors in Chapter 7 cases, Chapter 11 reorganizations and preference and lien disputes. Phillip Zagotti, JD/CPA, is admitted to the U.S. Tax Court and to the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Phillip Zagotti is not licensed by the Colorado Supreme Court; for Colorado state-law questions the firm works alongside Colorado-licensed counsel.

    The security agreement and the Secretary of State search usually decide these fights before anyone argues about the freeze rule. If a lapsed UCC-1 has turned up in your bankruptcy case, contact North Star Law Firm.